Manglona v. Tenorio

Manglona v. Tenorio, 4 N.M.I. 322 (1996) Guadalupe P. Manglona, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Margarita R. Tenorio, Defendant/Appellant, Theodore R. Mitchell, Real Party in Interest. Appeal No. 94-045 Civil Action No. 93-1061 Order Denying Rehearing January 3, 1996 Subm itted on Briefs Septem ber 8, 1995 Counsel for real party in interest: Theodore R. M itchell (pro se) & Jeanne H. Rayphand, Saipan. Counsel for appellee: David A. W iseman, Saipan. BEFORE: VILLAGOM EZ and ATALIG, Justices, and CRUZ, Special Judge. PER CURIAM : The appellant/real party in interest, Theodore R. M itchell (“M itchell”), has filed a m otion for reconsideration 1 stating that “[i]f the trial court can do what it did here, then it can sanction lawyers, willy-nilly, for failing to meet a deadline, any deadline!” W e have reviewed our opinion and are not persuaded that this is what it says or what it means. The m otion for reconsideration addresses only the issue of whether the trial court had a substantive legal basis for awarding the appellee attorney’s fees and costs in relation to the bringing of the summ ary judgm ent m otion. Our discussion will be correspondingly lim ited. This case was comm enced as a sim ple collection action pertaining to an alleged $250,000 loan. The plaintiff/appellee, Guadalupe P. M anglona (“M anglona”), served the defendant, M argarita R. Tenorio (“Tenorio”), with a request for adm issions (“request”) pursuant to Com. R. Civ. P. 36. The statements sought to be admitted were sim ply that Tenorio received from M anglona a $250,000 loan, which had not been paid, and that a dem and for paym ent had been made. Tenorio had forty-five days in which either to adm it or deny the statem ents. After the forty-five days had passed and no response was filed, the statements were deemed admitted pursuant to Com . R. Civ. P. 36. As a result of the adm issions, all issues of fact were elim inated and M anglona became entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M anglona filed her motion for sum m ary judgm ent and served it on Tenorio. In response, Tenorio filed a late response to the request. She also filed an opposition to the motion for sum m ary judgm ent. Technically, the trial court could have granted the m otion for sum m ary judgm ent and declared that the $250,000 was due and owing to M anglona. That would have ended the case. However, because the am ount involved was substantial, and Tenorio had belatedly denied that there was a loan, the trial court, in the exercise of its equitable power, denied the m otion for summ ary judgment and granted Tenorio an extension of tim e in which 1 Com. R. App. P. 40 provides for a petition for re-hearing. W e will consider this motion for reconsideration as the same. to respond to the request. Although the trial court noted that “equity dictates that the Defendant’s m otion to am end the adm ission be granted,” it also found that M anglona was “injured to the extent that she incurred attorney’s fees and costs in bringing the sum m ary judgm ent motion.” 2 It then referred to its authority to “award reasonable expenses to com pensate a party who unsuccessfully seeks to secure adm issions due to untim ely response by [the] adm itting party.” 3 The authority to grant such an award is provided by Com . R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). 4 The trial court, without expressly saying so, analogized the motion for sum m ary judgm ent to a motion to com pel discovery under Com . R. Civ. P. 37(a). The court proceeded to award M anglona attorney’s fees and costs. The award had to have been m ade pursuant to Com . R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).5 Although Tenorio initially did not respond to any of the matters set out in the request, she did, subsequent to the motion for sum m ary judgm ent, m ake a response adm itting som e of the matters and denying others. Consequently, under Com . R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), Tenorio should bear M anglona’s additional cost of essentially com pelling, by filing the motion for sum m ary judgm ent, a response to the request. The trial court did not sanction M itchell, “willy-nilly,” for failing to meet a deadline. Instead, it awarded M anglona fees and costs for filing a motion which she would not have filed had Tenorio responded tim ely to the request. Nor is the award of fees and costs in the case “as illegitim ate as it is unprecedented,” as M itchell contends, citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 115 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1991). See Davis v. Noufal, 142 F.R.D. 258, 258 (D.D.C. 1992): Before the Court are defendants’ motion for sum m ary judgm ent and plaintiff’s motion to withdraw adm issions. On consideration of the entire record, the Court denies defendants’ m otion without prejudice and grants plaintiff’s motion. The Court awards defendants the costs of filing the motion for sum m ary judgm ent, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). The m otion for rehearing is hereby DENIED. 2 Manglona v. Tenorio, Civ. No. 93-1061 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1994) (Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Withdrawal of Admissions and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 7). 3 Id. 4 See Davis v. Noufal, 142 F.R.D. 258, 259 n.2 (D.D.C. 1992), for a suggestion that Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) may arguably be applicable to factual situations such as in this case. 5 Had the trial court found that Mitchell’s failure to respond to the request was willful, reckless or based on bad faith, it could have imposed a sanction pursuant to its inherent powers. See Sonoda v. Villagomez, 3 N.M.I. 535, 541 (1993). However, no such finding was made.