Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON NAVNEET KAUR, an individual, No. 88392-5-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION WILLIAMS PORTFOLIO 17, d/b/a WILLIAMS PORTFOLIO 17, INC., a foreign profit corporation; ALLIED RESIDENTIAL, INC., a Washington profit corporation, Respondent. BUI, J. — Navneet Kaur sued the owner of the property and the property management company for breach of contract, violations of the Residential Landlord Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA) chapter 59.18 RCW, negligence, and nuisance, for water leakage and mold in her apartment unit. On summary judgment, the trial court dismissed all claims. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Kaur’s breach of contract claim and remand for further proceedings on the remaining claims. FACTS Since March 2013, Kaur has rented an apartment at the subject property, the Delano Apartments. On March 26, 2020, Kaur signed a new lease agreement, renewing her lease to April 15, 2021. At the time of the lease renewal, the Delano was managed by Essex Management Corporation (Essex). Community manager Paul Martinez, signed on behalf of Essex and the landlord. No. 88392-5-I /2 The ownership and management company of the Delano changed on July 30, 2020. Williams Portfolio 17 (WP) entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement (Agreement) with Essex to purchase the Delano, and the closing date of the sale was July 30. Under the Agreement, Essex would continue to “manage and operate” the Delano until the closing date. On July 30, pursuant to the Management and Operating Agreement between WP and Allied Residential (Allied), Allied became the property management company and acted as WP’s “exclusive agent to manage, operate, supervise, and lease the [Delano].” Around April 2020, Kaur sent an e-mail to then management company, Essex, and its agent Martinez, to report water leakage in her kitchen. On May 1, Essex received “a work order” on the kitchen sink in Kaur’s unit. On May 21, Kaur messaged Martinez, telling him the “water leakage has now penetrated through the wood and under the carpet in [the] dining area” and is “progressing fats [sic] under [the] carpet of living area.” On June 1, “repairs” were made to Kaur’s unit, which included rebuilding her kitchen cabinetry. One day later, Martinez sent Kaur an e-mail to follow up about the status of the leak. On November 20, Kaur sent a “maintenance request,” asking that her unit be “inspected urgently as I have been feeling sick for [the] past few months and there have been high Mold markers in my recent blood test.” Thereafter, Kaur’s unit was inspected and on November 24, Martinez messaged Kaur, telling her that “we got the tech reports back and it looks like we will have to do some work on your apartment.” Martinez offered alternative units that Kaur could relocate to 2 No. 88392-5-I /3 temporarily while work was being done. On November 25, Kaur responded and asked Martinez for a copy of the inspection report. Kaur and Martinez continued to communicate back-and-forth, and on December 2, Martinez wrote that he could not share the inspection documents “because they are still being reviewed.” On December 19, Kaur moved out of her unit and into another unit, and she signed a month-to-month lease with WP. Allied began an immediate demolition and restoration of Kaur’s unit. Kaur moved back into her unit on March 5, 2021. Following her return to her previous unit, Kaur experienced additional issues, including the inability to use various appliances: the dishwasher, because it leaked; the washer and dryer, because they were “unbelievably unhygienic”; and the microwave, because it “ma[de] noises when plugged [in].” Allied fixed the issues with the microwave and dishwasher. Allied agreed to replace Kaur’s current washer and dryer with a refurbished set, but not buy new machines as requested by Kaur and recommended by Kaur’s naturopathic physician Maria Marian because of Kaur’s “health conditions.” On March 29, 2023, Kaur filed a lawsuit against WP and Allied, for breach of contract, negligence, violations of the RLTA, and nuisance. WP and Allied moved for summary judgment, arguing they could not be liable to Kaur “for damages arising from a unit leak” that initially occurred when they were not owners of the Delano, and when they did become owners in July 2020, they promptly repaired the water leak. Kaur filed briefing in response to the motion, 3 No. 88392-5-I /4 attaching a declaration from Dr. Marian. Dr. Marian opined that based on her examination and testing of Kaur in October and November of 2020, Kaur’s symptoms of fatigue and her skin conditions were from exposure to environmental pathogens in her apartment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of WP and Allied and dismissed all claims. Kaur timely appealed. ANALYSIS Kaur argues the trial court erred in dismissing all claims on summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Horvath v. DBIA Servs., 5 Wn.3d 898, 908, 580 P.3d 969 (2025); CR 56(c). If the moving party meets their initial burden of proving by uncontroverted facts that there is no genuine issue of material fact, “then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce ‘specific facts evidencing a genuine issue of material fact for trial.’ ” Bittner v. Symetra Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 32 Wn. App. 2d 647, 660, 558 P.3d 177 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Welch v. Brand Insulations, Inc., 27 Wn. App. 2d 110, 115, 531 P.3d 265 (2023)). We review a trial court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Bolina v. AssureCare Adult Home LLC, 6 Wn.3d 737, 744, 592 P.3d 1 (2026). We undertake the same inquiry as the trial court and consider the evidence and the reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. State v. City of Sunnyside, 3 Wn.3d 279, 296, 550 P.3d 31 (2024). 4 No. 88392-5-I /5 Here, Kaur brought claims of breach of contract, nuisance under chapter 7.48 RCW, negligence, and violations of the RLTA. We discuss the claims in turn. Breach of Contract Kaur contends WP and Allied “breached their contractual duties imposed by the rental agreement.” We disagree. Here, the trial court found that WP and Allied “contracted to manage said property about two months after [Kaur’s] initial complaint [in April] and subsequent timely repairs, [in June].” Kaur did not challenge this finding. It is undisputed that Kaur entered into the lease agreement on March 25, 2020, with Essex when it was the owner and landlord. And beginning with the water leakage in April and ending with repairs done on June 1, Kaur continued to have a contractual relationship with Essex, not with WP or Allied. WP and Allied did not possess and become owners of the property until the sale closing date of July 30. Kaur’s breach of contract claim fails. No contractual relationship existed between Kaur and WP and Allied before July 30, upon which a duty could arise. Nuisance, Negligence, and RLTA Claims An actionable nuisance includes “an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of . . . the property.” RCW 7.48.010. Nuisance can also be an “act or omission [that] either annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health or safety of others . . . or in any way renders other persons insecure in life, or in the use of property.” RCW 7.48.120. “[W]here the alleged nuisance is the result of the defendant’s 5 No. 88392-5-I /6 alleged negligent conduct, rules of negligence are applied.” Atherton Condo. Apt.-Owners Ass’n Bd. Of Dirs. v. Blume Dev. Co., 115 Wn.2d 506, 527, 799 P.2d 250 (1990). In a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish, among other elements, “the existence of a duty.” Chaudhry v. Day, 31 Wn. App. 2d 225, 230, 548 P.3d 279 (2024). In general, the existence of a legal duty is a question of law, suitable for summary judgment. Chaudhry, 31 Wn. App. 2d at 230. However, where the existence of a duty depends on proof of certain facts, which are disputed, summary judgment is inappropriate. Chaudhry, 31 Wn. App. 2d at 230. A landlord is subject to liability for harm caused to the tenant by a dangerous condition existing before or arising after the tenant has taken possession if the landlord has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the condition and the existence of the condition is in violation of (1) an implied warranty of habitability or (2) a duty created by statute. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 17.6 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). A landlord is subject to liability under § 17.6 only for those conditions they are aware of or those conditions they could have known about in the exercise of ordinary care. RESTATEMENT§ 17.6, cmt. c. Hence, to prevail on a § 17.6 claim, the tenant must show: (1) that the condition was dangerous, (2) that the landlord was aware of the condition and failed to exercise ordinary care to repair the condition, and (3) that the existence of the condition was a violation of an implied warranty of habitability or a duty created by statute or regulation. 6 No. 88392-5-I /7 Additionally, a landlord may be liable under § 17.6 if the landlord violates the specific duties as set forth in the RLTA. Such duties include, by way of example and without limitation, the duties to “keep the premises fit for human habitation” and “[m]aintain all electrical, plumbing, heating, and other facilities and appliances supplied by [the landlord] in reasonably good working order.” RCW 59.18.060(8). Here, Kaur claims that WP and Allied violated their implied duty of habitability by failing to “maintain in a reasonably safe and habitable condition those portions of the premises that [Kaur] was . . . invited to use.” Kaur also claims that WP and Allied violated their landlord duties by failing to keep [Kaur’s] apartment “fit for human habitation.” In response to the summary judgment motion, Kaur submitted evidence of e-mail communications between community manager Martinez and Kaur, from April, June, and in November, where Martinez could have acted as an agent for Essex, the previous property owner, and WP, the assumed owner on July 30. The communications were about the water leak, the repairs on June 1, the presence of mold in Kaur’s unit, Kaur’s blood test results in November, the “water mitigation services” by Servpro to renovate her unit, the relocation to another unit, and the declaration of Dr. Marian. Addressing these claims together, the trial court concluded, “[a]s a matter of law, [WP and Allied] owed no duty to [Kaur] prior to [their] possession of the subject property.” (Emphasis added.) Critically, on the dispositive issues of whether WP and Allied owed any duty to Kaur on the subject claims, the trial court’s summary judgment order is silent and it overlooked the dispositive issues 7 No. 88392-5-I /8 surrounding their potential liability. Thus, Kaur’s claims (other than their breach of contract claim) still remain to be decided by the trial court. We affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and dismissing the breach of contract claim. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings to resolve Kaur’s remaining claims against WP and Allied, when they possessed and owned the property on July 30, 2020, and thereafter. WE CONCUR: 8