O'Connor v. American Medical Response West CA1/3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 13, 2026
DocketA173945
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/13/26 O’Connor v. American Medical Response West CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ADAM GREGORY O’CONNOR,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A173945
v.
AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE (City & County of San Francisco
WEST, Super. Ct. No. CGC-22-602999)
Defendant and Respondent.
Adam O’Connor (plaintiff) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of
American Medical Response West (defendant) after a jury rejected plaintiff’s
claim that defendant’s employee negligently caused an automobile accident.
Plaintiff, who represents himself on appeal, contends the jury’s verdict is not
supported by substantial evidence and the trial court made erroneous
evidence rulings. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In November 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint for personal injury and
vehicle-related property damage against defendant. Pretrial proceedings
were protracted. A jury trial was held over 11 court days in April 2025.
Neither party provides this court with a summary of the trial evidence, but
for context we summarize accounts of the automobile accident that were
presented to the jury.
On the afternoon of August 4, 2022, plaintiff was involved in a collision
with an ambulance owned by defendant and operated by defendant’s then
employee, S. Yamaguchi. Yamaguchi testified that when the accident
occurred he was traveling in the northbound left lane on Guerrero Street in
San Francisco. He first noticed plaintiff’s red Hyundai when plaintiff passed
him on the right, entering his lane in front of the ambulance. Yamaguchi did
not see a left signal indicator on the Hyundai before or after it entered his
lane. Then plaintiff stopped at a green light at the intersection of Guerreo
and 23rd Street. Yamaguchi hit his brakes but failed to bring the vehicle to a
complete stop in time to avoid a collision with plaintiff. The incident was
recorded on the ambulance’s dashboard camera and played for the jury at
trial.
Plaintiff testified that when the collision occurred, he was on his way to
a security guard job and was listening to audio directions. He was driving
north on Guerrero and planning to make a left onto 23rd Street, but there
were only two northbound lanes and no “pathway to get into a safe turning
lane.” He was in the right northbound lane, so he turned on his left signal
and “ended up in the left lane.” He did not recall how fast he was driving
when he changed lanes, or if he was going more than 25 mile per hour, but he
believed his lane change was safe. As he approached the intersection at 23rd
Street, plaintiff noticed a commercial truck driving southbound that stopped
in the intersection. Fearing the truck could make a wide turn and hit him,
plaintiff stopped short of the intersection and “yielded” to the larger vehicle.
Plaintiff testified that his light was green when he approached the
intersection, but he came to a stop before reaching the crosswalk because he
did not want to impede pedestrians. Then he heard a “large boom” and his
body jolted forward as the ambulance hit the back of his car. Under cross-
examination, plaintiff was asked about his response to an interrogatory
signed under penalty of perjury, which stated that he was sitting at a red
light at the intersection with his signal on when the ambulance hit him.
Plaintiff testified that he did not personally draft that discovery response or
notice that it was incorrect when he signed it. Plaintiff was also asked about
statements he made when reporting the incident for insurance purposes,
including that he had been sitting at a red light waiting for the light to
change when he was rear ended. Plaintiff admitted making the statement
and that it was incorrect, but offered this explanation to the jury: “I’m from
the Midwest and so we call traffic lights red lights. I’ve been doing it for 25
years since. . . . So it doesn’t matter if the light’s green, yellow, a traffic light
to us—to me is a red light.” Plaintiff also acknowledged that his report to
others that he was waiting for the light to change was inaccurate.
The jury rendered their verdict in this case by completing a special
verdict form. The first question on the form inquired whether defendant was
negligent. Answering “No,” the jury answered no other questions. The
verdict form was incorporated into a May 2025 judgment, which provides
that plaintiff shall take nothing from defendant and awards defendant costs
as prescribed by law.
DISCUSSION
In his appellant’s opening brief, plaintiff requests reversal of the
judgment and remand for a new trial on the following grounds: (1) the
verdict is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) defendant’s
“biomechanical” expert was not qualified to offer medical causation opinions;
(3) plaintiff was prejudiced by the admission of evidence that his counsel
referred him to medical providers who provided “lien-based treatment”; (4)
expert testimony that plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by the accident was
speculative; and (5) plaintiff was prevented from “fully exploring liability-
related evidence” pertaining to defendant’s internal investigation of the
incident.
None of these claims is supported by accurate citations to the trial
record, legal authority, or any analysis. Therefore, we conclude plaintiff has
failed to carry his burden as the appellant to overcome a presumption that
the judgment is correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557,
564.) The presumption a judgment is correct “ ‘is not only a general principle
of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of
reversible error.’ ” (Ibid.) It means that the burden is on plaintiff to
articulate claims of reversible error and to “present argument and authority
on each point made.” (County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d
576, 591.) Issues in an appellant’s opening brief that are not properly
presented or sufficiently developed to be cognizable may be deemed waived.
(People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; see also Sprague v. Equifax,
Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1050 [appellate court “ ‘not required to make
an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error’ ”].)
Relatedly, plaintiff fails to comply with rules governing the content of
an appellate brief, which is not excused by the fact that he is representing
himself. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985.) Appellant’s
opening brief does not “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to
matters in the record” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C)), nor does it
“[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record [with] a citation to the
volume and page number of the record where the matter appears” (id., rule
8.204(a)(1)(C)). Instead of providing accurate citations for factual
statements, plaintiff repeatedly offers throughout his brief the same, single
citation to the reporter’s transcript. These glaring deficiencies establish an
independent ground for concluding plaintiff waived any claim of error he
might otherwise have. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247;
Severson & Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 952.)
In his appellant’s reply brief, plaintiff acknowledges “inaccurate or
generalized record citations in the Opening Brief,” and purports to provide
accurate citations to support his material factual propositions. Plaintiff also
attempts to refine his claims of error in light of the substantive arguments
set forth in the respondent’s brief. We conclude that appellant’s reply brief
arguments are insufficient to carry his burden of proving a prejudicial trial
error occurred.
Plaintiff’s first claim is that the verdict is not supported by substantial
evidence. His argument, as we understand it, is that the jury’s verdict cannot
be sustained because the evidence establishes these facts: defendant’s
ambulance rear-ended him; the collision was avoidable; he was not
distracted; he was injured; and no alternative incident explains his
symptoms.
As an initial matter, we find plaintiff has waived his sufficiency of the
evidence claim. “When an appellant’s opening brief states only the favorable
facts, ignoring evidence favorable to respondent, the appellate court may
treat the substantial evidence issues as waived and presume the record
contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.” (Slone v. El Centro
Regional Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173–1174 (Slone); see
also Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 209, 218; Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 1014, 1072.)
In any event, plaintiff has the burden on appeal to show that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is not
sufficiently substantial to support the judgment. (Slone, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at p. 1176.) He neither applies nor even acknowledges this rule.
Instead, in his reply brief, plaintiff concedes that trial evidence supports
defendant’s account of the incident, but argues there is also evidence to
support his account. This argument misperceives the substantial evidence
test, which requires the appellate court to uphold a judgment supported by
substantial evidence even if other substantial evidence would have supported
a different result. (Contreras v. Green Thumb Produce, Inc. (2025) 116
Cal.App.5th 1251, 1262–1263; see also Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150
Cal.App.3d 870, 874 [when substantial evidence is found, it is of “no
consequence” that other evidence might support contrary conclusion].)
Plaintiff’s other claims all pertain to evidentiary rulings. As a general
rule, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed under the deferential
abuse of discretion standard. (McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Assn. (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 283, 295–296; Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476.) Plaintiff fails to show the trial court abused its
discretion as to any matter listed in his brief. Importantly, all but one of
those issues pertain to the nature or scope of plaintiff’s injuries, and thus
have no bearing on the jury’s finding that defendant was not negligent.
Plaintiff also contends the court excluded “liability-related evidence” relating
to defendant’s incident report of the accident. In his reply brief, plaintiff
appears to concede he was permitted to explore this matter at trial.
Regardless, he fails to identify any error by the trial court.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.
TUCHER, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
O’Conner v. American Medical Response West (A173945)