In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question

IN THE Supreme Court OF THE Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands IN THE MATTER OF A CERTIFIED QUESTION PETITION FROM RALPH DLG. TORRES, GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, AND MARYLOU S. ADA, CHAIRPERSON OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Petitioners. Supreme Court No. 2018-SCC-0021-CQU OPINION Cite as: 2020 MP 2 Decided January 14, 2020 CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN A. MANGLOÑA ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERRY B. INOS  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 CASTRO, C.J.: ¶1 Governor of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Ralph DLG Torres (“Governor”) and Chairperson of the Board of Education Marylou S. Ada (“Board”) submit three certified questions.1 All questions relate to the provisions governing education financing for the Public School System (“PSS”) in Article XV, Section 1(e) of the Constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands (“NMI Constitution”), which guarantees the school system “an annual budget of not less than twenty-five percent of the general revenues of the Commonwealth.” We are asked to answer the following questions: 1. What sources of income must be included when determining PSS’s “guaranteed annual budget of not less than twenty-five percent of the general revenues of the Commonwealth through an annual appropriation”? In particular, what sources of income can be properly earmarked without depriving PSS of its constitutionally guaranteed budget? 2. Can the legislature properly suspend an earmark in an annual appropriations bill? If so, does the suspension transform the income source into “general revenue”? 3. In the case of supplemental budgets, is PSS entitled to 25% percent of each supplemental budget during the course of a fiscal year or is PSS entitled to 25% percent of the total “general revenues” generated annually? Pet. 4. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that (1) PSS is constitutionally entitled to general revenues, not special revenues; (2) the legislature may suspend an earmark in an appropriations bill, transforming those revenues into general revenues, in which PSS is entitled to a percentage; and (3) PSS is constitutionally entitled to a portion of supplemental budgets when there is a revenue surplus; when there is a revenue shortfall, the legislature may proportionately reduce PSS’s budget as long as its twenty-five percent share is maintained. ¶2 The first certified question hinges on what general revenues in Article XV, Section 1(e) of the NMI Constitution (“Section 1(e)”) encompasses. Balancing the ordinary understanding of relevant terms with the drafters’ intent to constitutionally guarantee PSS funding, we render two findings. First, general and special revenue fall under the broader category of revenue, thereby precluding general revenue from meaning all revenue. Second, special revenue includes those revenues generated for a particular purpose which is related to the 1 The Court sua sponte amends the caption to accurately reflect the procedural posture in this matter. Petitions for certified questions brought by Commonwealth officials are jointly filed by the parties and do not always originate in an adversarial proceeding such as in federal court. See NMI SUP. CT. R. 13, 14(b)(2). Henceforth, where a Petition does not originate from an adversarial proceeding, we will fashion the caption as reflected in this decision.  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 revenue’s source. All revenues not designated as special under this standard are general revenues, in which PSS is entitled twenty-five percent. As to the second certified question, the Board and the Governor agree that the legislature may suspend an earmark and transform those revenues into general revenue. Finally, when the CNMI government passes supplemental budgets in the event of a revenue surplus, PSS is constitutionally entitled to supplemental revenues commensurate with its twenty-five percent share of total general revenues. When there is a revenue shortfall, the legislature may proportionately reduce PSS’s budget so long as the constitutionally mandated twenty-five percent share is preserved. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3 Although the NMI Constitution has always included provisions on education, particular aspects of education financing were not adopted until ten years after the Constitution’s original ratification. Briefly summarizing the history and development of the provision at issue today, we begin with the genesis of Article XV of the NMI Constitution. ¶4 The framers of the original 1978 NMI Constitution confronted a number of choices on fashioning provisions on education. These choices are expressed in the Briefing Papers, which drew upon a wide variety of materials such as other state constitutions and records, political science research, judicial decisions, statutes, and the legislative history of the Covenant. See Briefing Paper No. 1 at 30–31 (Oct. 8, 1976). The Briefing Papers were thus a series of extensive discussions on matters considered in drafting the NMI Constitution. Briefing Paper No. 13, in particular, addressed whether to include an article on education in the constitution, discussing education financing while remaining cognizant of the resources in and limitations of the Commonwealth. Briefing Paper No. 1 at 52 (Oct. 8, 1976). On the topic of education financing, Briefing Paper No. 13 noted the dissimilarities among state constitutions. Some constitutions provided for permanent school funds. Briefing Paper No. 13 at 25 (Oct. 8, 1976). Other constitutions “address the funds composition, investment of and interest on the fund, [and] school taxes. . . .” Id. Still, other jurisdictions omitted any provision on education and finance, “leav[ing] the matter to legislative determination.” Id. at 26. Critically, Briefing Paper No. 13 also discussed the option of “a constitutional mandate that the educational system be funded out of general revenues. This approach has the advantage of allowing school finance to respond to the current fiscal status of the Commonwealth, which is probably the most efficient method of funding governmental functions.” Id. (emphasis added). It included no other discussions on general revenues. ¶5 The framers ultimately elected not to provide any provisions on education financing. In fact, the Committee on Finance, Local Government and Other Matters recommended that no language concerning education financing “either of a permissive or restrictive nature in a separate article” be included. Committee Recommendation No. 2 at 283: Education, Committee on Governmental Institutions (Oct. 22, 1976). “Each raises very difficult and often controversial  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 matters.” Id. Leaving these matters to the legislature, the Committee felt it necessary to “preserve needed flexibility with regard to the educational policy . . . .” Id. Consequently, Article XV was included in the 1978 NMI Constitution, which only contained provisions guaranteeing the right to free public elementary and secondary education, and the right to higher adult education, in the Commonwealth. See NMI CONST. art. XV, §§ 1(a)–(b). ¶6 Ten years after its original adoption, the NMI Constitution was amended to include a provision specifically on education financing. Members of the Second Constitutional Convention submitted Amendment No. 38, which provided in relevant part: The public elementary and secondary education system shall be guaranteed an annual budget of not less than fifteen percent of the general revenues of the Commonwealth through an annual appropriation. The budgetary appropriation may not be reprogrammed for other purposes, and any unencumbered fund balance at the end of a fiscal year shall be available by reappropriation. NMI CONST. art. XV, § 1(e) (prior to 2014 amendment). The stated intent of this provision was to “guarantee[] a minimum budget to the elementary and secondary school system and to the college in order to ensure that sufficient resources are dedicated to the educational needs of our people.” Committee Report No. 64 at 1, Committee on Governmental Institutions (July 17, 1985). The Convention adopted the amendment in its entirety. Thus, not only did the members of the Second Constitutional Convention amend the NMI Constitution to include a provision on education financing, they also constitutionally guaranteed a percentage of general revenues of the Commonwealth.2 ¶7 This guaranteed percentage would later increase by ten percent in 2014, when House Legislative Initiative 18-12 was approved by the people of the CNMI. This initiative proposed to increase the constitutionally guaranteed fifteen percent of general revenues to twenty-five percent of general revenues. It contained the following findings: 2 In 1995, the CNMI held the Third Constitutional Convention. At this time, members of the Convention suggested to remove Section 1(e) in its entirety. In particular, Judiciary Committee Report No. 5 stated that the Committee: does not believe that earmarking has produced a higher quality of education over the past 10 years. The school system should have to justify its budget to the legislature just like any other agency. There are competing interests such as the health care system . . . . Earmarking revenues introduces an inflexibility into the system that may prevent the legislature from making the best choices in the interest of all the people. Committee Report No. 5 at 15, Committee on Judiciary and Other Elected Offices (July 18, 1995). Despite this, no changes were made to Section 1(e).  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 The Legislature finds that the guaranteed funding level of fifteen percent for the Public School System was established in 1985. The level of funding public education in other jurisdictions of the United States is closer to twenty-five percent of their annual budget. Increasing the guaranteed portion of the annual budget to twenty-five percent is reasonable and necessary to address the importance of education in the Commonwealth. HLI 18-12, § 1 (2014). The initiative garnered enough support from the voters of the CNMI to ratify the amendment, thereby increasing PSS’s guaranteed percentage of general revenues from fifteen percent to twenty-five percent.3 ¶8 No changes to Section 1(e) have since been made. The petitioners now invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to define the contours of Article XV, Section 1(e) of the NMI Constitution. II. JURISDICTION ¶9 We have original jurisdiction over disputes arising between elected or appointed Commonwealth officials regarding the exercise of their responsibilities or powers under the NMI Constitution. NMI CONST. art. IV, § 11. Here, the Governor is an elected Commonwealth official with the duty to act on budget and appropriations bills approved by the legislature. NMI CONST. art. III, § 9(a). The Chairperson of the Board of Education is an elected Commonwealth official pursuant to Article XV, Section 1(c) of the NMI Constitution charged with “formulat[ing] policy and exercis[ing] control over the public school system through the superintendent.” NMI CONST. art. XV, § 1(b). The issues concerning education financing squarely concern the petitioners’ exercise of their responsibilities. We thus have jurisdiction and answer the certified questions. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 10 We review certified questions de novo. In re Status of Certain Tenth Legislature Bills, 1998 MP 3 ¶ 1. IV. DISCUSSION ¶ 11 It is undisputed that the relative share (in terms of percentage) is clearly specified in the text, by use of the phrase “not less than twenty-five percent.” NMI CONST. art. XV, § 1(e). What is left somewhat ambiguous in the text, however, is the object of that percentage—i.e., to what quantity that percentage is relative to. The first and second certified questions address two pivotal issues in calculating that quantity: (1) how to determine what “the general revenues of the Commonwealth” encompasses; and (2) what actions can add to, or take away 3 See Dennis B. Chan, BOE, PSS Plan for Implementation of HLI 18-12, SAIPAN TRIBUNE, (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/boe-pss-plan- implementation-hli-18-12/ (stating HLI 18-12 garnered 7,826 “yes” votes and 3,958 “no” votes in polls).  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 from, what it encompasses? The third question, meanwhile, asks when is PSS entitled to receive its full share of guaranteed funds? A. Revenues ¶ 12 The petitioners present diametrically opposed arguments. The Board proposes a broad and expansive definition of “general revenue” such that PSS is guaranteed twenty-five percent of all revenue.4 Although acknowledging the sparse drafting history on defining the contours of “general revenue,” the Board suggests historical records and practices support its interpretation. The Governor argues the Board’s interpretation of general revenue is unsubstantiated and not based on any legal authority or authenticated documents. He submits a broad and expansive definition of “special revenue” such that the legislature may effectively categorize any revenue as special as long as there is some articulated purpose for it. Asserting the terms’ plain meaning, he proffers the following definition of special revenue: “(1) income from a specific constitutionally or statutorily identified source, (2) deposited into an account kept separate from the General Fund, and (3) used for a particular constitutionally or statutorily defined purpose.” Opening Br. 5. Critically, according to the Governor, the “particular constitutionally or statutorily defined purpose” need not be related to the revenue’s source. Id. Thus, any revenue—including general revenue—may be appropriated as special revenue by articulating any purpose. To properly delineate and understand the interplay between these concepts, we marshal the canons of constitutional construction, beginning with the plain meaning doctrine. ¶ 13 We have consistently interpreted constitutional provisions according to their plain, ordinary meaning. See Peter-Palican v. Commonwealth, 2012 MP 7 ¶ 6; Camacho v. NMI Retirement Fund, 1 NMI 362, 368 (1990) (“A basic principle of construction is that language must be given its plain meaning.”). We do this “unless there is evidence that a contrary meaning was intended,” Camacho, 1 NMI 362 at 368, or if the interpretation “def[ies] common sense or 4 The Board has shifted positions at various points. Initially, the Board’s position in the Petition for Certified Question was that “the term ‘general revenues’ does not include certain earmarks, specifically revenue streams generated from specific taxes or fees that are deposited into special accounts and appropriated for particular purposes . . . .” Pet. 2. In its Opening Brief, the Board stated that its position was “that the ‘general revenues of the Commonwealth’ should be defined as all the identified budgetary resources of a given fiscal year.” Opening Br. 14. That is, no earmarks could escape PSS’s guarantee. It reiterated this position in its Reply Brief. Reply. Br. 8. At oral argument, it stated that self-supporting fees of government agencies like the Law Revision Commission’s publication income are exempted from PSS’s guarantee but earmarked taxes are not. In deciding whether to answer a certified question, the Court’s determination is based on the representations made in the Petition for Certified Question. NMI CONST. art. IV, § 11 (“[P]arties to the dispute may certify to the supreme court the legal questions raised, setting forth the stipulated facts upon which the dispute arises.”). We remind future litigants that misrepresentations inhibit the Court’s ability to render a proper determination in whether to accept or reject a certified question.  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 lead[s] to absurd results.” Peter-Palican, 2012 MP 7 ¶ 6 (internal citation omitted). Dictionaries may be consulted to ascertain a provision’s plain meaning. Commonwealth v. Inos, 2013 MP 14 ¶ 12; see, e.g., Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 ¶ 15 (using Black’s Law Dictionary in defining “independent”); Commonwealth v. Santos, 2017 MP 12 ¶ 9 (using Black’s Law Dictionary in defining common-law marriage); Commonwealth v. Quitano, 2014 MP 5 ¶ 31 (using Merriam Webster’s Dictionary in defining “premeditation”); Pangelinan v. NMI Retirement Fund, 2009 MP 12 ¶ 18 (using Merriam Webster’s Dictionary to define “elect”). In analyzing particular language, we must conform our interpretation with “the context of the entire provision at issue,” Peter-Palican, 2012 MP 7 ¶ 6 (internal quotation marks omitted), and “give effect to every word of a constitutional provision, if possible, to avoid rendering any portion of the provision superfluous.” Palacios v. Yumul, 2012 MP 12 ¶ 4; see Sablan v. Superior Court, 2 NMI 165, 186 n.21 (1991) (interpreting every provision of the Covenant as having meaning). Finally, “[n]o provision should be construed to nullify or impair another.” Commonwealth v. Lot No. 218-5 R/W, 2016 MP 17 ¶ 24 (internal citation omitted). ¶ 14 Historical sources are also used to interpret constitutional provisions. See Teregeyo v. San Nicolas, 2018 MP 17 ¶ 19 (“[H]istorical documents concerning the provisions of local government provide[] substantial insight supporting this proposition.”); Larson, 2018 MP 7 ¶ 15 (“Legislative history confirms our interpretation.”). Interpreting constitutional provisions may involve reliance on “committee recommendations, constitutional convention transcripts, and other relevant constitutional history.” Palacios, 2012 MP 12 ¶ 5. The Analysis is a memorandum summarizing the intent of the Constitutional Convention adopting the 1978 NMI Constitution and “is extremely persuasive authority when one is called upon to discern the intent of the framers.” Rayphand v. Tenorio, 2003 MP 12 ¶ 71. ¶ 15 We have also looked to other jurisdictions’ constitutional jurisprudence in construing provisions of the NMI Constitution. See, e.g., Torres v. Manibusan, 2018 MP 4 ¶ 23 (quoting Sec’y of Admin. & Fin. v. Att’y Gen., 326 N.E. 334, 339 (Mass. 1975)) (relying on Massachusetts Supreme Court precedent to note that attorney generals “cannot act arbitrarily and capriciously or scandalously.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Peter-Palican, 2012 MP 7 ¶ 13 (citing cases standing for the proposition that interpreting ambiguous constitutional provisions concerning public office terms require limiting the term to the shortest time); Dep’t of Pub. Lands v. Commonwealth of the N. Mariana Islands, 2010 MP 14 ¶ 15 (citing Preece v. Rampton, 492 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1972)) (referencing Utah Supreme Court case to posit that legislatures “cannot transfer the functions of [a government] entity to another governmental body absent a constitutional amendment.”). Similarly, we may look to how other jurisdictions have understood the relevant concepts in the case at bar. With these principles in mind, we turn to the text of Section 1(e).  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 i. General Revenues ¶ 16 We make two observations regarding general revenue. First, ordinary understandings of revenue and general revenue suggest no synonymity. Looking to the ordinary meaning of these terms, “revenue” unmodified is an all- encompassing term, which includes all collected monies. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1482 (4th ed. 1968) (defining revenue “[a]s applied to the income of a government, a broad and general term, including all public moneys which the state collects and receives, from whatever source and in whatever manner.” (emphasis added)); Black’s Law Dictionary 1185 (5th ed. 1979) (same); Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“income from any and all sources,” or “gross income.” (emphasis added)).5 However, when modified by the word “general,” the definition transforms. In particular, the definitions of revenue and revenue modified by general suggest that general revenue is a subcategory of revenue, and not intended to mean all revenue. See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (distinguishing general revenue from revenue in a special fund). The plain understanding of general revenue is not synonymous with that of revenue, and assertions that general revenue must mean all revenue run contrary to the plain meaning of these terms. ¶ 17 Second, general revenue’s definition implies the existence of another separate and distinct subcategory of revenue. See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining general revenue as “the income stream from which a state or municipality pays its obligations unless a law calls for payment from a special fund.” (emphasis added)). The lexicon of related terms, such as “general fund,” confirms the existence of these revenues, and, further, that these revenues are used for particular purposes. See Black’s Law Dictionary 615 (5th ed. 1979) (defining general fund as “[a]ssets and liabilities of a nonprofit entity not specifically earmarked for other purposes.” (emphasis added)).6 The plain and ordinary meaning of general revenue and general fund requires the existence of another subcategory of revenue, defined as having a particular purpose and understood as “special revenue.” Compare General, Merriam-Webster (2019) (defining general as “not confined by specialization or careful limitation”), with Special, Merriam-Webster (2019) (defining special as “designed for a particular purpose or occasion”). ¶ 18 The distinction between revenue, general revenue, and special revenue is documented in other jurisdictions. In State ex rel. Spink v. Kemp, 283 S.W.2d 5 Relevant editions of Black’s Law Dictionary include the Fourth Edition, in existence when the original NMI Constitution was ratified; the Fifth Edition, published in 1979 and prior to when the 1985 Second Constitutional Convention gathered; and the current Eleventh Edition, published in 2019. 6 Our review of the ordinary meanings of these terms reveals that general revenue and general fund are distinguishable. “Revenue” concerns the source or stream of monies, whereas “funds” refer to or describe where those monies are deposited. When read in conjunction with one another, however, the terms’ definitions illustrate the two observations we discuss.  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 502 (Mo. 1955), the Missouri Supreme Court addressed whether Kansas City could “devote funds otherwise constituting general revenue to special uses.” Id. at 507. As we do here, the Kemp court found that “revenue” meant all revenue, but “general revenue” was distinguishable in that it constituted “all current income of the city, however derived, which is subject to appropriation for general public uses, as distinguished from special uses.” Id. (emphasis added). Although the exact phrase “special revenue” was not used, the Kemp court distinguished general revenue from other revenues that were constitutionally or statutorily “devoted to special purposes or [to] be paid into a special fund.” Id. (emphasis added); Cf. Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency v. Branstad, 504 N.W.2d 888, 889 n.2 (Iowa 1993) (defining “special fund” as “any and all moneys appropriated by the legislature, or moneys collected by or for the state, or an agency thereof, pursuant to which no general fund appropriation is made by the state”). General revenue was found to be a wholly distinct subcategory of revenue, distinguishable from revenues used for particular purposes. ¶ 19 The ordinary understanding of revenue and general revenue, as illustrated by various definitions and Kemp, reveal that the two concepts are not analogous. Rather, the plain and ordinary meaning of general revenue suggests that it falls under the broader and all-inclusive category of revenue. Additionally, the existence of general revenue implies a second subcategory of revenue delineated for particular purposes, understood as “special revenue.” Contrary interpretations ignore the plain and ordinary understanding of these concepts. ¶ 20 We must be mindful of the ordinary meaning of the language in Section 1(e), particularly where the drafting history on particular constitutional provisions is sparse. PSS concedes that the aforementioned definitions are not erroneous. See Reply. Br. 4 (“[The Board] does not contend that Black’s Law Dictionary’s is wrong . . . .”). Rather, PSS argues that history stands in favor of its own interpretation that general revenue must mean all revenue: “the definitions offered do not comport with the Second Constitutional Convention’s understanding of the terms, the legislative interpretation for the preceding two decades, nor the intended functionality of this constitutional amendment.” Id. But, the drafting history is silent on what the drafters meant by general revenue, and the Board provides no authenticated documentation to find otherwise. Even Briefing Paper No. 13 provides limited guidance as to what may be gleaned from these terms and phrases. There is nothing to suggest a contrary interpretation of the phrase’s plain meaning and we may give effect to the ordinary understanding of revenue and general revenue. See Camacho, 1 NMI at 368 (“We will apply the plain, commonly understood meaning of constitutional language ‘unless there is evidence that a contrary meaning was intended.’” (quoting Pangelinan v. Commonwealth, 2 CR 1148, 1161 (Dist. Ct. App. Div. 1987))). We thus find that: (1) revenue encompasses all revenue; (2) general revenue is not synonymous with revenue, but is rather a subcategory of revenue; and (3) the ordinary understanding of general revenue implicate the existence of special revenue.  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 ¶ 21 Because general revenue is not synonymous with all revenue, we must determine what general revenue does encompass. To do this, we look to the more particularized category of special revenue. Although the drafting papers do not mention “special revenue,” as discussed above, our review of general revenue as a concept implies the existence of special revenue. Demarcating between general and special revenue will answer the core issue underlying petitioners’ questions: what monies must be part of general revenue, of which PSS is entitled to a guaranteed percentage? Or put differently, what may be appropriated as special revenue while ensuring PSS receives its constitutionally guaranteed share? Resolving these issues is a more difficult task, but it is this complexity which we set out to unravel next. ii. Special Revenues ¶ 22 Special revenues are revenues generated for a particular purpose. See Queen v. Moore, 340 S.E.2d 838, 839 (W. Va. 1986) (discussing legislation that restricts imposition of fees for specific purposes and maintains them “as ‘special revenue funds’ [that] do not become part of the general revenue of the state.” (emphasis added)) (citing W. VA. CODE § 12-2-2); In re County Collector, 774 N.E.2d 832, 835 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (discussing special revenue funds that “are used to account for revenues from specific taxes or other earmarked revenue sources which by law are designated to finance particular functions of government,” which require “separate accounting because of legal or regulatory provisions or administrative action.”) (emphasis added); Statement No. 54 of the Government Accounting Standards Board, No. 287-B at 13 (February 2009) (defining “special revenue funds” as funds “used to account for and report the proceeds of specific revenue sources that are restricted or committed to expenditure for specified purposes other than debt service or capital projects.”) (emphasis added). Clearly, “special revenue” connotes revenues generated for a particular purpose. We do not stop there, however, but discuss a more complicated issue: whether the revenue’s purpose must be related to the revenue’s source. ¶ 23 Courts have used a relationship or nexus test in the context of other government finance circumstances.7 California courts have created what is known as the special fund doctrine. The California Constitution requires balanced budgets and prohibits incurring debts without the approval of two-thirds of the voters. The special fund doctrine is “a judicially created exception to the voter approval requirement.” City of Bakersfield v. West Park Home Owners Ass’n & Friends, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 346, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). Where obligations are paid from a special fund, the constitutional debt limitation is not violated. In City of Bakersfield, the court explicitly held “there must be a reasonable connection or nexus between the special fund revenues and the project to be financed with those revenues.” Id. at 351 (emphasis added). At issue 7 We do not use City of Bakersfield to propose that the drafters intended to follow California; rather, we use City of Bakersfield to elucidate the existence of nexus tests concerning government finance in other jurisdictions.  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 was whether there was a reasonable nexus between taxes and fees collected by the City and the improvements sought to be made out of these revenues. Specifically, the City proposed to fund road improvement projects via gas tax revenues, transportation impact fees, and restricted utility franchise and surcharge fees.8 Because “[t]he Projects are improvements to the City’s streets and highways,” there was a reasonable nexus between the revenues and projects financed by those revenues. Id. at 353. ¶ 24 Similar sentiments have been expressed by other courts. For instance, certain revenues derived from special taxes are often designated for particular purposes and excluded from appropriation for a government’s more general fiscal obligations. See Building Industry Ass’n. of Bay Area v. City of San Ramon, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 320, 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (acknowledging as undisputed tax revenues “to be placed in a special fund, distinct from the City’s General Fund,” and that such revenues are to be used for specific purposes rather than “for all governmental purposes”). West Virginia’s state constitution had at one point a fund in which fees and taxes on motor vehicles and fuel were deposited and then appropriated for expressly related purposes, such as highway construction. See State ex rel. State Rd. Commission v. O’Brien, 82 S.E.2d 903, 908 (W. Va. 1954) (finding that revenue from motor vehicle or fuel taxes and fees will be used for the express purpose of “construction, reconstruction or improvement of public highways, and the payment of obligations incurred in the construction,” and “may not go into any other fund or be used for any other purpose” since they “do not constitute a part of the general revenues of the State”). Indeed, it is unsurprising that courts have also found that merely designating any purpose is insufficient to establish revenues as special. See Mich. Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Dep’t of Treasury, 255 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Mich. App. 1977) (“In our opinion a fund is not made ‘special’ merely by designating a purpose for which it may be expended.”). These determinations parallel the findings of City of Bakersfield, requiring the legislature to articulate a purpose related to the revenue’s source when establishing special revenues. 8 The court laid out the particular details of the fees: The gas tax revenues constitute all amounts received by the City related to the purchase of motor vehicle fuels, including amounts received under Streets and Highways Code sections 2103, 2105, 2106, and 2107. The transportation impact fees are fees paid to the City by developers to mitigate the regional traffic impacts of development projects. The restricted utility franchise and surcharge fees are a surcharge on the franchise fees imposed on Pacific Gas and Electric Company and Southern California Gas Company related to their use of the City's streets for transmitting and distributing electricity and gas. These funds are segregated from all other revenues and general funds and are not maintained from the City's general funds. City of Bakersfield, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 352.  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 ¶ 25 Requiring a nexus between a revenue’s source and purpose balances the NMI Constitution’s plain meaning with the very explicit guarantee of funding to PSS: “The public elementary and secondary education system shall be guaranteed an annual budget of not less than fifteen percent of the general revenues of the Commonwealth . . . .” NMI CONST. art. XV, § 1(e) (prior to 2014 amendment) (emphasis added). The drafters’ decision to amend the NMI Constitution by constitutionally guaranteeing funding for PSS—and the people’s decision to later increase that guaranteed funding—is especially telling. By mandating a guaranteed percentage of funding, the drafters sought financial stability for PSS. Even if actual general revenues fluctuated, the drafters envisioned that PSS would be guaranteed a degree of funding each year. Focusing our inquiry on the definition of general revenues in isolation, as the dissent does, would be misguided. In fact, the dissent’s approach contributes nothing to the guarantee explicitly laid out in the NMI Constitution. Rather, we must look at Section 1(e) in its totality, giving effect to every word in the constitutional provision. The explicit constitutional guarantee weighs as much in our considerations as the explicit use of “general revenues.” These considerations reveal that any revenue stream may not be rendered special merely by enunciating a purpose. Permitting this would render the constitutional guarantee vulnerable, transforming general revenue into special revenue without restraint. It would eviscerate the financial stability the drafters sought to accomplish for the school system. Thus, while the Governor and the Board’s interpretations are plausible, neither fully capture’s the drafters’ intent. We find that a required nexus between the revenue’s source and purpose accomplishes the need to ensure PSS receives its constitutionally guaranteed percentage. We now turn to developing that test. ¶ 26 Childree v. Hubbert, 524 So.2d 336 (Ala. 1988) provides some guidance on how attenuated the relationship may be. There, the Alabama Supreme Court set out to define what constituted “educational purposes” for appropriations made out of the Alabama Special Education Trust Fund (“ASETF”). The government sought a broad construction of “educational purposes,” noting that the ASETF could pay for the government’s “ordinary expenses.” See id. at 338–39. For instance, “it could be [argued] that highway construction is both an ordinary expense . . . and an expenditure for educational purposes because it allows transportation of children to school.” Id. at 341. The court disagreed and opined that “educational purposes” must be narrowly construed to avoid a meaningless construction of the phrase. So, while highway construction allows for the transportation of children to school, this interpretation was far too attenuated to qualify as an “educational purpose.” Id. It was so much so, in fact, that the interpretation would render the provision requiring ASETF monies to be used for educational purposes “meaningless.” Id. The Alabama Supreme Court determined that not only must there be a relationship, but that the relationship must not to be too attenuated. ¶ 27 We do not elaborate on how stringent the relationship between the revenue’s source and purpose must be to qualify it as special revenues such that  In the Matter of a Petition for Certified Question, 2020 MP 2 PSS is not entitled to it. Nor do we definitively determine what revenues may qualify as special and what revenues may qualify as general. Rather, this relationship must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis because the particulars of a revenue’s source and purpose turns on the unique circumstances of each fund. But, in an effort to avoid the very unrestraint in categorizing any revenue as special, we take this opportunity, by way of illustration, to suggest certain revenues that may or may not qualify as special. ¶ 28 A revenue likely qualifying as special revenue is revenue appropriated for the Tobacco Control Fund, a fund created in 2002 under Public Law 13-38. The Tobacco Control Fund contains revenues derived from the excise tax on tobacco products, codified in 4 CMC § 1402(a)(16). Specifically, “[t]here shall be established a separate fund to be known as the Tobacco Control Fund. There shall be credited to said fund 30% of the increase in the cigarette tax authorized under Section 2 of this Act . . . .” PL 13-38, § 3. Articulating significant public health concerns associated with using tobacco products, the legislature determined it to be “in the best interest of the CNMI to increase taxes on alcohol and tobacco products. This increase in revenue would be reserved for funding tobacco control programs.” PL 13-38, § 1. The monies collected from taxes on tobacco products would in turn be used to combat the disease-causing effects of such products. This is a revenue source restricted to expenditure for a specified purpose, related to the revenue source, and therefore likely qualifying as special revenue. ¶ 29 Monies collected by Department of Public Lands (“DPL”) may also constitute special revenue. In accordance with Article XI of the NMI Constitution, DPL was established to manage and administer the CNMI’s public lands. See 1 CMC § 2801. Under 1 CMC § 2803(c)(3), revenues received