Full Opinion

Affirm and Opinion Filed November 13, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-25-00730-CV KENYETTA HICKMON, INDIVIDUALLY, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL HICKMON AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF M.H. AND E.H., MINORS, ASHLEY MONAE HICKS, LINDA LOUISE WILLIAMS, AND ORESTIA WILLIAMS, Appellants V. AQIB TALIB, Appellee On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-25-08755 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Goldstein, Garcia, and Barbare Opinion by Justice Barbare Kenyetta Hickmon, individually, as personal representative of the estate of Michael Hickmon and as next friend of M.H. and E.H., minors, Ashley Monae Hicks, Linda Louise Williams, and Orestia Williams (collectively, the Hickmon Family) appeal the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Aqib Talib (Talib). In a single issue, the Hickmon Family argues that the trial court erred in granting Talib’s motion for summary judgment on their assault claim against him. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. ALLEGATIONS1 Michael Hickmon (Hickmon) coached a youth football team, the Dragons. On Saturday, August 13, 2022, the Dragons played a game against the Bobcats on the football fields at the Lancaster Community Park in Dallas County. Talib and his brother, Yaqub Talib (Yaqub), both coached teams in the youth football league and attended the game with the Bobcats. The game was tense. Toward the end, the “Bobcats were penalized for taunting, giving the Dragons a first down instead of a turnover on downs.” The Dragons scored on the next play, and “the Bobcats [sic] coaches, including the Talib Defendants, became physically and verbally abusive.” In response, despite playing time remaining on the clock, the referee ended the game early. Once the game ended, Hickmon walked from the Dragons’ sideline onto the field to retrieve his son’s football, which had served as the game ball. On the field, “Talib confronted Hickmon, ultimately throwing a punch.”2 Surprised and outnumbered, Hickmon backpedaled to extricate himself from the situation. Although he fell, he got back on his feet. Shortly thereafter, “Defendant Yaqub Talib pulled a handgun and fired approximately five shots from just a few feet away.” 1 The Hickmon Family’s allegations are taken from their fourth amended petition, which was their live pleading at the time of the summary judgment hearing. See Hernandez-Lara v. CEC Facilities Grp., LLC, No. 05-23-00795-CV, 2025 WL 3091841, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 5, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering the allegations in the plaintiff’s live pleading at the time of the summary judgment hearing). 2 As discussed below, the Hickmon Family presented no evidence that Talib actually threw a punch a Hickmon. –2– Multiple shots hit Hickmon, who was unarmed, and he subsequently died from the gunshot wounds. At the time of the shooting, Talib knew that his brother Yaqub was a convicted felon who was on probation and not legally permitted to carry a handgun. The Hickmon Family sued Talib and Yaqub for negligence, gross negligence, assault, and battery.3 Talib moved for summary judgment on all of the Hickmon Family’s claims against him. Specifically, Talib sought traditional and no-evidence summary judgment on the Hickmon Family’s negligence and gross negligence claims, and no-evidence summary judgment on their assault and battery claims. The trial court granted the motion, and this appeal followed. LAW & ANALYSIS A. Summary Judgment Standard4 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Rosales v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co., 672 S.W.3d 146, 149 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, pet. denied). If no grounds are specified for the ruling, we must affirm if any of the grounds on which judgment is sought are meritorious. Id. We credit evidence favorable to the 3 The Hickmon Family also sued other parties, including the youth football league. However, Yaqub and the other defendants did not join Talib’s motion for summary judgment, and they are not parties to this appeal. Accordingly, we do not discuss these defendants or the claims against them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 4 Rule 166a was recently amended by the Supreme Court of Texas, and the amended rule became effective on March 1, 2026. See Supreme Court of Texas Misc. Docket No. 26-9012 (Feb. 27, 2026). However, the amendments do not apply to summary judgment motions filed before March 1, 2026, which includes this motion for summary judgment. Therefore, all references in this opinion to Rule 166a are to the former rule, which is available as a prior version of the rule on Westlaw and was in effect from September 1, 1997, through February 28, 2026. –3– nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and we disregard evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Id. A party may move for summary judgment “on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). It is well- established that to defeat a no-evidence motion, the nonmovant must produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Powell, 689 S.W.3d 620, 628 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, no pet.); see also Energen Res. Corp. v. Wallace, 642 S.W.3d 502, 514 (Tex. 2022) (“A no-evidence motion for summary judgment immediately shifts the burden to the nonmovant.”); First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Tex. 2017) (“To defeat a no-evidence motion, the non-movant must produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements.”). To avoid the movant’s entitlement to no-evidence summary judgment, the nonmovant “must ‘expressly’ point out fact issues in its written response.” State v. Three Thousand, Seven Hundred Seventy-Four Dollars & Twenty-Eight Cents U.S. Currency, 713 S.W.3d 381, 391 (Tex. 2025). Fact issues are not identified “by mere reference to summary judgment evidence.” Id. The nonmovant must make the trial court aware of the specific evidence it relies on. Id. The trial court does not have the –4– burden of reading every document in the record from start to finish, without guidance from the nonmovant. Id. On appeal, the Hickmon Family argues that the trial court erred in granting Talib’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on their assault claim. They do not challenge the summary judgment on their negligence, gross negligence, or battery claims. B. Hickmon Family’s Assault Claim “The elements of a civil assault mirror those of a criminal assault.” See Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 256 (Tex. 2012). A person commits the offense of “assault” if the person: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person’s spouse; (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury, including the person’s spouse; or (3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a); see also Loaisiga, 379 S.W.3d at 256 (reciting the elements of section 22.01(a)). On appeal, the parties dispute whether the Hickmon Family pleaded a cause of action under section 22.01(a)(1) or (a)(2). In the fact section of the fourth amended petition (discussed above), the Hickman Family alleged that the youth football game was tense and that the referee ended the game early. Once the game was over, Hickmon walked onto the field to –5– retrieve the game ball, which belonged to his son. Talib then “confronted Hickmon, ultimately throwing a punch.” Moreover, under the heading “Causes of Action,” the fourth amended petition included a subheading: “Assault and Battery Claims against Defendants Aqib Talib and Yaqub Talib,” which “incorporate[d] the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.” In this section, the Hickmon Family alleged that Talib and Yaqub “attacked” Hickmon, “causing him bodily harm, and ultimately, death.” Additionally, they contend that Talib started the brawl with Decedent that ultimately led to the fatal shooting by Yaqub Talib. Under Texas law, the Talib Defendants are liable for the reasonably foreseeable results of their assault. In this case, it was negligent and foreseeable to Aqib Talib that his initial assault on Michael Hickmon would result in Yaqub’s use of deadly force. The fourth amended petition alleged that Talib caused bodily injury to Hickmon. None of the Hickmon Family’s allegations would support a claim that Talib merely threatened Hickmon with imminent bodily injury. We conclude that the fourth amended petition asserted a cause of action for assault causing bodily injury pursuant to section 22.01(a)(1) of the penal code. C. No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment & Response Talib moved for no-evidence summary judgment on the ground the Hickmon Family had no evidence that: (1) he acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; (2) he made contact with Hickmon’s person; or (3) his alleged contact caused bodily harm to Hickmon. –6– In their response, the Hickmon Family asserted that no physical contact or injury is required to prove assault-by-threat and “Aqib undoubtedly and intentionally threated Mr. Hickmon with imminent bodily injury, which constitutes a civil assault under Texas law.” The Hickmon Family attached evidence to their summary judgment response.5 Relevant to meeting their summary judgment burden, the family cited Talib’s deposition in which he testified that once he and Hickmon were on the field, Hickmon picked up “the first down marker like a pole” and swung the pole at him. “That’s when everything started. That’s when the scuffle itself started.” His testimony continued: Q. Okay. And then obviously I think - - did you - - did you hit him at all? A. No. Q. Do you remember? A. No. I had a Gatorade water bottle in my hand. It was the middle of summer. I keep a water bottle with me. He swung the [first down marker] pole the first time. I can’t remember if it hit me or not. I threw my water bottle. Q. At Hickmon? A. Yeah, I threw my water bottle at Hickmon, and then he swung it again, and then it hit me in the top of my head, the chain, or it felt like the chain. . . . Then he hit me in my head with the second swing. Q. Okay. And then - - A. I didn’t hit him at all. I didn’t even throw a punch. 5 Talib objected to Exhibits 2, 5, and 6 that were attached to the Hickmon Family’s response. The trial court sustained these objections, and the Hickmon Family did not appeal these evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, we do not consider these exhibits on appeal. See John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v. SuperMedia, L.L.C., 408 S.W.3d 645, 656 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (“We may not consider stricken evidence when reviewing a summary judgment.”). –7– They also attached screenshots taken from a video of the incident. The screenshots show a group of men on a field. In each screenshot, the men’s names have been added to identify them, and we will assume for purposes of this appeal that those identifications are correct. Consistent with Talib’s testimony, the screenshots appear to show Hickmon holding a stick, falling to the ground near an unidentified man, getting back up, running away from the other men, and falling to the ground after he was shot. To defeat Talib’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the Hickmon Family was required to present evidence that (1) Talib made contact with Hickmon’s person and (2) Talib’s alleged contact caused bodily harm to Hickmon. Although Talib conceded in his deposition that he threw a Gatorade bottle at Hickmon, he testified that he “didn’t hit him at all.” No evidence shows that Talib hit Hickmon by punching him, by throwing a Gatorade bottle at him, or by any other means. The Hickmon Family presented no evidence that Talib made contact with Hickmon’s person or that he caused bodily harm to Hickmon. We conclude that the Hickmon Family did not produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements and, thus, did not meet their summary judgment burden. See Powell, 689 S.W.3d at 628 (reciting the standard for responses to no-evidence motions for summary judgment). –8– D. Assault-by-Threat Not Pleaded On appeal, the Hickmon Family maintains that they pleaded an assault-by- threat claim rather than an assault claim based on bodily injury, and that they provided evidence that Talib threatened Hickmon. They argue, then, that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because they produced evidence showing that Talib threatened Hickmon with imminent bodily injury. We disagree. As discussed above, the Hickmon Family pleaded a claim for assault causing bodily injury; the family did not allege an assault-by-threat claim. “Providing only fair notice of factual allegations does not provide fair notice of claims or causes of action asserted based on those alleged facts.” Montelongo v. Abrea, 622 S.W.3d 290, 300 (Tex. 2021). “Furthermore, a claim based on one variation of a cause of action will not ordinarily support a claim based on alternative variations.” See Garrett v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., LLC, 733 S.W.3d 101, 115–16 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2026, pet. denied) (citing Huff Energy Fund, L.P. v. Longview Energy Co., 482 S.W.3d 184, 194, 196–98 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015), aff’d, Longview Energy Co. v. Huff Energy Fund LP, 533 S.W.3d 866, 878 (Tex. 2017)). “Although the pleadings are generally construed liberally in favor of the pleader when special exceptions have not been filed, a defendant is not under an obligation to file special exceptions seeking clarification regarding a cause of action that cannot be reasonably inferred from the existing pleadings.” Id. (citing Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982), and Huff Energy Fund L.P., 482 S.W.3d at 198). –9– “A defendant moving for summary judgment is required to meet the plaintiff’s causes of action as they are pleaded and to demonstrate that the plaintiff cannot prevail on those claims.” MedStar Funding, LC v. Willumsen, 650 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022), opinion supplemented on denial of reh’g, 651 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (citing Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ)). “A summary judgment movant does not have a burden to develop summary judgment evidence and present argument addressing unpleaded claims.” Id. When a claim is raised for the first time in a non-movant’s summary judgment response, that claim does not become part of the live pleading that the movant must disprove in order to prevail. Id. “If, in response to a summary judgment motion, a claimant desires to assert additional claims, then it may file an amended pleading asserting new claims before the hearing without leave, or thereafter and before judgment with the court’s permission.” Id. at 813–14 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)). Talib moved for summary judgment based on the assault cause of action as pleaded. When the Hickmon Family, for the first time in their summary judgment response, asserted that they intended to pursue an assault-by-threat claim, Talib was not required to modify his motion for summary judgment to prevail. If, in response to the summary judgment motion, the Hickmon Family desired to assert a new or additional claim, then they were required to timely file a fifth amended petition –10– containing that claim. They did not do so. The fourth amended petition is the final petition the Hickmon Family filed, and it does not include an assault-by-threat claim. Additionally, a trial court can grant or deny a motion for summary judgment only on the grounds presented. See Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). Talib did not move for summary judgment on the ground that there was no evidence he threatened Hickmon. Accordingly, assault-by-threat could not have been a ground on which the trial court granted the summary judgment motion. See id. E. Motion for Reconsideration In the trial court, the Hickmon Family filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting Talib’s motion for summary judgment and again attached the transcript from Talib’s deposition and screenshots from the video of the incident. In that motion, the Hickmon Family argued that assault does not require proof of an injury and cited the assault-by-threat language in the penal code. The motion stated: “But Plaintiffs do not need to prove an injury in order to maintain a claim for assault under Texas law.” The Hickmon Family further argued that Talib’s motion “does not properly state the elements as to which there is no evidence” as required by rule 166a(i). The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. The order stated that the trial court “reviewed and considered the Motion, the Response of Defendant Aqib Talib, pleadings, documents, evidence and other information on file herein.” –11– When a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed after a summary judgment motion has been heard and ruled upon, the trial court may ordinarily consider only the record as it existed before the motion was first heard. Chang v. Liu, No. 05-20-00977-CV, 2022 WL 17175006, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Circle X Land & Cattle Co. v. Mumford Ind. Sch. Dist., 325 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)). However, if the trial court affirmatively indicates on the record that it accepted or considered the evidence attached to a motion to reconsider, this court reviews “the summary judgment based upon the grounds and proof in both prejudgment and post- judgment filings.” Id. (quoting PNP Petroleum I, LP v. Taylor, 438 S.W.3d 723, 730 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied)). In this case, the trial court affirmatively indicated that it considered the evidence attached to the motion to reconsider. However, that evidence was also attached to the family’s response to the motion for summary judgment, and we discussed it above. Additionally, in their motion for reconsideration, the Hickmon Family did not purport to provide evidence to meet their summary judgment burden based on the elements raised by Talib in his motion. Rather, the Hickmon Family re- urged its argument that Talib did not properly state the elements of assault for which there was no evidence. As explained above, we disagree. The fourth amended petition asserted a claim for assault causing bodily injury, as set forth in section 22.01(a)(1) of the penal code. Talib moved for no-evidence summary judgment on –12– the grounds that the Hickmon Family had no evidence that: (1) he acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; (2) he made contact with Hickmon’s person; or (3) his alleged contact caused bodily harm to Hickmon. The Hickmon Family failed to provide evidence in their response to the motion for summary judgment or their motion for reconsideration to show that Talib made contact with Hickmon’s person or caused bodily injury to Hickmon. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we overrule the Hickmon Family’s sole issue in which they argue that the trial court erred by granting Talib’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. /Cynthia Barbare/ CYNTHIA BARBARE JUSTICE –13–