Joshua Duffy v. Trinitas Regional Medical Center
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketA-1131-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1131-24
JOSHUA DUFFY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TRINITAS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
CROTHALL HEALTHCARE
INC.,[1]
Defendant.
_________________________
Argued October 27, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026
Before Judges Firko and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7423-19.
1
On January 21, 2022, Crothall was dismissed from the case and did not
participate in the trial.
Yongmoon Kim argued the cause for appellant (Kim
Law Firm LLC, attorneys; Yongmoon Kim and Angela
Yu, on the briefs).
Catherine J. Flynn argued the cause for respondent
(Flynn Legal Group, LLC, attorneys; Michael A.
Moroney and Catherine J. Flynn, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following a four-day trial in this slip and fall action, a jury returned a
verdict in favor of defendant Trinitas Regional Medical Center (Trinitas).
Plaintiff Joshua Duffy appeals from the trial court's March 11, 2025 order to
enter judgment dismissing his complaint with prejudice. We affirm.
I.
Factual Background
We derive the following facts from the record. Plaintiff, a taxi driver, was
dispatched to pick up a patient at Trinitas's emergency department entrance in
Elizabeth. When the patient came out of the emergency department, the patient
asked plaintiff to open the car door. After plaintiff closed the car door, he
stepped to his left, and his foot slid down the side flare of a handicap accessible
curb ramp. As a result, plaintiff sustained a trimalleolar ankle fracture.
A-1131-24
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The Litigation
On October 9, 2019, plaintiff's former counsel filed a complaint alleging
he was a lawful business invitee of Trinitas on the date of the incident. Plaintiff
alleged he slipped and fell as a result of a "defective and dangerous curb ramp,"
which was improperly and negligently maintained in the front exterior of
Trinitas. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, counsel fees, and
costs of suit.
On October 5, 2020, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint naming
Crothall Healthcare, Inc. (Crothall), the property manager, as a defendant.
Plaintiff alleged Crothall was negligent for failing to properly inspect and/or
maintain the curb ramp, negligently installed it, failed to recognize the
dangerous condition, and breached its duty to provide safe ingress and egress to
plaintiff.
Discovery ended on September 1, 2021, more than three years prior to
trial. The case was listed for trial twelve times dating back to February 2022,
spanning a period of thirty months. Plaintiff retained new counsel to try the
case.
A-1131-24
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Motions in Limine
Plaintiff filed multiple motions in limine seeking: to use demonstrative
aids at trial, such as 3D models of the ramp and depicting his ankle injury; to
bar Trinitas from mentioning a lack of prior incidents at the accident site, from
raising pretrial motions, and from using any prior unrelated medical or pre -
existing injury evidence. The 3D model of the ramp was created by Scott Moore,
a professional engineer, after he conducted a site inspection, which was not
disclosed to Trinitas. Plaintiff also requested the court take judicial notice that
Trinitas was governed by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI),
A117.1 standards of the International Code Council (ICC). Specifically,
plaintiff contended Trinitas was governed by and violated section 406.3.1 of
ANSI A117.1, which provides curb ramp flares "shall not be steeper than 1:10"
or 10%.2
Relevant here, the court denied plaintiff's request to use a 3D model of the
ramp during trial and reserved decision on whether counsel could use a 3D
2
New Jersey incorporated the ICC/ANSI A117.1 standard into its Uniform
Construction Code (UCC), formerly N.J.A.C. 5:23-7.2(a), as the technical
standard governing accessible construction. However, N.J.A.C. 5:23-7.2(a) was
originally adopted in 1999, amended over the years, and eventually repealed in
2015. Whether or not ANSI A117.1 applied was an issue in dispute based on
the opposing experts' opinions and created a question for the jury to decide.
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model depicting plaintiff's ankle injury, subject to an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing. The
court granted plaintiff's motion to bar Trinitas from mentioning the lack of prior
injuries at the incident location. The court denied plaintiff's motion seeking
judicial notice of ANSI A117.1, noting that New Jersey had incorporated ANSI
A117.1 into the UCC, and therefore, it could be used as evidence of negligence.
The court also ruled that violations of the UCC did not constitute negligence per
se.
Plaintiff served seven notices in lieu of subpoenas and subpoenas ad
testificandum on Trinitas's representatives. The subpoenas included demands
for Trinitas's financial and tax records for the past ten years. These documents
were never requested during discovery. The court barred plaintiff from calling
these individuals as witnesses on the grounds they were either not identified in
discovery or because plaintiff sought privileged or irrelevant information from
them. The court also denied plaintiff's document requests.
The Jury Trial
During plaintiff's counsel's opening statement, he got emotional.
Trinitas's counsel requested a sidebar, which led to the following colloquy:
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Judge, I apologize, but I do
get emotional.
THE COURT: You can't.
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PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: But if I get emotional . . .
THE COURT: You're not allowed. No. . . . You can't.
You're an officer of the court. You cannot. . . . [L]isten
. . . and don't interrupt [the court]. You're an officer of
the court. You're here to represent your client. You
cannot do that in your field.
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: I'm going to try my best to
hold my tears but if I . . .
THE COURT: If you cry it's a mistrial. [The court is]
telling you right now.
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: I'm trying. . . .
THE COURT: Well then you need to find a new line
of work. . . . [Y]ou cannot cry in front of the jury.
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: I'm going to try my best.
THE COURT: No. No, no, no, no, you're not going [to]
try your best. You're not going to do it. Understood?
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: I'm going to try. I am.
Plaintiff testified on his own behalf and called Stephen Mader, a medical
illustrator who created a 3D model depicting plaintiff's ankle injury, Melissa
Gechtmann, his aunt, Dr. Keith Cook, a podiatrist, and Vivian Goldblatt, an
accident reconstruction expert, as witnesses. Plaintiff argued that Trinitas was
negligent because the curb violated section 406.3.1 of ANSI A117.1, because it
was steeper than 10%.
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During trial, plaintiff filed a motion to substitute his accident construction
expert Goldblatt with Moore, due to "exceptional circumstances," as her father
was hospitalized. In support of his motion, plaintiff attempted to introduce an
expert report authored by Moore, which had never been served upon Trinitas.
The court denied plaintiff's motion to substitute his expert. Notably, the
court had already barred Moore from testifying during an in limine hearing.
Ultimately, Goldblatt testified at trial. She opined that ANSI A117.1 was
applicable to this case, and the subject flare violated the code provision because
it was approximately 36% steep. However, during voir dire, Goldblatt admitted
that she is not a licensed professional engineer or a licensed building inspector
and does not possess the necessary qualifications to create or submit plans for
pedestrian ramps to any State agency for approval.
Defense counsel then called Trinitas's liability expert, Stan Pitera, a
professional engineer. Pitera testified he issued a report regarding his inspection
of the subject area where plaintiff was injured. Pitera testified that the flares
were approximately 30% steep on one side, 32% steep on the other side, and
acknowledged that New Jersey adopted the ANSI code. However, Pitera
disagreed that the ANSI A117.1 standard was applicable here because the
subject ramp was not part of the "circulation path" or a main pathway for
A-1131-24
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transversing as the premises had metal poles preventing people from walking
through that path. Therefore, Pitera opined that the steepness of the curve did
not violate ANSI A117.1, and Trinitas was not negligent.
Plaintiff made several motions: (1) requesting the court take judicial
notice that Trinitas owns the subject premises; (2) to have the jury view the
premises; and (3) to admit the 3D model depicting plaintiff's ankle injury into
evidence. The court denied all of plaintiff's motions. At the close of plaintiff's
case, Trinitas moved for involuntary dismissal under Rule 4:37(b), which was
denied.
Defense counsel then called Dr. Wendell Scott, an orthopedic surgeon, as
an expert witness. Dr. Scott opined that plaintiff suffered a trimalleolar fracture
injury as a result of the incident.
The parties proceeded with summations. During plaintiff's counsel's
summation, he again became emotional and defense counsel requested a sidebar,
which proceeded as follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: We've already been here,
[j]udge. . . . And, he's doing the emotional thing,
adjusting his face like he was trying to hold back tears.
I witnessed him do it. He did it on opening. He's
starting again now. And before it got too far . . . .
THE COURT: [The court] didn't say you could [get
emotional].
A-1131-24
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PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: I'm not crying. Let's get
that out of the way. And, I didn't cry in opening. Let's
get that out of the way.
THE COURT: Get the emotion out of the case. . . .
Okay. You got to get your emotions in check, okay?
After summations, the court conducted a charge conference. Neither party
objected to the proposed jury charge:
THE COURT: With reference to the jury charges, we
[had] a jury charge conference last evening and today.
Did [the court] address everyone's concerns concerning
the jury charges?
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And, the jury charges are satisfactory.
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Judge.
The jury returned a no cause verdict in favor of Trinitas. Specifically, the
jury determined plaintiff failed to prove Trinitas was negligent in the design of
the subject ramp by a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff did not file a
motion for a new trial. A memorializing order to enter judgment dismissing the
complaint with prejudice was filed on March 11, 2025. This appeal followed.
Before us, plaintiff argues the court erred:
A-1131-24
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(1) by failing to conduct a fair and impartial trial,
failing to be courteous, temperate, patient, and
impartial, erred by allowing Trinitas's counsel's
meritless interruptions during plaintiff's counsel's
opening and closing statements;
(2) in its evidentiary rulings by barring Trinitas from
being called in his case-in-chief, in barring plaintiff
from substituting his liability expert, from using
extrinsic evidence to impeach Trinitas's liability expert,
and in barring plaintiff's use of the 3D replica of the
ramp;
(3) by charging the jury with instructions that
inadequately conveyed the standard of conduct; and
(4) by allowing Trinitas's counsel to make
impermissible remarks during summation, misstate the
evidence, distort the factual picture, use disparaging
remarks to discredit plaintiff's witnesses, and by
allowing Trinitas's counsel to use the "prohibited
phrase," of "false in one, false in all."
II.
"A jury verdict is entitled to considerable deference and 'should not be
overthrown except upon the basis of a carefully reasoned and factually
supported (and articulated) determination, after canvassing the record and
weighing the evidence, that the continued viability of the judgment would
constitute a manifest denial of justice.'" Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 385-
86 (2018) (quoting Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506,
521 (2011)). "A trial court therefore grants a motion for a new trial only 'if,
A-1131-24
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having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the
credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a
miscarriage of justice under the law.'" Id. at 386 (quoting Crawn v. Campo, 136
N.J. 494, 511-12 (1994)) (quoting R. 4:49-1(a)). We apply the same standard
on appeal. Risko, 206 N.J. at 522.
However, "when evaluating the decision to grant or deny a new trial, 'an
appellate court must give "due deference" to the "trial court's feel of the case."'"
Hayes, 231 N.J. at 386 (quoting Risko, 206 N.J. at 522). "That is not to say,
however, that we must accept the trial court's legal reasoning: '[a] trial court's
interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established
facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Hayes, 231 N.J. at 386-87
(alteration in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
"In reviewing a trial court's evidential ruling, an appellate court is limited
to examining the decision for abuse of discretion." Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J.
6, 12 (2008). A new trial is not warranted unless the trial court's evidentiary
ruling was "so 'wide of the mark' as to constitute 'a manifest denial of justice'
and an abuse of discretion." Id. at 25 (first quoting State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J.
397, 435 (2007) and then quoting Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 34 (2004)).
A-1131-24
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We apply a similar discretionary standard of review of the trial court's decisions
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. See, e.g., Townsend v. Pierre,
221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015) ("The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." (citing State v. Berry, 140
N.J. 280, 293 (1995))).
As plaintiff did not file a motion for a new trial before the court below,
we review for plain error under Rule 2:10-2. "Relief under the plain error rule,
R[ule] 2:10-2, at least in civil cases, is discretionary and 'should be sparingly
employed.'" Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999) (quoting Ford
v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435 (1957)). "The mere possibility of an unjust result
is not enough." State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016). "In the context of
a jury trial, the possibility must be 'sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to
whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'"
State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 389-90 (2020) (quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J.
409, 422 (1997)). Thus, the plain error standard requires a determination of:
"(1) whether there was error; and (2) whether that error was 'clearly capable of
producing an unjust result,' R[ule] 2:10-2; that is, whether there is 'a reasonable
doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not
A-1131-24
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have reached.'" State v. Dunbrack, 245 N.J. 531, 544 (2021) (quoting
Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 79).
III.
With respect to first plaintiff's argument that the court failed to conduct a
fair and impartial trial and failed to be courteous, temperate, and patient, we
have made clear that
[a] judge must "conduct [a] trial in a fair and impartial
manner, without making remarks that might prejudice a
party or which are calculated to influence the minds of
the jury." A judge should never unfairly criticize or
humiliate counsel, especially in front of the jury. A
judge's failure to abide by these guidelines "can easily
prejudice a jury since it conveys the opinion of the
judge as to his [or her] belief or disbelief in one side of
the case." Nevertheless, a trial court has wide
discretion in controlling the courtroom and the court
proceedings. Alleged misconduct by a trial judge must
be reviewed within the context of the entire record in
order to determine whether it had prejudicial impact.
[D.G. ex rel. J.G. v. N. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 400 N.J.
Super. 1, 25-26 (App. Div. 2008) (alterations in
original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).]
Plaintiff's counsel points to the interaction between himself and the court
at a sidebar conference during his opening statement. The court stated counsel
would "need to find a new line of work," if he could not prevent himself from
getting emotional in front of the jury. Plaintiff's counsel also maintains several
A-1131-24
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interactions between himself and the court during argument on in limine motions
resulted in a prejudicial impact on the outcome of the case.
We disagree. Here, the court acted within its discretion in preventing
plaintiff's counsel from getting emotional before the jury during his opening
statement. Moreover, the court's comments were made outside the presence of
the jury during a sidebar conference, and the in limine motions were conducted
outside the presence of the jury. When reviewing this "[a]lleged misconduct . . .
within the context of the entire record," we conclude the record evidences the
court presided over a well-tried case and exhibited patience and respect to both
parties' counsel. Mercer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 324 N.J. Super. 290, 298 (App.
Div. 1999).
We discern no plain error because the court's remarks did not prejudice
plaintiff or influence the minds of the jury. Cestero v. Ferrara, 110 N.J. Super.
264, 273 (App. Div. 1970). We also reject plaintiff's contention that defense
counsel made "meritless interruptions" during plaintiff's opening and closing
arguments. Defense counsel's objections were necessitated by reason of
plaintiff's counsel's conduct in getting emotional before the jury and
commenting on Trinitas's revenue stream during opening arguments. The court
A-1131-24
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maintained proper control of the courtroom and promptly took curative action
to prevent prejudice. See State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576 (1999).
IV.
Next, plaintiff argues the court committed several evidentiary errors.
Plaintiff challenges the court's ruling quashing his three notices in lieu of
subpoenas to Deborah Dolan, who was identified as Trinitas's risk manager, as
a corporate representative with knowledge of the subject ramp, and individually.
Plaintiff contends the court improvidently barred him from substituting his
accident reconstruction expert during trial and from using extrinsic evidence to
impeach defendant's liability expert. Plaintiff also maintains the court should
have conducted an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing on the admissibility of the 3D replica
of the subject ramp because photographs were insufficient. Plaintiff claims this
is a "very nuanced type of case because it has to do with an angle of the flare."
We are unpersuaded.
In reviewing the trial court's evidentiary rulings, this court defers to the
trial court absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430
(2021). Appellate courts review the trial court's evidentiary ruling "'under the
abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or
exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion.'" State v.
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Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018) (quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)). Under that deferential standard, "we
review a trial court's evidentiary ruling only for a 'clear error in judgment.'"
State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020) (quoting State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469,
479 (2017)). "A trial court's 'discretion is abused when relevant evidence
offered by the defense and necessary for a fair trial is kept from the jury.'" State
v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (quoting State v. Cope, 224 N.J. 530, 554-55
(2016)).
Further, N.J.R.E. 611(a) states: "[t]he [c]ourt shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting
evidence to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; (2)
avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment." See also Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 609-10
(App. Div. 2019). N.J.R.E. 611(b) states: "[c]ross-examination should not go
beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the
witness' credibility. The court may allow inquiry into additional matters as if
on direct examination."
Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in any of its evidentiary rulings.
The court properly denied plaintiff's attempt to substitute his liability expert —
A-1131-24
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Goldblatt—for a new expert—Moore—at trial. Saliently, during discovery,
plaintiff identified Goldblatt as his only expert in response to standard
interrogatory form A-23. No other potential experts were identified. The 3D
model of the ramp prepared by Moore was never disclosed to Trinitas until trial.
The court properly quashed plaintiff's notices in lieu of subpoena to call
Trinitas's risk manager in plaintiff's case-in-chief. The risk manager is part of
Trinitas's litigation control group and, as such, any information possessed by the
risk manager is privileged. N.J.R.E. 504(1).
We are also convinced the court did not err in barring Moore from
testifying at trial. The record shows Moore was previously barred from
testifying during the in limine hearing. Specifically, the court denied plaintiff's
application to introduce a report authored by Moore, which had never been
served during the five years of discovery in this case, and the 3D model of the
ramp created after a "surreptitious site inspection." The court correctly rejected
plaintiff's argument that Moore's report was "identical" to Goldblatt's report.
The court ruled, "Moore's report is not, as plaintiff represented, the same as . . .
Goldblatt's." The record supports that determination.
Trinitas counters plaintiff "was disingenuous" to the court and defense
counsel when on day four of trial he sought to substitute his liability experts.
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The court aptly noted defense counsel's expert—Pitera—would not have the
opportunity to provide a rebuttal report. The court provided Goldblatt the
opportunity to testify by Zoom or to have counsel take her de bene esse
testimony because she was at the hospital with her father. These were
reasonable alternatives. The court pointed out Goldblatt is a "paid professional,"
who has "an obligation to her client" especially in light of the fact a sworn jury
was in place. The court reasoned there would be "substantial prejudice" to
Trinitas if plaintiff substituted liability experts in the midst of trial. We conclude
the court did not abuse its discretion with respect to any of its evidentiary
rulings.
V.
Next, plaintiff argues the court committed reversible error in charging the
jury with instructions that inadequately conveyed the standard of conduct.
Plaintiff asserts Trinitas violated ANSI Code A.117.1, which provides the
maximum steepness of a handicap ramp's side flares cannot exceed 10%.
According to plaintiff, whether ANSI Code A.117.1 applied and whether the
flare was too steep was the "crux" of the liability issue.
In Washington v. Perez, 219 N.J. 338, 351 (2014), our Supreme Court
articulated the standard of review for challenging jury instructions in civil cases.
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Appellate review of a challenged jury instruction
entails not only scrutiny of the charge itself, but an
inquiry as to whether an erroneous charge may have
affected the trial's result. Notably, "in construing a jury
charge, a court must examine the charge as a whole,
rather than focus on individual errors in isolation."
Viscik [v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 18
(2002)]. . . . "As a general matter, [appellate courts]
will not reverse if an erroneous jury instruction was
'incapable of producing an unjust result or prejudicing
substantial rights.'" Mandal v. Port Auth. of N.Y. &
N.J., 430 N.J. Super. 287, 296 (App. Div. 2013). . . .
However, erroneous jury instructions "constitute[]
reversible error where the jury outcome might have
been different had the jury been instructed correctly."
Velazquez [ex rel. Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 677,
688 (2000)]. Generally, "erroneous instructions on
material points are presumed to be reversible error."
McClelland v. Tucker, 273 N.J. Super. 410, 417 (App.
Div. 1994).
[Id. at 351 (citations reformatted).]
Review of jury instructions is a two-step process. First, we must
determine whether an error actually occurred. "In civil matters, the trial court
should give an instruction that appropriately guides the jury on the legal basis
of a plaintiff's claim or a defendant's affirmative defense, so long as there is a
reasonable factual basis in the evidence to support that claim or defense."
Walker v. Costco Wholesale Warehouse, 445 N.J. Super. 111, 120 (App. Div.
2016). "Jury charges 'must outline the function of the jury, set forth the issues,
correctly state the applicable law in understandable language, and plainly spell
A-1131-24
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out how the jury should apply the legal principles to the facts as it may find them
. . . .'" Velazquez, 163 N.J. at 688 (quoting Jurman v. Samuel Braen, Inc., 47
N.J. 586, 591-92 (1966)). Second, we must determine whether that error "may
have affected the trial's result." Walker, 445 N.J. Super. at 120 (quoting
Washington, 219 N.J. at 351). Importantly, we have noted that an improper jury
instruction is a poor candidate for application of the harmless error rule, and a
charge which misleads a jury will require a reversal and a new trial. Vallejo by
Morales v. Rahway Police Dep't, 292 N.J. Super. 333, 342 (App. Div. 1996)
(internal citations omitted).
When a party fails to object to the jury charges, we review for plain error.
State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012). Plain error is error that "was
'clearly capable of producing an unjust result,' that is, whether there is 'a
reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise
might not have reached.'" Dunbrack, 245 N.J. at 544 (citation omitted) (first
quoting R. 2:10-2; then quoting Funderberg, 225 N.J. at 79).
Here, neither party objected to the court's jury charge. Pertinently, the
court instructed that the jury could find that Trinitas's violation of ANSI Code
A117.1 supported plaintiff's claim of negligence. The court charged the jury as
follows:
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Now you have heard some testimony by the experts of
the code. It was [ANSI] Code A117.1. In this case, . . .
plaintiff, in support of the claim of negligence made,
asserts that [Trinitas] violated a provision of the [ANSI]
Code . . . . [Trinitas] denies a violation and contends the
code was adhered to.
The code sets up a standard of conduct. If you find that
[Trinitas] has violated that standard of conduct, such
violation is evidence to be considered by you in
determining whether negligence, as [the court has]
defined that to you, has been established. You may find
that such violation constituted negligence on the part of
[Trinitas], or you may find that it did not constitute such
negligence. Your findings on this issue may be based
on such violation alone, but in the event that there is
other or additional evidence bearing upon the issue, you
will consider such violation together with all such
additional evidence in arriving at your ultimate
decision as to the [Trinitas's] negligence.
For the first time on appeal, plaintiff contends the jury charge constitutes
reversible error because the court did not include the specific language contained
in ANSI Code A117.1, as directed by the Model Jury Charge, which plaintiff
cites:
In this case, the plaintiff, in support of the claim of
negligence made, asserts that defendant violated a
provision of the New Jersey Administrative Code/New
Jersey Statutes [whichever is applicable]. The
provision referred to as N.J.A.C./N.J.S.A. [insert
citation] reads as follows:
....
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The administrative regulation/statute has set up a
standard of conduct. If you find that defendant has
violated that standard of conduct, such violation is
evidence to be considered by you in determining
whether negligence, as I have defined that to you, has
been established. You may find that such violation
constituted negligence on the part of the defendant, or
you may find that it did not constitute such negligence.
Your findings on this issue may be based on such
violation alone, but in the event that there is other or
additional evidence bearing upon the issue, you will
consider such violation together with all such
additional evidence in arriving at your ultimate
decision as to the defendant’s negligence.
[Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.10I(1), "Violation of
Administrative Regulation/Statute as Evidence of
Negligence" (Apr. 2016) (emphasis added).]
According to plaintiff, the Model Jury Charge directed it to expressly
recite the full text of the ANSI Code A117.1, and the court's failure to do so
constitutes reversible error. Having reviewed the record, we conclude there was
ample, competent evidence for the jury to determine whether Trinitas was
negligent. Both Goldblatt and Pitera testified extensively about ANSI Code
A1171, which was at issue. Moreover, plaintiff did not object to the jury charge
during the charge conference. When viewing the jury charge as a whole, it is
not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Ponzo v. Pelle, 166 N.J.
481, 490 (2001); R. 2:10-2. As a result, the jury charge neither constituted
A-1131-24
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reversible, nor plain error. Mogull v. CB Com. Real Est. Grp., Inc., 162 N.J.
449, 467-68 (2000).
VI.
Finally, plaintiff argues the court erred in allowing defense counsel to
make impermissible remarks during her closing argument and improperly
allowed defense counsel to interrupt plaintiff's opening and closing statements.
Plaintiff maintains the court erred when it allowed defense counsel to "misstate
the evidence, distort the factual picture, and use disparaging remarks to discredit
plaintiff's witnesses during summation." In particular, plaintiff argues defense
counsel stated, "[c]redibility is a big issue in this case" and commented
Goldblatt's truthfulness was questionable and stated, "she kept fighting me on
that," and "pushed back." Plaintiff claims defense counsel telling the jury
Goldblatt "wasn't candid" about how she measured the ramp was "probably
because they figured out that she didn't use the right measuring device."
Plaintiff avers that by making a comparison that Pitera did not "fight back"
during his cross-examination, defense counsel improperly attacked Goldblatt's
"character" and made "improper" comments.
We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing "the trial court's
rulings during counsel's summation." Litton Indus., Inc v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200
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N.J. 372, 392-93 (2009). "[C]ounsel is allowed broad latitude in summation."
Hayes, 231 N.J. at 387 (quoting Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166,
177 (App. Div. 1999)). "[C]ounsel may draw conclusions even if the inferences
that the jury is asked to make are improbable, perhaps illogical, erroneous or
even absurd.'" Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 431 (2006). "That latitude is
not without its limits, and 'counsel's comments must be confined to the facts
shown or reasonably suggested by the evidence introduced during the course of
the trial.'" Hayes, 231 N.J. at 387 (quoting Colucci, 326 N.J. Super. at 177).
"When summation commentary transgresses the boundaries of the broad
latitude otherwise afforded to counsel, a trial court must grant a party's motion
for a new trial if the comments are so prejudicial that 'it clearly and convincingly
appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.'" Bender, 187 N.J.
at 431 (quoting R. 4:49-1(a)). The failure to make a timely objection indicates
that counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial when they were made,
deprives the court of the opportunity to take curative action, and are reviewed
for plain error. Risko, 206 N.J. at 523 (quoting Jackowitz v. Lang, 408 N.J.
Super. 495, 505 (App. Div. 2009)). Here, plaintiff failed to object at trial and
thus, the plain error rule applies.
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Plaintiff references two instances where the court sustained defense
counsel's objections to plaintiff's opening statement, and one instance during his
closing argument. The referenced instances during opening statement first
occurred when defense counsel objected to plaintiff's counsel's use of the word
"revenue," and the second was when he got emotional. Defense counsel again
objected to plaintiff's counsel getting emotional during his closing argument.
Plaintiff argues he suffered prejudice because his counsel "lost credibility before
the jury" as a result of these "meritless interruptions."
Plaintiff also contends the court erred in allowing defendant to make
disparaging remarks about plaintiff's medical and liability experts, misstate
evidence regarding plaintiff's liability expert, comment on a lack of evidence
after successfully excluding it, and use the "false in one, false in all" phrase.
Plaintiff maintains defense counsel's inappropriately-made disparaging remarks
about Goldblatt and distorted the facts during closing argument. For example,
plaintiff claims defense counsel questioned Goldblatt about whether she was
sued for false advertising and holding herself out as an engineer. Goldblatt
responded in the negative and responded the suit involved a trademark matter.
Regarding Dr. Cook, plaintiff contends defense counsel transitioned him
from being plaintiff's treating doctor to being a paid expert. After not evaluating
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plaintiff for three