Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00465-CV ___________________________ SABRINA WILLIAMS, Appellant V. DALLAS-FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARD, Appellee On Appeal from the 348th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 348-372791-25 Before Kerr, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Sabrina Williams worked for a Flying Saucer restaurant concession at Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport until she was allegedly constructively terminated. In this accelerated interlocutory appeal,1 Williams challenges an interlocutory order granting a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing with prejudice her claims against Appellee Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport Board, arguing in two issues that the trial court improperly granted the Board’s plea to dismiss her claim of retaliation under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), see Tex. Lab. Code § 21.055, and improperly denied her motion to compel discovery. We will affirm the dismissal in part and reverse in part and remand to allow Williams opportunity to replead that claim. I. BACKGROUND To the extent possible, we recite only those facts relevant to Williams’s employment claim as alleged against the Board. Although the underlying facts remained relatively constant, Williams’s presentation of them varied greatly among her pleadings and her responses to the Board’s jurisdictional plea. Except as otherwise noted, we take the factual allegations solely from “Plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition”—her live 1 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). Williams’s claims against co-defendant SSP America DFW LLC remain pending in the trial court. 2 pleading—and its two incorporated exhibits.2 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 65 (“[T]he instrument for which [a substituted instrument] is substituted shall no longer be regarded as part of the pleading in the record of the cause.”); FKM P’ship, Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Hou. Sys., 255 S.W.3d 619, 633 (Tex. 2008) (“Our rules provide that amended pleadings and their contents take the place of prior pleadings.”). A. Relevant Facts as Pleaded On June 17, 2025, Williams was working for SSP at its Flying Saucer restaurant concession in Terminal D of the airport. That day, another SSP employee allegedly “waved an airport-issued knife [at] arm’s-length at [Williams] while yelling aggressively, causing [her] reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact.” Officer Niblett3 responded to a call about the alleged assault and spoke to Williams and to the SSP employee, Carolyn “Susie” Grider. Officer Niblett referred to Grider as “Miss Susie who’s been here a long time,” and credited SSP manager Leslie Bergman’s narrative that Grider “was ‘cutting sandwiches’ when [Williams] ‘burst in,’ portraying 2 Although this petition contains no attachments, it refers to two exhibits and includes a blanket statement that “[a]ll exhibits are incorporated by reference.” We will treat the two expressly mentioned exhibits—“Exhibit O,” a report Williams filed on an internal SSP ethics portal, and “Exhibit P,” an IRS form generated by SSP—as incorporated into her live pleading by reference. Officer Niblett—whose first name is not in the record—appears to be employed 3 by the Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport Department of Public Safety, although Williams does not so specify in her live pleading. 3 [Williams] as the aggressor” over Williams’s version of events. Grider denied wrongdoing, and Officer Niblett closed the investigation. That day, Williams filed a report through SSP’s ethics portal. The report alleged various improper hiring and employment practices dating back to 2024 and recounted a truncated version of the alleged assault. In a meeting two days later (June 19) with Bergman, Williams requested that legal counsel4 be present and informed Bergman that she would continue to press the airport-police investigation. On June 20, Bergman forwarded to Sergeant Greggory Sommerfield5 an email detailing a meeting between Williams and SSP management. Williams alleges that the Board deactivated her airport access badge less than two business days after Bergman forwarded the email. Williams’s live pleading stated that she was harmed when she “effected constructive discharge on August 25, 2025 due to intolerable conditions (pay cut, badge deactivation, no shifts, harassment)” and that she has been “[u]npaid since June 24, 2025.”6 4 Williams was pro se in the trial court and remains so on appeal. 5 We also assume that Sergeant Sommerfield is an airport-police employee. 6 Williams also pleaded that in March 2026, she received IRS Form 1095-C from SSP. Employers must provide form 1095-C to full-time employees who were employed and eligible to receive insurance for one or more calendar months of the previous calendar year. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H; 26 C.F.R. § 301.6056-1(c). The form in the record shows that Williams was an SSP employee through July 2025. 4 B. Hearing on Plea to the Jurisdiction The trial court heard argument on the Board’s plea to the jurisdiction in July 2026. No witnesses testified, but Williams introduced a copy of Bergman’s email to Sergeant Sommerfield. The Board argued that it was not Williams’s employer “under the hybrid economic and control test that Texas courts apply” and so Williams had failed to show a waiver of the Board’s governmental immunity. Williams argued that, although not her direct employer, the Board took direct retaliatory action against her through exercising its authority over the security-badge system—access she required to work. After hearing both parties’ arguments, the trial court granted the Board’s plea to the jurisdiction. This interlocutory appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION Williams alleged four causes of action against both SSP and the Board. Although the trial court dismissed all four causes of action against the Board, Williams’s brief challenges only the dismissal of her retaliation claim under the TCHRA. See Tex. Lab. Code § 21.055. We will address only that claim because the other dismissals are not before us. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, 47.1. The Board’s plea to the jurisdiction alleged that Williams did not show a waiver of sovereign immunity because she had not pleaded sufficient facts to show that (1) the 5 Board’s immunity was waived as an “employer” under the TCHRA or (2) Williams was the Board’s employee.7 The Texas Supreme Court has long recognized that “[s]overeign immunity protects the State, state agencies, and their officers, while governmental immunity protects subdivisions of the State, including municipalities and school districts.”8 Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 n.2 (Tex. 2008); Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002). Like sovereign immunity, governmental immunity bars suits against the government unless it has expressly consented to be sued. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 853. Legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language—either in a statute or by other express legislative permission. Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694–95 (Tex. 2003). Absent legislative consent, a trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit against a governmental entity. Id. at 696. Because immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, it is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). 7 The Board’s jurisdictional plea also argued that Williams had failed to give sufficient notice under the Texas Tort Claims Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.101. But because that notice provision applies only to claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act and not the TCHRA, we need not address it. The Board, as a local governmental entity, is protected by governmental 8 immunity. See Dallas/Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd. v. Vizant Techs., LLC, 576 S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tex. 2019). 6 Williams argues that the Board’s immunity is waived for her TCHRA claim. The TCHRA prohibits employers from retaliating or discriminating against a person who engages in certain protected activities, including filing a charge or complaint under the TCHRA. See Tex. Lab. Code § 21.055. By statute, “Employer” includes “a county, municipality, state agency, or state instrumentality.” Id. § 21.002(8)(D). The TCHRA thus clearly and unambiguously waives governmental immunity for claims against governmental entities that are statutorily defined as employers. See Little v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 148 S.W.3d 374, 377–78 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Cooke, 149 S.W.3d 700, 704 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (stating that the TCHRA “provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity when a governmental unit has committed employment discrimination”). The first jurisdictional question raised by the Board’s plea—whether the Board is an “employer” under the TCHRA—has already been addressed by this court. See Dallas/Fort Worth Intern. Airport Bd. v. Funderburk, 188 S.W.3d 233, 235–39 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2006, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.). The Board is indeed within the class of entities that can be “employers” under the TCHRA and for which immunity is waived. Id. The Board’s second jurisdictional question—whether Williams alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that the Board can be liable to her as an “employer” under the TCHRA—is one of law that we review de novo. See City of Westworth Vill. v. City of White 7 Settlement, 558 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)). When, as in this case, a jurisdictional plea challenges the plaintiff’s pleadings, the reviewing court determines whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. “[O]ur notice-pleading rules . . . require pleadings to not only give notice of the claim and the relief sought but also of the essential factual allegations.” In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d 653, 661–62 (Tex. 2023) (cleaned up). The Board, applying a hybrid economic-realities and common-law-control test, asserts that Williams was not the Board’s direct employee and thus it cannot be liable to her for retaliation under the TCHRA. But the Board’s view of the TCHRA’s anti-retaliation provision is too narrow. See Tex. Lab. Code § 21.055. While some portions of the TCHRA are restricted to discrimination against an employee or applicant, see e.g. id. § 21.051(2), Section 21.055 prohibits retaliation by an employer against “a person” broadly, not the more limited “employee,” id. § 21.055. See NME Hosps., Inc. v. Rennels, 994 S.W.2d 142, 144–45 (Tex. 1999); Hirsch v. City of Houston, 731 S.W.3d 50, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (“[T]he language of [S]ection 21.055 prohibits an employer from retaliating against ‘a person’ who engages in protective activity, not an ‘employee.’”). Williams argues that the Board’s “immunity is waived for a retaliation claim under Section 21.055 if the record raises a 8 fact issue on [the Board’s] role in the adverse action.” See Tex. Tech. Univ. Sys. v. Martinez, 691 S.W.3d 415, 419–20 (Tex. 2024). In the absence of a direct employment relationship, a plaintiff may maintain a TCHRA claim if: (1) “the defendant is an employer within the statutory definition of the [TCHRA]”; (2) “some sort of employment relationship exists between the plaintiff and a third party”; and (3) “the defendant controlled access to the plaintiff’s employment opportunities and denied or interfered with that access based on unlawful criteria.” Id. at 420 (quoting Rennels, 994 S.W.2d at 147). This test requires that the defendant exercised control over some specific aspect of employment and took some unlawful action consistent with that control. Id. A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that the defendant had operational control over employment decisions and took direct action. Id. at 421–22. Here, Williams’s live pleading satisfied the first two elements of the Rennels test: the Board is an employer under the TCHRA, and Williams was employed by a third party, SSP. We focus, then, on the third and final element. To meet that element, Williams’s pleadings must suffice to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether (1) the Board controlled access to her employment opportunities and (2) interfered with that access based on unlawful criteria. Martinez, 691 S.W.3d at 421; Rennels, 994 S.W.2d at 147. The facts as pleaded must show that the 9 Board had “operational control” over employment decisions and took direct action against Williams consistent with that control. Martinez, 691 S.W.3d at 421; Rennels, 994 S.W.2d at 147. As amended, Williams’s petition states that the Board “exercised significant control over [her] ability to work at the airport through its CIDA[9] badging system” and that the Board’s employees took actions that “led directly to [her] badge deactivation, massive reduction in work hours, and constructive discharge.” This allegation suffices to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether the Board, through its control of airport access, “was in a position to and did exert control over” Williams’s employment by removing a prerequisite to her employment with SSP. See Univ. of Tex.-Pan Am. v. Miller, No. 03-10-00710-CV, 2013 WL 4818355, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 28, 2013, no pet.) (holding that a police department, by cancelling complainant police chief’s commission, exercised control over his employment though he was directly employed by a university). But having pleaded facts showing that the Board exercised control over her employment opportunities, Williams must then show that it did so based upon unlawful criteria. See Martinez, 691 S.W.3d at 420; Rennels, 994 S.W.2d at 147–48. 9 Elsewhere, Williams referred to the “SIDA” badging system, which is the correct acronym. SIDA stands for “Security Identification Display Area.” 10 Although the TCHRA clearly and unambiguously waives immunity for certain unlawful employment practices, “it is a limited waiver of immunity.” Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 513 (Tex. 2012). The TCHRA “waives immunity from suit only for statutory violations, which means the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute absent some evidence the [defendant] violated” a statute.10 Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018). Although Williams alleged that the Board’s revoking her badge access harmed her, she did not assert facts showing that this action was based on any unlawful criteria. See Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 214 S.W.3d 672, 682 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). She alleges that her badge access was terminated two days after her meeting with SSP human resources but does not allege that the termination was because of—or even that the Board knew about—her complaint filed on SSP’s internal ethics portal. Even taking the facts as pleaded in the light most favorable to Williams, she has not pleaded a cause of action sufficient to demonstrate a waiver of the Board’s immunity. But neither has the Board demonstrated an incurable deficiency in Williams’s pleading. Texas courts allow parties to replead unless their pleadings show incurable 10 Section 21.055 prohibits retaliation against a person who “(1) opposes a discriminatory practice; (2) makes or files a charge [under the TCHRA]; (3) files a complaint; or (4) testifies, assists, or participates in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” Tex. Lab. Code § 21.055. 11 defects. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. 2011) (“When this Court upholds a plea to the jurisdiction on sovereign[-]immunity grounds, we allow the plaintiff the opportunity to replead if the defect can be cured.”); City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2009) (“The allegations found in the pleadings may either affirmatively demonstrate or negate the court’s jurisdiction. If the pleadings do neither, it is an issue of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend the pleadings.” (citations omitted)); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27 (“If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court[’]s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to amend.”). Texas law does not favor striking defective pleadings without allowing a repleading opportunity. Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 397 (Tex. 2022). Because neither Williams’s pleading nor the Board’s motion11 demonstrates an incurable defect, dismissal with prejudice without giving Williams a chance to replead was erroneous. Id. We sustain Williams’s first issue only as to the dismissal with prejudice. 11 Beyond asserting that the Board was not Williams’s direct employer, the Board did not—and does not—challenge the merits of Williams’s retaliation claim or argue any other pleading deficiency. See Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Tex. 2012) (placing burden on party resisting jurisdiction to demonstrate either “full and fair opportunity . . . to develop the record and amend the pleadings” or incurable defect). 12 III. CONCLUSION Because the trial court erred by dismissing Williams’s retaliation claim with prejudice without affording her an opportunity to replead when the pleading defects surrounding that claim were not demonstrably incurable, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice only as to that claim and remand to the trial court. Because Williams’s first issue is dispositive, we do not reach her second. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We deny Williams’s motion to supplement the appellate record. /s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice Delivered: November 12, 2026 13