Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 474 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-25-588 Opinion Delivered October 7, 2026 CHELSIE SANDERS APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE FRANKLIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, V. NORTHERN DISTRICT [NO. 24OCR-20-135] STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE JAMES DUNHAM, JUDGE AFFIRMED STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge Chelsie Sanders (“Sanders”) appeals the Franklin County Circuit Court’s revocation of her sixty-month probationary sentence following a finding that she committed new crimes, used controlled substances, failed to maintain employment, failed to comply with a treatment directive, and failed drug tests following completion of drug court. The circuit court further found Sanders possessed controlled substances in the presence of minors. Sanders was sentenced to seventy-two months in the Arkansas Division of Correction (ADC) along with a $5,000 fine, court costs, and public-defender fees. On appeal, Sanders argues the circuit court abused its discretion by (1) denying her attempt to discharge counsel without due consideration of the request; and (2) denying her right to allocution without due consideration. We affirm. I. Relevant Background On July 2, 2025, the Franklin County Circuit Court held a hearing on the State’s petition to revoke Sanders’s probation in case number 24OCR-20-135. Sanders was also facing charges in two additional cases, 24OCR-24-265 and 24OCR-25-1, which were set for pretrial proceedings following the revocation hearing. The State called two witnesses, probation and parole agent Guy Huff and Fifth Judicial Drug Task Force agent Joey Griffith. Sanders did not call any witnesses. The parties stipulated to the admission of Sanders’s original sentencing order, the conditions of her probation, and an order reflecting her completion of drug court. The evidence established that completion of drug court was a special condition of Sanders’s probation, and she successfully completed the program in 2024. After completing drug court, Sanders remained on probation and subject to its conditions. Guy Huff testified he worked in probation and parole for approximately eight years and served as a drug-court officer for approximately seven years. Huff became familiar with Sanders through drug court and continued supervising her after her graduation from the program. Sanders participated in drug court for approximately three years and received multiple opportunities for rehabilitation, including treatment programs, community service, sanctions, and placement in a Community Correction Center (“CCC”). On cross- examination, Huff clarified that Sanders spent one year, rather than ninety days, in the residential treatment program. 2 On November 1, 2024, Huff conducted a home visit to Sanders’s residence. During the visit, officers searched the residence, and Sanders directed Huff to a zippered pouch located in a double-layer coffee table. The pouch contained scales with residue on them. Huff testified that, from his training and experience, he believed the white residue on the scales was methamphetamine. When Huff asked Sanders where the methamphetamine was, Sanders told him she had “used it or sold it” and it was all gone. Huff testified that Sanders was required as a condition of probation to maintain employment and provide proof of employment, but she did not provide proof of employment at the time of the revocation proceedings. On cross-examination, Huff clarified Sanders provided proof of employment at other times but was unemployed when the revocation report was prepared. Of twelve reporting periods reflected in his records, Sanders was unemployed during eight. Sanders was also subject to regular drug testing. Following her graduation from drug court, Sanders failed two of four drug tests, with the most recent failed test occurring on December 11, 2024. Huff further testified that members of Sanders’s family approached him about obtaining rehabilitation for her. Huff attempted to convince Sanders to enter rehabilitation and explained to her the importance of doing so, but those efforts were unsuccessful. Huff explained he could not force Sanders to attend rehabilitation. The parties agreed the failed drug tests, failure to comply with a treatment referral or request, and failure to maintain employment were the issues being adjudicated as possible grounds for revocation. 3 Huff also testified Sanders’s husband and children lived at the residence where the scales were found, although no children were present during the November 1 home visit. Huff did not know the children’s ages but agreed they were minors. The State next called Joey Griffith, an agent with the Fifth Judicial Drug Task Force. Griffith testified he had been a full-time task-force agent since September 2024 and had nearly twenty years of experience as a certified law enforcement officer. On November 1, 2024, Griffith went to the Franklin County Jail after learning Sanders had been arrested on a drug offense. Griffith advised Sanders of her Miranda rights and interviewed her. During the interview, Sanders admitted selling methamphetamine since May 2024. She told Griffith she had more than five customers and sold quantities ranging from one- half gram to one-half ounce, or approximately fourteen grams. Sanders did not cross-examine Griffith, and the defense presented no witnesses after the State rested. At the conclusion of the evidence, the circuit court revoked Sanders’s probation. The court found Sanders had committed new criminal conduct, used controlled substances, failed to maintain employment as required by her probation conditions, failed to comply with a probation directive for treatment, and failed two of four drug tests following her completion of drug court. The court additionally found Sanders had committed a new crime—possessing controlled substances in the presence of minors. During sentencing, the State recommended seventy-two months’ imprisonment in the ADC. The State emphasized Sanders already received the benefit of drug court and residential treatment and argued she admitted selling methamphetamine shortly after 4 completing drug court. Defense counsel recommended eighteen months in a CCC, asserting Sanders continued to have significant drug issues and would benefit more from treatment than imprisonment. Before sentencing was imposed, Sanders told the court she did not believe defense counsel had adequately represented her. She stated counsel previously told her the State had evidence of a controlled buy and asked her to work for the prosecution as a means of obtaining a reduced sentence. Sanders subsequently stated she wanted to fire counsel and, when instructed by the court to communicate requests through counsel, stated she wanted to hire new counsel. The court admonished defense counsel and Sanders not to argue at counsel table and asked counsel whether he needed a recess to speak privately with Sanders. Counsel responded he did not. When the court asked whether Sanders needed to be heard further or whether counsel needed to meet privately with her before sentencing, counsel again responded he did not. Counsel stated Sanders was ready for sentencing; Sanders responded, “No.” The circuit court sentenced Sanders to seventy-two months in the ADC and imposed a $5,000 fine, court costs, a $100 public-defender user fee, and a $500 public-defender attorney fee. The court further ordered Sanders’s cash bonds be transferred to the case and applied toward her financial obligations. The court then advised Sanders of her right to appeal and the requirement that a notice of appeal be filed within thirty days after entry of the new sentencing order. Sanders stated she understood her appellate rights and had no questions concerning the case. 5 II. Discussion A. Request to Discharge Counsel Sanders first argues the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her request for new counsel. Specifically, Sanders argues the circuit court failed to give her request due consideration. While Sanders did not request a continuance, we have held a defendant’s request to change counsel is treated as a motion for a continuance, since the change of attorney would require such. See Mayfield v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 577, 725 S.W.3d 878. A circuit court retains broad discretion to grant or deny a continuance for purposes of obtaining new counsel. Brewer v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 335, at 4, 525 S.W.3d 24, 26. Once competent counsel has been obtained, any request for a change in counsel must be balanced against the public’s interest in the prompt dispensation of justice. Raino v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 331, at 8. A circuit court’s denial of a continuance request will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Id.. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the circuit court acts improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Brewer, 2017 Ark. App. 335, at 5, 525 S.W.3d at 27. Even if the circuit court abused its discretion, an appellant must also demonstrate prejudice amounting to a denial of justice. Raino, 2021 Ark. App. 331, at 8. In each situation, the court must look at the circumstances of the case at bar, and the issue must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Thorne v. State, 269 Ark. 556, 560–61, 601 S.W.2d 886, 889 (1980). Factors to be considered by the circuit court include (1) whether there was adequate opportunity for the defendant to employ counsel; (2) whether other 6 continuances have been requested and granted; (3) the length of the requested delay; (4) whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons; (5) whether the motion for a continuance was timely filed; (6) whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the request for a continuance; (7) whether the reason for the discharge of existing counsel was solely for the purpose of obtaining a continuance; and (8) whether the request was consistent with the fair, efficient and effective administration of justice. See id. at 561, 601 S.W.2d at 889. None of these factors are a prerequisite to the grant of a continuance, but these and other factors are the legitimate subject of the court’s attention when a continuance is requested. Id., 601 S.W.2d at 889. Here, Sanders told the court she did not believe counsel adequately represented her and described a prior interaction in which counsel allegedly shrugged his shoulders, told her the State had her on a controlled buy, and advised her that cooperating with the prosecution was the only way to obtain a reduced sentence. When Sanders attempted to speak further, counsel told the court she did not need to be heard. Sanders then expressly stated she wanted to fire counsel and hire new counsel. Although a defendant does not have an absolute right to substitute appointed counsel, the court must exercise its discretion in light of the circumstances surrounding the request, including the reasons for the requested change and the potential prejudice to the defendant. Edwards v. State, 321 Ark. 610, 906 S.W.2d 310 (1995). Certainly, the circuit court could have made a more thorough inquiry into Sanders’s concerns. However, the substance of Sanders’s complaint was that counsel advised her to cooperate with the 7 prosecution in hopes of obtaining a favorable plea agreement because the State possessed strong evidence against her. Given the evidence, that advice was neither unreasonable nor indicative of inadequate representation. Under these circumstances, Sanders’s dissatisfaction with counsel’s advice did not outweigh the public’s interest in the prompt dispensation of justice, particularly when appointing new counsel would have required further delay of the proceedings. Moreover, Sanders cannot demonstrate she was prejudiced. The evidence supporting her guilt is overwhelming and largely undisputed. Sanders admitted the scales containing methamphetamine residue belonged to her and told Huff she either used or sold the methamphetamine. She also failed two of four drug tests following her completion of drug court, failed to maintain employment, and declined efforts to obtain further treatment. Most significantly, after receiving Miranda warnings, Sanders admitted to Agent Griffith she had been selling methamphetamine since May 2024 to more than five customers. Therefore, because the State was required to prove only one violation of probation to support revocation, and Sanders identifies no action substitute counsel could have taken that would have undermined this evidence or produced a different result, she cannot establish the prejudice necessary for reversal. We affirm. B. Allocution Next, Sanders argues she was denied her right of allocution under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-106(b) (Repl. 2016), which provides that when a defendant appears for judgment, “she must be asked if . . . she has any legal cause to show why judgment should 8 not be pronounced against . . . her.” The circuit court’s failure to allow a defendant the opportunity for allocution is reversible error. Goff v. State, 341 Ark. 567, 19 S.W.3d 579 (2000). However, we will not reverse for failure to allow allocution when there has been no objection to the failure below. Id. Here, the record makes clear Sanders made no objection regarding her perceived denial of allocution. Because Sanders is raising her allocution argument for the first time on appeal, it is not preserved for appellate review; our court will not address arguments made for the first time on appeal. See Compton v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 587, 682 S.W.3d 348. Affirmed. HARRISON and BROWN, JJ., agree. Tim Cullen, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 9