American Federation of Government Employees, Afl-Cio v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledOctober 3, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2026-2640
JudgeJudge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 26-2640 (CKK)
v.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(October 3, 2026)
Currently before the Court is Defendants’ [23] Motion to Stay Discovery. Defendants
ask the Court to stay all discovery deadlines unless the Court (1) denies Defendants’ [27] Motion
to Dismiss and (2) until Defendants complete their internal investigation. Upon consideration of
the parties’ submissions,1 the relevant legal authority, and the entire present record, the Court
DENIES the Defendants’ [23] Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
In this action, a union representing federal employees and two employees of the Bureau of
Prisons allege that the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) unlawfully
adopted a categorical policy of pausing adjudication of class complaints presented to the EEOC
by federal-sector employees. After the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a
1
The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents, including the attachments and exhibits thereto:
Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (“Def.’s Mot.”), Dkt. 23; Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to Stay Discovery
(“Pls.’ Opp’n.”), Dkt. No. 25; Defendants’ Reply in Support of their Motion (“Def.’s Reply”), Dkt. No. 26; and
Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (“Pls. Supp. Br”), Dkt. 28. In
an exercise of its discretion, the Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary to the resolution of the issues
pending before the Court. See LCvR 7(f).
stay to halt the application of this alleged policy, the Defendants represented to the Court that
administrative judges have now entered appropriate scheduling orders in each of the relevant
pending class cases. The Defendants further represented that the “EEOC agrees that the
processing of class complaints should not have been suspended.” Dkt. No. 18, at 8 (emphasis in
original).
Based on the parties’ submissions, the Court denied without prejudice the Plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the Plaintiffs had not made a sufficient
showing of an imminent risk of irreparable harm. See Order, Dkt. No. 21. However, the Court
found that “[a]lthough the Defendants have denied that the EEOC ever issued a directive to
suspend the processing of these cases . . . the Plaintiffs have presented a substantial body of
evidence that tends to support an inference that the lengthy delays in Pippen and other cases did
result from a coordinated policy.” Mem. Op. at 9, Dkt. No. 22. The Court further explained that
“[b]ecause ‘only the Defendants know the contours of the challenged actions’ underlying the
Plaintiffs’ APA claims, limited discovery is appropriate.” Id. at 10 (quoting All. for Retired
Americans v. Bessent, No. 25-cv-0313, 2025 WL 1114350, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2025) (CKK)
(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to
serve discovery requests by September 8, 2026, and ordered Defendants to serve responses and
any objections by September 18, 2026. Order at 1, Dkt. No. 21.
On September 8, 2026, Plaintiffs served discovery requests on Defendants. On September
16, 2026, Defendants filed their [23] Motion for Leave to File a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
and to Stay Discovery. The Court denied Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Rule 12(b)(1)
Motion to Dismiss as unnecessary and set a briefing schedule for the Motion to Stay. In the
interim, the Court ordered any discovery deadlines and obligations be held in abeyance. The
parties completed briefing on the Motion to Stay, and, on September 28, 2026, Defendants filed
their [27] Motion to Dismiss.
II. ANALYSIS
Currently before the Court is Defendants’ [23] Motion to Stay Discovery. The Defendants
argue that the Court should stay discovery “unless [1] the Court denies the EEOC’s Rule 12(b)(1)
motion and until [2] EEOC counsel complete their ongoing internal inquiry.” Def. Mot. at 5–6
(emphasis in original). In response, Plaintiffs argue that “limited discovery will aid the Court in
resolving Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs’ injuries are not sufficiently concrete, likely, or
imminent for Article III standing.” Pl.’s Supp. Br. at 5.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. In this case, Defendants have acknowledged that an
Administrative Judge ordered that “all case processing . . . must be paused” and stated that “[t]his
notification applies to all class cases in the federal sector.” Dkt. No. 18, at 2 (quoting Dkt. No. 13-
10). However, while Defendants later denied that the EEOC or its Chair ordered this pause, Dkt.
20-11, the record does not demonstrate why the Administrative Judge issued this order or believed
it applied to “all cases in the federal sector,” Dkt. 18, at 2.
Accordingly, limited discovery in this case will help the Court to “ascertain the contours
of the precise policy at issue,” which directly bears on Plaintiffs’ standing, given that the “scope
of the alleged policy . . . impacts the scope of the harm to plaintiffs.” AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Lab.,
349 F.R.D. 243, 248-253 (D.D.C. 2025) (JDB) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Such
limited discovery falls comfortably within this Circuit’s practice. As the Court noted when it first
ordered limited discovery in this case, when the parties dispute the existence of a government
policy in an Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) case, a court may allow “limited
discovery . . . to determine ‘whether the alleged policy in fact exists.’” Mem. Op. at 10, Dkt. 22
(quoting AFL, 349 F.R.D. at 248). This discovery “is not so much ‘fact-finding’ as it is ‘filling in
gaps . . . to determine what the agency actually did.’” AFL, 349 F.R.D. at 249 (quoting Marshall
Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
Furthermore, as Plaintiffs emphasize in their Supplemental Briefing, limited discovery in
APA cases where the existence of a policy is disputed can “serve[] the same narrow purpose that
the administrative record normally would—simply requiring the agency to disclose the ‘basis of
its action’ to ‘permit meaningful judicial review.’” Pl.’s Suppl. Br. at 3 (quoting Dep’t of Com. v.
New York, 588 U.S. 752, 780 (2019)). After all, Local Rule 7(n)(1) requires the government to
file a certified list of the contents of the administrative record “simultaneously with the filing of a
dispositive motion,” even though, as Plaintiffs explain, those motions often raise jurisdictional
arguments. See id. Where, as here, the government represents that “no administrative record
exists” because no policy exists, Dkt. 18-5 at 2, limited discovery can help serve a similar role in
assisting the Court’s jurisdictional analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall DENY the Defendant’s [23] Motion for a Stay
of Discovery. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: October 3, 2026
/s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge