Reitz v. community/copperpoint
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket1 CA-IC 26-0001
JudgeMichael J. Brown
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
BARBARA REITZ, Petitioner,
v.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
COMMUNITY BRIDGES INC., Respondent Employer,
COPPERPOINT INDEMNITY INSURANCE CO., Respondent Carrier.
No. 1 CA-IC 26-0001
FILED 11-20-2026
Special Action - Industrial Commission
ICA Claim No. 20222370578
Carrier Claim No. 1000054465
The Honorable Amy L. Foster, Administrative Law Judge
AFFIRMED
APPEARANCES
Barbara Reitz, Phoenix
Petitioner
CopperPoint Indemnity Insurance Company, Phoenix
By Chiko F. Swiney
Counsel for Respondent Employer and Respondent Carrier
Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix
By Afshan Peimani
Counsel for Respondent
REITZ v. COMMUNITY/COPPERPOINT
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
B R O W N, Judge:
¶1 Barbara Reitz appeals a decision of the Industrial Commission
of Arizona (“ICA”) finding she has no loss of earning capacity (“LEC”) due
to her permanent impairment caused by industrial injury. Because
reasonable evidence supports the ICA’s decision, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Reitz, 70 years old at the time, injured her lower back while
working as a housekeeper for Community Bridges, Inc., whose insurance
carrier is Copperpoint Indemnity Insurance Co. (collectively
“Respondents”). Her claim was accepted and she received benefits. About
18 months after the injury, she reached maximum medical improvement.
The claim was closed and Reitz was awarded supportive care for two years
with a rating of 6% permanent impairment to her whole person.
¶3 In August 2024, the ICA claims division concluded Reitz
“suffered no reduction in earning capacity by reason of the [work] injury.”
Reitz requested a hearing to challenge that conclusion. The ICA then held
a hearing to determine only whether Reitz had any LEC, and if so, how
much. Reitz presented evidence to support a full LEC and Respondents
countered with evidence showing Reitz had no loss. Specifically, the
dispute focused on whether Reitz’s prescribed work restrictions and the
medications she took for her back pain prevented her from working at any
job for which she qualified.
¶4 The two doctors who testified generally agreed that Reitz
could perform light-duty work as long as she (1) does not lift more than 20
pounds; (2) avoids stooping, bending, crawling, or working on uneven
surfaces; and (3) always has her cane. Reitz’s doctor confirmed that he
prescribed her gabapentin and muscle relaxants, and that the gabapentin
caused drowsiness.
¶5 Reitz testified her medications made her drowsy and her
efforts to find work were unsuccessful. She has limited computer skills,
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does not own a computer, and uses her smartphone for internet access. She
testified she has an eye condition that affects her vision of screens and has
had two cataract removal surgeries. She does not believe she can work as
an unarmed security guard or at a call center because of her work
restrictions and these other limitations.
¶6 Two labor market consultants prepared written reports and
presented testimony. Consultant Nolan McKelvey conducted an
evaluation of Reitz to determine her LEC. He listed her significant
vocational factors as being her age, a valid Arizona driver’s license, and she
is a high school graduate with no postsecondary education. She has basic
computer skills but poor typing skills and vision issues. Her work history
included significant experience as a school bus driver and in security-
related positions, such as monitoring access to semi-truck loading bays.
Considering those factors and work restrictions, along with reports that
Reitz has vision trouble that prevents her from using a computer screen and
does not own a car, McKelvey concluded “she has most likely suffered a
complete loss in earning capacity in the competitive labor market.” He also
noted her medications “impaired [her] at times” and this would keep her
from performing jobs as a receptionist or appointment setter. He also
thought it would rule her out of unarmed security-related jobs.
¶7 Consultant Lisa Clapp also evaluated Reitz and concluded
that Reitz could perform jobs by working at a call center or as an
appointment setter, receptionist, or unarmed security guard. She surveyed
Phoenix-area employers with those jobs, giving them a profile with Reitz’s
factors, and found those jobs were available. According to Clapp, any of
those jobs would pay at a rate that would not cause LEC for Reitz. Clapp
did not believe Reitz’s vision issues were a significant factor because they
were not part of the industrial injury and are not noted in the available
medical records. Clapp also opined that Reitz’s basic computer skills were
sufficient for those positions. In an addendum to her LEC report, Clapp
referenced the medical testimony, noting Reitz’s doctor testified the
medications would affect Reitz “at times,” but he did not specify the
frequency or duration of the effects. Thus, in Clapp’s opinion, the effect of
medication was not a significant factor.
¶8 The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Reitz had
made a good-faith effort to find work, making a prima facie case for LEC.
However, the ALJ also found that any drowsiness caused by her
medications would not keep Reitz from performing the duties of the jobs
suggested by Clapp. The ALJ therefore concluded Reitz had no LEC and
was not entitled to disability benefits. After Reitz unsuccessfully requested
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Decision of the Court
administrative review, Reitz then filed this statutory special action for
judicial review. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(2), (B)
and 23-951(A).
DISCUSSION
¶9 In reviewing ICA awards, we defer to the ALJ’s factual
findings but review legal conclusions de novo. Sun Valley Masonry, Inc. v.
Indus. Comm’n, 216 Ariz. 462, 463–64, ¶ 2 (App. 2007). The ALJ must resolve
conflicting evidence and “determine which of the conflicting testimony is
more probably correct,” an essential duty when there is “a conflict in expert
medical testimony.” Perry v. Indus. Comm’n, 112 Ariz. 397, 398 (1975). We
will not disturb that resolution unless it is unreasonable. Royal Globe Ins.
Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 20 Ariz. App. 432, 434 (1973).
¶10 Once a permanent impairment is established, the ICA must
examine whether the injury has caused LEC. A.R.S. § 23-1047(A), (B). The
burden of proving LEC is on a claimant, who must first show an inability
to return to the same work they were doing on the date of injury. Landon v.
Indus. Comm’n, 240 Ariz. 21, 26–27, ¶ 18 (App. 2016). The claimant must
then show they made “a good faith effort to obtain other suitable” work or
“present testimony from a labor market expert” establishing the claimant’s
earning capacity. Id. If the claimant meets that burden, the employer must
then present evidence showing the availability of suitable employment or a
lack of causal relationship between any LEC and the injury. Id.
¶11 When determining LEC, “consideration shall be given,
among other things, to any previous disability, the occupational history of
the injured employee, the nature and extent of the physical disability, the
type of work the injured employee is able to perform after the injury, any
wages received for work performed after the injury and the age of the
employee at the time of injury.” A.R.S. § 23-1044(D). Medical expert
testimony is relevant to any work restrictions caused by the injury, but a
labor market expert is necessary when addressing whether a claimant is
able to carry out the skills of a particular job. See Tucson Steel Div. v. Indus.
Comm’n, 154 Ariz. 550, 556 (App. 1987) (explaining medical input enabled
a labor market expert to match a medical condition with requirements of
specific jobs in the open labor market).
¶12 To show LEC, an injured worker must show an “inability to
perform the job at which he was injured and to get other work which he can
perform in light of his physical impairments.” Zimmerman v. Indus.
Comm’n, 137 Ariz. 578, 580 (1983). Generally, one can meet this burden by
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showing the injury prevents a return to prior employment and there has
been a reasonable effort to find work. Id. “The object is to determine as near
as possible whether in a competitive labor market the subject in his injured
condition can probably sell his services and for how much.” Davis v. Indus.
Comm’n, 82 Ariz. 173, 175 (1957). This inquiry must consider whether the
evidence has shown job opportunities that are both suitable and reasonably
available to the claimant. Zimmerman, 137 Ariz. at 582.
¶13 Reitz’s argument on appeal focuses primarily on the weight
that should be given to her doctor’s opinion, essentially asking us to give
her evidence more weight than the ALJ did. But this court does not
re-weigh the evidence. Kaibab Indus. v. Indus. Comm’n, 196 Ariz. 601, 608–
09, ¶¶ 21, 25 (App. 2000). Here, the only significant evidentiary conflict was
between the labor market consultants. McKelvey considered the
drowsiness caused by Reitz’s medications to be a significant factor that kept
her from employment. But the ALJ, based on the medical testimony offered
by Respondents, recognized that the medications caused drowsiness at
times but was not persuaded that the “possibility of a side effect” was
significant enough to keep her from working the jobs Respondents
presented as available job opportunities. The evidence supports that
conclusion.
¶14 Reitz correctly notes that the ALJ decision contains two errors:
(1) she did not finish high school and (2) she has cataracts. The record
shows that Reitz completed high school and did not have cataracts at the
time she testified, although she has had cataracts removed twice before.
However, these factual errors are not material to the decision. Both labor
market consultants knew Reitz was a high school graduate when they
formulated their opinions. The ALJ focused her findings and decision on
the effects of the medications rather than Reitz’s educational background.
And whether Reitz had cataracts was not significant to the ALJ’s analysis,
as even Reitz characterizes the mistake as “clerical.” We will not set aside
an award with an incorrect factual finding when that finding is not material
to the decision. See Fry’s Food Stores v. Indus. Comm’n, 161 Ariz. 119, 122
(1989) (noting an expert opinion based on an incorrect factual assumption
is not rendered “fatally flawed” if the incorrect assumption is not material
to the opinion).
¶15 Finally, Reitz contends the ALJ decision is flawed because the
ALJ should have considered the “missing” 2023 documents she submitted
for the first time in her request for review. Those documents concerned
work restrictions recommended in September 2023. But as we have noted,
there was no significant medical conflict about Reitz’ work restrictions, so
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those documents are immaterial. Evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s
resolution of the conflicting opinions offered by the labor market
consultants.
CONCLUSION
¶16 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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