Full Opinion

J-S30030-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 PEYTON E. MITCHELL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : GRZEGORZ DEDEJCZYK, EAN : No. 1242 WDA 2025 HOLDINGS, LLC : Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 20, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-0154-CIV BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: October 30, 2026 Peyton E. Mitchell (“Mitchell”) appeals from the judgment imposed in favor of Grzegorz1 Dedejczyk (“Dedejczyk”) on Mitchell’s claim for negligence. We affirm. The trial court summarized the relevant factual history of this matter as follows: This case arises from an automobile . . . collision on December 16, 2020. . . . Mitchell and . . . Dedejczyk were operating their respective vehicles on a long, straight hill on a snowy day. Mitchell, in her Honda Civic, was traveling down the hill; Dedejczyk, in his rented Dodge minivan, was traveling up the hill. Dedejczyk felt his minivan begin to lose traction because of the snow. Concerned that he would slide backward down the hill, with the attendant risk of striking any vehicles that may enter the roadway behind him, Dedejczyk decided to make a U-turn to his left, so as to travel back down the hill to try to find a flat spot ____________________________________________ 1 We note that the defendant’s first name is spelled “Gregorz” in the transcripts and in some documents in the certified record. J-S30030-26 where he could pull over. He saw . . . Mitchell’s vehicle at the top of the hill, and thought he had enough time to make the U-turn. As he made the U-turn onto the eastbound lane, the two vehicles collided. The parties differed on which vehicle ran into the other. Mitchell alleged that she sustained personal injuries, and filed a complaint on February 22, 2021 against Dedejczyk, asserting a negligence cause of action.[2]. . . Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/25, at 1-3 (paragraph break added). The matter proceeded to a jury trial in August 2025. Mitchell testified that she was traveling down the hill in her red Honda Civic hatchback when Dedejczyk “veer[ed] towards [her] lane and [came] completely into [her] lane when the collision happened.” N.T. (“Testimony of Peyton Mitchell”), 8/21/25, at 12.3 She stated: “He was really close because there wasn’t really enough time to react to, you know, to try to prevent the accident. It was like seconds. I don’t know distance-wise, but he was close.” Id. at 12-13. Mitchell insisted she was “not speeding,” and estimated she was traveling thirty-five miles per hour, ten miles per hour under the forty-five miles per hour speed limit, “due to the weather conditions.” Id. at 11-12. ____________________________________________ 2 Mitchell subsequently added EAN Holdings, LLC (the owner of Dedejczyk’s minivan) and Clerac, LLC (a subsidiary of Enterprise Rent-A-Car who rented the minivan to Dedejczyk) as defendants. The trial court later discontinued Mitchell’s claims against these defendants and the matter proceeded to trial against Dedejczyk only. 3 The certified record included several trial transcripts for the August 21, 2025 and August 22. 2025 proceedings. We identify these volumes with the designations appearing on their cover pages. -2- J-S30030-26 Dedejczyk testified consistently with the trial court’s summary above, explaining that before beginning the U-turn, he saw Mitchell’s vehicle at the top of the hill, approximately 3,000 feet away, and believed that he had enough time to turn around. Dedejczyk recounted: “There was only her car on the street on the top of the hill. When I was turning around, I almost made it halfway to U-turn and all of a sudden I hear[d] a bang.” N.T., 8/22/25 (“Testimony of Gregorz Dedejczyk Continued”), at 17. He believed Mitchell was speeding because he should have been able to make the U-turn safely based on the initial distance between them. See id. at 36. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Dedejczyk, finding that he was not negligent. Mitchell filed a timely post-trial motion in which she argued, inter alia, that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and requested for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), or in the alternative, a new trial. The trial court denied this motion on September 2, 2025. Despite this ruling, on September 4, 2025, Dedejczyk filed a motion objecting to Mitchell’s post-trial motion for failure to comply with Local Rule 227.1 and failure to order pertinent parts of the record as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.3. The following day, Dedejczyk filed a second motion, wherein he argued that the jury’s verdict “should stand” but that his post-trial motion was “being filed in the alternative context” for the sake of “completeness and in order to preserve the issues should the jury verdict be -3- J-S30030-26 overturned and a new trial granted.” Dedejczyk’s Post-Trial Motion, 9/5/25, at 1. The trial court did not rule on Dedejczyk’s motions. On October 2, 2025, Mitchell filed a timely notice of appeal,4 and both Mitchell and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On October 20, 2025, upon receipt of Dedejczyk’s praecipe for final judgment, the prothonotary entered judgment in favor of Dedejzcyk. Subsequently, this Court issued a per curiam order directing Mitchell to show cause as to why the appeal should not quashed as “premature and void where [Dedejczyk’s] post-trial motions have not yet been disposed.” Order, 11/20/25, at 1. Dedejczyk responded that his post-trial motions were “filed in the alternative context and were rendered moot by the [trial court’s] denial of Mitchell’s post-trial motions.” Dedejczyk’s Response to Rule to Show Cause, 12/3/25, at 3. Mitchell did not file a response. Thereafter, this Court vacated the rule to show cause, but noted that “[t]his ruling [was] not binding upon ____________________________________________ 4 Mitchell purported to appeal from the September 2, 2025 order denying her post-trial motion. Generally, however, an appeal lies “from judgments entered subsequent to the trial court's disposition of any post-verdict motions, not from the order denying post-trial motions." Sereda v. Ctr. City Acquisitions, LLC, 222 A.3d 1161, 1164 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Additionally, we may deem an appeal as filed from a subsequently entered judgment. See id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (providing that “[a] notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof”). Accordingly, we have amended the caption to indicate the appeal lies from the October 2, 2025 judgment. -4- J-S30030-26 this Court as a final determination as to the propriety of the appeal [and] the issues may be revisited by the merits panel.” Order, 1/8/26, at 26. As a preliminary matter, we will address whether the appeal is premature. Pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1, a party must file a post-trial motion within ten days of “the conclusion of a trial in any type of action in order to preserve claims that a party wishes to raise on appeal.” Chalkey v. Roush, 805 A.2d 491, 496 (Pa. 2002) (emphasis omitted). “If a party has filed a timely post-trial motion, any other party may file a post-trial motion within ten days after the filing of the first post-trial motion.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c). Upon receipt of a post-trial motion filed by either party, the court may “affirm, modify or change the decision.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(a)(4). “Once a post-trial motion is timely filed, judgment cannot be entered until the trial court enters an order disposing of the motion or the motion is denied by operation of law one hundred and twenty days after the filing of the motion.” Melani v. Northwest Engineering, Inc., 909 A.2d 404, 405 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “In other words, a trial court’s order at the conclusion of a trial, whether the action is one at law or in equity, simply cannot become final for purposes of filing an appeal until the court decides any timely post-trial motions.” Chalkey, 805 A.2d at 496. However, we also note that generally “an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot. An issue before a court is moot when a determination is sought on a -5- J-S30030-26 matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.” Crespo v. Hughes, 292 A.3d 612, 617 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted). Here, the record shows that Mitchell, who did not prevail at trial, filed a timely post-trial motion on August 27, 2025. The trial court denied her motion on September 2, 2025. Two days later, on September 4, 2025, Dedejczyk filed a motion objecting to Mitchell’s post-trial motion, arguing that it did not comply with applicable rules. On September 5, 2025, he filed a second post- trial motion arguing that the jury’s verdict in his favor “should stand,” but outlined issues he would assert on appeal in the event the trial court granted Mitchell’s post-trial motion. Dedejczyk’s Post-Trial Motion, 9/5/25, at 1. Based on the content of his motions, it appears that Dedejczyk was unaware that the trial court had already denied Mitchell’s post-trial motion. Dedejczyk alluded to this fact in his response to the rule to show cause, explaining that he filed his post-trial motions in direct response to Mitchell’s, but that “around that same time, [the trial court] entered an [o]rder . . . denying Mitchell’s post-trial motions in their entirety.” Dedejczyk’s Response to Rule to Show Cause, 12/3/25, at 1-2. Dedejczyk emphasized that he filed his post-trial motion only “in the alternative context and [it] would [have] only [been] triggered if any of [Mitchell’s] post-trial motions were granted and a new trial ordered.” Id. at 1. -6- J-S30030-26 Based on this record, we conclude that Dedejczyk’s post-trial motions were moot since, at the time of their filing, the trial court had already denied Mitchell’s post-trial motion. Thus, any determination on the matters raised in Dedejczyk’s motions, while timely filed and technically still pending at the time judgment was entered, would not have had “any practical effect on the existing controversy.” Crespo, 292 A.3d at 617; see also Santander Bank, N.A. v. Ansorge, 327 A.3d 259, 263 (Pa. Super. 2024) (holding that an “issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect”). Accordingly, we conclude the appeal is not premature. Therefore, we will review the merits of Mitchell’s appeal. Mitchell raises the following sole issue for our review: “Did the trial court err in failing to enter judgment in favor of . . . Mitchell or, in the alternative, in failing to grant a new trial based upon the jury’s verdict being against the greater weight of the evidence?” Mitchell’s Brief at 2. Our review of a claim challenging the trial court’s denial of a motion for JNOV is well-settled: A motion for JNOV is a post-trial motion which requests the court to enter judgment in favor of the moving party. There are two bases on which the court can grant JNOV. One holds that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the other holds that the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first, the court reviews the record and concludes that even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor, whereas with the second, the court -7- J-S30030-26 reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure. In an appeal from the trial court’s decision to deny a motion for JNOV, a court must consider the evidence, together with all favorable inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. Our standard of review when considering motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are identical. We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a JNOV only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court. Concerning any questions of law, our scope of review is plenary. Concerning questions of credibility and weight accorded the evidence at trial, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the finder of fact. A JNOV should be entered only in a clear case. The entry of a JNOV is a drastic remedy. A court cannot lightly ignore the findings of a duly selected jury. DeVore v. Metro Aviation, Inc., 328 A.3d 1012, 1016-17 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation and brackets omitted), appeal granted on other grounds, 346 A.3d 1249 (Pa. 2025). We review challenges to the weight of the evidence as follows: The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial based upon a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, the function of an appellate court on appeal is to review the trial court’s exercise of discretion based upon a review of the record, rather than to consider de novo the underlying question of the weight of the evidence. An appellate court may not overturn the trial court’s decision unless the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim. Further, in reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, a verdict will be overturned only if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. **** A trial court’s determination that a verdict was not against the interest of justice is one of the least assailable reasons for denying -8- J-S30030-26 a new trial. A verdict is against the weight of the evidence where certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. Heffelfinger v. Shen, 342 A.3d 711, 725-26 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 353 A.3d 1259 (Pa. 2026). Importantly, “this Court’s review of a weight of the evidence claim is a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion in weighing the evidence, not of the underlying question of whether we believe that the verdict is, in fact, against the weight of the evidence.” In re Mampe, 932 A.2d 954, 960 (Pa. Super. 2007). In other words, this Court “may not reweigh the evidence.” Snyder v. Crusader Servicing Corporation, 231 A.3d 20, 28 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). As such, the test is: not whether this Court would have reached the same result on the evidence presented, but, rather, after due consideration of the evidence found credible by the jury, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, whether the [trial] court could reasonably have reached its conclusion. . . . We stress that if there is any support in the record for the trial court’s decision to deny the appellant’s motion for a new trial based on weight of the evidence, then we must affirm. An appellant is not entitled to a new trial where the evidence presented was conflicting and the fact-finder could have decided in favor of either party. Winschel v. Jain, 925 A.2d 782, 788 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). With respect to a claim of negligence, our Supreme Court has explained: Negligence is the absence of ordinary care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the same or similar circumstances. While the existence of a duty is a question of law, whether there has been a neglect of such duty is generally for the jury. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing, by a -9- J-S30030-26 preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant engaged in conduct that deviated from the general standard of care expected under the circumstances, and that this deviation proximately caused actual harm. To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, the breach resulted in injury to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff suffered an actual loss or damage. . . . Walters v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 187 A.3d 214, 221 (Pa. 2018) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Mitchell argues that this was “not a situation . . . of a mere conflict of testimony; rather, it [was] a situation where the jury ignored the evidence to deliver a verdict that was not in accord with justice.” Mitchell’s Brief at 7. She avers that Dedejczyk’s stated reasons for making the U-turn — the loss of traction and fear of sliding backwards — “conflict[] with the laws of nature” and “[was] not a matter of ‘credibility,’ but a matter of Newtonian physics that the trial court was required to recognize.” Id. at 8. She contends that “given the circumstances of this accident, i.e., it occurring in . . . Mitchell’s lane of travel . . . with no evidence of . . . Mitchell’s comparative negligence,” there was “only one conclusion: that [Dedejczyk] negligently operated his vehicle.” Id. at 11. The trial court considered Mitchell’s issue and found it meritless, reasoning: It is impossible to know with certainty what evidence the jury found to be credible, but the two drivers had varying accounts of what led to the crash. . . . **** - 10 - J-S30030-26 In short, the parties’ testimony conflicted on some points, and the jury resolved that conflict. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in testimony or because the trial judge on the same facts may have arrived at a different conclusion. My sense of justice is not shocked by this verdict. Credibility determinations are within the sole province of the jury. A jury can believe any part of a witness’ testimony that they choose, and may disregard any portion of the testimony they disbelieve. Because of the conflicting versions of the events surrounding the accident, it was the jury’s duty to make a credibility determination and to decide whether [Dedejczyk] exercised ordinary care under the circumstances.[] Negligence is the absence of ordinary care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the same or similar circumstances. The mere occurrence of an accident does not establish negligent conduct.[] Throughout the history of this case, continuing until the verdict, counsel for [Mitchell] has been adamant that negligence and liability is a foregone conclusion. The verdict clearly shows otherwise. Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/25, at 9, 11-12 (citations and footnotes omitted). With respect to the trial court’s denial of Mitchell’s motion for JNOV, we determine that the court did not abuse its discretion. After reviewing the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have rendered its verdict; therefore, an entry of JNOV was not warranted in this matter. We emphasize that “the entry of JNOV is a drastic remedy,” and we “cannot lightly ignore the findings of a duly selected jury.” DeVore, 328 A.3d at 1016-17. Accordingly, no relief is due on Mitchell’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of her motion for JNOV. Furthermore, after careful review of the evidence in the light most favorable to Dedejczyk as the verdict winner, we conclude that the trial court - 11 - J-S30030-26 properly exercised its discretion in finding that the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. We reiterate that this Court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial court when reviewing its determination as to whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. See Heffelfinger, 342 A.3d at 725. Indeed, one of the least assailable reasons for denying a new trial is the trial court’s determination that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. See id. Here, Mitchell’s arguments in support of her challenge to the weight of the evidence all center on her insistence that Dedejczyk’s decision to make the U-turn was “unreasonable and negligent.” Mitchell’s Brief at 10. In advancing this claim, Mitchell is essentially asking this Court to reweigh the evidence and to accord no weight to Dedejczyk’s testimony that the U-turn was reasonable due to poor road conditions on a steep, snowy hill, and that he believed Mitchell’s vehicle was far enough away such that he could complete the U-turn safely. Instead, Mitchell asks this Court to give all weight to her testimony that she was driving well below the speed limit and that Dedejczyk, suddenly and without warning, turned his vehicle directly into her lane and struck her. This we cannot do, as this Court may not reweigh the evidence. See Snyder, 231 A.3d at 28. Rather, this Court’s role is to review the exercise of discretion by the trial court in ruling on the weight claim. In this regard, we discern no abuse - 12 - J-S30030-26 of such discretion by the trial court. As explained above, a new trial cannot be granted on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence if the evidence at trial was conflicting and the jury could have decided in favor of either party. See Winschel, 925 A.2d at 788. The jury was free to credit Dedejczyk’s testimony and find that he did not act negligently. See Heffelfinger, 832 A.3d at 726. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment entered in favor of Dedejczyk. Judgment affirmed. DATE: 10/30/2026 - 13 -