Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1131-24 JOSHUA DUFFY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRINITAS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Respondent, and CROTHALL HEALTHCARE INC.,[1] Defendant. _________________________ Argued October 27, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026 Before Judges Firko and Bergman. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7423-19. 1 On January 21, 2022, Crothall was dismissed from the case and did not participate in the trial. Yongmoon Kim argued the cause for appellant (Kim Law Firm LLC, attorneys; Yongmoon Kim and Angela Yu, on the briefs). Catherine J. Flynn argued the cause for respondent (Flynn Legal Group, LLC, attorneys; Michael A. Moroney and Catherine J. Flynn, on the brief). PER CURIAM Following a four-day trial in this slip and fall action, a jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant Trinitas Regional Medical Center (Trinitas). Plaintiff Joshua Duffy appeals from the trial court's March 11, 2025 order to enter judgment dismissing his complaint with prejudice. We affirm. I. Factual Background We derive the following facts from the record. Plaintiff, a taxi driver, was dispatched to pick up a patient at Trinitas's emergency department entrance in Elizabeth. When the patient came out of the emergency department, the patient asked plaintiff to open the car door. After plaintiff closed the car door, he stepped to his left, and his foot slid down the side flare of a handicap accessible curb ramp. As a result, plaintiff sustained a trimalleolar ankle fracture. A-1131-24 2 The Litigation On October 9, 2019, plaintiff's former counsel filed a complaint alleging he was a lawful business invitee of Trinitas on the date of the incident. Plaintiff alleged he slipped and fell as a result of a "defective and dangerous curb ramp," which was improperly and negligently maintained in the front exterior of Trinitas. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, counsel fees, and costs of suit. On October 5, 2020, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint naming Crothall Healthcare, Inc. (Crothall), the property manager, as a defendant. Plaintiff alleged Crothall was negligent for failing to properly inspect and/or maintain the curb ramp, negligently installed it, failed to recognize the dangerous condition, and breached its duty to provide safe ingress and egress to plaintiff. Discovery ended on September 1, 2021, more than three years prior to trial. The case was listed for trial twelve times dating back to February 2022, spanning a period of thirty months. Plaintiff retained new counsel to try the case. A-1131-24 3 Motions in Limine Plaintiff filed multiple motions in limine seeking: to use demonstrative aids at trial, such as 3D models of the ramp and depicting his ankle injury; to bar Trinitas from mentioning a lack of prior incidents at the accident site, from raising pretrial motions, and from using any prior unrelated medical or pre - existing injury evidence. The 3D model of the ramp was created by Scott Moore, a professional engineer, after he conducted a site inspection, which was not disclosed to Trinitas. Plaintiff also requested the court take judicial notice that Trinitas was governed by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), A117.1 standards of the International Code Council (ICC). Specifically, plaintiff contended Trinitas was governed by and violated section 406.3.1 of ANSI A117.1, which provides curb ramp flares "shall not be steeper than 1:10" or 10%.2 Relevant here, the court denied plaintiff's request to use a 3D model of the ramp during trial and reserved decision on whether counsel could use a 3D 2 New Jersey incorporated the ICC/ANSI A117.1 standard into its Uniform Construction Code (UCC), formerly N.J.A.C. 5:23-7.2(a), as the technical standard governing accessible construction. However, N.J.A.C. 5:23-7.2(a) was originally adopted in 1999, amended over the years, and eventually repealed in 2015. Whether or not ANSI A117.1 applied was an issue in dispute based on the opposing experts' opinions and created a question for the jury to decide. A-1131-24 4 model depicting plaintiff's ankle injury, subject to an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing. The court granted plaintiff's motion to bar Trinitas from mentioning the lack of prior injuries at the incident location. The court denied plaintiff's motion seeking judicial notice of ANSI A117.1, noting that New Jersey had incorporated ANSI A117.1 into the UCC, and therefore, it could be used as evidence of negligence. The court also ruled that violations of the UCC did not constitute negligence per se. Plaintiff served seven notices in lieu of subpoenas and subpoenas ad testificandum on Trinitas's representatives. The subpoenas included demands for Trinitas's financial and tax records for the past ten years. These documents were never requested during discovery. The court barred plaintiff from calling these individuals as witnesses on the grounds they were either not identified in discovery or because plaintiff sought privileged or irrelevant information from them. The court also denied plaintiff's document requests. The Jury Trial During plaintiff's counsel's opening statement, he got emotional. Trinitas's counsel requested a sidebar, which led to the following colloquy: PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Judge, I apologize, but I do get emotional. THE COURT: You can't. A-1131-24 5 PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: But if I get emotional . . . THE COURT: You're not allowed. No. . . . You can't. You're an officer of the court. You cannot. . . . [L]isten . . . and don't interrupt [the court]. You're an officer of the court. You're here to represent your client. You cannot do that in your field. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: I'm going to try my best to hold my tears but if I . . . THE COURT: If you cry it's a mistrial. [The court is] telling you right now. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: I'm trying. . . . THE COURT: Well then you need to find a new line of work. . . . [Y]ou cannot cry in front of the jury. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: I'm going to try my best. THE COURT: No. No, no, no, no, you're not going [to] try your best. You're not going to do it. Understood? PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: I'm going to try. I am. Plaintiff testified on his own behalf and called Stephen Mader, a medical illustrator who created a 3D model depicting plaintiff's ankle injury, Melissa Gechtmann, his aunt, Dr. Keith Cook, a podiatrist, and Vivian Goldblatt, an accident reconstruction expert, as witnesses. Plaintiff argued that Trinitas was negligent because the curb violated section 406.3.1 of ANSI A117.1, because it was steeper than 10%. A-1131-24 6 During trial, plaintiff filed a motion to substitute his accident construction expert Goldblatt with Moore, due to "exceptional circumstances," as her father was hospitalized. In support of his motion, plaintiff attempted to introduce an expert report authored by Moore, which had never been served upon Trinitas. The court denied plaintiff's motion to substitute his expert. Notably, the court had already barred Moore from testifying during an in limine hearing. Ultimately, Goldblatt testified at trial. She opined that ANSI A117.1 was applicable to this case, and the subject flare violated the code provision because it was approximately 36% steep. However, during voir dire, Goldblatt admitted that she is not a licensed professional engineer or a licensed building inspector and does not possess the necessary qualifications to create or submit plans for pedestrian ramps to any State agency for approval. Defense counsel then called Trinitas's liability expert, Stan Pitera, a professional engineer. Pitera testified he issued a report regarding his inspection of the subject area where plaintiff was injured. Pitera testified that the flares were approximately 30% steep on one side, 32% steep on the other side, and acknowledged that New Jersey adopted the ANSI code. However, Pitera disagreed that the ANSI A117.1 standard was applicable here because the subject ramp was not part of the "circulation path" or a main pathway for A-1131-24 7 transversing as the premises had metal poles preventing people from walking through that path. Therefore, Pitera opined that the steepness of the curve did not violate ANSI A117.1, and Trinitas was not negligent. Plaintiff made several motions: (1) requesting the court take judicial notice that Trinitas owns the subject premises; (2) to have the jury view the premises; and (3) to admit the 3D model depicting plaintiff's ankle injury into evidence. The court denied all of plaintiff's motions. At the close of plaintiff's case, Trinitas moved for involuntary dismissal under Rule 4:37(b), which was denied. Defense counsel then called Dr. Wendell Scott, an orthopedic surgeon, as an expert witness. Dr. Scott opined that plaintiff suffered a trimalleolar fracture injury as a result of the incident. The parties proceeded with summations. During plaintiff's counsel's summation, he again became emotional and defense counsel requested a sidebar, which proceeded as follows: DEFENSE COUNSEL: We've already been here, [j]udge. . . . And, he's doing the emotional thing, adjusting his face like he was trying to hold back tears. I witnessed him do it. He did it on opening. He's starting again now. And before it got too far . . . . THE COURT: [The court] didn't say you could [get emotional]. A-1131-24 8 PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: I'm not crying. Let's get that out of the way. And, I didn't cry in opening. Let's get that out of the way. THE COURT: Get the emotion out of the case. . . . Okay. You got to get your emotions in check, okay? After summations, the court conducted a charge conference. Neither party objected to the proposed jury charge: THE COURT: With reference to the jury charges, we [had] a jury charge conference last evening and today. Did [the court] address everyone's concerns concerning the jury charges? PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And, the jury charges are satisfactory. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Judge. The jury returned a no cause verdict in favor of Trinitas. Specifically, the jury determined plaintiff failed to prove Trinitas was negligent in the design of the subject ramp by a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff did not file a motion for a new trial. A memorializing order to enter judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice was filed on March 11, 2025. This appeal followed. Before us, plaintiff argues the court erred: A-1131-24 9 (1) by failing to conduct a fair and impartial trial, failing to be courteous, temperate, patient, and impartial, erred by allowing Trinitas's counsel's meritless interruptions during plaintiff's counsel's opening and closing statements; (2) in its evidentiary rulings by barring Trinitas from being called in his case-in-chief, in barring plaintiff from substituting his liability expert, from using extrinsic evidence to impeach Trinitas's liability expert, and in barring plaintiff's use of the 3D replica of the ramp; (3) by charging the jury with instructions that inadequately conveyed the standard of conduct; and (4) by allowing Trinitas's counsel to make impermissible remarks during summation, misstate the evidence, distort the factual picture, use disparaging remarks to discredit plaintiff's witnesses, and by allowing Trinitas's counsel to use the "prohibited phrase," of "false in one, false in all." II. "A jury verdict is entitled to considerable deference and 'should not be overthrown except upon the basis of a carefully reasoned and factually supported (and articulated) determination, after canvassing the record and weighing the evidence, that the continued viability of the judgment would constitute a manifest denial of justice.'" Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 385- 86 (2018) (quoting Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011)). "A trial court therefore grants a motion for a new trial only 'if, A-1131-24 10 having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.'" Id. at 386 (quoting Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 511-12 (1994)) (quoting R. 4:49-1(a)). We apply the same standard on appeal. Risko, 206 N.J. at 522. However, "when evaluating the decision to grant or deny a new trial, 'an appellate court must give "due deference" to the "trial court's feel of the case."'" Hayes, 231 N.J. at 386 (quoting Risko, 206 N.J. at 522). "That is not to say, however, that we must accept the trial court's legal reasoning: '[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Hayes, 231 N.J. at 386-87 (alteration in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). "In reviewing a trial court's evidential ruling, an appellate court is limited to examining the decision for abuse of discretion." Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 12 (2008). A new trial is not warranted unless the trial court's evidentiary ruling was "so 'wide of the mark' as to constitute 'a manifest denial of justice' and an abuse of discretion." Id. at 25 (first quoting State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 435 (2007) and then quoting Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 34 (2004)). A-1131-24 11 We apply a similar discretionary standard of review of the trial court's decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. See, e.g., Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015) ("The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." (citing State v. Berry, 140 N.J. 280, 293 (1995))). As plaintiff did not file a motion for a new trial before the court below, we review for plain error under Rule 2:10-2. "Relief under the plain error rule, R[ule] 2:10-2, at least in civil cases, is discretionary and 'should be sparingly employed.'" Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999) (quoting Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435 (1957)). "The mere possibility of an unjust result is not enough." State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016). "In the context of a jury trial, the possibility must be 'sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'" State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 389-90 (2020) (quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997)). Thus, the plain error standard requires a determination of: "(1) whether there was error; and (2) whether that error was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result,' R[ule] 2:10-2; that is, whether there is 'a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not A-1131-24 12 have reached.'" State v. Dunbrack, 245 N.J. 531, 544 (2021) (quoting Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 79). III. With respect to first plaintiff's argument that the court failed to conduct a fair and impartial trial and failed to be courteous, temperate, and patient, we have made clear that [a] judge must "conduct [a] trial in a fair and impartial manner, without making remarks that might prejudice a party or which are calculated to influence the minds of the jury." A judge should never unfairly criticize or humiliate counsel, especially in front of the jury. A judge's failure to abide by these guidelines "can easily prejudice a jury since it conveys the opinion of the judge as to his [or her] belief or disbelief in one side of the case." Nevertheless, a trial court has wide discretion in controlling the courtroom and the court proceedings. Alleged misconduct by a trial judge must be reviewed within the context of the entire record in order to determine whether it had prejudicial impact. [D.G. ex rel. J.G. v. N. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 400 N.J. Super. 1, 25-26 (App. Div. 2008) (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).] Plaintiff's counsel points to the interaction between himself and the court at a sidebar conference during his opening statement. The court stated counsel would "need to find a new line of work," if he could not prevent himself from getting emotional in front of the jury. Plaintiff's counsel also maintains several A-1131-24 13 interactions between himself and the court during argument on in limine motions resulted in a prejudicial impact on the outcome of the case. We disagree. Here, the court acted within its discretion in preventing plaintiff's counsel from getting emotional before the jury during his opening statement. Moreover, the court's comments were made outside the presence of the jury during a sidebar conference, and the in limine motions were conducted outside the presence of the jury. When reviewing this "[a]lleged misconduct . . . within the context of the entire record," we conclude the record evidences the court presided over a well-tried case and exhibited patience and respect to both parties' counsel. Mercer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 324 N.J. Super. 290, 298 (App. Div. 1999). We discern no plain error because the court's remarks did not prejudice plaintiff or influence the minds of the jury. Cestero v. Ferrara, 110 N.J. Super. 264, 273 (App. Div. 1970). We also reject plaintiff's contention that defense counsel made "meritless interruptions" during plaintiff's opening and closing arguments. Defense counsel's objections were necessitated by reason of plaintiff's counsel's conduct in getting emotional before the jury and commenting on Trinitas's revenue stream during opening arguments. The court A-1131-24 14 maintained proper control of the courtroom and promptly took curative action to prevent prejudice. See State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576 (1999). IV. Next, plaintiff argues the court committed several evidentiary errors. Plaintiff challenges the court's ruling quashing his three notices in lieu of subpoenas to Deborah Dolan, who was identified as Trinitas's risk manager, as a corporate representative with knowledge of the subject ramp, and individually. Plaintiff contends the court improvidently barred him from substituting his accident reconstruction expert during trial and from using extrinsic evidence to impeach defendant's liability expert. Plaintiff also maintains the court should have conducted an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing on the admissibility of the 3D replica of the subject ramp because photographs were insufficient. Plaintiff claims this is a "very nuanced type of case because it has to do with an angle of the flare." We are unpersuaded. In reviewing the trial court's evidentiary rulings, this court defers to the trial court absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021). Appellate courts review the trial court's evidentiary ruling "'under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion.'" State v. A-1131-24 15 Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018) (quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)). Under that deferential standard, "we review a trial court's evidentiary ruling only for a 'clear error in judgment.'" State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020) (quoting State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017)). "A trial court's 'discretion is abused when relevant evidence offered by the defense and necessary for a fair trial is kept from the jury.'" State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (quoting State v. Cope, 224 N.J. 530, 554-55 (2016)). Further, N.J.R.E. 611(a) states: "[t]he [c]ourt shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." See also Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 609-10 (App. Div. 2019). N.J.R.E. 611(b) states: "[c]ross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness' credibility. The court may allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination." Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in any of its evidentiary rulings. The court properly denied plaintiff's attempt to substitute his liability expert — A-1131-24 16 Goldblatt—for a new expert—Moore—at trial. Saliently, during discovery, plaintiff identified Goldblatt as his only expert in response to standard interrogatory form A-23. No other potential experts were identified. The 3D model of the ramp prepared by Moore was never disclosed to Trinitas until trial. The court properly quashed plaintiff's notices in lieu of subpoena to call Trinitas's risk manager in plaintiff's case-in-chief. The risk manager is part of Trinitas's litigation control group and, as such, any information possessed by the risk manager is privileged. N.J.R.E. 504(1). We are also convinced the court did not err in barring Moore from testifying at trial. The record shows Moore was previously barred from testifying during the in limine hearing. Specifically, the court denied plaintiff's application to introduce a report authored by Moore, which had never been served during the five years of discovery in this case, and the 3D model of the ramp created after a "surreptitious site inspection." The court correctly rejected plaintiff's argument that Moore's report was "identical" to Goldblatt's report. The court ruled, "Moore's report is not, as plaintiff represented, the same as . . . Goldblatt's." The record supports that determination. Trinitas counters plaintiff "was disingenuous" to the court and defense counsel when on day four of trial he sought to substitute his liability experts. A-1131-24 17 The court aptly noted defense counsel's expert—Pitera—would not have the opportunity to provide a rebuttal report. The court provided Goldblatt the opportunity to testify by Zoom or to have counsel take her de bene esse testimony because she was at the hospital with her father. These were reasonable alternatives. The court pointed out Goldblatt is a "paid professional," who has "an obligation to her client" especially in light of the fact a sworn jury was in place. The court reasoned there would be "substantial prejudice" to Trinitas if plaintiff substituted liability experts in the midst of trial. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion with respect to any of its evidentiary rulings. V. Next, plaintiff argues the court committed reversible error in charging the jury with instructions that inadequately conveyed the standard of conduct. Plaintiff asserts Trinitas violated ANSI Code A.117.1, which provides the maximum steepness of a handicap ramp's side flares cannot exceed 10%. According to plaintiff, whether ANSI Code A.117.1 applied and whether the flare was too steep was the "crux" of the liability issue. In Washington v. Perez, 219 N.J. 338, 351 (2014), our Supreme Court articulated the standard of review for challenging jury instructions in civil cases. A-1131-24 18 Appellate review of a challenged jury instruction entails not only scrutiny of the charge itself, but an inquiry as to whether an erroneous charge may have affected the trial's result. Notably, "in construing a jury charge, a court must examine the charge as a whole, rather than focus on individual errors in isolation." Viscik [v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 18 (2002)]. . . . "As a general matter, [appellate courts] will not reverse if an erroneous jury instruction was 'incapable of producing an unjust result or prejudicing substantial rights.'" Mandal v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 430 N.J. Super. 287, 296 (App. Div. 2013). . . . However, erroneous jury instructions "constitute[] reversible error where the jury outcome might have been different had the jury been instructed correctly." Velazquez [ex rel. Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 677, 688 (2000)]. Generally, "erroneous instructions on material points are presumed to be reversible error." McClelland v. Tucker, 273 N.J. Super. 410, 417 (App. Div. 1994). [Id. at 351 (citations reformatted).] Review of jury instructions is a two-step process. First, we must determine whether an error actually occurred. "In civil matters, the trial court should give an instruction that appropriately guides the jury on the legal basis of a plaintiff's claim or a defendant's affirmative defense, so long as there is a reasonable factual basis in the evidence to support that claim or defense." Walker v. Costco Wholesale Warehouse, 445 N.J. Super. 111, 120 (App. Div. 2016). "Jury charges 'must outline the function of the jury, set forth the issues, correctly state the applicable law in understandable language, and plainly spell A-1131-24 19 out how the jury should apply the legal principles to the facts as it may find them . . . .'" Velazquez, 163 N.J. at 688 (quoting Jurman v. Samuel Braen, Inc., 47 N.J. 586, 591-92 (1966)). Second, we must determine whether that error "may have affected the trial's result." Walker, 445 N.J. Super. at 120 (quoting Washington, 219 N.J. at 351). Importantly, we have noted that an improper jury instruction is a poor candidate for application of the harmless error rule, and a charge which misleads a jury will require a reversal and a new trial. Vallejo by Morales v. Rahway Police Dep't, 292 N.J. Super. 333, 342 (App. Div. 1996) (internal citations omitted). When a party fails to object to the jury charges, we review for plain error. State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012). Plain error is error that "was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result,' that is, whether there is 'a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'" Dunbrack, 245 N.J. at 544 (citation omitted) (first quoting R. 2:10-2; then quoting Funderberg, 225 N.J. at 79). Here, neither party objected to the court's jury charge. Pertinently, the court instructed that the jury could find that Trinitas's violation of ANSI Code A117.1 supported plaintiff's claim of negligence. The court charged the jury as follows: A-1131-24 20 Now you have heard some testimony by the experts of the code. It was [ANSI] Code A117.1. In this case, . . . plaintiff, in support of the claim of negligence made, asserts that [Trinitas] violated a provision of the [ANSI] Code . . . . [Trinitas] denies a violation and contends the code was adhered to. The code sets up a standard of conduct. If you find that [Trinitas] has violated that standard of conduct, such violation is evidence to be considered by you in determining whether negligence, as [the court has] defined that to you, has been established. You may find that such violation constituted negligence on the part of [Trinitas], or you may find that it did not constitute such negligence. Your findings on this issue may be based on such violation alone, but in the event that there is other or additional evidence bearing upon the issue, you will consider such violation together with all such additional evidence in arriving at your ultimate decision as to the [Trinitas's] negligence. For the first time on appeal, plaintiff contends the jury charge constitutes reversible error because the court did not include the specific language contained in ANSI Code A117.1, as directed by the Model Jury Charge, which plaintiff cites: In this case, the plaintiff, in support of the claim of negligence made, asserts that defendant violated a provision of the New Jersey Administrative Code/New Jersey Statutes [whichever is applicable]. The provision referred to as N.J.A.C./N.J.S.A. [insert citation] reads as follows: .... A-1131-24 21 The administrative regulation/statute has set up a standard of conduct. If you find that defendant has violated that standard of conduct, such violation is evidence to be considered by you in determining whether negligence, as I have defined that to you, has been established. You may find that such violation constituted negligence on the part of the defendant, or you may find that it did not constitute such negligence. Your findings on this issue may be based on such violation alone, but in the event that there is other or additional evidence bearing upon the issue, you will consider such violation together with all such additional evidence in arriving at your ultimate decision as to the defendant’s negligence. [Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.10I(1), "Violation of Administrative Regulation/Statute as Evidence of Negligence" (Apr. 2016) (emphasis added).] According to plaintiff, the Model Jury Charge directed it to expressly recite the full text of the ANSI Code A117.1, and the court's failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Having reviewed the record, we conclude there was ample, competent evidence for the jury to determine whether Trinitas was negligent. Both Goldblatt and Pitera testified extensively about ANSI Code A1171, which was at issue. Moreover, plaintiff did not object to the jury charge during the charge conference. When viewing the jury charge as a whole, it is not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Ponzo v. Pelle, 166 N.J. 481, 490 (2001); R. 2:10-2. As a result, the jury charge neither constituted A-1131-24 22 reversible, nor plain error. Mogull v. CB Com. Real Est. Grp., Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 467-68 (2000). VI. Finally, plaintiff argues the court erred in allowing defense counsel to make impermissible remarks during her closing argument and improperly allowed defense counsel to interrupt plaintiff's opening and closing statements. Plaintiff maintains the court erred when it allowed defense counsel to "misstate the evidence, distort the factual picture, and use disparaging remarks to discredit plaintiff's witnesses during summation." In particular, plaintiff argues defense counsel stated, "[c]redibility is a big issue in this case" and commented Goldblatt's truthfulness was questionable and stated, "she kept fighting me on that," and "pushed back." Plaintiff claims defense counsel telling the jury Goldblatt "wasn't candid" about how she measured the ramp was "probably because they figured out that she didn't use the right measuring device." Plaintiff avers that by making a comparison that Pitera did not "fight back" during his cross-examination, defense counsel improperly attacked Goldblatt's "character" and made "improper" comments. We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing "the trial court's rulings during counsel's summation." Litton Indus., Inc v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 A-1131-24 23 N.J. 372, 392-93 (2009). "[C]ounsel is allowed broad latitude in summation." Hayes, 231 N.J. at 387 (quoting Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166, 177 (App. Div. 1999)). "[C]ounsel may draw conclusions even if the inferences that the jury is asked to make are improbable, perhaps illogical, erroneous or even absurd.'" Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 431 (2006). "That latitude is not without its limits, and 'counsel's comments must be confined to the facts shown or reasonably suggested by the evidence introduced during the course of the trial.'" Hayes, 231 N.J. at 387 (quoting Colucci, 326 N.J. Super. at 177). "When summation commentary transgresses the boundaries of the broad latitude otherwise afforded to counsel, a trial court must grant a party's motion for a new trial if the comments are so prejudicial that 'it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.'" Bender, 187 N.J. at 431 (quoting R. 4:49-1(a)). The failure to make a timely objection indicates that counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial when they were made, deprives the court of the opportunity to take curative action, and are reviewed for plain error. Risko, 206 N.J. at 523 (quoting Jackowitz v. Lang, 408 N.J. Super. 495, 505 (App. Div. 2009)). Here, plaintiff failed to object at trial and thus, the plain error rule applies. A-1131-24 24 Plaintiff references two instances where the court sustained defense counsel's objections to plaintiff's opening statement, and one instance during his closing argument. The referenced instances during opening statement first occurred when defense counsel objected to plaintiff's counsel's use of the word "revenue," and the second was when he got emotional. Defense counsel again objected to plaintiff's counsel getting emotional during his closing argument. Plaintiff argues he suffered prejudice because his counsel "lost credibility before the jury" as a result of these "meritless interruptions." Plaintiff also contends the court erred in allowing defendant to make disparaging remarks about plaintiff's medical and liability experts, misstate evidence regarding plaintiff's liability expert, comment on a lack of evidence after successfully excluding it, and use the "false in one, false in all" phrase. Plaintiff maintains defense counsel's inappropriately-made disparaging remarks about Goldblatt and distorted the facts during closing argument. For example, plaintiff claims defense counsel questioned Goldblatt about whether she was sued for false advertising and holding herself out as an engineer. Goldblatt responded in the negative and responded the suit involved a trademark matter. Regarding Dr. Cook, plaintiff contends defense counsel transitioned him from being plaintiff's treating doctor to being a paid expert. After not evaluating A-1131-24 25 plaintiff for three