Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00356-CV ___________________________ AURELIO ROMO, Appellant V. FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court Young County, Texas Trial Court No. CV05255 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION Following Appellant Aurelio Romo’s failure to pay his mortgage, the lender foreclosed on his property, and Appellee Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Federal Home) purchased it at the foreclosure sale. Federal Home sent Romo a notice to vacate, but he refused to surrender possession. Federal Home then filed a forcible-detainer suit, and the trial court found in Federal Home’s favor and awarded it immediate possession of the property. Romo filed this pro se appeal. In four issues,1 Romo contends that the trial court erred by awarding Federal Home possession because (1) legally insufficient evidence supports Federal Home’s superior right to immediate possession and (2) the disputed validity of the foreclosure deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. Because legally sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s award of immediate possession to Federal Home, and because Federal Home was not required to prove title to prevail in its forcible- detainer suit, we will affirm. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2019, Romo executed a thirty-year promissory note (the Note) to purchase real property (the Property) in Young County, Texas. The Note was secured by a deed of trust. The deed of trust authorized the mortgage holder, upon Romo’s breach of any covenant or agreement, to accelerate the Note and foreclosure on the Property, Although he enumerates four, Romo substantively raises two issues. 1 2 and it empowered a trustee to sell the Property to the highest bidder. The deed of trust also required Romo to “immediately surrender possession of the Property to the purchaser of that sale” if the Property was sold at foreclosure and provided that, if he failed to do so, he “shall be a tenant at sufferance and may be removed by writ of possession or other court proceeding.” Romo later stopped making payments on the Note, prompting the mortgage holder to accelerate the debt and move forward with foreclosure. In October 2024, a substitute trustee sold the Property at foreclosure to Federal Home. On January 20, 2025, Federal Home sent Romo a notice to vacate and demand for possession.2 The notice instructed Romo to vacate the Property within three days of delivery and warned him that Federal Home would file suit if he refused to surrender possession. Romo nevertheless remained in possession of the Property. On February 4, 2025, Federal Home responded by filing a forcible-detainer suit against Romo in a justice court in Young County. In its verified petition, Federal Home alleged that it had purchased the Property at foreclosure and provided written notice requiring Romo to vacate but that Romo refused to surrender possession. The justice court held a jury trial, and the jury found in Federal Home’s favor. The justice court signed a judgment awarding Federal Home possession of the Property. Romo appealed to the County Court of Young County (the trial court) for 2 The notice was sent via certified mail and delivered on January 24, 2025. 3 a de novo trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.19 (governing the right to appeal a forcible- detainer judgment from justice court to county court). The trial court conducted a bench trial.3 To support its forcible-detainer claim, Federal Home offered three exhibits: (1) the deed of trust establishing Romo’s status as a tenant at sufferance, (2) the substitute trustee’s deed4 naming Federal Home as the grantee, and (3) a business-records affidavit containing the notice to vacate and demand for possession. Romo challenged the propriety of the foreclosure.5 Romo proceeded pro se. 3 Federal Home offered a certified copy of the substitute trustee’s deed. 4 Romo contended that the foreclosure was wrongful because he did not “sign a 5 second contract” with the successive mortgage holder. The record reflects that the original lender assigned the Note to another mortgage holder, and Romo appears to argue that he needed to sign a “second contract” with the subsequent mortgagee. Romo also asserted that the foreclosure was wrongful because the Note’s paperwork did not match his “name,” explaining, “This is my ID. I’m not the all capital letters name. I’m a state national. For me as private man I have to have a contract with commerce. Otherwise, there’s nothing between us if we don’t have a contract.” The trial court inquired into Romo’s name and ID: THE COURT: Who issues this? MR. ROMO: Huh? We make it. This is not state. THE COURT: This is just an ID you have made for yourself? MR. ROMO: Yes. I’m not -- I’m not part of the state if you know what I mean. THE COURT: I don’t know what you mean. What do you mean? MR. ROMO: Meaning I’m a private man. 4 At Federal Home’s request, the trial court took judicial notice of the court’s file and the exhibits. The trial court found in Federal Home’s favor and awarded it possession of the Property. Romo filed this appeal.6 After the judgment, Federal Home moved for issuance and execution of a writ of possession,7 and the trial court granted the writ. The writ, however, remained unexecuted. Federal Home then moved to compel the constable to execute, and the trial court granted that motion and ordered the constable to execute the writ.8 Despite the order, the record reflects that Romo remains in possession of the Property.9 III. DISCUSSION A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE In his first and fourth issues, Romo contends that the trial court erred by awarding Federal Home possession of the Property because there is legally insufficient evidence to support Federal Home’s superior right to immediate possession. We disagree. 6 No findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested or filed. 7 Federal Home asserted that Romo had failed to post a supersedeas bond. See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.007 (providing that a county court judgment may not be stayed pending appeal unless the appellant files a supersedeas bond within ten days of the signing of the judgment and that failure to post the bond renders the judgment immediately enforceable by writ of possession). 8 The trial court granted the writ of possession on September 30, 2025. As of January 9, 2026, the writ remained unexecuted. 9 The record does not contain the completed “Sheriff/Constable’s Return.” 5 1. Standard of Review We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding. Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727–28 (Tex. 2003). More than a scintilla exists if the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair- minded people to differ in their conclusions. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658. 2. Applicable Law A tenant at sufferance commits a forcible detainer when he refuses to surrender possession of real property on written demand by the person entitled to 6 possession of that property. See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.002.10 A plaintiff in a forcible- detainer suit can establish “the superior right to immediate possession by establishing the fact of a foreclosure pursuant to a deed of trust that created a tenancy at sufferance after the foreclosure.” Askew v. Mena Homes, Inc., No. 02-19-00181-CV, 2020 WL 579121, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 6, 2020, pet. denied) (quoting Martinez v. Cerberus SFR Holdings, L.P., No. 02-19-00076-CV, 2019 WL 5996984, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 14, 2019, pet. denied)). To prevail in a forcible-detainer action, the plaintiff need not prove title but only sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Woods v. Pennymac Loan Servs., L.L.C., No. 02-12-00301-CV, 2013 WL 4506776, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 22, 2013, no pet.). To prove its forcible-detainer claim, Federal Home had to show that (1) it owned the Property; (2) Romo became a tenant at sufferance when Federal Home purchased the Property under the deed of trust; (3) Federal Home provided proper notice to Romo to vacate the Property; and (4) Romo refused to vacate the Property. See Girard v. AH4R I TX DFW, LLC, No. 02-13-00112-CV, 2014 WL 670198, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 20, 2014, no pet.); see also Tex. Prop. Code § 24.002. 10 The Texas Legislature enacted a substantial revision of Chapter 24 effective January 1, 2026. See Act of May 28, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., ch. 960, 2025 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2155, 2163. In turn, the Texas Supreme Court revised the eviction rules in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure effective January 1, 2026. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510 cmt. Federal Home’s petition was filed before January 1, 2026. Therefore, all citations in this opinion to statutes and rules are to those in effect at the time this case was tried in the trial court. 7 3. Analysis As mentioned, Federal Home introduced three exhibits: (1) the deed of trust establishing Romo’s post-foreclosure status as a tenant at sufferance, (2) the substitute trustee’s deed naming Federal Home as the grantee of the Property, and (3) a business-records affidavit containing the notice to vacate and demand for possession. The substitute trustee’s deed showed that Federal Home purchased the Property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The deed of trust showed that Romo became a tenant at sufferance after the foreclosure. The notice to vacate showed that Federal Home demanded possession and that Romo received written notice requiring him to leave. The record also shows that Romo continued to occupy the Property at the time of trial, and his appeal from the justice court’s judgment was itself a tacit concession that he remained in possession of the Property after receiving Federal Home’s notice to vacate.11 We conclude that Federal Home presented more than a scintilla of evidence with respect to each element of its forcible-detainer claim. Cf. Tex. Prop. Code 11 See Brittingham v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 02-12-00416-CV, 2013 WL 4506787, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 22, 2013, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (holding that there was sufficient refusal-to-vacate evidence based in part on appellant’s tacit admission that he remained in possession by appealing judgment); Mekeel v. U.S. Bank Nat’l. Ass’n, 355 S.W.3d 349, 359 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, pet. dism’d) (holding that there was sufficient refusal-to-vacate evidence based in part on the appellant’s continued pursuit of appeals); Rodriguez v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 03-10-00093-CV, 2011 WL 182122, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 6, 2011, no pet.) (“Rodriguez has tacitly conceded that she has remained in possession of the property by continuing to prosecute appeals from and superseding lower court judgments awarding Citimortgage possession.”). 8 § 24.002(a)(2); see also Brittingham, 2013 WL 4506787, at *4 (holding that deed of trust, substitute trustee’s deed, and business records containing notice to vacate provided sufficient evidence of plaintiff’s superior right to possession); Couch v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 02-10-00261-CV, 2011 WL 1103684, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2011, no pet.) (“Freddie Mac proved its right to possession by presenting the substitute trustee’s deed, the deed of trust, and the notice to vacate sent to and received by Couch.”); Fleming v. Fannie Mae, No. 02-09-00445-CV, 2010 WL 4812983, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 24, 2010, no pet.) (recognizing substitute trustee’s deed as evidence that plaintiff purchased property and deed of trust as evidence of defendant’s status as tenant at sufferance). Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment that Federal Home has a superior right to possession. See Marathon Corp., 106 S.W.3d at 727–28; Brittingham, 2013 WL 4506787, at *4. We overrule Romo’s first and fourth issues. B. THE DISPUTED FORECLOSURE In his second and third issues, Romo argues that the trial court erred by awarding Federal Home possession of the Property because the foreclosure’s validity was disputed, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction. We disagree. 1. Applicable Law In a forcible-detainer suit, the only issue a trial court determines is the right to actual and immediate possession of the property. See Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood 9 Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 919 (Tex. 2013) (citing Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of the City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006)); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e) (stating that in a forcible-detainer suit, “[t]he court must adjudicate the right to actual possession and not title”). And the mere existence of a title dispute does not deprive a county court of jurisdiction. See Mosely v. Am. Homes 4 Rent Props. Eight, LLC, No. 02-15-00200-CV, 2015 WL 9942695, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 10, 2015, pet. dism’d). “The arena to challenge the propriety of a foreclosure” is not in a forcible- detainer action but “in a separate suit for wrongful foreclosure or to set aside a substitute trustee’s deed.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5996984, at *3; see Williams v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (stating title and foreclosure-process defects “may be pursued in suits for wrongful foreclosure or to set aside the substitute trustee’s deed, but they are not relevant in [a] forcible[-]detainer action”). 2. Analysis The question of title to the Property was not intertwined with the issue of possession. When, as here, “a foreclosure pursuant to a deed of trust establishes a landlord and tenant-at-sufferance relationship between the parties, the trial court has an independent basis to determine the issue of immediate possession without resolving the issue of title to the property.” Reardean v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 03-12-00562-CV, 2013 WL 4487523, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2013, no 10 pet.). Alleged defects in the foreclosure process cannot be used either to negate a landlord–tenant relationship provision in a deed of trust or to raise a question of title depriving a county court of jurisdiction to resolve the issue of immediate possession. Wilder v. Citicorp Tr. Bank, F.S.B., No. 03-13-00324-CV, 2014 WL 1207979, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 18, 2014, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). Accordingly, because the foreclosure under the deed of trust created a landlord and tenant-at-sufferance relationship, the trial court had an “independent basis to determine the issue of immediate possession,” and the defects in the foreclosure process alleged by Romo—even if meritorious—did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over Federal Home’s forcible-detainer suit. See Sissom v. Equity Tr. Co. FBO 200186851 IRA, No. 03-20-00154-CV, 2021 WL 3148871, at *2 (Tex. App.— Austin July 27, 2021, no pet.) (citing Schlichting v. Lehman Bros. Bank FSB, 346 S.W.3d 196, 199 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. dism’d)). We overrule Romo’s second and third issues. IV. CONCLUSION Having overruled Romo’s four issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.12 See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a). /s/ Brian Walker Brian Walker Justice Delivered: September 24, 2026 12 We deny all pending motions in this appeal. 11