Samantha L. Croteau v. Bella Construction of Key West, Inc.
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket4D2025-1536
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
SAMANTHA L. CROTEAU,
Appellant,
v.
FAMILY 5, INC., d/b/a WHISTLE STOP, et al.,
Appellees.
No. 4D2025-1536
[November 18, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; James Sherman, Judge; L.T. Case No.
502022CA000608XXXXMB.
Bard D. Rockenbach of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm
Beach, and Steven G. Calamusa of Gordon & Partners, P.A., Palm Beach
Gardens, for appellant.
Jack R. Reiter and Robert C. Weill of GrayRobinson, P.A., Miami, for
appellee Family 5, Inc. d/b/a Whistle Stop.
GERBER, C.J.
In this personal injury case, the plaintiff appeals from the circuit court’s
final summary judgment which found, without genuine issue of material
fact, that the plaintiff could not prove her negligence action against a bar
which had served her alcoholic beverages before she was injured later that
night. The summary judgment rested on the circuit court’s application of
“the dram shop statute”—section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2020):
Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication.
A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a
person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable
for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the
intoxication of such person, except that a person who willfully
and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a
person who is not of lawful drinking age or who knowingly
serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all
alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage
caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or
person.
§ 768.125, Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphases added).
The underlined second exception is at issue here. The plaintiff argues
the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment for the bar, because
she allegedly had “presented evidence that [the bar had] served her
alcoholic beverages despite knowing she was habitually addicted [to the
use of any or all alcoholic beverages].”
We conclude the circuit court correctly found, without genuine issue of
material fact, that the bar did not know the plaintiff was “habitually
addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages.” Therefore, we affirm
the circuit court’s summary judgment order.
We present this opinion in six sections:
1. The parties’ pleadings;
2. The bar’s summary judgment motion;
3. The plaintiff’s summary judgment response;
4. The circuit court’s summary judgment order;
5. The parties’ arguments on appeal; and
6. Our review.
1. The Parties’ Pleadings
The plaintiff’s operative complaint pertinently alleged:
At all times material hereto, … Plaintiff … was habitually
addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages.
On … March 10, 2021[,] and March 11, 2021, Plaintiff …
was a patron of the Defendant[] [bar] ….
….
… Plaintiff … exhibited behavior at the … bar … consistent
with a person who was habitually addicted to the use of any
and all alcoholic beverages, including but not limited to
drinking alcohol beyond the point of intoxication … [and]
displaying a very high tolerance to alcohol ….
2
… [The bar], through its employees, agents and/or
servants … did knowingly serve or furnish alcoholic beverages
to Plaintiff, … a person habitually addicted to the use of any
or all alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication.
….
… [I]mmediately after exiting the [bar’s] premises on …
March 11, 2021, Plaintiff … drove her vehicle while intoxicated
by alcohol served to her by [the bar]. While driving her vehicle
on I-95[,] … Plaintiff’s … vehicle got a flat tire and Plaintiff …
was struck by a vehicle, as a pedestrian, when she was trying
to cross I-95 to seek help to address the flat tire while
intoxicated, due to the impairment caused by [the bar’s]
alcohol served to her in violation of § 768.125, Florida
Statutes. At the time her blood was drawn in the hospital,
after this incident, her Blood Alcohol Level was .234 which is
almost three (3) times the legal limit for intoxication.
(paragraph numbers and internal paragraphs omitted).
The bar’s answer generally denied the above allegations. The answer
also included numerous affirmative defenses, including “that the
[plaintiff’s] injuries … were not caused by the negligence, fault, or want of
reasonable care of [the bar].”
2. The Bar’s Summary Judgment Motion
The bar’s summary judgment motion contended the bar was entitled to
protection under section 768.125, because no competent substantial
evidence existed that the bar knew the plaintiff was allegedly habitually
addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages:
Plaintiff was an anonymous patron to [the instant bar, and]
drank alcohol at the bar on only one occasion …. Plaintiff was
… not a “regular customer” of [the bar]. …
….
Furthermore, nothing about Plaintiff’s behavior and
demeanor at [the bar] could have provided the bar with
knowledge of her alleged habitual addict[ion] [to the use of any
or all alcoholic beverages]. Plaintiff was clear that her entire
visit to [the bar] that night involved her sitting down, ordering
3
drink(s), and watching television – all without interacting with
anyone. As Plaintiff admitted [during her depositions]:
(1) she had no conversations with the bartender other
than ordering drink(s); (2) she did not share any
information with the bartender regarding her alleged
problems with alcohol abuse; (3) she did not interact
with anybody other than ordering drink(s) from the
bartender; (4) nothing unusual happened; (5) she did
not get into any arguments with anyone; (6) she has no
idea whether she slurred her words at any point; (7) she
was quiet, demure, not boisterous, not loud, not
abusive, kept to herself; and (8) she has no recollection
of any behavior she may have exhibited to lead a
bartender to believe she had a problem with abusing
alcohol.
Based on the foregoing, there is … no record evidence from
which a reasonable jury could determine that the bartender(s)
who served [Plaintiff] knew she was habitually addicted [to the
use of any or all alcoholic beverages] … and summary
judgment must be granted.
3. The Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Response
The plaintiff’s summary judgment response pertinently argued:
[The bar’s summary judgment motion] argues that the lack
of signs that Plaintiff was intoxicated after consuming several
alcoholic beverages is proof Plaintiff is not an alcoholic …. The
argument demonstrates [the bar’s] confusion on the subject.
Appearing to be sober and not intoxicated after consuming
several drinks is a sign that a patron is an alcoholic, not that
the patron isn’t an alcoholic. As [Plaintiff’s medical expert]
explain[s] in his affidavit, a person who is habitually addicted
to … alcohol won’t exhibit signs of impairment as would
someone who is not an alcoholic.
The plaintiff’s medical expert’s affidavit pertinently attested:
A person who has developed a higher tolerance for alcohol
will not display the same symptoms of impairment as a
normal person after consuming alcohol. A habitual alcoholic
4
who has developed a high tolerance for alcohol will appear to
not be intoxicated with alcohol consumption.
….
Based upon [the plaintiff’s] intoxication level and the time
at [the] bar, there was ample time for [the bar’s] employees …
to observe and notice that the amount of alcohol [which the
plaintiff had] consumed was having no effect on her.
4. The Circuit Court’s Summary Judgment Order
After a hearing, the circuit court entered its order granting the bar’s
summary judgment motion and entering final judgment for the bar. The
order recited the circuit court’s factual findings:
[F]or purposes of the summary judgment, it is undisputed
that [the bar] had no prior knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged
habitual addiction to alcohol.
….
By Plaintiff’s own [deposition] testimony, her behavior on
the night in question was unremarkable. She … testified:
a. She did not “get into an argument with anybody” …
b. [S]he had “no fights that night” …
c. She did not recall any behavior she exhibited “that
would have led the server to believe [she] had some type
of alcohol abuse problem” …
d. She “just sat there to [herself] and just watched tv”
…
e. She was “quiet” and “demure” …
f. She “just kept to [herself]” …
g. She wasn’t “boisterous” …
h. She did not “get loud” …
5
i. She did not “get abusive” …
Put simply, there is no evidence Plaintiff exhibited any
outward indication that she was a habitual alcoholic other
than, as contended by Plaintiff, that she had approximately
2.5 drinks worth of alcohol and sat quietly from 6:08 to 9:50.
The order then provided the circuit court’s legal analysis:
[T]he Court begins with the plain language of the statute.
Lafrance v. Emile, 401 So. 3d 379, 380 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025).
Florida’s Dram Shop Act provides as follows:
A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages
to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby
become liable for injury or damage caused by or
resulting from the intoxication of such person, except
that a person … who knowingly serves a person
habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic
beverages may become liable for injury or damage
caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such
minor or person.
See § 768.125, Fla. Stat. [(2020)].
… [T]he Court assumes as true for purposes of this motion
that Plaintiff was “habitually addicted to the use of any or all
alcoholic beverages” because her own testimony [on that
element] creates, at least, a material issue of fact. …
The question for the Court’s consideration is whether there
is any evidence [that the bar] knew … Plaintiff was habitually
addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages when it
served her sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
The Supreme Court has held that “[s]erving an individual
multiple drinks on one occasion would be insufficient, in and
of itself, to establish that the vendor knowingly served a
habitual drunkard alcoholic beverages.” Ellis v. N.G.N. of
Tampa, Inc., 586 So. 2d 1042, 1048 (Fla. 1991).
….
6
… [C]onsistent with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement
in Ellis, serving Plaintiff drinks for the first time on the night
of the accident, without more, cannot be used to impute
knowledge to [the bar].
Plaintiff relies on the Supreme Court’s recognition in Ellis
that knowledge can “be established by circumstantial
evidence” to argue Plaintiff’s behavior, or more specifically her
composure after 2.5 drinks[,] is sufficient circumstantial
evidence to submit the issue to the jury. Ellis, 586 So. 2d at
1048-49. Plaintiff also relies on Roster v. Moulton, 602 So. 2d
975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)[,] in furtherance of her argument that
a vendor may be able to gain knowledge of an alcoholic
condition on the first meeting. The facts in Roster could not
be more different. In Roster, a first time customer came into
the bar and drank 8-10 beers and two shots in 90 minutes,
left, and then was served another beer. Id. at 976.
Additionally, the patron was belligerent and was asked to
leave. Id. Under those circumstances, the Fourth District
held there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to overcome
summary judgment.
In contrast, here, … no circumstantial evidence show[s] the
bar knew Plaintiff was a habitual alcoholic. If a patron’s
composed silence on one occasion was sufficient indicia of
habitual alcoholism to defeat summary judgment in a dram
shop case, it is impossible to conceive of a case that would not
create a jury issue, rendering the protections afforded by the
statute illusory.
….
In enacting the Dram Shop Act, the Legislature made a
policy choice to severely limit the potential liability of alcohol
vendors to instances where it can be shown that the bar
knowingly served someone habitually addicted to alcohol.
Plaintiff’s theory would expand the scope of potential liability
significantly, which is a job for the Legislature, not this Court.
(paragraph numbers omitted).
The plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing, which the circuit court denied.
This appeal followed.
7
5. The Parties’ Arguments on Appeal
The plaintiff summarizes her argument as follows:
Under this [c]ourt’s binding precedent, the [circuit] court
was required to deny [the bar’s] motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiff presented evidence that she drank a large
amount of alcohol without showing signs of being drunk, as
well as expert testimony proving that a high tolerance to
alcohol is a sign that a person is an alcoholic, as this Court
previously held in Roster …. The [circuit] court improperly
ignored Plaintiff’s evidence and … experts, and misread …
Roster. Instead of applying Roster to conclude that showing
no signs of drunkenness after drinking a large amount of
alcohol is evidence a person is an alcoholic, and that [the bar]
knowingly served an alcoholic, the [circuit] court decided the
lack of drunken behavior meant [the bar] could not know [the
plaintiff] was an alcoholic. In other words, the [circuit] court’s
ruling was the exact opposite of the conclusion [which] the
[circuit] court was legally required to reach based on the
evidence and … Roster.
The bar summarizes its response as follows:
[The bar] did not serve [the plaintiff] knowing that she was
habitually addicted [to the use of any or all alcoholic
beverages]. …
Indeed, nothing about [the plaintiff’s] demeanor at [the bar]
imputed notice to the bar of her alleged habitual addiction [to
the use of any or all alcoholic beverages]. That a person does
not exhibit signs of impairment after drinking cannot,
standing alone, establish notice that the person is habitually
addicted [to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages]. The fact
that [the plaintiff] did not appear or act intoxicated,
particularly considering the amount of alcohol she ordered,
was insufficient to prove that [the bar] knowingly served
someone habitually addicted [to the use of any or all alcoholic
beverages]. See Fleuridor v. Surf Café, 775 So. 2d 411, 413
(Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
8
6. Our Review
Our standard of review is de novo. See Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at
Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) (standard of appellate
review applicable to grant of summary judgment is de novo).
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(a) pertinently provides:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. … The
summary judgment standard provided for in this rule shall be
construed and applied in accordance with the federal
summary judgment standard.
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a) (2025).
Under the federal summary judgment standard, summary judgment
should be granted only “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead
a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The dram shop statute—section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2020),
entitled “Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication”—
pertinently provides:
A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a
person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable
for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the
intoxication of such person, except that a person who …
knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of
any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or
damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such
… person.
§ 768.125, Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphases added).
As we have stated:
From its clear language, section 768.125 does not create a
cause of action. Rather, it is a protective statute meant to
eliminate a cause of action [for negligence] where one might
otherwise exist, except in certain circumstances. This
interpretation was made clear by the Florida Supreme Court
9
in Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa, Inc., 586 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1991).
…
….
… Examining section 768.125 … we see that the legislature
explicitly intended to protect providers from liability except in
cases where the provider serves an underage person or a
known habitual alcoholic and “the intoxication of such ...
person” “cause[s] or result[s]” in “injury or damage.” §
768.125, Fla. Stat.
Okeechobee Aerie 4137, Fraternal Ord. of Eagles, Inc. v. Wilde, 199 So. 3d
333, 337, 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (emphases added; alterations in
original).
As an initial matter—given the plaintiff’s deposition testimony claiming
that she is a long-time alcoholic—the circuit court correctly assumed a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was
habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages. Thus, the
circuit court correctly framed the only question as whether a genuine issue
of material fact existed to show the bar knew the plaintiff was habitually
addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages.
Like the circuit court, our answer is no, based on the Florida Supreme
Court’s Ellis decision, and our Fleuridor decision, both of which warrant
affirmance. Our Roster decision—the primary case upon which the
plaintiff relies—is distinguishable.
In Ellis, a mother sued a bar for injuries which her son—an alleged
“habitual drunkard”—sustained in a single-car crash after consuming
about twenty alcoholic drinks at the bar. 586 So. 2d at 1043. The circuit
court dismissed the complaint, finding no cause of action existed under
section 768.125 against an alcoholic beverages vendor. Id. The
intermediate appellate court affirmed on different grounds, finding
dismissal was proper because the bar had not been provided with written
notice of the son’s alcohol addiction pursuant to section 562.50, Florida
Statutes. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the intermediate appellate court’s
decision, holding the written notice required to establish the criminal
offense of knowingly selling intoxicating liquors to a habitual drunkard
was not required to prove a negligence claim for an injury resulting from a
vendor’s knowingly serving alcoholic beverages to a habitual drunkard. Id.
10
at 1048–49. The Court concluded that, “under the habitual drunkard
exception to section 768.125, a plaintiff need show only that the vendor
knowingly sold alcoholic beverages to a person who is a habitual
drunkard.” Id. at 1048.
In addressing “what constitutes ‘knowledge’ in order for a vendor’s
conduct to be found negligent,” the Court found:
[T]he cause of action [under section 768.125’s second
exception] only requires evidence that the vendor had
knowledge that the individual the vendor served was a
habitual drunkard. Serving an individual multiple drinks on
one occasion would be insufficient, in and of itself, to establish
that the vendor knowingly served a habitual drunkard alcoholic
beverages. On the other hand, serving an individual a
substantial number of drinks on multiple occasions would be
circumstantial evidence to be considered by the jury in
determining whether the vendor knew that the person was a
habitual drunkard.
Id. (emphases added). While stating the “knowledge” element “can
properly be established by circumstantial evidence,” id. at 1048–49, Ellis
gave only one example: “serving an individual a substantial number of
drinks on multiple occasions.” Id. at 1048 (emphases added).
We recognize that the Court’s one identified circumstantial example is
not the only circumstantial evidence situation which can establish the
“knowledge” element. In any event, that example does not apply here,
because the bar here did not serve the plaintiff “a substantial number of
drinks on multiple occasions.” Id. What is more applicable to the bar here
is the Court’s earlier statement—“Serving an individual multiple drinks on
one occasion would be insufficient, in and of itself, to establish that the
vendor knowingly served a habitual drunkard alcoholic beverages.” Id.
Fleuridor is also instructive. There, we affirmed a summary judgment
for the defendant bar, where the plaintiff patron was unknown to the bar’s
staff, was not a bar regular, and had purchased up to four drinks over two
to three hours. 775 So. 2d at 413. We held that we could not impute
notice of the patron’s alcohol addiction to the bar when the patron had not
shown any signs of intoxication, despite his alcohol consumption:
The fact that the … bartender served [the patron] three or four
drinks and that [the patron] did not appear intoxicated, alone,
is insufficient to prove that [the bar] knowingly served a
11
habitual drunkard. … [The patron] was not a regular at [the
bar], he was unknown to its staff, and on the few occasions
he had gone there, he did not get intoxicated. …
….
We find nothing … to indicate that the act of serving multiple
drinks to an anonymous patron on one occasion is, alone,
sufficient to meet the statutory criteria. To so hold would be
inconsistent with the Ellis court’s conclusion that “[s]erving
an individual multiple drinks on one occasion [is] insufficient,
in and of itself, to establish that [a] vendor knowingly served a
habitual drunkard....” Ellis, 586 So. 2d at 1048 (emphasis
added).
Fleuridor, 775 So. 2d at 413.
Here, consistent with Ellis and Fleuridor, the bar’s serving the alcoholic
beverages to the plaintiff for the first time on the incident date, without
more, should not be considered sufficient evidence to impute knowledge
to the bar that the plaintiff was “habitually addicted to the use of any or
all alcoholic beverages.” As the bar’s answer brief submits:
The dramatically different facts in Sabo v. Shamrock
Communications, Inc., 566 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990),
approved sub nom. Peoples Restaurant v. Sabo, 591 So. 2d 907
(Fla. 1991), reinforce this analysis. In Sabo, the court found
the following circumstantial evidence militated against
summary judgment:
• For at least two years before the accident, the bar
patron went to the bar twice a week.
• [The patron] got drunk every time he went to the bar,
and the bartenders never refused to serve him.
• When [the patron] got drunk, he became loud and
talkative; slurred his words; became unbalanced; had
red eyes: all obvious physical signs of a person’s
intoxication.
• [The patron] got to know the bar’s evening
bartenders well. The[se] [bartenders] frequently talked
to [the patron] at the bar, and started pouring his
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favorite drink, a White Russian, as soon as he came
through the door.
• [The patron] normally drank at least five double
White Russians (four shots of liquor per drink); and on
the night of the accident, he probably had seven double
drinks.
Id. at 268-69.
[Sabo] … underscores that … evidence of habitual addiction
[must exist,] and [strongly suggests that] one visit [to a bar]
does not … establish habit as a matter of law. If a patron’s
composed silence on one occasion was sufficient indicia of
habitual alcoholism to defeat summary judgment in a dram
shop case, it is impossible to conceive of a case that would not
create a jury issue, rendering the protections afforded by the
statute illusory. See Sabo, 566 So. 2d at 268 (“Statutes
should not be given an interpretation that would render them
pointless.”).
Roster—the primary case upon which the plaintiff relies—is
distinguishable. There:
Appellant, plaintiff below, filed a complaint alleging that on
[the incident date], [a bar patron] became intoxicated as a
result of consuming numerous alcoholic beverages at [a bar]
and, while operating his automobile, struck appellant while
he rode his bicycle, rendering appellant a quadriplegic. The
complaint also alleged that [the bar] violated section 768.125,
Florida Statutes (1988), when it served alcohol to [the bar
patron] with knowledge that [the patron] was habitually
addicted [to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages]. [The
bar] answered the complaint with a general denial and filed a
motion for summary judgment on two grounds: It was not
liable under section 768.125 because there was no evidence
that it knew [the patron] was habitually addicted [to the use
of any or all alcoholic beverages], and it had not received prior
written notice of [the patron’s] alcohol addiction, which they
asserted was required under section 562.50, Florida Statutes
(1988). The [circuit] court granted summary judgment on the
former.
602 So. 2d at 975 (internal footnote omitted).
13
In reversing the final summary judgment for the bar, we held:
Notably, the supreme court in Ellis … held that [section
768.125’s] knowledge [requirement] could be demonstrated
with circumstantial evidence. [586 So. 2d] at 1048; see also
Peoples Restaurant v. Sabo, 591 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1991).
While we recognize that the facts in Ellis and Sabo are
more compelling than those at bar, we hold that the evidence
adduced at the summary judgment hearing, which included
expert witness affidavits, created an issue of fact as to whether
[the bar’s] employees knew that [the patron] was [habitually]
addicted [to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages]. Notably,
the Ellis Court wrote:
We find the cause of action in this circumstance only
requires evidence that the vendor had knowledge that
the individual the vendor served was a habitual
drunkard. Serving an individual multiple drinks on one
occasion would be insufficient, in and of itself, to
establish that the vendor knowingly served a habitual
drunkard alcoholic beverages.
Id. at 1048 …. [In Roster,] [i]t is undisputed that [the patron]
consumed 8–10, 12–ounce cans of beer and two straight shots
of tequila over the period of an hour and a half. After a short
absence from [the bar], during which [the patron] drank yet
another beer served elsewhere, [the patron] returned to [the
bar’s] walk-up window, where he ordered and was served
another beer. The [bar manager] admitted that it would be
unusual for a person to consume that many beers and two
shots of tequila without showing signs of intoxication. Despite
[the patron’s] considerable alcohol consumption, [the patron]
did not stagger and did not slur his speech. The manager
twice asked [the patron] to leave the bar only because [the
patron] became loud and argumentative. [The patron] pled
guilty to the charge of driving while under the influence of
alcohol and admitted that he had a drinking problem from the
age of sixteen, which he still had at the time of the accident.
At that time, [the patron] had never received treatment for his
alcohol addiction.
Id. at 975–76 (internal footnote omitted).
14
By affidavit in Roster, “two experts[] … essentially stated that the large
amount of alcohol that [the patron had] consumed over a relatively short
time period, together with the lack of impairment [which the patron had]
demonstrated, would have put a reasonable server of alcohol on notice
that [the patron] was habitually addicted to alcohol. [The bar] submitted
no affidavits to oppose these viewpoints.” Id. at 976 n.2.
Relying on Roster, the plaintiff here argues:
[The circuit court] … ignored [the plaintiff’s] expert
testimony—which presented the exact same point as in
Roster—and ignored the evidence that [the plaintiff] showed
no signs of drunkenness even after she surpassed the point of
being legally drunk. This evidence was especially strong
because, while [the plaintiff] showed no outward signs of
drunkenness, she was well on her way to having … [a] blood[-
]alcohol level [three times the legal limit].
However, unlike in Roster, as the bar’s answer brief submits:
… [W]hatever alcohol [the plaintiff] may have consumed at
[the bar], she claims she drank over a five-hour period—much
longer than the 90 minutes during which the Roster [patron]
consumed 10–12 drinks.
Furthermore, [the plaintiff] claims she sat, ordered
drink(s), and watched television for five hours, which is much
different than the Roster [patron,] who left the bar …, drank
another alcoholic beverage elsewhere, and then came back to
the bar where he was served yet another drink. Also, unlike
… in Roster, there is no evidence that [the plaintiff]
demonstrated a level of intoxication consistent with someone
who had either a high or low tolerance for alcohol. Finally,
unlike the [patron] in Roster, [the plaintiff here] did not
become loud or argumentative at the [bar]. By her own
admission, she was quiet, not boisterous, not loud, not
abusive, and she simply kept to herself. Roster is therefore
distinguishable. The Court should follow its more recent
decision in Fleuridor, which distinguished Roster and held:
“We find nothing in Roster to indicate that the act of serving
multiple drinks to an anonymous patron on one occasion is,
alone, sufficient to meet the statutory criteria.” 775 So. 2d at
413.
15
[The plaintiff] wishes for this Court to ignore these …
factual differences, [asserting] that this Court [in Roster]
recognized “that an alcoholic will not show signs of
drunkenness after consuming a large amount of alcohol.” But
this Court [also] expressly noted in [Roster] that the bar [had]
asked the patron twice to leave because he “became loud and
argumentative.” That [conduct] [wa]s an “obvious” sign of
intoxication[,] [s]ee Sabo, 566 So. 2d at 269[, from which the
bar’s knowledge of the patron and/or his level of intoxication
could be imputed]. …
(internal footnotes omitted).
We agree with the bar’s reasoning. Unlike the Roster patron, the
plaintiff here was an anonymous patron, whose behavior during her visit
to the bar was, by her own statements, unremarkable.
Conclusion
In sum, the circuit court’s well-reasoned order correctly found, without
genuine issue of material fact, that the bar did not know the plaintiff was
“habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages” as
required to show liability under section 768.125. Based on the foregoing,
the circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment for the bar on
the plaintiff’s negligence claim. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
WEISS, MARLON J., Associate Judge, concurs.
LOTT, J., concurs with opinion.
LOTT, J., concurring.
I fully join the majority’s opinion and agree with its reasoning that
Roster v. Moulton, 602 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), is distinguishable
from the instant case. I write separately to note my view that Roster is
wrongly decided because its holding is ungrounded from the statutory
language.
In Roster, we found that a plaintiff created a genuine dispute of material
fact where a bar patron drank at a bar on only one occasion. 602 So. 2d
at 976. The patron had consumed a fairly staggering amount of alcohol—
8–10 beers and two tequila shots over an hour and a half—drank another
16
beer elsewhere, returned and ordered another beer. Id. We noted that he
so drank “without showing signs of intoxication,” and that “[d]espite [the
patron’s] considerable alcohol consumption, he did not stagger and did not
slur his speech,” but then noted that he later “became loud and
argumentative.” Id. We placed particular emphasis on the fact that the
plaintiff’s evidence “included expert witness affidavits,” noting that “[t]he
two experts’ affidavits essentially stated that the large amount of alcohol
that [the patron] consumed over a relatively short time period, together
with the lack of impairment [the patron] demonstrated, would have put a
reasonable server of alcohol on notice that [the patron] was habitually
addicted to alcohol.” Id. & n.2.
I’m not convinced.
Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2020), says that a bar owner is not
liable for damage caused by the sale of alcoholic beverages, except that (as
relevant here) a person “who knowingly serves a person habitually
addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable.”
The language does not require expert testimony, and does not ask how
the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) defines pathologies related to alcohol use. Indeed, the
DSM-5 describes “alcohol use disorder”; before that, the DSM-IV defined
two distinct pathologies, “alcohol abuse” and “alcohol dependence.” 1
The statutory language asks whether the server has actual knowledge
that the person is, as a matter of habit, addicted to alcohol. The ordinary
person, certainly the ordinary server, knows exactly what that statutory
language means and knows what it means to be “habitually addicted to
alcohol.” It means to be a “habitual drunkard.” Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa,
Inc., 586 So. 2d 1042, 1048 (Fla. 1991). You know such a thing when you
see it—and it’s hard to imagine being able to see it given only a single
occasion of indulgence.
A few things stand out about the statutory language. First, the
establishment must have actual knowledge that the patron is habitually
addicted to alcohol; constructive knowledge or that the server “should have
known” is not sufficient. See Ellis, 586 So. 2d at 1048 (“[T]he cause of
action in this circumstance only requires evidence that the vendor had
1 E.g., Traci Takahashi et al., Comparison of DSM-IV and DSM-5 criteria for alcohol
use disorders in VA primary care patients with frequent heavy drinking enrolled in
a trial, Springer Nature (18 July 2017), online at
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s13722-017-0082-0.
17
knowledge that the individual the vendor served was a habitual
drunkard.”); cf. Faircloth v. Main St. Entm’t, Inc., 392 So. 3d 1042, 1046
(Fla. 2024) (“The term ‘willfully,’ as used in section 768.125, simply means
that the alcohol provider knew that the recipient was under age 21.”).
Second, the inquiry of the patron is whether the patron is “addicted to
the use of any or all alcoholic beverages.” § 768.125, Fla. Stat. (2020).
“Addiction”—at least as the word is used in the statute—is not a medical
diagnosis that changes with evolving medical practices; it is a word that
has a common meaning to ordinary people. Cf. City of Lake Worth v. Viera,
51 Fla. L. Weekly D1490 (Fla. 4th DCA July 22, 2026) (“We strive to
determine the text’s objective meaning through the application of the text
to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in
the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued.”
(quotation omitted)). One apt definition describes “addiction” as a
condition “in which a person has strong cravings, is unable to stop or limit
the activity, continues the activity despite harmful consequences, and
experiences distress upon discontinuance.” 2
Third, said addiction to alcohol must be “habitual.” § 768.125, Fla.
Stat. (2020). That, again, doesn’t align neatly with the definitions of
alcohol afflictions in the past or present DSMs (nevermind whatever a
someday-forthcoming DSM-6 will tell us about them). “Habitually” means
“[d]one by habit” or “[b]eing so by habit,” and a “habit” is “[a] recurrent,
often unconscious pattern of behavior that is acquired through frequent
repetition” or a “[c]ustomary manner or practice.” 3 It is difficult to fathom
how a server could have actual knowledge that a person is addicted to
alcohol by habit if they have observed that person imbibe on only a single
occasion, however remarkable that occasion might be. Our Supreme
Court seemed to recognize as much. See Ellis, 586 So. 2d at 1048
(“Serving an individual multiple drinks on one occasion would be
insufficient, in and of itself, to establish that the vendor knowingly served
a habitual drunkard alcoholic beverages.”). Cf. Peoples Rest. v. Sabo, 591
So. 2d 907, 908 (Fla. 1991) (evidence of knowledge where plaintiff drank
2 Addiction, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=addiction (last visited Oct.
13, 2026).
3 Habitual, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=habitual (last visited Oct.
13, 2026); Habit, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=habit (last visited Oct. 13,
2026).
18
heavily at bar twice a week for four months); Gonzalez v. Stoneybrook W.
Golf Club, LLC, Inc., 225 So. 3d 891, 892 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (evidence of
knowledge where patron played golf dozens of times over three years and
drank heavily each time); Evans v. McCabe 415, Inc., 168 So. 3d 238, 239
(Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (evidence of knowledge where patron h