Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 480 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-26-40 Opinion Delivered October 7, 2026 CODY ANN CARTER APPEAL FROM THE GREENE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT APPELLANT [NO. 28CR-23-703] V. HONORABLE MELISSA BRISTOW RICHARDSON, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS AFFIRMED; REMANDED TO APPELLEE CORRECT SENTENCING ORDER KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge Appellant Cody Ann Carter appeals after the Greene County Circuit Court revoked her probation and sentenced her to serve forty-eight months’ imprisonment. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support her revocation; instead, her sole argument on appeal is that the circuit court’s failure to sua sponte order a competency examination was clearly erroneous because her demeanor and her attorney’s argument presented at her revocation hearing called into question her competence to proceed. We affirm but remand to correct the sentencing order. I. Relevant Facts On January 8, 2024, appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree terroristic threatening, a Class D felony, in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-13-301 (Supp. 2023). She was placed on thirty-six months’ probation and was ordered to pay court costs and fees in $50 monthly installments. The State filed a petition to revoke appellant’s probation on August 29, 2025, and an amended petition to revoke on October 20, 2025. In the amended petition, the State alleged that appellant had violated her probation by committing new misdemeanor offenses, failing to complete a rehabilitation program as directed, using drugs, failing to maintain gainful employment, and failing to pay her fines and supervision fees. A revocation hearing was held on October 25, 2025. At the hearing, copies of the amended petition to revoke, a violation report, the earlier sentencing order, and a signed copy of the written terms and conditions was admitted into evidence without objection. Hannah Morgan, appellant’s probation officer, testified that appellant was arrested for public intoxication on December 9, 2024; left a rehabilitation program at Agape House before completing the program; admitted using THC and methamphetamine; was not gainfully employed; was arrested for misdemeanor offenses then under advisement; and owed $710 in delinquent fines and $104 in supervision fees. Officer Morgan opined that appellant had violated the terms and conditions of her probation and had not done well while on probation. On cross-examination, Officer Morgan admitted that appellant was not court ordered to complete the rehabilitation at Agape House. She also explained that she had told appellant that she would need to have the terms and conditions of her probation modified if appellant intended to use a medical marijuana card. 2 After the State rested, appellant testified in her defense. She explained that she left Agape House because she woke up with a sharp pain, and the people at the facility were blunt and rude to her. She was further told that she might need to go to a medical facility. Appellant admitted using THC for pain and that she had once “slipped up” and used methamphetamine. She further admitted that she currently did not have a medical marijuana card and that she forgot about paying her fines. She asserted that she had completed community service to cover a portion of the supervision fees but admitted that she still owed $44 in fees. Appellant further claimed that she had recently been diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer and only had months to live. On cross-examination, appellant admitted that she had not mentioned having terminal pancreatic cancer to Officer Morgan, nor did she have any documentation with her at the hearing. She also admitted being publicly intoxicated on December 9, 2024, and spending time in jail for it while on probation. She had not maintained gainful employment. The circuit court questioned appellant about her pancreatic-cancer diagnosis. Appellant told the court that she could not remember the name of her doctor, was not sure about the correct name of the facility, and did not have a pending doctor’s appointment. Appellant admitted that she had gone to the probation office after she had been diagnosed to turn in her community-service paperwork but did not tell anyone about her diagnosis because she wanted to tell Officer Morgan in person. She claimed that she had shared her diagnosis with her attorney. At one point, the circuit court asked appellant the following: 3 THE COURT: Are you -- are you under the influence of any substance right now? MS. CARTER: No, ma’am. THE COURT: When is the last time you’ve been drug screened? MS. CARTER: The last time I went to her. I don’t -- I don’t -- I told her the truth, so. Several months ago. THE COURT: And your testimony is that you have been incarcerated since August? MS. CARTER: I have been -- no, ma’am. I have not been incarcerated. THE COURT: When have you been -- MS. CARTER: -- I’ve been incarcerated since September the 8th, for 42 days. THE COURT: So since September the 8th. MS. CARTER: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: And you were diagnosed with cancer, per your testimony, sometime in August? MS. CARTER: Yeah, I’m not sure of the exact date cause I don’t have the paperwork with me. After the State conducted a brief recross-examination, the circuit court stated the following: “Before I hear argument, I am going to instruct that, based upon the Defendant’s demeanor on the witness stand, that she should be drug tested.” The test came back “negative on everything.” 4 The circuit court granted appellant’s motion for directed verdict on the alleged “completing the rehab program as directed” violation after Officer Morgan had been recalled to confirm that appellant had not been ordered to go to the program. After the State and appellant offered closing arguments, the circuit court orally found that appellant had violated the conditions of her probation on the basis that “there are multiple violations, in the sense that there are multiple admissions of continued drug use of controlled substances while on probation, as well as admission of failing to pay the fines and fees as Ordered, and specifically the fines.” However, the circuit court stated that it would defer sentencing until the next Monday to allow appellant the opportunity to provide the court with documentation of her terminal diagnosis, and court was adjourned. Despite the court’s offer to defer sentencing until the next Monday, the circuit court resumed the proceedings because appellant’s counsel informed the court that appellant “wanted to address this now” and did not want to provide counsel with the name of her doctor. The State argued that appellant’s decision to not even attempt to obtain records to support her claim that she had terminal pancreatic cancer was “a clear indication that she was making it up.” It asked that the circuit court consider that when imposing its sentence. Appellant’s counsel made the following request: Your Honor, with everything being sort of [e]ncapsulated here in what’s gone on today, when The Court renders its decision, we would -- Defense would ask this Court [to] also consider sending Ms. Carter to some sort of treatment facility. I believe the best basis for this is indicated by The Court’s own requirement of Ms. Carter to submit to a drug screen. I concur with the -- what The Court had to say about that in that I believe there’s clearly some sort of -- some sort of substance abuse issue. I – I understand that she -- she tested clean today, however, she has been in jail for, I 5 believe, 47 -- for 42 days, so she’s had plenty of time to get -- get all that this time around to clear out. So when The Court renders its decision, I -- we would ask for it to please consider sending her to some sort of treatment facility, so that she may be able to obtain the treatment that she -- that she clearly needs. The circuit court sentenced appellant to serve forty-eight months’ imprisonment, and the circuit court filed a sentencing order on October 25, 2025, and an amended sentencing order on December 19, 2025. This timely1 appeal followed. II. Competency Examination Although in a revocation hearing a defendant is not entitled to the full panoply of rights that attend a criminal prosecution, he or she is entitled to due process. Lewis v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 503, 505 S.W.3d 725. Because due process is a flexible concept, each particular situation must be examined in order to determine what procedures are constitutionally required. Id. No person who lacks the capacity to understand a proceeding against him or her or to assist effectively in his or her own defense as a result of mental disease or defect shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-302(a) (Repl. 2013). Criminal defendants are presumed to be competent to stand trial, and they have the burden of proving otherwise. Philips v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 221, 625 S.W.3d 394. The circuit court shall order a competency examination if it finds there is a reasonable suspicion 1 Appellant spends a portion of her brief explaining the timeliness of her notice of appeal and amended notice of appeal, and the State concedes that we have jurisdiction in its response. We agree that appellant’s appeal was timely, and we accordingly have jurisdiction. 6 that a defendant is not fit to proceed. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-327(a)(2) (Supp. 2023). The test for determining whether a circuit court should sua sponte order a competency examination is whether there is substantial evidence that the defendant may be mentally incompetent. Flowers v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 181, at 4–5, 458 S.W.3d 250, 252. Evidence is “substantial” if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s fitness to proceed. Seward v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 183. In determining the existence of a reasonable doubt as to competency, it is appropriate to consider any irrational behavior exhibited by the defendant, his or her demeanor in the proceedings, and any prior medical opinion on competence to assist in his or her defense. Flowers, supra. We will reverse a circuit court’s decision to proceed in a revocation proceeding without a competency examination only if the decision was clearly erroneous. Seward, supra. Appellant’s sole argument on appeal is that the circuit court’s failure to sua sponte order a competency examination was clearly erroneous because her demeanor and her attorney’s argument presented at her revocation hearing called into question her competence to proceed. She more specifically argues that when the circuit court’s suspicion that appellant’s unexplained demeanor was not due to recent drug usage, it should have “reasonably suspect[ed] that some mental health issue (even from long-term drug use) caused Carter’s troubling demeanor.” She alleges that mental-health issues are frequently associated with substance abuse. She further argues that her attorney “raised doubt to her competency” in his sentencing argument. She claims that her demeanor and her attorney’s argument constituted substantial evidence of reasonable doubt regarding her fitness to proceed, which 7 “could not be dispelled by resorting to conflicting evidence, such as the negative result of Carter’s drug screen.” Accordingly, appellant argues that because such error cannot be harmless, we must reverse and remand. The State maintains that the circuit court did not violate appellant’s due-process rights by failing to order a competency examination. It argues that even though the circuit court believed appellant’s demeanor warranted a drug test, it does not follow that appellant’s demeanor demonstrated that appellant was incompetent to proceed. We agree with the State. Although the circuit court observed something in appellant’s demeanor that caused it to order a drug test, it does not necessarily follow that appellant’s demeanor warranted a competency examination if the drug test was negative as appellant contends. In Barnes v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 323, 739 S.W.3d 45, we distinguished the defendant’s irrational behavior of violently attacking strangers and law enforcement officers from the type of irrational behavior that would put into doubt a defendant’s fitness to proceed. We explained that “[s]ocial incompetence does not necessarily equal legal incompetence.” Barnes, 2026 Ark. App. 323, at 2, 739 S.W.3d at 46. Instead, the “focus is on whether the defendant has the capacity ‘to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.’” Id. (quoting Lewis, 2016 Ark. App. 503, at 7, 505 S.W.3d at 730). In Britton v. State, 2014 Ark. 192, 433 S.W.3d 856, the supreme court was called upon to determine whether the circuit court erred in not sua sponte halting a murder trial and 8 having Britton mentally evaluated due to Britton’s outbursts, agitation, irritability, aggressiveness, rambling testimony, and bizarre behavior. Britton’s attorney did not raise any issue of mental incapacity during trial, nor did any expert or any witness at the trial. The supreme court held that although Britton’s behavior was questionable, it did not rise to the substantial-evidence level such that the trial court was mandated to intervene and halt proceedings. Similarly in Flowers, supra, we were asked to determine whether the circuit court erred by not sua sponte halting a revocation hearing to determine whether appellant was mentally fit to proceed. Flowers pointed to the following behaviors in support of his argument: his initial confusion about whether he was entitled to a jury in a revocation proceeding; his speaking out of turn; his identifying himself as “Brother Flowers” instead of using his given name; his sometimes rambling and inconsistent testimony; his request for mental-health help from the circuit court; his statement that he considered suicide; and the circuit court’s remark at the end of the hearing that appellant had burned some brain cells due to long- term drug use. We affirmed and explained that there was no evidence before the court that Flowers was unable to consult with counsel or assist in preparing his defense or had the inability to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him. Accordingly, although we acknowledged that Flowers’s behavior may have been questionable, it did not rise to the substantial-evidence level that would require the circuit court sua sponte to intervene and halt the proceedings. 9 The same is true here. Contrary to her assertion, appellant’s trial counsel did not raise doubt as to her competency. Instead, appellant’s counsel asked that she be sent to a treatment facility because he believed that appellant had a substance-abuse issue. He did not suggest that appellant was unable to consult with him or assist in preparing her defense or that she had an inability to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against her. In fact, appellant was able to testify in her own defense at the revocation hearing and even testified that she had consulted with her attorney before the revocation hearing to let him know about her terminal cancer diagnosis. As in both Britton and Flowers, appellant’s behavior may have been questionable, but it did not rise to the substantial-evidence level that would require the circuit court sua sponte to intervene and halt the proceedings. Thus, on this record, we simply cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred here and affirm. III. Amended Sentencing Order Finally, we remand the case to the circuit court for the limited purpose of entering an amended sentencing order that corrects a clerical error. Although the order being appealed states that appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty, appellant was found guilty by the circuit court at the revocation hearing and was sentenced by the court. Therefore, we remand for the circuit court to correct the sentencing order. See Palmer v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 178, 663 S.W.3d 436. Affirmed; remanded to correct sentencing order. TUCKER and WOOD, JJ., agree. D. Franklin Arey III, for appellant. 10 Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 11