Full Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 6D2026-0149 Lower Tribunal No. 2021-CA-003430-O _____________________________ LITTLE ROBERT ROBERTSON, Appellant, v. ORANGE COUNTY, Appellee. _____________________________ Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Orange County. Heather Pinder Rodriguez, Judge. October 9, 2026 PRATT, J. Appellant has filed an appeal from an order granting summary judgment. However, the summary judgment order at issue in this appeal is neither an appealable final order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110 nor an appealable nonfinal order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130. See, e.g., Atrium Med. Corp. v. MSP Recovery Claims, Series, LLC, 367 So. 3d 573, 575 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“[I]t is well-established that an order which merely grants summary judgment, without more, is only appealable as a final order when no judicial labor remains to be done by the trial court.” (citation omitted)); Dixon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 609 So. 2d 71, 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“Clearly, [the order granting summary judgment at issue in this case] is not an appealable non-final order pursuant to Rule 9.130(a)(3) because it does not fit within any of the limited categories of appealable non-final orders set out there.”). See generally S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974) (“Generally, the test employed by the appellate court to determine finality of an order, judgment or decree is whether the order in question constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the cause, and nothing further remains to be done by the court to effectuate a termination of the cause as between the parties directly affected.”); Timmons v. Lake City Golf, LLC, 293 So. 3d 596, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“[A] judgment is final when it puts an end to judicial labor, with only execution and enforcement of the judgment remaining.” (citation omitted)); Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(f) (defining “order” as “[a] decision, order, judgment, decree, or rule of a lower tribunal”); Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3) (listing the types of nonfinal orders that are appealable). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as premature. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(l). DISMISSED. STARGEL and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur. Little Robert Robertson, Orlando, pro se. 2 Bobby G. Palmer, Jr. and Damon S. Starrett, of Hilyard, Bogan & Palmer, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED 3