Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0463n.06 Case No. 25-1827 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 18, 2026 ) LORI VIILO, personal representative of the estate KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk of Joshua Joseph Maslowski, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN KENT COUNTY, MICHIGAN; VITALCORE HEALTH STRATEGIES, LLC; MICHELLE ) LAJOYE-YOUNG; DEPUTY VANDERMOLEN; ) DEPUTY CHEYENNE SMITH; DEPUTY ) TIMOTHY BISHOP; DEPUTY RITZ; DEPUTY ) OPINION MCNEIL; DEPUTY FENNEMA; DEPUTY AJ ) BERNHARDT; DEPUTY BX CALDERA; ) DEPUTY J. SPRIGGEL; DAVID DEGRAFF; ) MARY E. MACMILLAN; LINDSEY N. LUCAS; SONYA RAWLS; JANE DOE, CMS 127, ) ) Defendants-Appellees. ) Before: READLER, DAVIS, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Joshua Maslowski died while in the custody of the Kent County Correctional Facility as a pretrial detainee in 2021. In the weeks leading up to his death, he had complained to the defendant correctional officers and nurses about experiencing ongoing headaches, mental health issues, and sundry other symptoms. The defendants responded to Maslowski’s complaints, but he experienced little relief. Eventually, corrections officers found Maslowski unresponsive in his cell after an apparent seizure. He never regained consciousness. No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. A brain scan revealed that Maslowski had a terminal brain tumor, which was later determined to have caused his death. Lori Viilo, the personal representative of Maslowski’s estate, brought this action claiming that the defendants violated Maslowski’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by showing deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs leading up to his death. Because Viilo has not overcome the Deputy Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity and has not shown that the Medical Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Maslowski’s serious medical needs, we disagree and AFFIRM. I. A. Factual Background On March 4, 2021, Joshua Maslowski was arrested on assault-related charges and booked at the Kent County, Michigan, Correctional Facility (“KCCF”). During booking, Maslowski completed a medical screening form in which he: denied taking any medications; denied having any medical illness or health conditions, including seizures, recent head injuries, or recent hospitalization; and indicated that there was nothing that the medical team needed to know about his medical health history. In truth, however, Maslowski had been diagnosed with schizophrenia in his twenties. And he had prescriptions for Abilify, Tramadol, and Protonix filled less than a week before his arrest. Within days of his arrival, on March 7, 2021, Maslowski complained of chest pain, and a nurse referred him to a provider for a next-day appointment. Kent County contracts with VitalCore Health Strategies, LLC, to provide health care services to detainees at KCCF. Nurse practitioner (“NP”) Joanne Sherwood saw Maslowski the day after his initial complaint and diagnosed him with chronic lumbar pain and anxiety. Sherwood recommended Motrin and anxiety medication and referred him for a psychiatric evaluation. On March 9, 2021, Maslowski was concerned he -2- No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. might have a concussion; he told Deputy Andrew VanderMolen that he wanted to speak with medical because his head was pounding and he was seeing flashing lights. VanderMolen reported this to medical staff. Two days later—on March 11, 2021—Maslowski told Deputy AJ Bernhardt that he had blood in his feces and a broken ear drum from getting hit in the head with a pipe prior to his arrest. Deputy Bernhardt reported this information to medical staff. That same day, Maslowski submitted a medical kite complaining of stomach pain, weight loss, and migraines. He requested a medication change from ibuprofen to Excedrin, to receive Ensure Plus (a nutritional supplement to manage his weight loss), and a visit with a psychiatric doctor. On March 12, 2021, Nurse Mary E. MacMillan noted Deputy Bernhardt’s report, and medical staff marked Maslowski’s kite as received. That same day, NP Sherwood discontinued Maslowski’s ibuprofen prescription and sent an order for Excedrin and crackers. Two days later, on March 14, 2021, a nurse performed an initial health assessment, which indicated that Maslowski had not suffered any head trauma with loss of consciousness in the last twenty-four hours and had no hospitalizations for medical or psychiatric reasons. During the health assessment, Maslowski denied chest pain, head injury, seizures, ulcers, cancer, and mental health problems, among other things. Then, on March 17, 2021, Maslowski again requested Excedrin for a headache. On March 20, 2021, Deputy Baudelio Caldera notified medical staff that Maslowski reported having an ulcer. And on March 22, 2021, Maslowski was still not feeling well. Mental health staff notified medical that Maslowski reported that his stomach was “burning” and that he felt like he might die. Maslowski had started banging on the door. Another deputy also alerted medical that Maslowski was requesting a visit because his stomach was burning, and he was in -3- No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. pain. In response, the medical team scheduled Maslowski for a nurse sick call follow-up evaluation. Later this same day, Deputy J. Spriggel reported that Maslowski was having random loud outbursts and screaming at the top of his lungs in the middle of the night for no apparent reason. Still complaining of stomach pain, an ulcer, and mental health issues on March 24, 2021, Maslowski submitted a health care request to see a psychiatric doctor and for better medication. Maslowski also approached a doctor and requested more food and medication. That same day, NP Sherwood weighed Maslowski to determine his body mass index (“BMI”) and prescribed Excedrin. But that night, Maslowski told Deputy Caldera that he was having trouble breathing from his stomach. Deputy Caldera notified medical staff. On March 27, 2021, Maslowski’s BMI was within normal range. Maslowski’s March 24 medical request to see a doctor was fulfilled on March 31, 2021. However, Maslowski continued to display symptoms of distress. On April 14, 2021, at 5:11pm, Deputy Ritz observed Maslowski screaming and hitting his cell window because of eye and head pain. Maslowski told Deputy Ritz that “it hurt[] really bad” and that the pain had been going on for a couple of weeks. (Record Log, R. 105-3, PageID 1219). Deputy Ritz contacted Nurse Sonya Rawls about the situation, and she said she would send someone up to see him. Nurse David DeGraff went to see Maslowski and entered a progress note at 6:00 pm indicating that Maslowski complained of a headache secondary to pounding his head on the wall when frustrated. Nurse DeGraff reported normal vital signs, eye movement, and grip strength, and that Maslowski appeared well. He assessed Maslowski as having a headache secondary to anxiety, recommended Tylenol and Motrin, and advised him to return to the clinic as needed. Nurse DeGraff stated that -4- No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. he “knew [Maslowski] well from many, many contacts with him.” (DeGraff Dep., R. 107-5, PageID 1573). On April 15, 2021, at 4:46 p.m., Deputy Ritz notified medical staff that Maslowski had complained of a constant headache due to his not taking Excedrin. About thirty minutes later, Deputy Ritz notified medical that Maslowski was vomiting and could not keep food down. Then, during dinner time that evening, Deputy Ritz reported to medical staff that Maslowski was having a possible seizure. Nurse DeGraff responded to Deputy Ritz’s call and evaluated Maslowski. Deputy Ernest McNeil and Deputy Kyle Fennema also responded to the situation. Nurse DeGraff relayed that Maslowski appeared normal and responsive when he arrived, and all he talked about was his tooth pain and headache. According to Nurse DeGraff, Maslowski’s grip strength and extraocular movement were normal. Maslowski requested Excedrin and a toothbrush. For follow- up, Nurse DeGraff sent a provider referral for the next day. In the early morning of April 16, 2021, Maslowski was found unresponsive after an apparent seizure. He had wet himself, could not be awakened, and his vitals were irregular. He was taken to the hospital. A computerized tomography (“CT”) scan of Maslowski’s brain revealed a mass. Based on a prior scan, it appears that Maslowski had had the tumor since at least 2019. Maslowski’s family decided to withdraw life support and he passed away. The Kent County Medical Examiner determined that Maslowski’s cause of death was an anaplastic oligodendroglioma, a malignant brain tumor. B. Procedural Background Plaintiff Lori Viilo, the personal representative of Maslowski’s estate, filed this action against VitalCore, various medical personnel assigned to KCCF, several KCCF deputies, Kent County, and the Kent County Sheriff for claims arising out of Maslowski’s death. Viilo alleged -5- No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Maslowski’s constitutional rights and state law claims. VitalCore and Nurses DeGraff, MacMillan, and Rawls moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The district court approved and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant in part and deny in part the motion. Other parties were dismissed by stipulation and motion. As relevant to this appeal, the remaining defendants are: Kent County and Sheriff Michelle Lajoye-Young (“County Defendants”); Deputies VanderMolen, Ritz, McNeil, Fennema, Bernhardt, Caldera, and Spriggel (“Deputy Defendants”); and Nurses DeGraff, MacMillan, and Rawls (“Medical Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants all moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommended granting all motions. Viilo objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court denied Viilo’s objections and approved the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Viilo now appeals. II. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is proper when no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). III. Viilo argues that the district court wrongly granted Defendants summary judgment on her Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims. She insists that a reasonable jury could find that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm from Maslowski’s serious medical needs and that the district court misapplied the law. -6- No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. “[T]he government has a constitutional obligation to provide medical care to those whom it detains.” Burwell v. City of Lansing, 7 F.4th 456, 462 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate indifference towards the serious medical needs of an individual serving a custodial sentence. Id. at 462–63. “The Fourteenth Amendment similarly protects pretrial detainees.” Id. at 463. We analyze both Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims under a two-part framework that includes an objective and a subjective component. Id. The objective component asks whether the inmate or detainee had a “sufficiently serious medical need.” Id. (citation omitted). The subjective component asks whether “the official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (citation modified). And historically we asked the same questions to determine culpability whether the case involved an inmate serving a sentence or a pretrial detainee awaiting further process. See, e.g., Lawler ex rel. Lawler v. Hardeman County, 93 F.4th 919, 927 (6th Cir. 2024) (collecting cases). But in our decision in Brawner v. Scott County, we modified our approach to the subjective component for Fourteenth Amendment claims. 14 F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir. 2021); see also Howell v. NaphCare, Inc., 67 F.4th 302, 311 (6th Cir. 2023). We held that a pretrial detainee making a Fourteenth Amendment claim need only show that the prison official(s) “acted deliberately (not accidentally), but also recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.” Brawner, 14 F.4th at 596 (citation modified). In other words, “[a] pretrial detainee must prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. (citation modified). Viilo argues that the district court erroneously applied the pre-Brawner standard for the subjective prong. That standard, as with claims raised under the Eighth Amendment, derives from -7- No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). It requires a plaintiff to show “that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” Burwell, 7 F.4th at 466 (citation modified). As to the final component of the subjective prong, a plaintiff must show that the officer “disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Murray v. Dep’t of Corr., 29 F.4th 779, 787 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). After briefing and argument in this case, we issued Poynter ex rel. Fernandez v. Shirley, 191 F.4th 745, 754 (6th Cir. 2026) (en banc), which restored Farmer’s articulation of the subjective component and, therefore, “requires a showing that the jailer was subjectively aware of the [detainee’s substantial] risk.” Id. at 749 (citation modified) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829). In doing so, we eschewed the less exacting known-or-should-have-been-known standard from Brawner. But in any case, Brawner “had yet to ‘clearly establish anything’” at the time of the defendants’ conduct, all of which preceded Brawner. Overstreet v. Ontonagon County, 175 F.4th 680, 686 (6th Cir. 2026) (quoting Lawler, 93 F.4th at 927). So, at least for qualified immunity purposes, Viilo’s argument over the district court’s misapplication of the applicable standard starts from a flawed premise. IV. A. Objective Component To satisfy the objective component, Viilo argues that the district court erred in concluding that Maslowski did not have a serious medical need that posed a substantial risk of harm. But even were we to accept Viilo’s contention that she has satisfied the objective prong, her claims still fail for two reasons. First, she has not shown that the right she claims was clearly established at the time of the Deputy Defendants’ conduct—meaning she has not defeated their claim to qualified -8- No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. immunity. And second, Viilo’s failure to individually analyze the actions of the Medical Defendants on the subjective prong dooms her claims against each of them. B. Deputy Defendants—Qualified Immunity Viilo argues that a reasonable jury could conclude that Deputy Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Maslowski in light of his serious medical needs. But Viilo does not persuade us that, under these circumstances, Maslowski’s right to receive something more than multiple referrals to and evaluations by medical staff was clearly established law. This failure is fatal to her claim, because Deputy Defendants have all asserted qualified immunity. And once an official asserts qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defense does not apply. Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 760 (6th Cir. 2021). Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability unless they (1) violated a constitutional right, and (2) that right was clearly established. Howell, 67 F.4th at 317. We can address these prongs in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). And “[i]f one is lacking, we need not address the other.” Crawford, 15 F.4th at 760. Here, our analysis begins and ends with the clearly established prong; Viilo has not shown that the law at the time of Deputy Defendants’ conduct clearly established that referring Maslowski’s complaints to medical staff and relying on the care they provided in response to those referrals violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Clearly Established Right. A right is clearly established when “existing law . . . placed the constitutionality of the officer’s conduct beyond debate.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (citation modified). That is, “at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” Id. (citation modified). “The determinative issue is whether the officer had fair -9- No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. warning that his conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.” Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 699 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). Fair warning does not require that a plaintiff identify a case that is “on all fours” with the facts of their own case. Pleasant View Baptist Church v. Beshear, 78 F.4th 286, 295 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). But there must be “a sufficiently analogous case (or cases)” to signal to “a reasonable official” that his conduct violates the specific right claimed. Id. (citation modified). Deputy Defendants have consistently claimed qualified immunity in both the district court and before us. The district court declined to address qualified immunity. But “[w]e may affirm on any basis supported by the record.” Campbell v. Riahi, 109 F.4th 854, 860 (6th Cir. 2024). Moreover, “[q]ualified immunity is ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 n.2 (2007) (citation modified) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Thus, resolution on that ground is particularly appropriate here, as the issue is dispositive as to Deputy Defendants. So we turn to it first. As an initial matter, Viilo does not squarely address qualified immunity in her appellate briefing. Indeed, she does not mention the doctrine by name in either her opening or reply brief. So, she has arguably forfeited the issue. See Norton Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard, 99 F.4th 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2024); see also Paul v. Whitley County, No. 24-5142, 2024 WL 4362260, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 2024) (per curiam). Read generously, however, Viilo attempts to answer Deputy Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity with her argument that circuit precedent bars Deputy Defendants from deferring to the judgment of medical staff under the circumstances presented. She argues that the district court erred in concluding otherwise. We turn first to what our caselaw says about non-medical officials’ deferral to medical professionals. And it does not clearly establish Maslowski’s right as articulated by Viilo. For we - 10 - No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. recognized long ago that even when a detainee is experiencing an acute symptom, such as difficulty breathing, an officer “contacting the nursing staff at the jail for medical assistance” is ordinarily reasonable and will defeat a deliberate indifference claim. Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2008). That is how we saw things in McGaw v. Sevier County, where jail officers observed that McGaw was visibly intoxicated, so they summoned a nurse to examine him. 715 F. App’x 495, 496 (6th Cir. 2017). The nurse advised that McGaw could be left in his holding cell to sleep off his intoxication. Id. But, overnight, McGaw suffered a heart attack and later died. Id. Albeit in an unpublished decision, a panel of this court concluded that the jail officers did not act with deliberate indifference because, rather than ignoring the risks that McGaw’s intoxication posed, they sought medical help and followed the nurse’s guidance. Id. at 498–99. The jail officers’ lack of medical training, in the absence of evidence suggesting “that the officers were or should have been aware that their lay understandings of th[e] situation were superior to [the nurse’s] trained assessment,” informed our conclusion that it was reasonable for them to rely and act on the nurse’s counsel. Id. at 497. Deputy Defendants faced similar circumstances here. On the facts presented, each deputy appears to have witnessed only bits and pieces of Maslowski’s symptoms. For instance, when Maslowski complained of experiencing headache- related issues, Deputy Ritz referred him to medical staff each time. And when Maslowski lamented that his condition was not improving and in fact worsening—including with emergent symptoms, like vomiting and possibly seizing—Deputy Ritz relayed these further complaints to the medical staff, too. Similarly, Deputy VanderMolen received complaints from Maslowski about having a headache and seeing flashing lights. He too reported this information to medical. Deputy Bernhardt reported to medical staff Maslowski’s claim that he had blood in his feces and a broken - 11 - No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. ear drum. And Deputy Caldera notified medical staff that Maslowski complained of an ulcer and trouble breathing. For their parts, Deputies Fennema and McNeil merely responded to a call that Maslowski was possibly having a seizure. Thereafter, Nurse DeGraff assessed Maslowski’s condition. And Viilo does not claim that Maslowski relayed any medical concerns to these two deputies or that they failed to address any of his symptoms. And finally, Deputy Spriggel observed Maslowski making random loud outbursts and screaming in the middle of the night. Deputy Spriggel made a report of this, and while the record is unclear on whether medical personnel were immediately notified about this behavior, there is no evidence suggesting that Deputy Spriggel perceived Maslowski’s behavior to indicate an emergent medical need. After all, Maslowski was observed yelling in his cell throughout the preceding days, and medical professionals had checked in on him in between the previous episodes of yelling and Deputy Spriggel observing the behavior. Viilo does not assert that any of these deputies had any medical training to draw from or delayed notifying medical staff of Maslowski’s complaints or symptoms. And, according to the chronology of events, the Deputy Defendants alerted medical staff of changes in Maslowski’s condition in a timely manner as they occurred. In considering what law was and was not clearly established at the time, contacting medical staff for assistance is at least consistent with the standard discussed in Harrison, 539 F.3d at 519. Viilo argues that the calculus changes when a detainee has escalating symptoms. (Appellant’s Br., ECF 26, 28–29). And it is true that we have recently acknowledged limits to such deference when, for instance, an “officer does not seek medical help” after observing “an inmate suffer[ing] from new and alarming symptoms since last seeing a medical professional.” Hehrer v. County of Clinton, 161 F.4th 955, 964 (6th Cir. 2025), abrogated on other grounds by - 12 - No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. Poynter, 191 F.4th 745. We have also recognized that deference to medical professionals can be unreasonable when an officer is privy to “additional information concerning an incarcerated person’s condition” about which the medical professionals are unaware, or when circumstances have changed since the medical professional rendered their opinion to the point that further follow up is needed. Grote v. Kenton County, 85 F.4th 397, 412 (6th Cir. 2023). But these cases—like most of the cases on which Viilo relies—postdate Deputy Defendants’ conduct. So “they do not clearly establish anything ‘at the time’ the [Deputy Defendants] acted.” Lawler, 93 F.4th at 927 (citation omitted); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (explaining that “reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law” that was clearly established “at the time of the conduct”) (citation modified). Still, Viilo insists that Deputy Defendants could not categorically rely on medical staff. Of the cases Viilo cites for support, however, only Phillips v. Roane County, 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008), was decided before March and April 2021, and that case does not address whether correctional officers may rely on or defer to medical professionals when faced with a detainee’s escalating medical needs. Rather, in Phillips, the officers did not notify medical professionals immediately after learning of the detainee’s serious medical needs. Id. at 536–37, 541. And we determined that the officers—who had ignored Phillips’s troubling medical symptoms altogether until it was too late to save her—were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs. Id. at 541–42. Because that case is not analogous, it does not clearly establish that a constitutional violation occurred here. And, in fact, other cases we have discussed at least suggest the opposite. Therefore, the Deputy Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. - 13 - No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. C. Medical Defendants—Subjective Component Generally, courts are “reluctant to second guess the medical judgment of prison medical officials.” Howell, 67 F.4th at 313 (citation omitted). So, to show deliberate indifference, Viilo must show that a medical official was “subjectively aware of information from which [they] could have inferred a substantial risk to [the detainee’s] health, and that [they] acted with reckless disregard to that risk.” Winkler v. Madison County, 893 F.3d 877, 892 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Negligence alone is not sufficient to rise to a level of a constitutional violation. See id. at 891. We have found no deliberate indifference where a nurse responded to all complaints, administered over-the-counter medication, performed tests, assessed vitals, and elevated concerns to a superior. See, e.g., Griffith v. Franklin County, 975 F.3d 554, 577–78 (6th Cir. 2020). And we have found that a nurse was not deliberately indifferent in responding to a seizure where the nurse responded immediately, examined the detainee’s condition, and prescribed medication to alleviate his symptoms. Id. at 578–79. To test Viilo’s claims, we must analyze each defendant individually—something Viilo fails to do in her briefing. See Phillips, 534 F.3d at 542 (“The subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim must be addressed for each [official] individually.” (citation modified)). Based on the facts in the record, Viilo has not established a triable issue as to any of the Medical Defendants. Rather, each Medical Defendant’s actions here support the district court’s conclusion that none of these defendants responded with reckless disregard for a known substantial risk to Maslowski’s health. We consider each of the Medical Defendants in turn. Nurse DeGraff. Deputy Ritz notified medical staff that Maslowski was screaming and banging his cell window because of an ongoing headache. Within the hour, Nurse DeGraff evaluated Maslowski. Maslowski told Nurse DeGraff that he had been hitting his head on the wall. - 14 - No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. Nurse DeGraff examined Maslowski, found no abnormalities, and concluded that his headache was secondary to his anxiety. He prescribed Tylenol and Motrin and advised Maslowski to return to the clinic as needed. The next day, Deputy Ritz called medical staff because Maslowski was having a possible seizure. Nurse DeGraff quickly responded to the call and assessed Maslowski. When Nurse DeGraff arrived on scene, no one could “elaborate that [Maslowski] really had a seizure.” (DeGraff Dep., R. 107-5, PageID 1575). Nurse DeGraff testified that Maslowski appeared responsive and “everything seemed normal” following the incident. (Id., PageID 1573–75). He also noted that Maslowski spoke only about his tooth pain and headache. Nurse DeGraff performed a physical evaluation and concluded that everything was normal. Nurse DeGraff, nonetheless, referred Maslowski to be seen the following day by a medical care provider and prescribed him acetaminophen. This evidence does not reasonably show that Nurse DeGraff disregarded Maslowski’s serious medical needs. Rather, upon being notified of Maslowski’s condition, Nurse DeGraff responded and evaluated him the same day. A pain relief prescription is not an unreasonable first response to complaints about headaches. And here, Nurse DeGraff did more; he also advised Maslowski to return to the clinic if the issue persisted. In the absence of evidence that Nurse DeGraff had additional information that might suggest an obvious risk to Maslowski, we will not second-guess his medical judgment. As to the reported seizure incident, Nurse DeGraff apparently saw it as an escalation and referred Maslowski to a medical provider for a visit the next day, which is more than what we have found to be sufficient in similar circumstances. See Griffith, 975 F.3d at 578–79. Given the prompt response and apparent escalation in treatment, Viilo has failed to - 15 - No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. create a genuine dispute regarding whether Nurse DeGraff was deliberately indifferent to Maslowski’s needs. Nurse Rawls. Deputy Ritz notified Nurse Rawls that Maslowski was complaining of ongoing headaches. Nurse Rawls indicated that she would send someone up to see him. Consistent with Nurse Rawls’s promise to send someone, Nurse DeGraff arrived shortly thereafter to assess Maslowski. On these facts, Viilo has not demonstrated that Nurse Rawls unreasonably responded to Maslowski’s medical needs and acted with deliberate indifference. Nurse MacMillan. Maslowski submitted a note to medical complaining of a stomachache, weight loss, and migraines. He requested an Excedrin prescription, Ensure, and a psychiatric visit. That same day, Maslowski complained to Deputy Bernhardt about “blood in his feces and a broken ear drum from getting hit in the head with a pipe before he came to jail,” which Deputy Bernhardt reported to medical. (Bernhardt Notification, R. 105-2, PageID 1174). Nurse MacMillan documented this notification. Shortly thereafter, NP Sherwood sent an order for Excedrin and crackers. Viilo offers no proof that Nurse MacMillan ignored these complaints or declined to take action. The evidence suggests the contrary: in response to Maslowski’s expressed needs and concerns, Nurse MacMillan forwarded Maslowski’s request to NP Sherwood to ensure it was addressed. Viilo has, therefore, failed to establish that a reasonable jury could conclude that Nurse MacMillan ignored an unjustifiably high risk of harm, as there was no reason to believe that Maslowski’s medical concerns warranted attention or treatment beyond his requested medical relief. Because Viilo cannot satisfy the subjective component of her deliberate indifference claims against the Medical Defendants, we affirm the district court’s decision. - 16 - No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. V. Viilo also challenges the district court’s determination that she abandoned her claims against the County Defendants arising under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The magistrate judge concluded that because Viilo failed to respond to County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, she had abandoned her Monell claims against them. Regardless of whether the claims are forfeited, however, they do not survive summary judgment. Viilo makes two arguments on appeal. First, she claims that the district court failed to engage in a Rule 56 analysis (i.e., independently evaluating, on the merits, whether summary judgment is proper), which she claims that it was required to do. This argument ignores the magistrate judge’s secondary conclusion that “even disregarding [Viilo’s] abandonment, the County Defendants have properly discharged their summary judgment burden of showing no genuine issue of fact on [Viilo’s] Monell claims against them.” (Summ. J. R&R, R. 141, PageID 3119). Second, Viilo asserts that she “has vigorously contested the core constitutional violation and the record presents ample material from which a factfinder could conclude that the defendant municipality or contractor played a role in causing it.” (Appellant’s Br., ECF 26, 37). Monell liability for a constitutional violation attaches under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff demonstrates that the violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom. Hall v. Navarre, 118 F.4th 749, 756–57 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Viilo can demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom of violating federal rights by pointing to (1) an official policy or legislative enactment, (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-making authority, (3) inadequate training or supervision, or (4) a custom of tolerance for or acquiescence in conduct violative of - 17 - No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. constitutional rights. Novak v. City of Parma, 33 F.4th 296, 309 (6th Cir. 2022); Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 828 (6th Cir. 2019). Viilo has not identified the municipal custom or policy responsible for the alleged constitutional injuries. In her opening brief, Viilo vaguely references “policies, customs, staffing arrangements, escalation practices, [and] training obligations,” but fails to identify any specific municipal customs or policies that she claims is at issue. (Appellant’s Br., ECF 26, 36). She faults the district court for not discussing “whether the[] systemic features of the jail’s medical-response structure could reasonably be found to have contributed to the constitutional violations alleged,” (id.), without further argumentation or evidence showing that the response-structure did, in fact, deprive Maslowski of his constitutional rights. Viilo fails to cite evidence in the record supporting a finding of municipal liability. In the absence of affirmative evidence, Viilo cannot defeat County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which the district court concluded was properly supported. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. And her “[c]onclusory statements unadorned with supporting facts” do not save the day. Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 560 (6th Cir. 2009). So, even assuming her Monell claims were preserved, she failed to establish that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the County Defendants’ liability. VI. Viilo challenges the district court’s award of costs to Defendants. Defendants argue that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal of the decision awarding costs because it is not included in the Notice to Appeal. The requirements for a notice of appeal set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) are jurisdictional. So, if a party fails to meet those requirements, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal. Wright v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 144 F.4th 817, 822 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Smith v. Barry, 502 - 18 - No. 25-1827, Viilo v. Kent County, Mich., et al. U.S. 244, 248 (1992)). Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B) requires that the notice of appeal “designate the judgment—or the appealable order— from which the appeal is taken.” Here, the notice of appeal indicated an intent to appeal “the final judgment entered on August 12, 2025.” (Notice of Appeal, R. 155, PageID 3221). It did not designate an intent to appeal the order awarding costs. Although the district court awarded costs after Viilo filed her notice of appeal, Viilo never filed a separate notice of appeal for the cost award or any other document providing notice of her intent to challenge the award. See Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 541–42 (6th Cir. 2021) (finding that the court had jurisdiction over expert fee award where plaintiff timely filed a separate notice—even if not entitled “notice of appeal”—that indicated intent to appeal that post-judgment decision); Alemarah v. GM, LLC, 980 F.3d 1083, 1088 (6th Cir. 2020) (concluding that the court had jurisdiction to review challenge to district court’s denial of costs because even though the notice of appeal did not designate the cost order as part of the appeal and the plaintiff did not file another document styled as an order to appeal, she did file a “Civil Appeal Statement” indicating intent to appeal the cost order, which provided the notice r