Full Opinion

Case: 26-20180 Document: 43-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals ____________ Fifth Circuit FILED No. 26-20180 November 6, 2026 ____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III Clerk Erica Anderson Ross, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Target Corporation, Defendant—Appellee. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:24-CV-3666 ______________________________ Before King, Higginson, and Douglas, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* In 2023, Erica Anderson Ross was struck by a warehouse cart inside a Target store, which she says resulted in pain and injury to her right arm and head. She sued Target, alleging negligence and premises liability. Ross did not designate any experts by the deadline set by the district court’s scheduling order, instead seeking leave to designate over two dozen experts from sixteen medical practices about two-and-a-half months after the court’s _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 26-20180 Document: 43-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 No. 26-20180 deadline, days before docket call (known in other district courts as the final pretrial conference). The tardy designation did not include summaries of the expert opinions, instead stating with identical language that each expert would testify about “whether the incident that forms the basis of this lawsuit was the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries . . . [and] the reasonableness of the medical bills incurred in this case.” In response to a motion from Target, the district court denied Ross’s motion for leave to file late expert disclosures and granted Target’s motion to exclude the testimony of any late-designated experts at trial. With permission of the court, Target then moved for summary judgment, arguing that no reasonable jury could find that Ross’s injuries were caused by the incident absent this expert testimony. The district court granted that motion. Ross now appeals the district court’s exclusion of her expert witnesses designated after the court’s deadline and the court’s grant of summary judgment to Target. We AFFIRM both rulings. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to exclude expert witnesses who were not timely designated. Newsome v. Int’l Paper Co., 123 F.4th 754, 766 (5th Cir. 2024); Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 875, 883 (5th Cir. 2004). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) establishes procedures governing the disclosure of information regarding experts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. If a party fails to abide by Rule 26(a), “the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). “We consider four factors when reviewing a district court’s ‘discretion to exclude evidence that was not properly designated’: ‘(1) the explanation for the failure to identify the witness; (2) the importance of the 2 Case: 26-20180 Document: 43-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 No. 26-20180 testimony; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the testimony; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.’” Newsome, 123 F.4th at 766 (quoting Stewart v. Gruber, No. 23-30129, 2023 WL 8643633, at *4 (5th Cir. Dec. 14, 2023)). Beginning with the first factor, Ross explains that she failed to comply with the district court’s deadline because of an internal calendaring error. But “[m]ere inadvertence on the part of the movant, even when coupled with the absence of prejudice to the non-movant, is insufficient to establish good cause.” Id. at 767 (quoting Akpan v. United States, No. CV-H-16-2981, 2017 WL 6527427, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2017)). Turning to the third factor, Target faced substantial potential prejudice if the expert testimony were admitted. Target had some information on the potential identities of Ross’s experts from her initial and supplemental disclosures. But Ross had never, even in her designations, provided summaries of the facts and opinions to which these witnesses would testify. Target therefore lacked insight into which providers would testify regarding the necessity of treatment, the reasonableness of medical expenses, or the causation of Ross’s injuries by the incident. Ross had several preexisting conditions and injuries to different regions of the body, described in more detail below, and Target could not determine from the designations how the experts would address these various conditions. It would have required substantial time and resources for Target to depose each expert, prepare updated expert reports from its existing experts, and designate additional responsive experts beyond its spine and shoulder experts. And the timing of the disclosure—just weeks before trial—significantly enhanced the prejudice against Target. When the first and third factors weigh against admitting the testimony, the district court is not obligated to continue the trial; 3 Case: 26-20180 Document: 43-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 No. 26-20180 “Otherwise, the failure to satisfy the rules would never result in exclusion, but only in a continuance.” Hamburger, 361 F.3d at 883–84. The district court did not abuse its discretion in so concluding here. The second and fourth factors similarly support the district court’s ruling. Turning to the second factor, the expert testimony was critical to Ross’s ability to prove causation and prevail before a jury, as both sides acknowledge. “[W]here an expert is crucial to the plaintiff’s case, it ‘only underscores the importance of plaintiffs’ compliance with the court’s deadlines.’” Newsome, 123 F.4th at 767 (quoting Stewart, 2023 WL 8643633, at *4–5). The second factor has at times been applied differently, with courts weighing the importance of testimony as a point in favor of the inclusion of that testimony. See, e.g., Betzel v. State Farm Lloyds, 480 F.3d 704, 708 (5th Cir. 2007). But that weighing is “inconsistent with longstanding Fifth Circuit precedent and our rule of orderliness[.]” Newsome, 123 F.4th at 767. Finally, as to the fourth factor, a continuance would not have fully cured the prejudice to Target. The parties were preparing for trial to begin within a few weeks of Ross’s tardy disclosure. A continuance would have delayed trial and required Target to incur additional expenses, essentially reworking its trial strategy after the close of discovery. See id. at 767–68 (“No continuance would prevent the increased expense of reviewing and responding to a new expert, preparing for and deposing that expert, and potentially preparing rebuttal opinions—before, if needed, re-drafting and re-filing dispositive motions which had already been completed.”). Ross contends that the district court’s exclusion of all her experts was overbroad, as Target had notice from earlier disclosures that she intended to call certain of her listed experts. That is relevant to the degree of prejudice to Target, but it does not cure the significant prejudice that Target faced 4 Case: 26-20180 Document: 43-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 No. 26-20180 based on the newly disclosed experts and complete lack of substantive information about the experts’ proposed testimony, in violation of Rule 26. Next, we turn to the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Target. “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is warranted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under Texas law, “[t]he general rule has long been that expert testimony is necessary to establish causation as to medical conditions outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors.” Guervara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. 2007). Whan a plaintiff has pre-existing medical conditions, expert testimony is particularly useful. Id.; Flynn v. Racicot, No. 09-11-00607-CV, 2013 WL 476756, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 7, 2013, no pet.) (“The presence of a medical condition before an accident may complicate a causation connection and require expert evidence to support causation.”). Ross had a history of pain in her neck, back, right shoulder, right wrist, and head, and she had been injured in two automobile accidents and a slip-and-fall. Before the incident, she was diagnosed with complex regional pain syndrome. She previously had neck surgery and back surgery. Ross concedes that, without expert testimony, she “could not present admissible proof necessary to establish an essential element of the claims.” The district court appropriately granted summary judgment to Target because no reasonable jury could find that Ross’s injuries were caused by the Target incident absent this testimony. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s exclusion of Ross’s expert witnesses and award of summary judgment to Target. 5