Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 481 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-26-305 Opinion Delivered October 7, 2026 ANTHONY ENNIS APPEAL FROM THE COLUMBIA APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 14JV-22-87] V. HONORABLE DAVID W. TALLEY, JR., ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILDREN APPELLEES AFFIRMED KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge Appellant Anthony Ennis appeals from an order entered on February 18, 2026, which terminated his parental rights to his children MC1 (DOB 01-31-18) and MC2 (DOB 11-24-20). On appeal, Anthony raises three arguments. First, he argues that there was reversible error because he was not timely informed of his right to counsel in the dependency- neglect proceedings and was not appointed counsel until after appellee Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. Next, he contends that DHS failed to prove statutory grounds supporting the termination. Finally, Anthony argues that termination was not in the children’s best interest. We affirm. I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History On December 20, 2022, DHS filed a petition for dependency-neglect and emergency custody of MC1 and MC2. When the petition was filed, the children were removed from the custody of their mother, Teasia Turner, and Anthony was incarcerated in Louisiana. 1 The children’s removal was based on Teasia’s illegal drug use and her failure to maintain stable housing and employment. The petition was filed against Teasia but named Anthony as a putative parent of MC1 and MC2. On December 20, 2022, the trial court entered an ex parte order for emergency custody of MC1 and MC2. The emergency-custody order set forth that the parents from whom custody were removed have a right to an attorney at each stage of the proceedings, and the trial court made a preliminary finding of indigency and appointed an attorney for Teasia. On January 13, 2023, the trial court entered a probable-cause order that identified Anthony as the putative father, and Anthony was served in prison with a putative-parent notice and summons. On February 7, 2023, the trial court ordered DNA testing on Anthony to determine paternity of MC1 and MC2. 1 Teasia’s parental rights to MC1 and MC2 were ultimately terminated on September 8, 2025, after a separate termination hearing held on August 8, 2025; on appeal, we affirmed the termination of her parental rights. See Turner v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2026 Ark. App. 267. After Teasia’s parental rights were terminated, DHS filed a petition to terminate Anthony’s parental rights, which resulted in the termination order now on appeal. The record shows that Anthony was incarcerated the entire time from when this case began until his parental rights were terminated. 2 On February 15, 2023, the trial court entered an adjudication order finding the children dependent-neglected. The order noted that both Teasia and Anthony had appeared at the adjudication hearing. The goal of the case was reunification with the concurrent goals of adoption and relative placement. Anthony did not appear at the first review hearing, and in a review order entered on June 6, 2023, Anthony was not mentioned. Anthony did not appear at the second review hearing, and in a review order entered on August 15, 2023, the trial court found that DNA testing showed Anthony is the biological father of MC1 and MC2. Anthony did not appear at the third review hearing, and in a review order entered on October 16, 2023, the trial court found Anthony to be the parent of MC1 and MC2. Anthony did not appear at the permanency-planning hearing, and on January 2, 2024, the trial court entered a permanency-planning order noting that Teasia had made measurable progress and stating the goal of the case remained the same. Anthony did appear at the fourth review hearing, and in a review order entered on February 15, 2024, the trial court ordered MC1 and MC2 to begin a trial home placement with Teasia. On July 15, 2024, DHS filed a new petition for dependency-neglect based on Teasia’s failure to meet the children’s needs for food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. The new petition alleged that Anthony’s whereabout were unknown. 2 On July 16, 2024, the trial 2 The record shows that during Anthony’s incarceration in Louisiana, he was transferred to different correctional facilities multiple times, making it challenging for DHS to track his location. 3 court entered an emergency order placing MC1 and MC2 back in DHS custody. A second adjudication order was entered on October 9, 2024, finding the children dependent- neglected due to medical neglect and inadequate supervision. On November 20, 2024, DHS filed a motion to terminate reunification services as to Teasia alleging that MC1 and MC2 had been subjected to aggravated circumstances in that there was little likelihood that continued services to the family would result in reunification. On February 5, 2025, the trial court entered a permanency-planning order relieving DHS from providing services to Teasia and changing the goal to termination of her parental rights. On June 24, 2025, DHS filed a petition to terminate Teasia’s parental rights. A termination hearing was held on August 8, 2025, and the trial court entered an order terminating Teasia’s parental rights on September 8, 2025. In the order terminating Teasia’s parental rights, the trial court found that issues involving Anthony were reserved. On September 11, 2025, DHS filed a petition to terminate Anthony’s parental rights. DHS alleged that Anthony was incarcerated in Louisiana throughout the case and was notified of the children’s removal and the dependency-neglect proceedings. DHS alleged that despite being given notice, Anthony did not participate in the case and had exhibited a clear lack of interest in engaging in parenting of the children. On October 21, 2025, Anthony filed a pro se answer to the termination petition asking that the petition be denied. Anthony stated that he expected to be paroled from prison on June 9, 2026, and that he intended to seek custody of MC1 and MC2 within a 4 reasonable time after his release. Anthony also stated in his answer that he was indigent, and he requested appointment of counsel. On November 16, 2025, the trial court entered an order finding Anthony indigent and appointing attorney Samantha Carpenter as his counsel. In that order, the termination hearing (originally scheduled for November 7, 2025) was rescheduled for January 21, 2026. The termination hearing was held on January 21, 2026. Two witnesses testified: DHS family service worker Roquayyah Blake and Anthony. Roquayyah Blake testified that she has been the family service worker assigned to the case since it opened in December 2022. She stated that the children were removed from their mother while Anthony was incarcerated and that Anthony was notified of their removal and served before the adjudication hearing, at which he appeared. Ms. Blake stated that at no time during the pendency of the case did Anthony reach out to DHS to inquire about his children or request any type of visitation. DHS never received any letters or cards from Anthony in regard to his children. Ms. Blake stated that on numerous occasions, DHS made efforts to contact Anthony in prison but were sometimes unsuccessful because he was frequently transferred between facilities. Ms. Blake testified that she had contacted Anthony’s mother, grandmother, and grandfather for possible placement of the children but that none of them were able to care for the children. She stated that within the last month, Anthony’s second cousin, Whitney Carver, who lives in Louisiana, had come forward for possible placement of the children after Anthony had contacted Ms. Carver from prison. Ms. Carver lives in a two-bedroom 5 apartment with her husband and infant daughter but stated she might be able to move into a three-bedroom apartment. Ms. Carver had not seen MC1 in several years and had never seen MC2. Ms. Blake stated that DHS was “putting together an I.C.P.C.3 to send” in regard to Ms. Carver. Ms. Blake stated that MC1 is in a therapeutic foster home and that MC2 is in a private foster home. She stated that both children are doing well, although MC1 “has good days and bad days” and sometimes gets upset and has tantrums. Ms. Blake stated that both children have shown growth and progress in their current placements. Ms. Blake stated that neither child has any medical issues that would prevent them from being adopted and that she thought both children are adoptable. Ms. Blake stated that she did not know of any services DHS could offer Anthony that would lead to successful reunification with MC1 and MC2. She also thought that there was potential harm in returning the children to Anthony given his criminal history and uncertain living situation in the event he is released from prison. Ms. Blake thought that it was in the children’s best interest for Anthony’s parental rights to be terminated, and she recommended termination of parental rights. Anthony testified and discussed his criminal history resulting in his incarceration. Anthony was convicted in Louisiana of aggravated criminal damage to property in 2020 and was sentenced to eight years in prison with six years suspended. He served some time in 3 Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. 6 prison and was released on parole in November 2021. However, sometime in 2022, Anthony was convicted in Arkansas of aggravated assault committed against his grandfather. As a result of the aggravated-assault conviction, he was placed on five years’ probation in Arkansas, and his suspended sentence was revoked in Louisiana, resulting in a prison term of six years beginning in October 2022. Anthony testified that he had obtained the maximum good-time credit and expected to be released on June 9, 2026, although he would remain on parole until 2028. Anthony also stated that during his incarceration, he completed classes in substance abuse, anger management, parenting, and job readiness. Anthony testified that he had been living with Teasia after MC1 was born and that he became incarcerated for the first time when Teasia was pregnant with MC2. Anthony stated that between November 2021 and October 2022 while he was on parole, he lived with his grandmother in Texarkana, Arkansas. He stated that during that time, MC1 and MC2 lived with Teasia, but he would visit them, and they stayed with him a couple of weekends. Anthony stated that he never paid child support but that he bought the children things as needed and also bought them gifts before his suspension was revoked and he was sent back to prison. Anthony acknowledged that he was notified that the children had been removed and placed in DHS custody from the outset of the case. He stated that he had DHS’s address and that he wrote them one time in 2023 to inquire about “what was going on with them and maybe if [he] could see them or have [his] rights reserved until [he got] home or something like that.” He stated, “I never got a response, so I don’t know if it didn’t go 7 through or what happened, but that was my attempt to reach out.” Anthony never attempted to contact DHS either by mail or by phone after that. He stated that he never tried to call DHS because his phone calls were restricted to certain approved persons such as family members and that he “couldn’t make a call to just anybody.” Anthony stated that his only contact with MC1 and MC2 since the case began was a couple of two-minute video calls. On one of these calls, he had called Teasia, and the children were there; and on the other, Anthony “just so happened” to call his mother at a time when she had visitation with the children. Anthony testified that the only time he had talked with the DHS caseworker was in court. He stated that no one ever spoke to him about any services or asked if he wanted visitation. Anthony stated that when he is released from prison, he plans to live with his grandmother, who has a three-bedroom trailer home. He stated that he has a car, but it will need some work when he gets home. Anthony stated that he is a certified welder and that he has a job lined up through his father when he gets out of prison, although “it’s not all official.” He stated that he eventually wanted to seek custody of MC1 and MC2 after his release from prison but that it would take a few months to get settled first. On February 18, 2026, the trial court entered an order terminating Anthony’s parental rights to MC1 and MC2. The trial court found that Anthony was incarcerated during the entire case, had not provided for or seen the children in years, and had taken no initiative to reach out to DHS to inquire about his children’s well-being or to try to contact 8 them. The trial court found further that although Anthony expected to be released from prison on June 9, 2026, the jail records introduced at the termination hearing contained contradictory information that his “Good Time / Diminution of Sentence Release Date” was April 20, 2027. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of these five statutory grounds under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2025): failure to remedy, subsequent factors, failure to provide significant material support or maintain meaningful contact, abandonment, and aggravated circumstances. The trial court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest, and the court considered the likelihood that the children would be adopted as well as the potential harm of returning them to Anthony’s custody as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-325(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). This appeal followed. II. Standard of Review The intent behind the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the family home because it is contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(a)(3). A trial court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on findings proved by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-25-325(b)(3). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t 9 of Health & Hum. Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). On appeal, the appellate court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In order to terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1) the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and (2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35- 325(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). The order terminating parental rights must also be based on a showing by clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination listed in section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B). III. Anthony’s Points On Appeal On appeal, Anthony raises three arguments. First, he argues that there was reversible error because he was not timely informed of his right to counsel in the dependency-neglect proceedings and was not appointed counsel until after DHS filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. Next, he contends that DHS failed to prove statutory grounds supporting the termination. Finally, Anthony argues that termination was not in the children’s best interest. We will review each argument in turn. A. Right to Counsel 10 Anthony’s first argument on appeal is that he was entitled to court-appointed counsel during all stages of the dependency-neglect proceedings and that the trial court erred in failing to inform him of that right or provide him counsel as required by the relevant provisions in the Arkansas Juvenile Code until after DHS filed the petition to terminate his parental rights. Under this point, Anthony also claims error because DHS failed to make reasonable efforts or provide services to him while he was incarcerated during the case. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-311(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 2025) provides that all parents have a right to counsel in all dependency neglect proceedings. Subdivision (e)(1)(B)(i) provides that in all dependency-neglect proceedings that set out to remove legal custody from a parent, the parent from whom custody was removed shall have the right to appointed counsel. Subdivision (e)(1)(B)(ii)(a) provides: (ii) The court may appoint an attorney to a: (a)(1) Noncustodial parent if the court determines that the noncustodial parent has demonstrated a significant custodial relationship with the juvenile. (2) A determination that the noncustodial parent has demonstrated a significant custodial relationship with the juvenile shall be made at the first appearance of the noncustodial parent in the matter. Subdivision (e)(1)(C) provides that counsel shall not be appointed to a party in a dependency- neglect proceeding unless the court finds that the parent is indigent and counsel is requested by the parent after the parent is informed of his or her right to be appointed counsel. Subdivision (e)(1)(D)(i) provides that parents shall be advised in the dependency-neglect petition or the ex parte emergency order, whichever is sooner, and at the first appearance 11 before the court, of the right to counsel and the right to appointed counsel, if eligible. Subdivision (e)(1)(E) provides that all parents shall have the right to be appointed counsel in termination-of-parental-rights hearings and that the court shall appoint counsel if the court makes a finding that the parent is indigent and counsel is requested by the parent. Subdivision (e)(2) provides that, if at the permanency-planning hearing or at any time the court establishes the goal of adoption and counsel has not yet been appointed for a parent, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the parent as provided by subdivision (e)(1)(E) of this section. In a review order entered on October 16, 2023, the trial court found Anthony to be the parent of MC1 and MC2 following DNA testing. Anthony’s first appearance after he was found to be the parent was at a review hearing on February 2, 2024, and Anthony notes that in the ensuing review order entered on February 15, 2024, there was no mention of the nature of the relationship between Anthony and his children nor any indication that he was advised of the right to counsel. Anthony notes further that on February 5, 2025, the trial court entered a permanency-planning order that changed the goal of the case to adoption, and there is no indication he was advised of his right to counsel at his next appearance at a June 20, 2025 review hearing. Although Anthony was appointed counsel after DHS filed a petition to terminate his parental rights on September 11, 2025, and he was afforded counsel at the termination hearing held on January 21, 2026, he contends that his right to counsel and to be informed of that right attached before then and that had he been afforded counsel 12 earlier in the proceedings, his due-process rights would have been protected, and the outcome might have been different. In making this argument, Anthony relies primarily on Buck v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2018 Ark. App. 258, 548 S.W.3d 231. In that case, appellant Buck was a custodial parent from whom his children were removed, and his parental rights were ultimately terminated. The record showed that Buck had repeatedly requested and was denied counsel during the dependency-neglect proceedings and that he was not appointed counsel until the goal was changed to termination of parental rights. Buck argued on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to appoint him counsel at the outset of the dependency- neglect proceedings under Arkansas law, and we agreed. We held in Buck that because Buck was not appointed counsel from the outset, he was not afforded the essential and vital services an attorney would have provided, he did not have an attorney to advise him and explain to him each stage of the proceedings and the likelihood of achieving his goals, and the appointment of counsel might have made a difference in the outcome. Thus, in Buck, the termination order was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. We hold that the present case is distinguishable from Buck because, here, there is no indication that Anthony had requested counsel before DHS filed the petition to terminate his parental rights and no indication that either Anthony or his appointed counsel at any time argued to the trial court that he was not given notice of his right to counsel or that he was denied appointment of counsel at the appropriate time. Because the argument was not raised below, it is not preserved for review. See Reynolds v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. 13 App. 287 (holding that we will not consider arguments that are made for the first time on appeal). We were presented with similar circumstances in Adame v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2020 Ark. App. 248, 601 S.W.3d 432. In Adame, the father was incarcerated when his children were removed from their mother’s custody, and he remained incarcerated throughout the case. The trial court later entered a review order finding Adame to be the children’s father. Adame was not appointed counsel until a permanency-planning order was entered, after which DHS filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. Adame’s parental rights were terminated, and Adame argued on appeal that he was never notified of his right to counsel and that he was denied his right to counsel at the outset of the proceedings as required under the relevant provisions in the Arkansas Juvenile Code. We held that the issue was not preserved, and we explained: In his brief, Jeremy concedes that it is “unclear” if he ever asked for counsel to be appointed to him, as the statute requires. Because Jeremy did not assert to the circuit court that he was not given notice of his right to counsel or that he was denied appointment of counsel at the proper time—either under the statute or the Sixth Amendment—his arguments are not preserved for appeal. Even in a case involving termination of parental rights where constitutional issues are argued, we will not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal. Adame, 2020 Ark. App. 248, at 8, 601 S.W.3d at 437 (citations omitted). We noted in Adame that the case was distinguishable from Buck because, in Buck, the father had repeatedly asked for counsel to be appointed for him. More recently, we decided Lewis v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2024 Ark. App. 66, 684 S.W.3d 262. In Lewis, the father’s child was removed from the mother’s 14 custody, and he was initially identified as the putative father. Later, Lewis became incarcerated, and he was found to be the father. Lewis was represented by appointed counsel at the termination hearing, and his parental rights were terminated. Lewis argued on appeal that there was a lack of due process because DHS failed to secure his participation in the case, he had not been appointed an attorney to represent him at the adjudication hearing and throughout the remainder of the case, and counsel was not appointed until just before the termination hearing. We held that these arguments were not preserved, and we wrote: However, we are unable to reach the merits of appellant’s due-process arguments because he is raising these arguments for the first time on appeal and failed to obtain a ruling on them by the circuit court. We will not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal, even constitutional arguments, because doing so deprives the circuit court of the opportunity to fully develop the issue. Accordingly, appellant’s arguments are not preserved for our review. Lewis, 2024 Ark. App. 66, at 11–12, 684 S.W.3d at 269–70 (citations omitted). In the present case, there is no indication that Anthony requested counsel until he filed his answer to DHS’s termination petition. Pursuant to Anthony’s request for counsel, the trial court appointed him counsel on November 16, 2025, which was well in advance of the January 21, 2026 termination hearing. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35- 311(e)(6)(A) provides that appointment of counsel shall be made at a time sufficiently in advance of the court appearance to allow adequate preparation by appointed counsel and adequate consultation between the appointed counselor and the client. Because Anthony did not assert to the trial court that he was not given notice of his right to counsel or that he 15 was denied counsel at the proper time, and the trial had no opportunity to develop or rule on the issue, this argument is not preserved for review. See Lewis, supra; Adame, supra. Under this point, Anthony also complains that DHS failed to make reasonable efforts or provide services to him while he was incarcerated during the case. However, because we affirm the termination of Anthony’s parental rights under the aggravated-circumstances ground as discussed below, this is inconsequential because DHS’s reasonable efforts to provide services is not an element of the aggravated-circumstances ground, and a finding of aggravated circumstances does not require DHS to prove that meaningful services toward reunification were provided. See McCullar v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 15, 683 S.W.3d 202; Ford v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 211.4 B. Statutory Grounds The trial court found that DHS proved five statutory grounds as alleged in its termination petition, and on appeal Anthony addresses each of these grounds and argues that the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous. We have held that proof of only one ground is sufficient to support termination, making it unnecessary to discuss the remaining grounds found by the trial court. See Garrett v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 401, 499 S.W.3d 659. We conclude that the trial court’s finding that Anthony subjected the 4 We observe that at the termination hearing, Anthony’s counsel argued that meaningful services had not been provided only in the context of the proof required on the failure-to-remedy ground, and counsel did not make any due-process or constitutional argument in this regard. 16 children to aggravated circumstances was not clearly erroneous, and we limit our discussion to that statutory ground. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A)–(B)(i) provides a ground for termination when the trial court finds that the parent has subjected the juveniles to aggravated circumstances, meaning that a determination has been made by a judge that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification. When the children were taken into DHS custody in December 2022, Anthony was in prison after having been convicted of two felonies, and he remained in prison when the termination hearing was held in January 2026. We have held that a parent’s incarceration may be considered in finding whether there are aggravated circumstances. See Kohlman v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 164, 544 S.W.3d 595 (holding that the father’s criminal misconduct and incarceration for the majority of the case was an impediment to successful reunification and that it supported a finding of an aggravated circumstance). Moreover, there was evidence that, although Anthony had DHS’s contact information from the beginning of the case, DHS never received any written correspondence or phone calls from Anthony in relation to his children, and Anthony stated that he wrote a letter just once in 2023 but did not know if DHS had received the letter and that he got no response. Anthony made no effort to contact DHS, either directly or through family members, after that despite acknowledging his ability to contact his family. Between Anthony’s incarceration beginning in October 2022 and the termination hearing in January 2026, the only contact Anthony had with MC1 and MC2 was during two two-minute video calls when the children happened 17 to be present when he called his mother and grandmother. Furthermore, DHS family service worker Roquayyah Blake testified that she did not know of any services DHS could offer Anthony that would lead to successful reunification with MC1 and MC2. In addressing the aggravated-circumstances ground in his brief, Anthony states that he expected to be released from prison on June 9, 2026, and that a stable home and employment awaited him upon his release. However, as found by the trial court in the termination order, the jail records introduced at the termination hearing contained contradictory information that his “Good Time / Diminution of Sentence Release Date” was April 20, 2027. Given Anthony’s incarceration, his lack of contact with his children, and his lack of interest demonstrated over an extended period of more than three years, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake in finding that Anthony subjected MC1 and MC2 to aggravated circumstances. We therefore reject Anthony’s argument that DHS failed to prove a ground sufficient to support termination of his parental rights. C. Best Interest Anthony’s remaining argument is that the trial court erred in finding that termination of his parental rights was in MC1’s and MC2’s best interest. An order terminating parental rights must be based on a finding by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children, including consideration of the likelihood of adoption and the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the children to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9- 18 35-325(b)(3)(A). Anthony does not challenge adoptability but argues that there was lack of evidence that the children would be at risk of harm if placed in his custody. Anthony asserts that he has completed numerous services while in prison and that, although he will need some additional time before the children can be returned to him, there was no evidence that he could not safely care for his children upon reunification as he had done before he went to prison. We have held that there is no requirement that the factors of adoptability and potential harm be established by clear and convincing evidence; rather, after consideration of all the relevant factors, the evidence must be clear and convincing that the termination is in the best interest of the child. McFarland v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 91 Ark. App. 323, 210 S.W.3d 143 (2005). The court is not required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Dowdy v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 180, 314 S.W.3d 722. The potential-harm evidence must be viewed in a forward-looking manner and considered in broad terms. Samuels v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 527, 443 S.W.3d 599. In Fraser v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2018 Ark. App. 395, 557 S.W.3d 886, we affirmed the trial court’s best-interest finding because the evidence demonstrated that the appellant had been incarcerated throughout the case and had no relationship with the child. Similarly, in the instant case, Anthony was incarcerated throughout the dependency-neglect proceedings and had virtually no contact with his children during that time. Nor did he make a sustained effort to have any meaningful contact with his children. 19 More than three years passed between the time the children were removed and the termination hearing, and Anthony was still in prison with documentation reflecting an expected release date of more than a year after the termination hearing. The trial court’s finding that termination of Anthony’s parental rights was in MC1’s and MC2’s best interest was consistent with the Juvenile Code’s purpose of providing permanency in children’s lives, and having reviewed the record, we cannot say the trial court’s best-interest finding was clearly erroneous. IV. Conclusion We hold that Anthony’s argument that he was not given notice of his right to counsel and that he was denied counsel at the proper time is not preserved for review because the argument was not raised at the trial level. We hold further that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that DHS proved a statutory ground supporting termination and that termination was in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, the order terminating Anthony’s parental rights is affirmed. Affirmed. TUCKER and WOOD, JJ., agree. Dusti Standridge, for appellant. Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee. Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children. 20