Sonoda v. Villagomez

Sonoda v. Villagomez, 4 N.M.I. 34 (1993) Jesus Ramon Arriola Sonoda, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Maria Arriola Villagomez and Carmen Arriola Pablo, Defendants/Appellants. Appeal No. 92-034 Civil Action No. 90-1035 September 15, 1993 Subm itted on Briefs August 19, 1993 Counsel for appellants: Jam es S. Brooks, Guam (Brooks & Brooks). Counsel for appellee: Richard W . Pierce, Saipan. BEFORE: VILLAGOM EZ, Justice, and KOSACK and M ACK, Special Judges. VILLAGOM EZ, Justice: The appellants, M aria Arriola Villagom ez (“Villagom ez”) and Carmen Arriola Pablo (“Pablo”), appeal the trial court decision that the appellee, Jesus Arriola Sonoda (“Sonoda”), has acquired a roadway easement across Villagomez and Pablo’s land by both im plication and prescription. Villagomez and Pablo seek reversal of the court’s decision on two grounds. First, the creation of an easem ent by im plication failed because such an easem ent, once established, may not be relocated and, in this case, Sonoda relocated an established easem ent. Second, because Sonoda, in a letter to Pablo, sought Sonoda’s perm ission to maintain power poles on her land, Sonoda adm itted having no roadway easem ent and such adm ission warrants sum m ary reversal of the trial court decision. W e have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 1 CM C § 3102(a). W e find no error in the decision of the trial court and we affirm . ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW The appellants raise the following issues for our review: 1. Is Sonoda, the owner of Lot 1602, entitled to change the location of the access road to his lot [across] Lot 1879, which is owned by Villagomez and Pablo? 2. Once an easement of necessity is established, may it be unilaterally relocated by the owner of the dom inant tenem ent? 3. Does the adm ission made by Sonoda in his letter to Villagom ez and Pablo, which letter was adm itted in evidence, warrant sum m ary reversal of the judgm ent? Appellants’ Brief at 1. Each of the three issues raises a question of law which we review de novo. See, e.g., Deleon Guerrero v. Nabors, 4 N.M .I. 31, 33 (1993).  BACKGROUND M iguel Lizam a Arriola, grandfather of Villagom ez and Pablo, was the original owner of adjoining Lots 1602 and 1879 prior to W orld W ar II. Today, Villagom ez and Pablo own Lot 1879. Prior to the war, M iguel sold two hectares of Lot 1602 to Ana Arriola Benavente, Sonoda’s mother. The land sold to Ana becam e landlocked in that it had no direct access to a public road. At that tim e, there was a road “which may have” 1 provided access from a public thoroughfare to Lot 1602 and which did not cross over Lot 1879. In its memorandum decision, the trial court noted that there was “no testim ony or other evidence presented as [to] who used this other easement and for how long.” 2 It further stated: “The Court viewed the general area in which this prior easement should have been but noted no present day indications of the existence of such an easem ent.” 3 After W orld W ar II, the U.S. military used the area for military housing and built and paved part of the present-day roadway. Num erous maps and aerial photographs adm itted into evidence, including an official map of Saipan, depict the existence of the current road now in dispute. The trial court noted that a disinterested witness used this roadway to gain access to the area (Lot 1602) around 1967 or 1968. This road is in a different location from the road that allegedly existed prior to W orld W ar II. Sonoda built his three-story house on Lot 1602 and had been using the current disputed roadway for access to his house until pow er poles and lines were installed along the roadw ay. Villagom ez and Pablo objected to such installation. On April 26, 1990, Sonoda wrote to Pablo, in longhand, stating, in part: W e’ve been trying to get in touch with you but haven’t been succesful [sic]. C.U.C. had inform ed m e that you had filed a complaint regarding the power pole in your property. I apologize for the intrusion but I also ask for your kind consideration to please allow me to keep the power pole in your lot. I have approached other people in the area and they refused for one reason or another. M y last resort was your lot and since we are closely related, I took the liberty of assum ing that you would not mind, especially since having power into the area would be of benefit to all. If I am wrong in this assumption then please forgive m e. If you still insist that I rem ove the pole then what else can I do. All I ask is you give us a couple of weeks so I can search for ways to continue power connection to our house, especially since I have an ailing 85 year-old mother with us. In Decem ber 1990, Villagom ez and Pablo dum ped coral on the road, thereby blocking it. The blocking of the road led to the filing of this action in the Superior Court. Shortly thereafter, that court ordered Villagom ez and Pablo to rem ove the coral and to not block the road. After finding that Sonoda had acquired an easem ent by both im plication and prescription, it perm anently enjoined Villagom ez and Pablo from further obstructing the roadway. Villagomez and Pablo appeal from the trial court’s decision. DISCUSSION Villagom ez and Pablo argue that because the location of the easement was established before W orld W ar II, from the west boundary of Lot 1602 to a road running between Lots 1879 and 1880, Sonoda has no right to change the location of the easem ent without their consent. As a matter of law, this statem ent is generally correct. Once the location of an easem ent has clearly been established, the easement holder may not relocate such easem ent without either the consent of the owner of the servient estate, or by openly, continuously, and adversely 1 See Sonoda v. Villagomez, Civ. No. 90-1035 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 1992) (Memorandum Decision at 3). 2 Id. at 5. 3 Id. at 3.  Sonoda v. Villagomez, 4 N.M.I. 34 (1993) using the newly-claim ed easement area without interruption for a prescribed period.4 In the present case, as a matter of fact, the trial court did not find that an easem ent was established prior to W orld W ar II, or that Sonoda relocated such an easem ent. Rather, the trial court found that the present road is an easement under two separate rationales: easement by im plication 5 and easement by prescription. Neither form of easem ent depends upon the status of the pre-W orld W ar II road. The present road did not com e into existence as a result of Sonoda changing the pre-war easem ent to a new location. It cam e into existence when the U.S. military built new and different roadways after the war. Therefore, while the appellants correctly state the law, it has no application to the facts as found by the trial court. Next, Villagomez and Pablo argue that in order for Sonoda to establish an easement by necessity,6 he would have to show that there is “strict necessity.” However, because Sonoda could re-establish the road that existed prior to W orld W ar II, there could be no “strict necessity” to maintain the present roadway. Again, as a m atter of law, Villagomez and Sonoda are correct in stating that if the old roadway were identifiable and could be re-established, that would be the preferred remedy. However, there is no evidence in the record regarding the current location of such a road, the current condition or ownership of the lands through which it passed, and whether or not it could be re-opened. Therefore, the facts are insufficient to support their legal argum ent. Furtherm ore, the trial court found that Sonoda acquired an easement not only by im plication but also by prescription. And, where an easem ent is established by prescription, “strict necessity” is irrelevant.7 The third and final argum ent that Villagom ez and Pablo raise is that because Sonoda adm itted in his letter to Pablo that he could not maintain the power poles on Pablo’s land without her consent, such adm ission “readily supports a conclusion that Sonoda realized he was not entitled to the easement he claim ed,” citing Hair v. County of Monterey, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Ct. App. 1975). However, Hair is not on point. In that case, the plaintiff’s counsel wrote to the court and stated in part: “In the case at Bench, I do not believe that we would be able to prove actual physical injury.” Id., 119 Cal. Rptr. at 642. No such adm ission has been made to the court by Sonoda in this case. Additionally, the statement is irrelevant to whether or not there was an easement established for the purpose of Sonoda’s access to a public thoroughfare. W hile the owner of an easem ent may maintain and repair that easement,8 the extent of an easement is fixed upon its creation. “Every easement is a particular easement privileging the owner thereof to m ake particular use of a servient tenem ent . . . and the process which creates an easement necessarily fixes its extent.” 9 That Sonoda wrote for perm ission to maintain power poles on the easem ent is irrelevant to the existence of the roadway easem ent. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s interpretation and disposition of the letter in evidence. 4 See, e.g., R ESTA TEM EN T O F P RO PERTY [hereinafter P RO PERTY ] § 457 & cmt. a (1944) (easement by prescription). 5 “[T]he dominant and servient tenements were at one time owned by the same person, who conveyed a portion of Lot 1602 to plaintiff’s predecessor in interest. Under such circumstances, an easement by implication arises.” Sonoda, supra note 1, memorandum decision at 4. 6 Easement by “necessity” as used here is synonymous with easement by “implication”; the terms are interchangeable. 7 An easement by prescription is created where “for the period of prescription . . . the use is . . . adverse, and . . . continuous and uninterrupted.” P RO PERTY , supra note 4, § 457. 8 See id. §§ 480-82, 485. 9 Id. § 482 cmt. a (emphasis added); see also id. § 478 cmt. a.  CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the trial court decision, and the decision is hereby AFFIRM ED.