Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE BARBARA REITZ, Petitioner, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, COMMUNITY BRIDGES INC., Respondent Employer, COPPERPOINT INDEMNITY INSURANCE CO., Respondent Carrier. No. 1 CA-IC 26-0001 FILED 11-20-2026 Special Action - Industrial Commission ICA Claim No. 20222370578 Carrier Claim No. 1000054465 The Honorable Amy L. Foster, Administrative Law Judge AFFIRMED APPEARANCES Barbara Reitz, Phoenix Petitioner CopperPoint Indemnity Insurance Company, Phoenix By Chiko F. Swiney Counsel for Respondent Employer and Respondent Carrier Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix By Afshan Peimani Counsel for Respondent REITZ v. COMMUNITY/COPPERPOINT Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Angela K. Paton joined. B R O W N, Judge: ¶1 Barbara Reitz appeals a decision of the Industrial Commission of Arizona (“ICA”) finding she has no loss of earning capacity (“LEC”) due to her permanent impairment caused by industrial injury. Because reasonable evidence supports the ICA’s decision, we affirm. BACKGROUND ¶2 Reitz, 70 years old at the time, injured her lower back while working as a housekeeper for Community Bridges, Inc., whose insurance carrier is Copperpoint Indemnity Insurance Co. (collectively “Respondents”). Her claim was accepted and she received benefits. About 18 months after the injury, she reached maximum medical improvement. The claim was closed and Reitz was awarded supportive care for two years with a rating of 6% permanent impairment to her whole person. ¶3 In August 2024, the ICA claims division concluded Reitz “suffered no reduction in earning capacity by reason of the [work] injury.” Reitz requested a hearing to challenge that conclusion. The ICA then held a hearing to determine only whether Reitz had any LEC, and if so, how much. Reitz presented evidence to support a full LEC and Respondents countered with evidence showing Reitz had no loss. Specifically, the dispute focused on whether Reitz’s prescribed work restrictions and the medications she took for her back pain prevented her from working at any job for which she qualified. ¶4 The two doctors who testified generally agreed that Reitz could perform light-duty work as long as she (1) does not lift more than 20 pounds; (2) avoids stooping, bending, crawling, or working on uneven surfaces; and (3) always has her cane. Reitz’s doctor confirmed that he prescribed her gabapentin and muscle relaxants, and that the gabapentin caused drowsiness. ¶5 Reitz testified her medications made her drowsy and her efforts to find work were unsuccessful. She has limited computer skills, 2 REITZ v. COMMUNITY/COPPERPOINT Decision of the Court does not own a computer, and uses her smartphone for internet access. She testified she has an eye condition that affects her vision of screens and has had two cataract removal surgeries. She does not believe she can work as an unarmed security guard or at a call center because of her work restrictions and these other limitations. ¶6 Two labor market consultants prepared written reports and presented testimony. Consultant Nolan McKelvey conducted an evaluation of Reitz to determine her LEC. He listed her significant vocational factors as being her age, a valid Arizona driver’s license, and she is a high school graduate with no postsecondary education. She has basic computer skills but poor typing skills and vision issues. Her work history included significant experience as a school bus driver and in security- related positions, such as monitoring access to semi-truck loading bays. Considering those factors and work restrictions, along with reports that Reitz has vision trouble that prevents her from using a computer screen and does not own a car, McKelvey concluded “she has most likely suffered a complete loss in earning capacity in the competitive labor market.” He also noted her medications “impaired [her] at times” and this would keep her from performing jobs as a receptionist or appointment setter. He also thought it would rule her out of unarmed security-related jobs. ¶7 Consultant Lisa Clapp also evaluated Reitz and concluded that Reitz could perform jobs by working at a call center or as an appointment setter, receptionist, or unarmed security guard. She surveyed Phoenix-area employers with those jobs, giving them a profile with Reitz’s factors, and found those jobs were available. According to Clapp, any of those jobs would pay at a rate that would not cause LEC for Reitz. Clapp did not believe Reitz’s vision issues were a significant factor because they were not part of the industrial injury and are not noted in the available medical records. Clapp also opined that Reitz’s basic computer skills were sufficient for those positions. In an addendum to her LEC report, Clapp referenced the medical testimony, noting Reitz’s doctor testified the medications would affect Reitz “at times,” but he did not specify the frequency or duration of the effects. Thus, in Clapp’s opinion, the effect of medication was not a significant factor. ¶8 The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Reitz had made a good-faith effort to find work, making a prima facie case for LEC. However, the ALJ also found that any drowsiness caused by her medications would not keep Reitz from performing the duties of the jobs suggested by Clapp. The ALJ therefore concluded Reitz had no LEC and was not entitled to disability benefits. After Reitz unsuccessfully requested 3 REITZ v. COMMUNITY/COPPERPOINT Decision of the Court administrative review, Reitz then filed this statutory special action for judicial review. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(2), (B) and 23-951(A). DISCUSSION ¶9 In reviewing ICA awards, we defer to the ALJ’s factual findings but review legal conclusions de novo. Sun Valley Masonry, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 216 Ariz. 462, 463–64, ¶ 2 (App. 2007). The ALJ must resolve conflicting evidence and “determine which of the conflicting testimony is more probably correct,” an essential duty when there is “a conflict in expert medical testimony.” Perry v. Indus. Comm’n, 112 Ariz. 397, 398 (1975). We will not disturb that resolution unless it is unreasonable. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 20 Ariz. App. 432, 434 (1973). ¶10 Once a permanent impairment is established, the ICA must examine whether the injury has caused LEC. A.R.S. § 23-1047(A), (B). The burden of proving LEC is on a claimant, who must first show an inability to return to the same work they were doing on the date of injury. Landon v. Indus. Comm’n, 240 Ariz. 21, 26–27, ¶ 18 (App. 2016). The claimant must then show they made “a good faith effort to obtain other suitable” work or “present testimony from a labor market expert” establishing the claimant’s earning capacity. Id. If the claimant meets that burden, the employer must then present evidence showing the availability of suitable employment or a lack of causal relationship between any LEC and the injury. Id. ¶11 When determining LEC, “consideration shall be given, among other things, to any previous disability, the occupational history of the injured employee, the nature and extent of the physical disability, the type of work the injured employee is able to perform after the injury, any wages received for work performed after the injury and the age of the employee at the time of injury.” A.R.S. § 23-1044(D). Medical expert testimony is relevant to any work restrictions caused by the injury, but a labor market expert is necessary when addressing whether a claimant is able to carry out the skills of a particular job. See Tucson Steel Div. v. Indus. Comm’n, 154 Ariz. 550, 556 (App. 1987) (explaining medical input enabled a labor market expert to match a medical condition with requirements of specific jobs in the open labor market). ¶12 To show LEC, an injured worker must show an “inability to perform the job at which he was injured and to get other work which he can perform in light of his physical impairments.” Zimmerman v. Indus. Comm’n, 137 Ariz. 578, 580 (1983). Generally, one can meet this burden by 4 REITZ v. COMMUNITY/COPPERPOINT Decision of the Court showing the injury prevents a return to prior employment and there has been a reasonable effort to find work. Id. “The object is to determine as near as possible whether in a competitive labor market the subject in his injured condition can probably sell his services and for how much.” Davis v. Indus. Comm’n, 82 Ariz. 173, 175 (1957). This inquiry must consider whether the evidence has shown job opportunities that are both suitable and reasonably available to the claimant. Zimmerman, 137 Ariz. at 582. ¶13 Reitz’s argument on appeal focuses primarily on the weight that should be given to her doctor’s opinion, essentially asking us to give her evidence more weight than the ALJ did. But this court does not re-weigh the evidence. Kaibab Indus. v. Indus. Comm’n, 196 Ariz. 601, 608– 09, ¶¶ 21, 25 (App. 2000). Here, the only significant evidentiary conflict was between the labor market consultants. McKelvey considered the drowsiness caused by Reitz’s medications to be a significant factor that kept her from employment. But the ALJ, based on the medical testimony offered by Respondents, recognized that the medications caused drowsiness at times but was not persuaded that the “possibility of a side effect” was significant enough to keep her from working the jobs Respondents presented as available job opportunities. The evidence supports that conclusion. ¶14 Reitz correctly notes that the ALJ decision contains two errors: (1) she did not finish high school and (2) she has cataracts. The record shows that Reitz completed high school and did not have cataracts at the time she testified, although she has had cataracts removed twice before. However, these factual errors are not material to the decision. Both labor market consultants knew Reitz was a high school graduate when they formulated their opinions. The ALJ focused her findings and decision on the effects of the medications rather than Reitz’s educational background. And whether Reitz had cataracts was not significant to the ALJ’s analysis, as even Reitz characterizes the mistake as “clerical.” We will not set aside an award with an incorrect factual finding when that finding is not material to the decision. See Fry’s Food Stores v. Indus. Comm’n, 161 Ariz. 119, 122 (1989) (noting an expert opinion based on an incorrect factual assumption is not rendered “fatally flawed” if the incorrect assumption is not material to the opinion). ¶15 Finally, Reitz contends the ALJ decision is flawed because the ALJ should have considered the “missing” 2023 documents she submitted for the first time in her request for review. Those documents concerned work restrictions recommended in September 2023. But as we have noted, there was no significant medical conflict about Reitz’ work restrictions, so 5 REITZ v. COMMUNITY/COPPERPOINT Decision of the Court those documents are immaterial. Evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s resolution of the conflicting opinions offered by the labor market consultants. CONCLUSION ¶16 We affirm. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 6