Erie Ins. Exchange v. Cardinale, L. & N.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket1683 MDA 2025
JudgeBender
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
J-A20038-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LORI & NICHOLAS CARDINALE :
:
Appellants : No. 1683 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered November 5, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s):
2024-CV-05191
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., STABILE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: NOVEMBER 19, 2026
Appellants, Lori and Nicholas Cardinale (the Cardinales), appeal from
the order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Erie Insurance
Exchange (Erie). The Cardinales contend that the trial court erred in
concluding that they were collaterally estopped from pursuing an action for
underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits from Erie. After careful review, we
affirm.
The record reflects that on August 29, 2018, Christine Lunny (Lunny)
was operating a vehicle that struck Mrs. Cardinaleās vehicle from behind. The
parties agreed to resolve the Cardinalesā tort action against Lunny1 through a
binding high/low arbitration agreement, which provided that the award would
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1 We note that the tort action against Lunny also included the carās owner,
Jason Kulick, as a named defendant. See, e.g., Complaint, 8/24/20, at 2;
Arbitration Award, 5/26/23 (single page). However, for ease of discussion we
shall refer to the third-party tortfeasor simply as Lunny.
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be molded to conform to Lunnyās liability policy limits. Erie, the Cardinalesā
insurer, declined to participate in arbitration. See Erieās Complaint, 5/7/24 at
4-10; Cardinalesā Answer and New Matter, 6/6/24 at 1-6 (unnumbered); Erieās
Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/2/25 at 1-3. The record reflects that in an
email dated March 29, 2023, Erie notified the Cardinales that it declined to
participate in the arbitration but requested a copy of the Cardinalesā demand
packet to allow Erie to evaluate the claimed damages āshould a UIM trigger
ultimately exist.ā Erieās Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/2/25 (Exhibit F).
The arbitrator awarded the Cardinales $164,978.00 in damages,
including Mrs. Cardinaleās past, present, and future pain and suffering, medical
expenses, and Mr. Cardinaleās loss of consortium claim. Arbitration Award,
5/26/23 (single page); Erieās Complaint, 5/7/24 at 6. Consistent with the
Arbitration Agreement, the award was molded to Lunnyās $100,000 policy
limit.
The Cardinales pursued a UIM claim under their Erie policy seeking
damages that had not been presented to the arbitrator. In a letter dated June
9, 2023, the Cardinalesā counsel notified Erie that the arbitration award had
not accounted for Mrs. Cardinaleās lost wages, an āeconomic horizon
vocational expert report,ā or a ālife care plan.ā Letter, 6/9/23, at ¶¶1-2. Erieās
response was to offer the Cardinales $64,976.86, which represented the
difference between the arbitration award and Lunnyās policy limits, while
declining to consider the additional damages the Cardinales had identified.
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Cardinalesā Brief in Opposition to Erieās Motion for Summary Judgment,
8/11/25, at 3.
Erie filed a declaratory judgment action in May of 2024, seeking a ruling
that collateral estoppel would bar any UIM recovery beyond $64,976.86.
Following briefing and argument, the trial court granted Erieās motion for
summary judgment on November 5, 2025.
This timely appeal followed. The trial court did not direct the Cardinales
to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the
trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) statement indicating that the rationale for its
decision was set forth in the November 5, 2025 order granting summary
judgment in favor of Erie.
On appeal, the Cardinales raise the following issues:
1. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion in granting summary judgment based on
collateral estoppel where the arbitratorās jurisdiction was
expressly limited by a written [arbitration] agreement to the
resolution of the underlying third-party action [involving
Lunny] and did not extend to [the Cardinalesā UIM] claims?
2. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion by applying collateral estoppel where the
arbitration award exceeded third-party policy limits, triggered
UIM coverage, and was rendered beyond the arbitratorās
limited jurisdiction, contrary to controlling Pennsylvania law?
Cardinalesā Brief at 7 (some formatting altered).
We review a trial court order granting summary judgment bearing in
mind the following principles:
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In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, our scope of
review is plenary, and our standard of review is the same as that
applied by the trial court. Our Supreme Court has stated the
applicable standard of review as follows: An appellate court may
reverse the entry of summary judgment only where it finds that
the lower court erred in concluding that the matter presented no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is clear that the
moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In
making this assessment, we review the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
against the moving party. As our inquiry involves solely questions
of law, our review is de novo.
Therefore, our responsibility as an appellate court is to determine
whether the record either establishes that the material facts are
undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out
a prima facie cause of action, such that there is no issue to be
decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence that would allow a
fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party,
then summary judgment should be denied.
TCS Black Label Realty, LLC v. Serhant Pennsylvania, LLC, 352 A.3d
528, 538 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted and some formatting altered).
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies if:
(1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to one presented
in the later case; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits;
(3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in
privity with a party in the prior case; (4) the party or person privy
to the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding and
(5) the determination in the prior proceeding was essential to the
judgment.
Llaurado v. Garcia-Zapata, 223 A.3d 247, 253 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted). Moreover, this Court has explained that
there is no requirement that there be an identity of parties
between the two actions to invoke the [collateral estoppel] bar.
Parties to a subsequent action need not be the same as those in
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the prior suit in order to raise the question of collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel may be used as either a sword or a shield by a
stranger to the prior action, as long as the party against whom
the defense is invoked is the same.
Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 464 A.2d 1313, 1319, (Pa.
Super. 1983) (some formatting altered and citation omitted). āCollateral
estoppel . . . presents a question of law. Like all questions of law, our standard
of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.ā Gregg v.
Ameriprise Financial, Inc., 195 A.3d 930, 935 (Pa. Super. 2018).
Here, the Cardinales argue that the first and fourth prongs of the test
for collateral estoppel were not met.2 See Cardinalesā Brief at 17, 27;
Llaurado, 223 A.3d at 253 (setting forth the test for collateral estoppel).
Specifically, the Cardinales assert that they were not afforded a full and fair
opportunity to litigate their damages at arbitration and that the trial court
erred by applying collateral estoppel to cap their UIM benefits at $64,976.86
because the gross arbitration award of $164,976.86 exceeded the third-party
policy limits of $100,000. See Cardinalesā Brief at 15-34.
Erie responds that the sole issue on appeal is whether collateral estoppel
bars the Cardinales from recovering UIM benefits beyond $64,976.86, the
amount by which the arbitration award of $164,976.86 exceeded Lunnyās
____________________________________________
2 Because the Cardinales challenge only the first and fourth prongs and offer
no developed argument as to the second, third, and fifth, any challenge to
those prongs is waived. See In re Estate of Anderson, 317 A.3d 997, 1003
(Pa. Super. 2024) (explaining that issues that are not developed in the
appellantās brief are abandoned and, therefore, waived). Accordingly, we
address only prongs one and four of the test set forth in Llaurado.
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policy limits. Erie contends that the trial court correctly applied the doctrine,
as the damages arising from the August 29, 2018 accident were fully
adjudicated during binding arbitration, leaving no basis for the Cardinales to
re-litigate the extent of their damages in a subsequent proceeding against
Erie. See Erieās Brief at 8.
The record reflects that the arbitratorās award provided, in relevant part,
as follows:
AND NOW this 26th day of May 2023, upon consideration of the
Memoranda and exhibits submitted by both parties plus testimony
received before me on May 24, 2023, I hereby Award as follows:
1. Past, present & future pain and suffering to [Mrs.]
Cardinale $140,000.00
2. Past, present & future loss of consortium to [Mr.]
Cardinale $10,000.00
3. Medical expenses $ 14,987.00
Gross Award $164,987.00
Arbitration Award, 5/26/23 (single page) (some formatting altered).
In the order granting Erieās motion for summary judgment, the trial
court explained:
The litigation of any further issues are identical to those presented
at the arbitration. The arbitration rendered a final judgment on
the merits. The party against whom the plea is asserted was in
privity with a party in the arbitration. The party or person in the
doctrine as asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issues at the arbitration. Lastly, the arbitration was essential to
the judgment.
Order, 11/5/25 at 2 (unnumbered).
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In Incollingo v. Maurer, 575 A.2d 939 (Pa. Super. 1990), this Court
addressed a scenario similar to the case at bar. That matter arose from an
automobile accident in which Incollingo was injured when a truck operated by
Keith Alan Maurer, and owned by Maurer Enterprises, Inc., swerved into
oncoming traffic and struck his vehicle. Maurer allegedly swerved to avoid an
unidentified āphantomā vehicle that had suddenly stopped, though that vehicle
was never physically involved in the accident and was never identified. See
id. at 940.
Incollingo sued his own insurer for uninsured motorist (UM) benefits
based on the phantom vehicleās alleged negligence, with coverage capped at
$90,000. An arbitration panel found the phantom vehicle liable and awarded
Incollingo $70,000. Incollingo then filed a personal injury suit against Maurer
and Maurer Enterprises, Inc., seeking additional damages including lost future
income arising from the same accident. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Maurer and Maurer Enterprises, Inc., on collateral
estoppel grounds, and Incollingo appealed, arguing that collateral estoppel
was improper because he was not fully compensated, the arbitration panel did
not explain the basis for its award, and Maurer and Maurer Enterprises, Inc.,
were not parties to the arbitration. See id.
The Incollingo Court affirmed, holding that Incollingoās damages claim
was barred by collateral estoppel. Relevant to our discussion in the instant
case, on the first prong of the test for collateral estoppel, the Court found that
the arbitration panel had been expressly asked to determine both liability and
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damages resulting from the accident, and that Incollingo had presented
evidence of his personal injuries, medical treatment, pain and suffering, and
past and future earnings. The arbitration panel found in Incollingoās favor and
awarded him $70,000. Further, on the fourth prong, the full and fair
opportunity to litigate, the Incollingo Court concluded that Incollingo had
been free to present whatever evidence he wished regarding his damages,
and that the arbitration panel had been fully apprised of the extent of those
damages. See id. at 941-42.
In Sterling v. Fineman, 630 A.2d 1224 (Pa. Super. 1993), the plaintiffs
were in an accident involving defendant Anne Fineman (Fineman) and a
phantom hit and run driver. The plaintiffs filed a claim for UM benefits,
contending that the phantom vehicle bore partial responsibility for their
injuries. The applicable UM policy carried policy limits of $100,000 per person
and $300,000 per occurrence. Following a UM arbitration hearing, the
arbitration panel awarded $40,000 to the plaintiff driver and $50,000 to the
plaintiff passenger. In the separate tort action, Fineman moved for summary
judgment, asserting that collateral estoppel barred re-litigation of the
damages issue, which had already been resolved through the UM arbitration.
Finemanās motion for summary judgment was granted based on collateral
estoppel. See id. at 1225-26.
On appeal to this Court, the plaintiffs contended that since the
arbitration panelās award covered only injuries sustained up to the date of the
hearing, any medical expenses arising afterward represented new damages
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not subject to estoppel. Fineman countered that because the plaintiffs had
already recovered for injuries arising from the same accident, they had been
fully compensated and could not seek additional damages. The Sterling Court
rejected the plaintiffsā position and, in affirming the order granting summary
judgment based on collateral estoppel, stated:
Instantly, plaintiffs proceeded in arbitration on the theory that the
phantom driver caused the accident and the resulting injuries.
Plaintiffs are not before us contending that the claims raised in the
prior arbitration are different from those raised instantly. Rather,
plaintiffs argue that the damages sought previously differ from
those demanded instantly in that they have been incurred since
the arbitration. However, the injuries (claims) upon which these
new and different damages are based remain the same as were
heard in the prior arbitration. Indeed, counselās own statements
reflect that the additional damages sought are those incurred in
the continued treatment of the same injuries. We believe that
based upon the authority of Incollingo, we must reject plaintiffsā
arguments herein and hold that summary judgment was properly
granted. The present state of the law would hold that where a
plaintiff has previously litigated a claim under the uninsured
motorist provisions of an insurance policy, he is collaterally
estopped from pursuing the same claim of injury again against a
new defendant even though he may have incurred additional
damages.
Id. at 1230.
Here, the Cardinales argue that Incollingo and Sterling are
distinguishable. See Cardinalesā Brief at 17-21. The Cardinales contend that
in both Incollingo and Sterling, the appellants were awarded full
compensation for their injuries during arbitration because they were awarded
damages within the applicable policy limits. See Cardinalesā Brief at 17-21.
Here, however, the Cardinalesā damages were in excess of the $100,000.00
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policy limit. Id. at 21. The Cardinales aver that Incollingo and Sterling
apply only when the award falls below the tortfeasorās policy limits, and that
an award exceeding those limits is beyond the arbitratorās jurisdiction. Id. at
22. The Cardinales further assert that the arbitratorās jurisdiction was limited
to addressing only the third-party issue and did not involve claims concerning
coverage under the Erie policy of insurance. Id. In support, the Cardinales
state:
It is clear by the actions of the [Cardinales] that due to the policy
constraints and the arbitratorās limited jurisdiction their strategy
at the arbitration was to offer only the amount of damages they
believed would be necessary in order to exhaust the third-party
policy limit in the arbitration. In furtherance of this, the
[Cardinales] invited [Erie] to attend the third-party arbitration but
[Erie] by and through Mr. Andrew Waxman, declined to
participate. In doing so, the [Cardinales] were under the
impression that by declining to attend the arbitration, the UIM
policy afforded to the [Cardinales] by [Erie] would not be
implicated nor included in any way by the third-party arbitration.
Id. at 22-23.
Pursuant to Incollingo and Maurer, damages arising from a single
accident that were resolved in arbitration cannot be re-litigated in a later
proceeding. Incollingo, 575 A.2d at 942; Sterling, 630 A.2d at 1230. As
stated above, the Cardinales contend that Incollingo and Sterling apply only
in cases where an arbitration award falls short of the tortfeasorās policy limits,
and that any award exceeding those limits lies outside the arbitratorās
jurisdiction. Cardinalesā Brief at 20-24. However, the Cardinales offer no
authority directly on point to support this conclusion. Moreover, because the
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arbitration agreement and its limitations were never presented to the
arbitrator, we conclude that he was unconstrained in his authority to award
whatever amount he deemed necessary to fully compensate the Cardinales.
The arbitration agreement that capped the Cardinalesā recovery from the
third-party tortfeasor was an arrangement between the Cardinales and the
third-party tortfeasor and had no effect on the arbitratorās jurisdiction. While
the arbitrator did not know the terms of the agreement, the Cardinales did,
and they were therefore aware that it did not contain any limitations with
respect to the amount of the possible award or limiting language concerning
collateral estoppel.3
Additionally, we find no support for the Cardinalesā position that their
omission of certain damages defeats collateral estoppel. The Cardinalesā
strategy at arbitration was deliberately limited to presenting only evidence of
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3 In their reply brief, the Cardinales cite to Muse v. Cermak, 630 A.2d 891
(Pa. Super. 1993), as support for their claim that collateral estoppel should
not apply in the case at bar. Cardinalesā Reply Brief at 6-7. Muse is
distinguishable. In Muse, the arbitration expressly stated that any decision
made under that arbitration agreement
is not res judicata to the same or similar issues in companion
claims or any other claim between the arbitrating companies. It
is conclusive only of the controversy in the claim submitted to the
panel and has no legal or moral effect on any other claim or suit
arising out of the same accident or occurrence.
Muse, 630 at 893. In the instant case, there was no limiting language
concerning collateral estoppel or res judicata in the arbitration agreement,
and as such, we cannot conclude Muse applies or that the arbitration
agreement precluded the application of collateral estoppel.
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damages to exhaust the third-party policy limits, and they invited Erie to
attend, but Erie declined. See Cardinalesā Brief at 22-23. At arbitration, the
Cardinales chose not to present certain evidence of Mrs. Cardinaleās damages.
The Cardinalesā failure to present evidence was a choice of their own making,
as there is no support in the record that they were precluded from raising any
and all damages. Their decision not to pursue certain claims at that time was
their own, and they cannot now use that omission as a basis to escape the
estoppel bar. Sterling expressly held that post-arbitration damages for the
same injuries are precluded, Sterling, 630 A.2d at 1230, and furthermore,
we find persuasive the decision in Anthem Personal Ins. Co. v. Vargo, 30
Pa. D. & C.4th 193, 198-99, 1996 WL 908702, at *4 (C.C.P. Bucks 1996).4
In Anthem, the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas rejected the
defendantsā contention that because they did not put on their full case with all
their evidence, collateral estoppel should not apply to preclude their
subsequent UIM claim against Anthem after arbitration. The Anthem Court
stated āwhether this was a tactical mistake on the part of the defendants or
whether they undervalued their case in agreeing to submit to a hearing where
there was a $25,000 cap and now believe they should have gotten more for
their injuries, is of no concern to usā as the defendants were bound by the
prior arbitration proceeding and concluding that defendants were estopped
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4 See Huber v. Etkin, 58 A.3d 772, 778 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2012) (noting that
decisions from the courts of common pleas are not binding precedent on
appellate courts but may be considered for their persuasive authority).
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from pursuing the UIM claim after arbitration. Id. at *4. Having chosen not
to advance certain claims during arbitration, the Cardinales cannot now point
to that deliberate omission as a means of avoiding the consequences of
collateral estoppel.
Moreover, we fail to see how Erieās decision not to participate in the
arbitration impacts the collateral estoppel analysis. Here, the Cardinales, the
party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the
arbitration, and Erieās participation or lack thereof was immaterial to the
application of collateral estoppel. See Llaurado, 223 A.3d at 253 (setting
forth the requirements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel).5
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5 The Cardinales cite to McNally vs. Dagney, 510 A.2d 722 (Pa. Super.
1986), and assert that it is unclear whether the trial court relied on the
evidence when finding that the Cardinales had a full and fair opportunity to
argue the issue of damages because the trial court mentioned only the
arbitratorās award and the concept of collateral estoppel in its opinion. See
Cardinalesā Brief at 29-31. In McNally, the plaintiff was a passenger in an
automobile involved in a collision with a vehicle being driven by an unknown
driver. The plaintiff brought an action against his own insurer under the UM
provisions of his policy. Following arbitration, the plaintiff was awarded
damages in an amount less than the policy coverage. The plaintiff then
proceeded with a trespass action against the driver of the vehicle in which he
was a passenger (the defendant). The trial court entered summary judgment
in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, and this Court reversed and
remanded for further proceedings. The McNally Court stated that the plaintiff
is not entitled to recover duplicate damages, but on the record before the
Court, it was impossible to determine if the plaintiff was seeking to recover
identical damages. The Court further noted āa second automobile accident in
which [plaintiff] was involved,ā and remarked that documents concerning that
separate accident āmay be relevant to the extent that [plaintiffās] injuries
resulting from the two accidents overlap.ā Id. at 725, n.7. Ultimately, the
McNally Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to determine if
identical issues were litigated in the prior proceeding and remand was
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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After careful review, we conclude that the first and fourth prongs of the
collateral estoppel test were satisfied. See Llaurado, 223 A.3d at 253
(setting forth the five-pronged test for the application of collateral estoppel).
The damages arising from the automobile accident were at issue in both the
arbitration proceeding and the subsequent claims against Erie, and the
Cardinales were afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the
arbitration proceeding. Accordingly, we discern no error in the trial court
decision, and we affirm the order granting summary judgment in favor of Erie.
See TCS Black Label Realty, 352 A.3d at 538.
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necessary to determine whether the damages claimed in the trespass action
were the same as those claimed in the arbitration proceeding. Id. at 725.
Here, while the trial court did not provide its findings or the rationale for its
decision in its opinion or order, we may affirm the trial court on any correct
basis. See Shamnoski v. PG Energy a Div. of Southern Union Co., 765
A.2d 297, 303 (Pa. Super. 2000). In the instant matter, we are neither faced
with a second automobile accident, nor a record that is unclear or so lacking
in information that we cannot discern what was raised at arbitration and what
the Cardinales sought to recover from Erie. We conclude that remand is
therefore not necessary and McNally is inapposite.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/19/2026
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