Lonetta Nicole Silas v. Progressive Marathon Insurance Company
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket376618
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LONETTA NICOLE SILAS, UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 10:45 AM
and
MENDELSON ORTHOPEDICS and SYNERGY
SPINE AND ORTHOPEDIC SURGERY,
Plaintiffs,
v No. 376618
Oakland Circuit Court
TERRENCE VERNARD PLAIN, LC No. 2022-197086-NF
Defendant-Appellee,
and
PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
Before: LIEVENSE, P.J., and SWARTZLE and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff and defendant were involved in a motor-vehicle accident, and plaintiff sued
defendant to recover damages. A jury found defendant negligent, but the jury concluded that
plaintiff did not suffer an injury or an aggravation of a preexisting condition. Plaintiff now appeals,
claiming errors in relation to defendant’s expert testimony and arguments pertaining to plaintiff’s
accident history. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND
After the vehicle collision between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff complained of neck
and back pain, as well as headaches. Her medical provider diagnosed injuries to her head and
spine and determined that plaintiff was disabled from work, housework, and caring for herself and
her children. She received several lumbar fusions in an attempt to fix her back issues.
Plaintiff moved in limine to exclude evidence of her prior accident history, requesting that
“any and all evidence of Plaintiff’s prior car accidents” be excluded, as well as any references to
these or other accidents. Plaintiff had three significant accidents prior to the one at issue: (1) a
motor-vehicle accident that occurred ten years earlier and required treatment for brain, shoulder,
and knee injuries; (2) a motor-vehicle accident that occurred five years earlier and resulted in
shoulder, knee, and hand surgeries, as well as aggravation to her previous back and brain injuries;
and (3) a slip-and-fall accident a week prior that involved her knee and ankle Plaintiff argued that
introduction of her accident history “would unfairly suggest to the jury that Plaintiff is a ‘career
claimant’ or someone who habitually seeks to profit from car accidents.” The trial court denied
the motion.
The parties scheduled a deposition shortly before trial with the defense’s expert, Dr. Adeel
Khalid, a brain-and-spine radiologist. Less than a week before the scheduled deposition, plaintiff
requested “all of the records defense experts will be relying on during their respective
deposition[s].” At the deposition, defense counsel asked Dr. Khalid to compare MRI imaging of
plaintiff’s spine five years before the accident at issue here versus a month-and-a-half after the
accident; Dr. Khalid testified that he “found no objective change between pre-accident and post-
accident imaging of the cervical spine.” Plaintiff’s counsel objected, arguing that the earlier
images had not been disclosed to plaintiff. Defense counsel asserted that the records had been
subpoenaed and were supplied earlier that day to defense counsel and then Dr. Khalid. Dr. Khalid
also testified that in his earlier report, he came to the conclusion that there was no objective
evidence of trauma to the cervical spine based only on the post-accident MRIs, and that the pre-
accident MRIs only “confirmed” his original conclusion. Dr. Khalid also explained a teaching
diagram of spondylolisthesis during his deposition, to which plaintiff’s counsel objected.
The day after the deposition, plaintiff moved to strike Dr. Khalid’s testimony, arguing that
the undisclosed MRIs and diagram were “classic trial by ambush.” At the final pretrial hearing
held the same day as when the motion was filed, plaintiff expressed displeasure with Dr. Khalid’s
use of the comparative films and diagram, but because the trial court was unaware of the motion,
it did not make a decision at that time. During this hearing, the trial court urged the parties to
consider carefully before making an evidentiary objection.
Four days later, on the morning of trial, plaintiff reminded the trial court about the pending
motion to exclude Dr. Khalid’s testimony. The trial court denied the motion and offered instead
for plaintiff to depose Dr. Khalid again; plaintiff declined the offer. The trial court warned counsel
on both sides that due to their “difficulty in cooperatively” preparing the video depositions, every
objection that the trial court rejected would lead to a $50 sanction.
During opening and closing arguments, as well as cross-examination of plaintiff, defense
counsel highlighted plaintiff’s medical and legal history, including multiple accidents, surgeries,
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and lawsuits with the same counsel, and used visual materials to display their arguments. Plaintiff
did not object to any of this except for defense counsel’s practice of “leaving exhibits” in the jury’s
view. The trial court told plaintiff that if there was an objection to the materials, the trial court
would ask defendant to move the display, and the trial court did so.
The jury found defendant negligent but did not find that plaintiff suffered an injury or an
aggravation of a preexisting condition, and therefore did not reach the questions of whether
defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of any injury or aggravation of a preexisting
injury, or whether plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of a body function or permanent serious
disfigurement. Plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, mistrial, and a new trial
based on surprise testimony, improper references to prior lawsuits, and objection sanctions. The
trial court denied the motion, finding no errors.
Plaintiff now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. EXPERT TESTIMONY
On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by allowing Dr. Khalid’s
testimony. We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision on a discovery matter;
the trial court abuses its discretion if its decision falls outside the range of reasonable outcomes.
In re Gregory Hall Trust, 346 Mich App 75, 81; 11 NW3d 552 (2023).
A party must initially provide to the other party a copy of any document or other evidence
that it possesses and may use as support during the lawsuit. MCR 2.302(A)(1). The disclosing
party must timely correct or supplement an initial disclosure “if the additional or corrective
information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process
or in writing.” MCR 2.302(E)(1)(a)(i). “If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness
as required by MCR 2.302(A) or (E), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to
supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified
or is harmless.” MCR 2.313(C)(1). The trial court may impose other appropriate sanctions for
such violation. MCR 2.313(C)(1)(c).
Plaintiff’s claim is without merit. First, plaintiff has failed to show that defendant even
violated MCR 2.302(E)(1)(a)(i) with respect to the comparison imaging. Defense counsel asserted
that he received the comparison imaging the day of Dr. Khalid’s testimony. The information was
then made known to plaintiff on the same day, during Dr. Khalid’s testimony, indicating that
disclosure was timely. Second, the imaging was of plaintiff, and there is nothing in the record to
explain why plaintiff’s counsel did not have access to his client’s imaging prior to the deposition.
Third, even assuming for the sake of argument that disclosure of the imaging and/or teaching
diagram was tardy, the trial court offered plaintiff a practical solution—an opportunity to re-depose
Dr. Khalid. This subsequent deposition would have been conducted with plaintiff’s full knowledge
of Dr. Khalid’s use of the comparative imaging and teaching diagram and would not have been
tainted by any surprise or supposed harm. For whatever reason, plaintiff decided not to re-depose
the expert witness. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Dr. Khalid to testify or
offering plaintiff a practical solution to any unfair surprise.
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B. EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT ABOUT PRIOR-ACCIDENTS AND PRIOR-LAWSUITS
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing prior-accident and
prior-lawsuit evidence to be used as proof of character rather than limiting such evidence to
causation. Relatedly, plaintiff argues that she was denied a fair trial because defendant’s
arguments and displays of evidence at trial constituted misconduct by suggesting that plaintiff had
a “pattern” of filing lawsuits.
Plaintiff concedes that her prior medical history may have been relevant but argues that
“the defense was permitted to move beyond medical history and to use prior accidents and claims
as a general reason to distrust Plaintiff’s current claim.” Plaintiff, however, never objected to
defendant’s actions at trial. Plaintiff’s motion in limine requested a complete bar to the prior-
accident evidence, regardless of the relevance and defendant’s use of such evidence. The trial
court denied the motion, but the denial did not give defendant free rein to use the evidence in an
improper manner.
When defense counsel used the prior-accident and lawsuit evidence in a potentially
improper manner at trial, plaintiff failed to object to such use. If a trial court properly admits
evidence for a certain purpose, then the trial court, “on timely request, must restrict the evidence
to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” MRE 105 (emphasis added). There was no
timely request from plaintiff to restrict the scope of the evidence. Thus, any prejudice from
defendant’s use of evidence outside the proper scope, including visual displays used during
opening statements that were left for the jury to view during the trial, resulted from plaintiff’s
counsel’s failure to object. In any event, by failing to object, plaintiff has waived the matter. See
In re Muskegon County Treasurer for Foreclosure, 348 Mich App 678, 687; 20 NW3d 337 (2023).
C. CUMULATIVE EFFECT
Lastly, plaintiff argues that the cumulative effect of irregularities denied plaintiff a fair
trial. For plaintiff’s cumulative-effect argument, there must have been errors on the part of the
defense or the trial court, and these errors must have caused harm to plaintiff. Reetz v Kinsman
Marine Transit Co, 416 Mich 97, 102-103; 330 NW2d 638 (1982). As already discussed, the trial
court’s discovery remedy was not error, and any error in relation to the prior-accident evidence
could have been cured by a timely objection by plaintiff.
In addition to the alleged irregularities addressed above, plaintiff also claims that the trial
court threatened the parties that they “could be personally fined for rejected objections while
evidentiary disputes were still unfolding.” As plaintiff makes clear, she “does not rely on that
warning as a stand-alone appellate issue” that would be worthy of relief in itself. And this “threat”
did not appear to chill or hinder plaintiff’s ability to object, as plaintiff continued to make other
objections throughout trial and after the trial court’s warning occurred. On review of the entire
record, we find no discernible abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Affirmed.
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
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