Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket24-1869
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 24–1869
KEVIN BROWN, Individually and as Natural Parent and Next Friend
of G.B. and D.B.; CHRISTOPHER BLUNDON, Individually and as
Natural Parent and Next Friend of A.B. and Z.B.; THERESA BROWN,
Individually and as Natural Parent and Next Friend of G.B. and
D.B.; KIMBERLY PEICKER, Individually and as Natural Parent and
Next Friend of M.P. and A.P.; MARK PEICKER, Individually and as
Natural Parent and Next Friend of M.P. and A.P.; CORRIN WILSON,
Individually and as Natural Parent and Next Friend of K.H.,
L.H., and R.H.; BRIAN HARRIS, Individually and as Natural Parent
and Next Friend of K.H., L.H., and R.H.; OLEG GOLTSOV,
Individually and as Natural Parent and Next Friend of J.G.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
ADAM W. DYER; BRIAN MENDEZ, Individually and as Natural Parent
and Personal Representative for M.M.; BRENDA MORSE; JAMES
BOLLENGIER; JEAN DOWLING; AMY MENDEZ, Individually and as
Natural Parent and Personal Representative for M.M.; BEVERLY
VOLNER; JAMES VOLNER; DAWNA WORCESTER; RICHARD SLIDE,
Individually and as Natural Parent and Personal Representative
for C.S. and M.S.; ERIN SLIDE, Individually and as Natural
Parent and Personal Representative for C.S. and M.S.; JONATHAN
KILEY, Individually and as Natural Parent and Personal
Representative for A.K., K.K., E.K. 1, and E.K. 2; JENNIFER
KILEY; APRIL PROVENCHER; PHYLLIS PROVENCHER; RICHARD PROVENCHER;
DARLENE DEBLOIS; DARLENE E. DEBLOIS LIVING TRUST; DAVID TRUE;
BRIDGET HEARD,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SAINT-GOBAIN PERFORMANCE PLASTICS CORPORATION; GWENAEL BUSNEL,
Defendants, Appellants,
JOHN DOES 1–5,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Joseph N. Laplante, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Kayatta and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.
Mark S. Cheffo, with whom Bruce W. Felmly, Jeremy T. Walker,
McLane Middleton, PA, Douglas E. Fleming III, Bert L. Wolff, Paul
A. LaFata, and Dechert LLP were on brief, for appellants.
Stephanie A. Douglas, Susan M. McKeever, A. Lane Morrison,
and Bush Seyferth PLLC on brief for Product Liability Advisory
Council, Inc. and the National Association of Manufacturers as
amici curiae in support of appellants.
Kevin S. Hannon, with whom Singleton Schreiber, LLP, Morgan
A. Hollis, Gottesman & Hollis P.A., John A. Yanchunis, and Morgan
& Morgan were on brief, for appellees.
Robert S. Peck, Center for Constitutional Litigation, PC,
Lori Andrus, Jeffrey R. White, and American Association for Justice
on brief for the American Association for Justice as amicus curiae
in support of appellees.
November 17, 2026
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff property owners in
and around Merrimack, New Hampshire, allege that defendant
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation released airborne
toxic chemicals from its manufacturing facility in Merrimack and
that these chemicals then made their way into the municipal water
supply and private wells, invading plaintiffs' property and
contaminating their drinking water.1 Before the district court,
plaintiffs moved to certify a class comprised of property owners
who used the municipal water supply and property owners who used
private wells within a certain area around the Saint-Gobain
facility. The district court allowed the motion in part and denied
the motion in part, certifying a class under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3). In so doing, it found that Saint-Gobain's
liability on plaintiffs' negligence, negligent-failure-to-warn,
and trespass claims could be determined on a common basis and
"predominate[d] over the individualized inquiries pertaining to
damages." Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics,
No. 16-CV-242, 2023 WL 9023158, at *22 (D.N.H. Dec. 29, 2023).
Saint-Gobain timely sought permission to appeal, which we granted.
1 Plaintiffs also name as a defendant Gwenael Busnel, general
manager of the Saint-Gobain facility during the relevant time.
Because plaintiffs assert no claims solely against Busnel, we
generally refer to the defendants as "Saint-Gobain" throughout
this opinion.
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We now reverse in part and affirm in part. We reverse
certification with respect to plaintiffs' negligence and
negligent-failure-to-warn claims, and we affirm certification with
respect to plaintiffs' trespass claim.
I.
The facility at the heart of this case -- which we call
the "Merrimack Facility" or, simply, the "Facility" -- sits on the
left bank of the Merrimack River, in the northeast pocket of the
town of Merrimack, surrounded by the municipalities of Bedford,
Manchester, Londonderry, and Litchfield. Since the 1980s, the
Facility has manufactured chemical- and weather-resistant
fiberglass and films under the auspices of Saint-Gobain and its
predecessor-in-interest ChemFab Corporation.
During that time, the manufacturing processes at the
Facility have used poly- and perfluoalkyl substances (PFAS),
including perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA).2 PFAS are human-made
chemicals commonly used in the manufacture of many commercial
products. Studies suggest that exposure to PFAS, including PFOA,
may lead to adverse health effects for humans. PFOA is a
persistent chemical that does not break down and can accumulate
2 We follow the district court's lead and largely refer to
the substances at issue as PFOA. See Brown, 2023 WL 9023158, at
*2 n.3. The distinctions between PFAS generally, PFOA
specifically, and other subtypes of PFAS do not affect the
resolution of this appeal.
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both in the environment and in the human body. Particulate PFOA
used in manufacturing may be released into the air via stack
emissions, transported by wind, deposited onto the ground, and
then dissolved into groundwater, contaminating the drinking water
of nearby communities. That is precisely what plaintiffs allege
happened here.
On March 4, 2016, the New Hampshire Department of
Environmental Services (NHDES) issued a press release announcing
that Saint-Gobain had detected PFOA in water samples taken from
faucets at its Merrimack Facility. As a result, NHDES worked with
Saint-Gobain and the Merrimack Village District Water Works (the
"District Water Works") to investigate the presence of PFAS in
drinking water in Merrimack. The investigation focused on two
sources of water in the area: the District Water Works, which
supplies water to 25,000 customers in Merrimack; and private wells.
Ultimately, the investigation found PFOA contamination
exceeding regulatory standards in groundwater around the Merrimack
Facility. The level of PFOA varied at different wells, with
concentrations generally decreasing as distance from the Merrimack
Facility increased. Overall, within the District Water Works,
PFOA contamination varied from "non-detect" to 141 parts per
trillion ("ppt"); 45% of results showed contamination at 20 ppt or
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greater, with 4% of results at 70 ppt or greater.3 In private
wells, PFOA concentrations ranged from undetectable to 1600 ppt,
with 70% of results at 20 ppt or greater and 34% of results at 70
ppt or greater.
Concurrently with the NHDES investigation, Saint-Gobain
hired Barr Engineering Company "to evaluate and simulate transport
mechanisms of PFOA, released by historical air emissions at [the
Facility] that may have resulted in the presence of PFOA in soil
and groundwater in the vicinity of th[e] facility." To do so,
Barr calculated air emissions of PFOA from the Facility from 2004
to 2015, and used the data from 2004 to estimate PFOA emissions
from 1986 to 2003, a period for which data was not available. Barr
then used four separate models to simulate the four phases of
potential PFOA transport from the Facility to local groundwater.
First, Barr used the AERMOD Modeling System, the dispersion model
preferred by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to simulate
air dispersion and deposition on the ground, thereby "estimat[ing]
annual PFOA ground surface deposition at each model node." Second,
Barr used the Soil–Water Balance model to calculate groundwater
infiltration rates for PFOA deposited on the ground. Third, Barr
simulated the "leaching and retention of PFOA in the unsaturated
zone" using the MODFLOW-NWT and MT3D-USGS codes. Finally, Barr
3 New Hampshire sets its "Ambient Groundwater Quality
Standard" for PFOA at 70 ppt.
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used the MT3D-USGS code to simulate PFOA transport in groundwater
and the MODFLOW-NWT code to simulate groundwater flow. Barr then
compared these simulation results with measurements of PFOA in
soil and groundwater in the study area to determine whether those
measurements could be associated with the Merrimack Facility.
In a report released in June 2017 and updated in
September 2018 (the "Barr Report"), Barr concluded that "air
deposition of emitted PFOA from the [Merrimack F]acility may have
contributed to the observed PFOA in groundwater in portions of the
study area located in close proximity to the [Merrimack F]acility."
However, the Barr Report also noted "areas where air deposition
from the [Merrimack F]acility does not explain the presence or
reported concentration of PFAS," and posited "numerous other
likely sources of PFAS in the study area," which it did not
simulate for purposes of the report.
In 2018, under a consent decree in an action brought by
the State of New Hampshire, Saint-Gobain agreed to pay certain
remediation costs for select contaminated properties in Bedford,
Litchfield, Manchester, and Merrimack. The consent decree did not
contain any admission of wrongdoing or liability on Saint-Gobain's
part.
II.
Plaintiffs began this putative class action in New
Hampshire state court in May 2016. Saint-Gobain removed the action
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to federal court, and the case followed a labyrinthine path of
pretrial proceedings for the next several years. We summarize
here only the relevant details of the case as it now stands.
A.
Named plaintiffs are all occupants or owners of
residential property in or around Merrimack. They allege that
Saint-Gobain's airborne emissions of PFOA from the Merrimack
Facility intruded onto their property and contaminated their
household wells and water supplies. Asserting claims for trespass,
nuisance, negligence, and negligent failure to warn,4 plaintiffs
seek damages for the diminished value and marketability of their
property, the costs of remediation and mitigation, the loss of use
and enjoyment of their property, and annoyance, discomfort, and
inconvenience.5
In December 2020, plaintiffs filed the motion for class
certification that gives rise to this appeal. In it, plaintiffs
sought to represent a class of property owners pursuing "damages
4 For simplicity, we refer to plaintiffs' negligence and
negligent-failure-to-warn claims together as their "negligence-
based claims."
5 Plaintiffs also originally included a medical-monitoring
claim for the increased risk of illness resulting from exposure to
PFOA. On certification from the district court, the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire held that New Hampshire does not recognize a cause
of action or remedy for medical monitoring. Brown v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 300 A.3d 949, 950 (N.H. 2023). As a
result, the district court mooted plaintiffs' medical-monitoring
claims.
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for harm to their real property interests caused by the
contamination" from Saint-Gobain's PFOA emissions, to wit,
"economic losses for diminution in value and cost of replacement
water," as well as "non-economic claims for interference with
property rights." Plaintiffs defined the putative class as:
All persons who on or after March 4, 2016 own
or owned residential properties with private
wells in the Private Well Property Owners
Class Geographic Area or residential
properties in the Merrimack Village District
Water Works (MVDWW) Class Geographic Area
which are supplied household water by [the
District Water Works] . . . .
The Private Well Property Owners Class Geographic Area
includes:
In Bedford and Merrimack, the geographic area
west of the Merrimack River within three (3.0)
miles of the property boundary of the
Saint-Gobain Site; in Litchfield, the
Geographic area bounded by the Merrimack River
on the west, Cummings Drive on the South,
extended east to the Merrimack River and west
to the Londonderry Town line, and the
Londonderry Town line on the East and the City
of Manchester on the North and East . . . and
the geographic area in Manchester bounded by
Raymond Wieczorek Drive on the North . . . .
Although plaintiffs' pleading subdivided this class into
two "subclasses" -- property owners who used private wells and
property owners who used the District Water Works supply -- they
make no argument that either subclass might be certified even if
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the class as a whole is not. Like the parties and the district
court, we therefore train our attention on the class as a whole.
The parties litigated plaintiffs' class-certification
motion for three years, with each side submitting expert reports
to support its position. Because much of the parties' briefing on
appeal focuses on what those expert reports do and do not show, we
briefly summarize the relevant reports here.
Plaintiffs' expert David Sullivan, a meteorologist,
submitted two reports. His reports "evaluate[d] the air quality
and airborne deposition pathway for [PFAS] in relation to the class
geographic area and the observed PFAS contamination in
groundwater." Sullivan did not conduct any modeling of PFAS
deposition himself but rather relied on a site visit and existing
documentation and data, including the Barr Report's modeling, well
sampling results, and meteorological data. Based on this evidence,
Sullivan concluded that "dispersion and deposition of air
pollutants from the [Merrimack Facility] have occurred throughout
and beyond the boundaries of the class geographic area," and that
"[t]he methodology of the study of the dispersion and deposition
of pollutants from the [Facility] is common to the class geographic
area." In deposition testimony, Sullivan further opined that,
although previous investigations may not have detected PFOA in
some well samples, PFOA "has fallen on every property within the
class geographic area."
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Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Hyeong-Moo Shin was at the
relevant time an Assistant Professor in the Department of Earth
and Environmental Sciences at the University of Texas at Arlington.
Plaintiffs asked Dr. Shin to "examine whether the properties
defined in the lawsuit were contaminated with [PFOA] due to
releases from the [Merrimack Facility]." Dr. Shin concluded that
"[a]ir deposition of emitted PFAS from the [Merrimack Facility]
has contributed to the observed PFAS in groundwater in the class
area." Dr. Shin acknowledged that other sources may have
contributed to contamination within the class area but opined that
"[o]ther likely sources of PFAS listed in the Barr [Report] cannot
explain patterns of observed PFOA in groundwater in close proximity
to the [Merrimack Facility] and widespread contamination of PFOA
in the properties defined in the lawsuit."
Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Russell Detwiler, an Associate
Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
at the University of California, Irvine, "examine[d] the migration
of PFOA in soil and groundwater related to the [Merrimack]
Facility." Dr. Detwiler reviewed and re-ran several of the Barr
Report's models, calibrating the models to the measured results
from the District Water Works wells. His report suggests that the
Barr Report may have underpredicted the PFOA concentrations in
groundwater.
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Christopher Baggett, a licensed engineer from
engineering firm Wright-Pierce's Water Treatment Practice Group,
also provided plaintiffs with a report modeling "the transport of
PFOA through the [District Water Works]" over time. This report
"provide[d] reasonable estimates of contaminant levels at various
locations" in the District Water Works.
Finally, plaintiffs presented two reports on the
economic damages from PFOA contamination. The first -- prepared
by economists Jeffrey Carr, Robert Chase, and Nathan
Masse -- calculated the costs associated with switching from a
contaminated private well to the District Water Works, concluding
that "the present value sum of additional utility costs to
residential properties in the Towns of Litchfield, Bedford, and
Merrimack is approximately $2,626,494." Dr. Randall Bell, a real
estate economist and appraiser, calculated the overall diminution
in value of properties in the class area due to PFOA contamination,
finding that the total loss was not less than $577,935,862.
Saint-Gobain countered with several experts of its own.
Principally, Dr. Michael Mobile, a civil engineer, provided a pair
of reports rebutting the opinions of Sullivan, Dr. Shin, and
Dr. Detwiler. Dr. Mobile acknowledged that the Merrimack Facility
"is a source of PFOA measured in groundwater at certain locations
within the proposed Private Well Class Geographic Area." But
Dr. Mobile pointed out that plaintiffs' experts did not rule out
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other potential sources of PFOA and criticized their reliance on
the Barr Report, which he characterized as limited to "generally
assess[ing] the potential chemical transport pathway" of PFOA.
Dr. Sorab Panday and John A. Connor, engineers at GSI
Environmental Inc., also provided a pair of reports addressing
"the nature and extent of PFOA . . . within the water sources and
distribution systems for the water supply district and private
well users" and rebutting the modeling conducted by plaintiffs'
experts, including Dr. Detwiler and Baggett. The reports
concluded that "[g]iven the inevitable variability of PFOA . . .
levels in the water delivered to individual water users,
determination of their level or duration of exposure requires an
individual analysis and cannot be generalized across the [District
Water Works] service area, pressure zones, neighborhoods, or among
private well users." Further, according to these reports, "[t]he
actual water quality measurements that are available do not tell
us when PFOA arrived at the [District Water Works] wells, when the
concentrations peaked, or at what concentrations."
Finally, atmospheric scientist Lyle Chinkin also
reviewed the reports of Sullivan, Dr. Shin, and Dr. Detwiler.
Chinkin, like Dr. Mobile, criticized plaintiffs' experts' reliance
on the Barr Report, averring that the AERMOD model used to simulate
air dispersion and deposition on the ground "is not able to
accurately predict PFOA deposition at any specific location."
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Additionally, Chinkin identified another fabric coating facility
south of Merrimack, local landfills, and the Manchester Airport as
potential alternative sources of PFOA found in the class areas,
though he did not conduct any specific analyses tied to these
alternative sources. Overall, Chinkin opined that "[g]iven the
number of potential PFAS sources and the complexities of PFAS fate
and transport, a robust, property-by-property analysis is required
to reliably determine the sources contributing to PFAS
concentrations on any given property."
The district court deemed these reports largely
admissible, see Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,
No. 16-CV-242, 2023 WL 9016496, at *4–17 (D.N.H. Dec. 29, 2023),
and relied on its review of the reports in its certification
decision, see Brown, 2023 WL 9023158, at *5.
B.
In December 2023, the district court granted in part and
denied in part plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Brown,
2023 WL 9023158, at *22. The court's ruling had three relevant
parts.
First, as to plaintiffs' nuisance claim, the court
denied certification, concluding that claim "necessarily turn[ed]
on individual assessments of the harm experienced by each putative
class member, making class treatment of these issues
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unmanageable." Id. at *2. No party here challenges that
conclusion.
Second, the court certified "the class as to liability
issues under the trespass, negligence, and negligent failure to
warn claims." Id. at *1. According to the court, liability on
those claims was "predicated on predominantly common issues"
including "the defendants' actions in emitting toxic chemicals and
their subsequent efforts to investigate, mitigate, and warn the
potentially affected population of the emissions; the hazardous
nature of the chemicals emitted; and the geographical scope and
foreseeability of groundwater contamination." Id.
Third, as to damages on the three surviving claims, the
court concluded that "damages issues cannot be determined on a
class-wide basis." Id. at *2. As the court explained, damages
would "vary based on factors including the extent of contamination
attributable to Saint-Gobain in the groundwater sources for
individual property owners, each individual's duration of
residence at the relevant property, the effects and timing of
mitigation efforts, and specific inconveniences and discomfort
experienced by each class member." Id. These individualized
issues "preclud[ed] certification as to damages." Id. at *20.
Nevertheless, the court remained convinced that "several core
liability issues can be proven on a class-wide basis, and these
common issues predominate over the individualized inquiries
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pertaining to damages." Id. at *22. Accordingly, the court
decided to bifurcate trial proceedings: The first phase would
"focus on liability determinations" and "be managed as a class
action," while the second phase would address damages. Id. The
district court did not specify how it would manage the second
phase, stating only that "[f]urther discovery and findings from
the liability phase will inform the format of the damages phase."
Id.
Saint-Gobain timely petitioned us for permission to
appeal the district court's certification decision pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Saint-Gobain then moved in
the district court for a stay of proceedings pending our resolution
of the petition. The district court denied that motion.
Ultimately, we granted Saint-Gobain's petition, and this appeal
followed.
III.
We review the district court's class-certification
decision for abuse of discretion. In re Asacol Antitrust Litig.,
907 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2018). "Within this ambit, we review
pure issues of law de novo and 'fact-dominated' issues for clear
error." Id. (quoting In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp.
Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2008)).
To certify a class action, "the district court must
undertake a 'rigorous analysis'" to determine whether plaintiffs
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satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2015)
(quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013)). First,
plaintiffs must meet the four threshold prerequisites of
Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation. Id. Second, plaintiffs must show that the
proposed class falls into one of the three class types provided by
Rule 23(b). Comcast, 569 U.S. at 33 ("The party [seeking class
certification] must . . . satisfy through evidentiary proof at
least one of the provisions of Rule 23(b)."). Here, the district
court certified the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which allows
for class treatment where "questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members," and "a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."
These are referred to as Rule 23(b)(3)'s "predominance" and
"superiority" prongs, respectively.
IV.
A.
Saint-Gobain's initial critique of the district court's
certification order portrays the order as a sua sponte misuse of
Rule 23(c)(4). That Rule states: "When appropriate, an action
may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to
particular issues." According to Saint-Gobain, "[t]he district
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court erred by reading Rule 23(c)(4) to override Rule 23(b)(3)'s
predominance and superiority requirements" -- creating a
liability-only issue class where plaintiffs' claims as a whole
could not be certified.
Had the district court done this, it would raise a
question subject to significant debate: Where a party seeks class
certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) but is unable to satisfy
that provision's requirements with respect to an entire cause of
action, may a court nevertheless certify for class treatment only
the subset of issues relevant to that cause of action that do
satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)? Contrast Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The proper interpretation of
the interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a
cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance
requirement of (b)(3) and that (c)(4) is a housekeeping rule that
allows courts to sever the common issues for a class trial."),
with Jacks v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 118 F.4th 888, 898 (7th Cir.
2024) (holding that "a district court can certify an issue under
Rule 23(c)(4) so long as the resolution of that issue is driven
predominantly by common questions" and "certifying the proposed
issues would be the most practical and efficient way to resolve
the litigation"); see also Laura J. Hines, The Unruly Class Action,
82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 718, 725–29 (2014) (summarizing debate);
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Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, The Issue Class Revolution, 101
B.U. L. Rev. 133, 137–41 (2021) (same).
But the district court did no such thing. Rather, the
court found Rule 23(a)'s four prerequisites and Rule 23(b)(3)'s
predominance and superiority requirements satisfied as to the
three certified claims -- negligence, negligent failure to warn,
and trespass -- as a whole.6 Granted, in doing so, the court did
divide the elements of those claims into liability issues -- which
it found could be resolved class-wide -- and damages
issues -- which it found could not. Brown, 2023 WL 9023158, at
*16–19, *22. But the court then concluded that the "core liability
issues" "predominate[d] over the individualized inquiries
pertaining to damages." Id. at *22. The only time the court
explicitly invoked Rule 23(c)(4) was in response to Saint-Gobain's
stay motion, as the source of its "authority to bifurcate liability
and damages when certifying a class without an affirmative request
from a party to do so." In other words, the court found the three
certified claims satisfied Rule 23(a) and (b), then proposed to
use (c)(4) to treat on a common basis fewer than all the issues
6 Saint-Gobain does not argue that the district court erred
in analyzing the class-action criteria claim by claim, rather than
across the entire lawsuit, and we have previously used a claim-
by-claim approach. See Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323
F.3d 32, 38–43 (1st Cir. 2003).
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raised by those claims (i.e., those issues identified as common in
the court's (b)(3) analysis).7
In summary, Saint-Gobain's Rule 23(c)(4) argument rests
on a misreading of the district court's certification order. That
being so, we have no occasion now to decide whether the district
court could have used Rule 23(c)(4) to certify a part of a cause
of action without finding that the action as a whole satisfied one
of the Rule 23(b) alternatives.
B.
We turn our attention, then, to the more familiar issue
raised in class litigation: whether the district court acted
within its discretion in finding that the requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3) were satisfied. We start -- and end -- with
Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement.
"The predominance inquiry asks whether the common,
aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or
important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual
issues." Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016)
(citation modified). "[A] common question is one where the same
evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing
or the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof."
7 Rule 23(b)(3) itself plainly anticipates that some cases
may present both predominating common issues and non-predominating
individual issues, and (c)(4) makes clear that the court can
maintain those predominating common issues as a class action.
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Id. (citation modified). An individual question, in contrast, is
one for which "members of a proposed class will need to present
evidence that varies from member to member." Id. (citation
omitted).
Although predominance requires that common issues
dominate the adjudication of the action, "the need for some
individualized determinations at the liability and damages stage
does not defeat class certification." Nexium, 777 F.3d at 21; see
also Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 469
(2013) ("Rule 23(b)(3) . . . does not require a plaintiff seeking
class certification to prove that each element of her claim is
susceptible to classwide proof." (citation modified)).
Ultimately, "[t]he aim of the predominance inquiry is to test
whether any dissimilarity among the claims of class members can be
dealt with in a manner that is not 'inefficient or unfair.'"
Asacol, 907 F.3d at 51 (quoting Amgen, 568 U.S. at 469). As we
have explained:
Inefficiency can be pictured as a line of
thousands of class members waiting their turn
to offer testimony and evidence on individual
issues. Unfairness is equally well pictured
as an attempt to eliminate inefficiency by
presuming to do away with the rights a party
would customarily have to raise plausible
individual challenges on those issues.
Id. at 51–52.
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Here, the district court found that, as to plaintiffs'
negligence-based and trespass claims, common issues of liability
predominated over individualized issues of damages. Brown, 2023
WL 9023158, at *22. Saint-Gobain insists the district court erred
in this conclusion. In the end, we agree in part with
Saint-Gobain: The district court erred in its predominance
conclusion with respect to the negligence-based claims, but not
the trespass claim. We consider the two sets of claims separately.
1.
"Considering whether 'questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate' begins, of course, with the elements of
the underlying cause of action." Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809 (2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3)). Plaintiffs' negligence claim, arising under New
Hampshire law,8 requires plaintiffs to "establish that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty, and
that the breach proximately caused the claimed injury." Est. of
Joshua T. v. State, 840 A.2d 768, 771 (N.H. 2003). Plaintiffs'
negligent-failure-to-warn claim follows roughly the same contours,
with the caveat that the duty to warn arises "only so far as there
8 No party disputes that New Hampshire law governs
plaintiffs' state-law negligence, negligent-failure-to-warn, and
trespass claims. See Forbes v. BB&S Acquisition Corp., 22 F.4th
22, 25 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting that, in diversity suits, "we apply
state substantive law as that law has been applied by the state's
highest court" (citation modified)).
- 22 -
is reason to apprehend danger to those not instructed." Trombly
v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 146 A. 815, 815–16 (N.H. 1929) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, we can describe the liability elements
of plaintiffs' negligence–based claims as comprising duty, breach,
injury, and causation.
The district court found that both the existence of a
duty and Saint-Gobain's breach of that duty turned on common
questions susceptible to class-wide proof. Brown, 2023 WL 9023158,
at *17. We see no error in those findings. "In general, anyone
who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise
the care of a reasonable person to protect them against an
unreasonable risk of harm to them arising out of the act." Coan
v. N.H. Dep't of Env't Servs., 8 A.3d 109, 115 (N.H. 2010)
(citation modified). Thus, the existence of a duty depends on
"the likelihood and magnitude of the risk" created by a defendant's
conduct. Thibeault v. Campbell, 622 A.2d 212, 214 (N.H. 1993)
(citation omitted). Accordingly, evidence of duty and breach will
focus on Saint-Gobain's conduct, not the individual circumstances
of each class member. In other words, "the same evidence will
suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing" of duty and
breach, rendering both common questions. Tyson Foods, 577 U.S. at
453 (citation omitted).
More problematic is the need to prove the third element
of plaintiffs' negligence–based claims: injury. Plaintiffs
- 23 -
propose to prove injury by presenting expert testimony to prove
the geographic scope of Saint-Gobain's groundwater contamination
and then limiting the class to owners of property within the scope
of contamination. To this end, their experts produced a map
delineating the geographic scope of the contamination. Their
testimony, in brief, is that all properties within this area
experienced PFOA contamination from Saint-Gobain's Facility.
When called upon by the district court to explain how it
intends to refute this class-wide proof of contamination,
Saint-Gobain put forward the testimony of its experts challenging
the accuracy of the models and assumptions plaintiffs' experts
relied upon to prove the geographic scope of contamination.
Saint-Gobain also pointed to evidence of other sources of PFOA
contamination within the class area. None of its experts attempted
a property–by–property refutation of plaintiffs' claims.
The district court found that, as framed by the parties,
the geographic scope of the contamination was a common issue. If
the factfinder determines that plaintiffs' experts are correct,
all of their properties suffered at least some contamination. If
the factfinder rejects that evidence, all class members lose given
that plaintiffs offer no individual property-specific proof.
A favorable finding for plaintiffs on the scope of
contamination would therefore suffice to prove at least some
intrusion of Saint-Gobain's PFOA on all class members' properties.
- 24 -
But for the two negligence–based claims, that mere intrusion is
not enough to establish liability. Rather, plaintiffs must show
that the intrusion caused harm to that property. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 165 (1965) (providing that negligently causing
an object to enter another's land gives rise to liability "if, but
only if, . . . the presence of the thing . . . upon the land causes
harm to the land [or] to the possessor"). As the district court
observ