Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1737 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ Zale E. Owens, Executor of the Estate of John R. Owens, Deceased, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Connie J. Owens, Defendant–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Benton County, The Honorable Lars G. Anderson, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Peter C. Riley (argued) of Tom Riley Law Firm, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant. Theodore T. Appel (argued) and Kevin C. Rigdon of Bradley & Riley PC, Cedar Rapids, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Greer, P.J. 1 GREER, Presiding Judge. Zale Owens, as the executor of his father’s estate (the Estate), appeals the district court order granting summary judgment in favor of Connie Owens on the Estate’s claim for past crop and rental proceeds from previously co-owned real property.1 On appeal, the Estate argues the district court improperly concluded the doctrine of claim preclusion applied to bar the Estate’s claim. Because Connie is correct that the claim for past crop and rental proceeds could have and should have been fully adjudicated in the partition action that now is fully resolved, on our review, we affirm. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Prior to his death, John Owens owned undivided fractional interests in nine pieces of real property in Benton and Linn Counties. Other relatives held the remaining interests. Relevant to this appeal, John had an undivided one-half interest in a Benton County property (the Property) as tenants in common with Connie, his sister-in-law. Connie’s residence was on the Property, and the Property also had tillable farmland. Connie admits that the Property has generated crops or rental income from tenant farmers over the years. When John died in July 2020, his property interests passed to the Estate. Zale was eventually appointed the Estate’s sole executor. Zale determined that the Estate’s assets could not be divided until the common ownership issues with the properties were resolved. To accomplish that goal, in February 2023, the Estate filed a partition action against the property owners and Estate beneficiaries to sever the For ease of reference, after providing their full name, we will refer to members of 1 the Owens family by their first names. 2 common ownership of all nine parcels of land, including the Property. In the petition, the Estate requested the district court, among other things, “identify[] the interests in property” and “grant appropriate equitable relief in connection with the partition of the property.” The parties—except for one defendant, Janis Owens, who was served but eventually defaulted—began negotiating an agreement to exchange ownership interests to settle the partition issue. Eventually, these parties created a partition exchange agreement (the Agreement) to “resolv[e] all issues in [the] partition action.” Relevant here, the parties agreed that the Estate would transfer its interest in the Property to Connie in exchange for Connie’s interest in several other parcels of property. The Agreement did not contain a release-of-claims or reservation-of-rights clause. All parties, except Janis, executed the Agreement. On January 5, 2024, the court entered an order approving the Agreement among the parties and entering judgment against Janis, binding her to the terms of the Agreement. The court “retain[ed] jurisdiction to do any other acts necessary to effectuate the [Agreement].” Thereafter, issues arose with the Estate performing its obligations under the Agreement. Specifically, sometime after executing the Agreement, the Estate had the properties surveyed, which, in the Estate’s view, showed “that the lots did not have the same size as [the Estate] understood them to have when [the Estate] entered into the [Agreement].” After that, the Estate “stopped taking the actions [the Estate] and [its] attorney were ordered to do to finalize this case.” The Estate failed to transfer record title of the Property to Connie in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. 3 On June 24, the court requested the parties submit a status report describing “their positions with regard to what, if any, further action should be taken by the Court in this matter and if any further action should be taken, what the timeline would be for the Court to take such action.” On July 15, the Estate submitted a status report indicating that three months would be sufficient to resolve the remaining issues. Based on the Estate’s status report, on July 16, the district court entered an order giving the parties until October 31 to finalize the transfers in accordance with the Agreement. The court warned, “If no further filings have been made by this deadline, the matter may be dismissed without prejudice, at [the Estate’s] cost, and without further notice to the parties.” Despite the court’s order, the Estate failed to take the steps necessary to finalize the property transfers. On October 29, Connie and the other defendants filed a motion to enforce the Agreement. The court held a hearing on the motion on February 28, 2025. On March 3, after the hearing but before the court’s ruling, the Estate filed the petition in this case, seeking a money judgment for one-half the value of crops produced and rents paid on the Property since March 1, 2020. According to the Estate, Connie had not paid any crop or rental proceeds to John or the Estate, and as a tenant in common with Connie, the Estate was entitled to fifty percent of these proceeds. On March 8, in the partition action, the district court entered an order confirming that the Agreement was court-approved and binding on the parties. The court noted that the Estate had not filed any request to vacate or modify the Agreement, nor had the Estate explained why it failed to do so. The court described the current posture of the case as follows: 4 The present situation involves a settlement agreement which was already approved by the Court. This is a substantial distinction that both parties glossed over at the hearing. Once the court approves the settlement agreement and incorporates its terms into a court decree, it is the decree— not the parties’ agreement and stipulation—that determines the parties’ rights. The intent of the parties is no longer relevant. It is the Court’s intent which matters. It is clear [the January 5, 2024 order] intended to approve the [Agreement] and ordered [the Estate] and [its] counsel to execute certain actions to finalize the case in accordance with the [Agreement]. No evidence was presented to the contrary. As stated above, the [Estate] failed to file any appropriate motion, application, or petition to vacate or modify [the January 5] order. It is unclear what remedy the court could now provide without a proper motion before the Court. The [Estate]’s position is in essence to allow it to completely ignore [the January 5] order, as if it was never entered, and try to negotiate a new agreement which is better for the [Estate] and to the Defendants’ detriment. The undersigned sees no legal support for this position. The way to enforce a court order is to file for contempt of court pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter 665. The Defendants have not taken this step. Therefore, the Court will not make any findings related to contempt. Under the present procedural posture, the Court can take no action except to grant the motion to enforce to the extent that it was previously approved and ordered by the Court. The [Estate] has failed to present any argument to the Court which would allow it to vacate or modify [the January 5] order at this time. Furthermore, the evidence presented at the hearing was otherwise insufficient to rule in the [Estate]’s favor. (Internal citations omitted). The court also reiterated, “[T]he obligation to implement the partition agreement remains and [the Estate] must follow the court order.” In its ruling, the court confirmed the motion was “granted to clarify to the parties that the [Agreement] has already been reviewed and approved by the district court.” The court ordered the Estate and its counsel to comply with the order and Agreement. 5 On May 29, in the present case, Connie answered, denying the Estate’s claims and raising several affirmative defenses, including that the Estate’s claims were “barred by the doctrine of res judicata and, specifically, [the] settlement agreement reached between the parties.” In June, Connie filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the partition action had settled all issues, including any right to proceeds from farming or renting the Property, and the Estate’s claims were therefore barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. The Estate resisted. The district court agreed with Connie, concluded the Estate’s claims were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, and granted Connie’s motion for summary judgment. The Estate filed a motion to reconsider, enlarge, or amend, which the court denied. The Estate appeals. II. Standard of Review. We review a summary judgment ruling for correction of legal error. Pavone v. Kirke, 807 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue of material fact after a review of the entire record.” Id. We review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether the movant has “established entitlement to judgment on the merits as a matter of law.” Id. (citation omitted). III. Analysis. On appeal, the parties dispute whether the doctrine of claim preclusion applies to the Estate’s request for past crop and rental proceeds from the Property. Specifically, they disagree about whether the Agreement was a final judgment on the merits and whether the proceeds claim could have been fully and fairly adjudicated in the partition action. 6 “The general rule of claim preclusion holds that a valid and final judgment on a claim bars a second action on the adjudicated claim or any part thereof.” Id. at 835. Our supreme court has previously addressed the policy underlying the claim preclusion doctrine: The policy of the law underlying claim preclusion is that a claim cannot be split or tried piecemeal. Thus, a party must try all issues growing out of the claim at one time and not in separate actions. An adjudication in a prior action between the same parties on the same claim is final as to all issues that could have been presented to the court for determination. Simply put, a party is not entitled to a “second bite” simply by alleging a new theory of recovery for the same wrong. Id. at 835–36 (citation omitted). The doctrine applies equally “to matters actually determined in an earlier action” and “to all relevant matters that could have been determined.” Id. at 835 (citation omitted). For that reason, claim preclusion may apply to bar “litigation on matters the parties never litigated in the first claim.” Id. To successfully assert claim preclusion, the party seeking to use the doctrine must show: (1) the parties in the first and second action are the same parties or parties in privity, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the first action, and (3) the claim in the second suit could have been fully and fairly adjudicated in the prior case (i.e., both suits involve the same cause of action). Id. at 836. The parties do not dispute the first element. Instead, they disagree about whether the second and third elements have been met in this case. We address both elements in turn. 7 A. Whether There Was a Final Judgment on the Merits in the Partition Action. The district court concluded that the January 5, 2024 order approving the Agreement in the partition action constituted a final judgment on the merits as it was “a full resolution of the common ownership of property contemplated by the Petition, and [left] no issue to be resolved by the Court, aside from effectuating the conveyance of property interests.” On appeal, the Estate argues that because the Agreement had not been fully consummated, additional court involvement could still be necessary, and for that reason neither the Agreement nor the order approving the Agreement is a final judgment on the merits of the case. Yet, at oral argument, the Estate conceded it was bound by the Agreement, at least, as far as the exchange of property was concerned. A final judgment “finally adjudicates the rights of the parties.” In re M.W., 894 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted). “It must put it beyond the power of the court which made it to place the parties in their original position.” Id. (citation omitted). Regarding voluntary settlement agreements, “in the absence of an express reservation of rights, a settlement agreement disposes of all claims between the parties arising out of the event to which the agreement related.” Peak v. Adams, 799 N.W.2d 535, 544 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted). Generally, settlements end with the plaintiff dismissing the case with prejudice. Our supreme court has previously concluded that “[a] dismissal filed as part of a settlement agreement is considered a final adjudication to prevent multiple litigation over the same claims or issues.” Phipps v. Winneshiek Cnty., 593 N.W.2d 143, 147 (Iowa 1999). Based on that, “a voluntary dismissal can constitute a final adjudication of the claims and issues of a dismissed lawsuit.” Id. 8 In this case, however, no dismissal of the partition action has been filed. For that reason, we must look at other facts to determine whether there was a final judgment on the merits. On our review, we conclude that the district court properly found that the Agreement and order approving the Agreement constitute a final judgment on the merits. The Agreement’s purpose was to “resolv[e] all issues in [the] partition action,” which was filed to sever the common ownership of the co-owned properties, including the Property. The Estate and Connie both accepted and executed the Agreement, which did not contain a reservation of rights. The Estate did not file any motion to amend or set aside the Agreement. The district court accepted the Agreement in its January 5, 2024 order. The Estate did not move to modify or vacate the court order at any time, nor did the Estate appeal the order. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1012 (correcting, vacating, or modifying judgment); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.103 (reviewing final orders on appeal). The time for the Estate to file such a motion or appeal has passed. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1013(1) (timing of motion under rule 1.1012); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(b) (timing of appeal). Thereafter, the district court reaffirmed the finality and effect of the Agreement in its ruling on the motion to enforce the Agreement. In the ruling on the motion to enforce, the district court concluded that the Estate had no evidence that Connie or any of the other defendants breached the Agreement, nor could the Estate present evidence of “fraud, misrepresentation or concealment which would lead the court to reject the [A]greement.” The court also found “insufficient evidence of an actual factual mistake on the dimensions of the lots.” The court found no merit to any argument that the Estate could avoid the Agreement, concluding, “Parties are bound by their contracts even if they later realize they could have 9 gotten a better deal or otherwise should have done more due diligence before entering into the contract.” The Estate did not appeal this ruling, and the time to do so has passed. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(b). For the above-stated reasons, we conclude, based on the unique facts of this case, that the Agreement and order approving the Agreement constituted a final judgment on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion. The district court properly found for Connie on this element. B. Whether the Proceeds Claim Could Have Been Fully and Fairly Adjudicated in the Partition Action. The district court concluded that the crop and rental proceeds claim originated from and was connected to the Property and the claim could have been brought during the partition action. On appeal, the Estate argues that it could not have joined or litigated the proceeds claim during the partition action. At the outset, we note that it was the Estate’s “duty to explore and discover all of [its] possible causes of action and to bring them at the same time [it] brought [its] first claim.” Arnevik v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents, 642 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Iowa 2002). Relatedly, under Iowa Code section 651.9 (2023), “Real and personal property owned by the same person may be partitioned in the same action.” Regarding joinder of claims in a partition action, Iowa Code section 651.7 provides: A party may perfect or quiet title to property that is subject to a partition petition or request adjudication of a right of a party as to any matter originating from or connected to the property, including a lien between any parties. Except as permitted by this section, a joinder of any other claim to a partition petition shall not be permitted. A counterclaim to a partition petition shall not be permitted. (Emphasis added). While section 651.7 statutorily limits the kinds of claims that may be joined in a partition action, the Estate does not address why a 10 claim for crop and rental proceeds would not constitute a “matter originating from or connected to the property.” We find the Estate’s other arguments regarding limitations on joinder unavailing. While joinder of claims may be disallowed or statutorily limited in certain cases, those scenarios do not apply here. See Struve v. Struve, 930 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Iowa 2019) (discussing cases disallowing joinder); see also Gansen v. Gansen, 874 N.W.2d 617, 621 (Iowa 2016) (“By requiring joinder of additional claims, what was originally a relatively simple and straightforward action can become much more complicated. A requirement of joinder of claims might therefore deter the effective use of declaratory actions.”). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Estate could have joined and pursued the proceeds claim in the partition action. Even so, we must determine whether the Estate’s failure to pursue the claim in the partition action implicates the doctrine of claim preclusion to bar the Estate from pursuing the claim in this case. In determining whether a claim could have been fully and fairly adjudicated in a prior action, we must decide “whether both suits involve the same cause of action.” Pavone, 807 N.W.2d at 837. Our supreme court has previously adopted the Restatement (Second) of Judgments explanation of a single cause of action, which connotes a natural grouping or common nucleus of operative facts. Among the factors relevant to a determination whether the facts are so woven together as to constitute a single claim are their relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether, taken together, they form a convenient unit for trial purposes. Though no single factor is determinative, the relevance of trial convenience makes it appropriate to ask how far the witnesses or proofs in the second action would tend to overlap the witnesses or proofs relevant to the first. If there is a substantial overlap, the second action should ordinarily be held precluded. But the opposite 11 does not hold true; even when there is not a substantial overlap, the second action may be precluded if it stems from the same transaction or series. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. b (A.L.I. 1982)). We may find that the claims are the same “if the acts complained of, and the recovery demanded, are the same, or when the same evidence will support both actions.” Leuchtenmacher v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 460 N.W.2d 858, 860 (Iowa 1990). “If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.” Iowa Coal Min. Co. v. Monroe Cnty., 555 N.W.2d 418, 443 (Iowa 1996) (citation omitted). In making this determination, we consider: “(1) the protected right, (2) the alleged wrong, and (3) the relevant evidence.” Id. at 441. The Estate argues that Hoth v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co., 577 N.W.2d 390 (Iowa 1998), stands for the proposition that a settlement agreement is only binding as to the subject matter of the agreement. The Estate is correct that Hoth states, “Under claim preclusion law, consent judgments are binding on the parties thereto with respect to the subject of the judgment consented to.” 577 N.W.2d at 391. However, Hoth—which involved issue preclusion rather than claim preclusion—did not cite any authority in favor of that proposition. Id. Further, Hoth continued by reiterating that Iowa had adopted the Restatement (Second) of Judgments approach “concerning the dimension of a claim.” Id. at 391–92. The Restatement (Second) provides: When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the rules of merger and bar, the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. 12 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (A.L.I. 1982) (cleaned up) (emphasis added); see also Hoth, 577 N.W.2d at 391–92. We do not find Hoth supports the Estate’s narrow view of claim preclusion. The Estate also argues that the district court misapplied Shivvers v. Hertz Farm Management, Inc., 595 N.W.2d 476 (Iowa 1999), to the Estate’s proceeds claims. The court cited Shivvers, which in turn cites Hoth, for the proposition that “consent judgments that are a bar to refiling are binding on both the parties and their privies.” Shivvers, 595 N.W.2d at 481. The district court cited Shivvers in its discussion about the finality of the judgment in the partition action, not whether the claims in both actions were the same. Additionally, Shivvers does not cite Hoth for the proposition that consent judgments are preclusive only to the extent of the agreement. For that reason, Shivvers similarly does not support the Estate’s narrow view of claim preclusion. We conclude that the partition claim and the proceeds claim arise out of “a natural grouping or common nucleus of operative facts” such that they are the same cause of action for purposes of claim preclusion. Pavone, 807 N.W.2d at 837 (citation omitted). Importantly, the Estate brought the partition action as an equitable proceeding to resolve common ownership issues arising from the Estate’s co-ownership of several properties. Specifically, regarding the Property, the partition action addressed the common ownership between the Estate and Connie. The proceeds claim arises out of the Estate and Connie’s common ownership of the Property. Based on that, the claims are related in space, origin, and motivation, and would have formed a convenient unit for trial purposes. See id. Additionally, the evidence applicable to both the partition claim and the proceeds claim substantially overlaps. The relevant evidence in both 13 cases includes evidence regarding the co-ownership of the Property. While the proceeds claim would involve additional evidence regarding the value of any proceeds from farming or renting the Property, this evidence would have been relevant to and readily available in the partition action. Because there is substantial overlap of the evidence in both cases, these claims constitute the same cause of action for claim preclusion purposes. See id; see also Arnevik, 642 N.W.2d at 321 (“Even though some of the facts necessary to prove [the plaintiff’s] claim based on contract may be different, that does not change the fact [the plaintiff ] was required to bring forth all potential theories of recovery at the time of the first action.”). Based on the foregoing, the Estate’s claim regarding crop and rental proceeds from the Property could have, and should have, been fully adjudicated in the partition action. Because the Estate failed to pursue the proceeds claim in the partition action, the Estate is now barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion from doing so in this case. We find no error in the district court’s summary judgment ruling. IV. Conclusion. Upon our review, we conclude the doctrine of claim preclusion barred the Estate’s proceeds claim and affirm the district court order granting summary judgment in Connie’s favor. AFFIRMED. 14