Ragsdale v. Driend

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Ragsdale v. Driend LILLY RAGSDALE v. TARYN DRIEND ET AL. (AC 47601) Elgo, Wilson and Pellegrino, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s summary judgment for the defendant D in her negligence action stemming from a motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff was injured by a vehicle driven by D and owned by the defendant S. In a prior action, the plaintiff had set forth a claim against S only, claiming that S both owned and operated the vehicle during the acci- dent. After the trial court granted S’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff, within one year, brought a second action against S and D, pursu- ant to the wrong defendant statute (§ 52-593). She claimed that the court improperly concluded that § 52-593 did not save her action, which was not commenced within two years of the underlying motor vehicle accident as required by statute (§ 52-584). Held: The trial court erred in granting D’s motion for summary judgment, as the plaintiff, in her second action, named the correct defendant as to the legal theory alleged in her complaint and commenced that action within one year of the termination of the prior action, and, thus, the necessary prerequisites for the application of § 52-593 were established and the general remedial purpose of § 52-593 was satisfied by permitting the action to continue. Argued February 9—officially released October 6, 2026 Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, personal injuries sustained as a result of the named defendant’s alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the plaintiff withdrew her claims as to the defendant Candace Smith; thereafter, the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, granted the named defendant’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings. Devin W. Janosov, for the appellant (plaintiff). Dirk D. Bender, for the appellee (named defendant).  Ragsdale v. Driend Opinion PELLEGRINO, J. In this negligence action, the plain- tiff, Lilly Ragsdale, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the named defendant, Taryn Driend. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that General Statutes § 52-593 did not save her action, which was not commenced within two years of the underlying motor vehicle accident as required by General Statutes § 52-584. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, reverse the summary judgment ren- dered by the trial court. The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. In a complaint dated January 31, 2019 (first action), the plaintiff set forth a claim of neg- ligence against Candace Smith stemming from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on February 1, 2017. The plaintiff alleged therein that, while she was driving in a westerly direction in her Honda Accord (Accord) on Captain Thomas Boulevard in West Haven, a truck neg- ligently operated by Smith “came into direct and violent collision with the plaintiff’s [Accord] . . . .” The plaintiff further alleged that, as a result of this motor vehicle accident, she suffered “serious and permanent injuries.” On June 10, 2019, Smith filed a motion for summary judgment. Smith asserted that she was not the operator of the truck that collided with the plaintiff’s Accord. Smith attached two documents to her memorandum of law. The first was her affidavit in which Smith averred that, on February 1, 2017, although she owned the truck referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint, she was not driving that vehicle at the time of the accident, nor was she present during that incident. Additionally, Smith’s affidavit stated that Driend was operating her truck at the time of the accident. Smith also attached a copy of the police report to her memorandum of law. That report listed Smith as the owner of the truck and Driend as the operator.  Ragsdale v. Driend On July 27, 2020, the court, Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe, judge trial referee, denied Smith’s motion for summary judgment. The court set forth the following reasoning: “The complaint alleges that [Smith] was BOTH the owner and operator of the [truck]. If the [truck] was being oper- ated with the permission of the owner, then liability for the negligent operation of that [truck] may attach. Bogart v. Tucker, [164 Conn. 277, 320 A.2d 803] (1973). Permissive use remains a question of fact.”1 That same day, Smith filed a motion for reargument pursuant to Practice Book § 11-12. The court denied this motion on August 10, 2020. On February 17, 2021, Smith filed a second motion for summary judgment. She argued that no genuine issue of material fact existed that “she was not operating the [truck in] question as alleged in the complaint nor was the operator of the [truck] her agent.” Smith attached the police report to this motion, as well as two affidavits. In her affidavit, Smith averred that Driend operated the truck on February 1, 2017, as Driend had requested to use it to transport materials to a school for use in her employment. Further, while Smith had acquiesced to Driend’s use of her truck, Smith had not asked Driend to perform any task or duty on her behalf. Driend also provided an affidavit in which she averred that she had operated the truck owned by Smith when it collided with the plaintiff’s Accord on February 1, 2017. Driend further averred that she had borrowed Smith’s truck to transport materials to her place of employment, a school, and, after dropping off these materials, she drove to an appointment. After this appointment, the acci- dent occurred on the way to return the truck to Smith. Finally, Driend stated: “At no time during the use of the 1 In Bogart v. Tucker, supra, 164 Conn. 281, our Supreme Court stated: “At the outset, we note that our so-called agency statute, [General Statutes] § 52-183, generally precludes the direction of a verdict for the defendant on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to establish agency. . . . The statute creates the presumption that the operator of a car is the agent of the owner, and it places the burden of rebutting the presump- tion on the owner.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.)  Ragsdale v. Driend [truck] was I performing any task or duties requested by . . . Smith but instead requested the use of the [truck] to perform errands for my purposes . . . .” The plaintiff filed an objection, with an accompanying memorandum of law, to this motion for summary judgment. On January 6, 2022, Judge Radcliffe issued a memo- randum of decision granting Smith’s second motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court stated: “[Smith] was not the operator of the [truck], and [Driend] the operator of the [truck] has refuted agency. There- fore, the rebuttable presumption in [General Statutes §] 52-183 . . . has been rebutted.”2 The plaintiff did not file an appeal from that decision. See Ragsdale v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (January 6, 2022). On December 12, 2022, the plaintiff brought the pres- ent action against Driend and Smith.3 In count one, the plaintiff set forth a negligence claim against Driend based on the motor vehicle accident described in the first action. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Driend was operating a truck with the express consent, authority, knowledge, and/or permission of the owner, Smith, when the February 1, 2017 accident occurred. The plaintiff further claimed that she had expended large sums of money for medical treatment and care and will incur such expenses in the future, sustained a disruption of her ability to carry on and enjoy life’s activities, and 2 See generally Schimmelpfennig v. Cutler, 65 Conn. App. 388, 392–93, 783 A.2d 1033 (where record unequivocally established that there was no claim that operator was agent or employee of owner and used motor vehicle only with permission of owner, § 52-183 was inapplicable), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 934, 785 A.2d 230 (2001). 3 In Connecticut, an action is commenced when the complaint is served upon the defendant. See Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 549, 848 A.2d 352 (2004); see also Russell v. Mitchell Properties, Inc., 148 Conn. App. 635, 639–40, 87 A.3d 591, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 912, 100 A.3d 404 (2014). Additionally, we note that our Supreme Court has observed that no substantive distinction exists between the phrases “bringing an action” and “commencing an action.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Rocco v. Garrison, supra, 549. These interchangeable phrases are used to describe the initiation of an action. See id.  Ragsdale v. Driend suffered anxiety and fear of increased injuries in the future. The first count concluded with an allegation that the plaintiff brought this suit pursuant to § 52-593, the so-called “wrong defendant” statute,4 in that she failed to obtain a judgment in the first action by reason of the failure to name the correct defendant therein, and made service of process in the present action within one year of the termination of the first action. In count two of the complaint, the plaintiff, incorporat- ing the allegations from count one, asserted that Smith was vicariously liable for Driend’s conduct and resulting damages. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Driend operated Smith’s truck with Smith’s express consent, authority, knowledge, and/or permission. In support of this claim, the plaintiff cited General Statutes §§ 52-182 and 52-183.5 On February 8, 2023, Driend and Smith filed an answer and raised the special defenses of comparative negligence 4 See DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 123 Conn. App. 583, 586, 2 A.3d 963 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, 306 Conn. 107, 49 A.3d 951 (2012); Imperati v. MS Gill, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 27, 2026). 5 General Statutes § 52-182 provides: “Proof that the operator of a motor vehicle or a motorboat, as defined in section 15-127, was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle or motorboat was being operated as a family car or boat within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption.” General Statutes § 52-183 provides: “In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the neg- ligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption.” This statute establishes that, in an action brought against the nonop- erator of a motor vehicle for damages that are the result of the negligent operation of that motor vehicle, the operator shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner and operating it in the course of his employment. See Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 836–37, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). Further, § 52-183 “goes further than merely estab- lishing a presumption, in that it expressly places upon the defendant  Ragsdale v. Driend and the statute of limitations. Specifically, as to the sec- ond special defense, they set forth the following: “The plaintiff’s action against [Driend and Smith] is barred by the applicable statute of limitations set forth in § 52-584 and not saved by . . . § 52-593 on the grounds that the correct defendant was properly named in the original action.” The plaintiff denied these special defenses. On July 25, 2023, Driend and Smith moved for sum- mary judgment and set forth two grounds. First, they asserted that the action against Smith alleging vicari- ous liability was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Second, Driend and Smith claimed that the applicable statute of limitations barred the action and that § 52-593 was inapplicable. In the attached memorandum of law, they argued that the “doctrine of res judicata applie[d] to the [vicarious liability claim alleged in the second count of the complaint] against Smith since she is being pros- ecuted for the same cause of action in the same capacity as the [truck’s] owner.” Driend and Smith concluded by stating that the plaintiff “had the opportunity to litigate her claim against . . . Smith in the prior action—and in fact, did litigate the matter against . . . Smith. Res judicata bars her ability to relitigate the claim against . . . Smith now.” As to their argument that § 52-593 did not save the action from the application of the statute of limitations, Driend and Smith claimed that Smith had been named as both the owner and operator of the truck in the first action. Smith, therefore, properly was characterized as a correct defendant in both actions. They further argued that the failure to include all potentially liable parties in the first action did not fall within the ambit of § 52-593 the burden of introducing evidence to rebut the presumption . . . . Indeed, [t]he presumption ceases to be operative [only] when the trier finds proven facts which fairly put in issue the question. . . . [I]f no evidence relevant to the issue is produced, or, if countervailing evidence is produced but the trier does not believe it, the presumption applies, and the plaintiff is entitled to have the issue found in his favor.” (Cita- tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 837–38; see also Engram v. Kraft, 83 Conn. App. 782, 786–87, 851 A.2d 363 (2004).  Ragsdale v. Driend and, thus, the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. On July 27, 2023, the plaintiff objected to the motion for summary judgment and withdrew her claim as to Smith as set forth in count two of her complaint. The court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, heard argument on the motion for summary judgment on November 6, 2023. On March 1, 2024, the court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of Driend, the remaining defendant in the action. At the outset, the court observed that the dispositive issue in the case was whether § 52-593 applied and saved the action from the statute of limitations. The court then observed that it was bound by the final judgment rendered in the first action. After reviewing the applicable appellate case law, the court determined that the plaintiff had not named the wrong defendant, as that term is used in the context of § 52-593, in the first action because she had sued Smith in her capacity as the owner of the truck that collided with the plaintiff. The court further explained that “[t]he granting of summary judgment in the earlier case went to ultimate liability and not whether a ‘wrong’ party was named for that purpose.” The court concluded that “the facts do not fit within the scope of any recog- nized application of . . . § 52-593, and cannot reasonably be made to do so. The plaintiff sued a proper party [in the first action]—the owner of the ‘other’ vehicle under a proper statutory claim of vicarious liability for the fault of the driver. That the plaintiff also incorrectly named the owner as a driver did not detract from the fact that the [first] action had named a proper defendant—and under a properly applicable theory. That based on the facts presented in the [first action], the court concluded that there could be no vicarious liability does not come within the scope of the statute. Simplistically, there is no presumptive equivalence between a ‘wrong’ defendant under § 52-593 and a nonliable owner under . . . § 52-183.” Pursuant to Practice Book § 11-11, on March 4, 2024, the plaintiff moved to reargue the summary judgment  Ragsdale v. Driend rendered in favor of Driend. She maintained that the complaint in the first action named an incorrect person, Smith, in an incorrect capacity, the operator of the truck that collided with the plaintiff’s Accord. The plaintiff further asserted that, as a result of this error, she was unable to obtain judgment in the case and, therefore, the conditions of § 52-593 were satisfied. Driend objected to the motion to reargue on March 5, 2024. The court heard argument on this motion on April 1, 2024. The court denied the merits of the plaintiff’s motion to reargue on April 12, 2024. The court explained that, although the complaint in the first action incorrectly named Smith as the operator, that pleading set forth a “theoretically proper claim against a proper defendant [i.e., Smith as the owner] for that claim.” This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. The following applicable standard of review and legal principles inform and guide our analysis. “Practice Book § [17-49] requires that judgment shall be rendered forth- with if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case. . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. . . . The party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Practice Book §§ [17-44 and 17-45]. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judg- ment is plenary. . . . Summary judgment may be granted  Ragsdale v. Driend where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russell v. Mitchell Properties, Inc., 148 Conn. App. 635, 638, 87 A.3d 591, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 912, 100 A.3d 404 (2014); see also Connex Credit Union v. Madgic, 354 Conn. 459, 463, 354 A.3d 709 (2026); Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes, 230 Conn. App. 1, 20–21, 329 A.3d 256 (2024). We agree with the trial court that the determination of whether § 52-593 applies to save the plaintiff’s action constitutes the dispositive issue. The motor vehicle acci- dent occurred on February 1, 2017. The plaintiff com- menced the present action on December 12, 2022, when Driend, as the defendant, received service of process. See Russell v. Mitchell Properties, Inc., supra, 148 Conn. App. 639–40. This action, therefore, indisputably was brought outside the applicable two year statute of limita- tions. See General Statutes § 52-584.6 Accordingly, the plaintiff relies on § 52-593 to preserve the viability of her action against the defendant. See, e.g., Billerback v. Cerminara, 72 Conn. App. 302, 307, 805 A.2d 757 (2002) (no dispute that, if action is not saved by § 52-593, then it is time barred by § 52-584). In determining whether the court misconstrued § 52-593 under these facts and circumstances, we are guided by the fundamental prin- ciples of statutory construction. See Finkle v. Carroll, 315 Conn. 821, 830, 110 A.3d 387 (2015); see also Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 7–8, 882 A.2d 597 (2005). These principles include ascertaining and giving effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. See Ulbrich v. Groth, 310 Conn. 375, 448, 78 A.3d 76 (2013); see also General Statutes § 1-2z.7 6 General Statutes § 52-584 provides in relevant part: “No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained . . . .” See generally Pascola- Milton v. Millard, 203 Conn. App. 172, 174–75, 247 A.3d 652, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 934, 248 A.3d 710 (2021); Mocek v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 393, 394, 523 A.2d 916 (1987). 7 This court previously has determined that § 52-593 “is not clear and unambiguous, [and, therefore] we are not constrained by the plain meaning rule. Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., [supra,  Ragsdale v. Driend We begin our analysis by setting forth the language of the statute. Section 52-593 provides in relevant part: “When a plaintiff in any civil action has failed to obtain judgment by reason of failure to name the right person as defendant therein, the plaintiff may bring a new action and the statute of limitations shall not be a bar thereto if service of process in the new action is made within one year after the termination of the original action. . . .” The saving provision in this statute, therefore, “applies if the plaintiff has failed to obtain judgment in the origi- nal action on the basis of her failure to name the right person as defendant . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 8. Our Supreme Court has set forth the following inter- pretation of § 52-593, based on the various appellate decisions that have considered this statutory text. “In its simplest application, the wrong defendant statute contemplates the situation in which a plaintiff errone- ously sues A under the mistaken belief that A negligently operated or owned a vehicle, when in fact B operated or owned the vehicle. . . . This language contemplates that, so long as the second action is brought within the one year time limitation, the defendant in that action may not avail itself of the statute of limitations. The general remedial purpose of this statute is to relieve a plaintiff of the statute of limitations consequences where the plaintiff made a factual mistake in selecting her original defendant for the legal theory of the action, so long as the plaintiff brings the second action against the right person within the one year period. Because the statute is remedial in nature, it should be construed broadly to accomplish its remedial purpose. . . . In addi- tion, any ambiguities should be resolved in a manner that furthers, rather than thwarts, the [statute’s] remedial purposes. . . . Nevertheless, as the Appellate Court has aptly observed, an excessively broad reading of § 52-593 276 Conn. 7–8].” DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 123 Conn. App. 583, 593, 2 A.3d 963 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, 306 Conn. 107, 49 A.3d 951 (2012).  Ragsdale v. Driend would undermine the statute of limitations because a plaintiff could unilaterally extend the limitation period simply by filing an action against a defendant who could not be liable based on a legal theory. To allow [such an] action to continue at this time would defeat the basic purpose of the public policy that is inherent in statutes of limitation[s], i.e., to promote finality in the litigation process. . . . Under Connecticut law, a right person, as that term is used in § 52-593, is one who, as a matter of fact, is a proper defendant for the legal theory alleged. . . . As this court has previously stated, failure to name all of the defendants from whom [the plaintiff] could have recovered in [the] original action does not constitute a failure to name the right person as defendant within the meaning of § 52-593.” (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Finkle v. Carroll, supra, 315 Conn. 830–32; see also Krom v. In- Vest, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (October 5, 2010) (50 Conn. L. Rptr. 798, 800) (there is required nexus between factual error as to identity of liable party and theory of liability alleged). In the present case, the trial court focused its reason- ing on the principle that a plaintiff’s failure to name all of the defendants from whom he or she could have recovered in the original action does not constitute the failure to name the right person as a defendant for pur- poses of § 52-593. Specifically, the court explained that, in its view, the plaintiff sued Smith in the first action as both the owner and operator of the truck and the court in that action rendered judgment not because Smith was the wrong defendant for the legal theories alleged, but rather there was no genuine issues of material fact as to the two issues of agency and that she was not the operator of the truck. Smith provided evidence that established, as a matter of law, that Driend operated the truck on February 1, 2017, for her own purposes and was not performing any task or duties on behalf of Smith. “The granting of summary judgment in the [first action]  Ragsdale v. Driend went to the ultimate liability and not whether a ‘wrong’ party was named for that purpose.” In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on sev- eral cases from our appellate courts. First, it cited to Perzanowski v. New Britain, 183 Conn. 504, 440 A.2d 763 (1981). In that case, the plaintiff initially brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in federal court against the city of New Britain (city) and certain individual defendants after his real property was demolished. Id., 504–505. The United States District Court for the District of Con- necticut dismissed this action against the city on January 4, 1974, because the city “was not a person amenable to suit under [§ 1983].” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 505. A jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of the individual defendants. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced an action in state court against the city on January 9, 1978, on the basis of the city’s conduct pertaining to the 1972 demolition of his building. Id. The trial court granted the city’s motion for summary on the basis of the statute of limitations. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly concluded, inter alia, that his action was not saved by § 52-593. Id. Our Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, stating that “[t]he short answer . . . is that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that he failed to obtain judgment by reason of (his) failure to name the right person as defendant. . . . The record plainly shows that he failed to obtain judgment in federal court (1) because the city could not be liable for the civil rights violations alleged and (2) because the jury [returned] a general verdict in favor of the remaining defendants who were sued in their individual capacity. Neither result arises from a mistake in naming a defendant.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 507. Next, the trial court considered our decision in Iello v. Weiner, 129 Conn. App. 359, 20 A.3d 81 (2011). There, the plaintiff filed a dental malpractice action against Kenneth Epstein, her former dentist, and Family Den- tal Group, P.C. (Family Dental), on September 4, 2003.  Ragsdale v. Driend Id., 361. This negligence action was based on Epstein’s postoperative treatment of the plaintiff following her dental surgery. Id. The plaintiff voluntarily withdrew this action on January 30, 2006. Id. Nearly one year later, on January 17, 2007, the plaintiff commenced a second action against Michael Weiner, a dentist, and Family Dental again based on a theory of negligence fol- lowing the dental surgery described in the first action. Id. “Notably, the plaintiff conceded that both Epstein and [Weiner] provided postoperative care to her follow- ing her dental surgery.” Id. Weiner and Family Dental both moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired and that § 52-593 did not save the plaintiff’s action. Id. “In support of his motion, [Weiner] claimed, inter alia, that because both the first action and the second action alleged negligence in the postoperative treatment provided by Epstein and [Weiner], respectively, and because the plaintiff con- ceded that both Epstein and [Weiner] provided post- operative care to her, the plaintiff had in fact named a ‘right person’ in her first action, as that term is used in § 52-593. Therefore, [Weiner] argued that § 52-593 was inapplicable, as Epstein was a proper defendant for the legal theory of negligence alleged by the plaintiff in the first action.” Id., 361–62. The trial court agreed and ultimately rendered summary judgment in favor of Weiner on the grounds that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the statute of limitations and was not saved by § 52-593. Id., 362. At the outset of our analysis, this court stated: “Under Connecticut law, a right person, as that term is used in § 52-593, is one who, as a matter of fact, is a proper defendant for the legal theory alleged. . . . Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial [Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 8] . . . . Moreover, the plaintiff’s failure to name all of the defendants from whom she could have recovered in her original action does not constitute a failure to name the right person as defendant within the meaning of . . . § 52-593.” (Emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Iello v. Weiner, supra, 129 Conn. App. 363.  Ragsdale v. Driend We then conducted a plenary review of the record and concluded that the legal theory alleged in the initial action was negligence in the postoperative treatment provided by Epstein. “Although it may be the case that the plaintiff’s failure to name [Weiner] as a defendant in the first action was a benign oversight, our law is clear that [t]he fact that the complaint in the plaintiff’s origi- nal action failed to name all potentially liable defendants is immaterial. . . . Because the plaintiff’s first action, premised on a theory of negligence, was brought against a right person, § 52-593 is inapplicable and cannot save the plaintiff’s second action from being time barred by § 52-584.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 363–64. Finally, the trial court discussed Isidro v. State, 62 Conn. App. 545, 771 A.2d 257 (2001). That case arose from an accident involving a pedestrian and a motor vehicle owned by the state and operated by a state trooper. Id., 547. The plaintiff commenced a negligence action against the state trooper, who was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident. Id. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the state trooper on the basis of immunity pursuant to Gen- eral Statutes § 4-165.8 Id. More than three years after the accident, the plaintiff commenced a second action in which she named the state as a defendant on the basis of vicarious liability for the conduct of the state trooper. Id. The plaintiff, in an effort to save the action from the applicable two year statute of limitations, relied upon § 52-593. Id., 547–48. The trial court rejected such reli- ance and rendered summary judgment in favor of the state in this second action. Id., 548. On appeal, we explained that “[o]ur Supreme Court has recognized that § 52-593 applies only in circum- stances in which the plaintiff’s original action failed by 8 “General Statutes § 4-165 (a) provides in relevant part: No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Isidro v. State, supra, 62 Conn. App. 547 n.3.  Ragsdale v. Driend reason of naming, in fact, the wrong defendant; that is, in cases in which the naming of the wrong defendant was the product of a reasonable and honest mistake of fact as to the identity of the truly responsible individual.” Id., 549–50. This court then explained that the initial action failed not because the plaintiff failed to name the proper defendant as a matter of fact, but as a result of the statutory immunity afforded to the state trooper. Id., 550. Accordingly, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. We conclude that the present case is distinguish- able from the precedent cited by the trial court in its memorandum of decision. At the outset, we note that, in determining whether the court properly concluded that § 52-593 did not apply under these facts and cir- cumstances, we conduct a plenary review of the record to determine whether the plaintiff named the proper defendant for the legal theory alleged in the first action. See Finkle v. Carroll, 134 Conn. App. 278, 288, 37 A.3d 851 (2012), aff’d, 315 Conn. 821, 110 A.3d 387 (2015); Iello v. Weiner, supra, 129 Conn. App. 363. In the com- plaint filed in the first action, the plaintiff identified Smith as the owner and operator of the truck that hit the plaintiff’s Accord on February 1, 2017. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that “the [truck] owned and operated by . . . Smith . . . came into direct and violent collision with the plaintiff’s [Accord] . . . .” The plaintiff further alleged that the Smith’s negligence caused the colli- sion due to her failure to keep a lookout, by operating her truck unreasonably fast with reckless disregard for traffic and conditions, by failing to keep her truck under proper control, and by operating it with faulty and defec- tive brakes. The plaintiff then claimed that the accident occurred due to Smith’s carelessness and negligence. In the memorandum of law in support of her motion for summary judgment, Smith summarized the com- plaint as identifying her as the operator of the truck that struck the plaintiff’s Accord and that her purported negligent operation of said truck caused the collision  Ragsdale v. Driend and resulting injuries to the plaintiff. It does not appear that the plaintiff filed a response to Smith’s motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, the court in the first action sua sponte injected the issue of Smith’s potential liability based on a new legal theory of vicarious liability resulting from the use of her truck by another individual. Indeed, in Smith’s July 27, 2020 motion to reargue the denial of her motion for summary judgment, she stated: “As a threshold matter, permissive use is irrelevant because the plaintiff could not recover upon a claim that the unnamed operator of the [truck] was operating it with the permission of [Smith]. The plaintiff’s recovery is of course limited to the allegations of the complaint and the allegations in the complaint clearly limit her claim to the factual predicate that [Smith], not another individual, was operating the [truck] in question. The ONLY allegations of negligence against [Smith] involve her alleged negligent operation of the [truck]. There are zero allegations that [Smith] is responsible for the neg- ligence of another.”9 (Emphasis added.) In her second motion for summary judgment, dated February 17, 2021, Smith asserted that there was no genuine issue of material fact that (1) she was not the operator of the truck that struck the plaintiff’s Accord on February 1, 2017, and (2) said operator was not her agent. In the plaintiff’s February 24, 2021 objection to Smith’s second motion for summary judgment, she asserted that Smith had not satisfied her burden to have summary judgment rendered in her favor. In her April 9, 2021 reply, Smith again contended that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged only the negligent operation of the truck by Smith. Judge Radcliffe ultimately rendered summary judgment in favor of Smith on January 6, 2022. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced the present action on December 12, 2022. Service of process, therefore, was made upon Driend within one year of the termination of the first action as required by § 52-593. See Finkle 9 Judge Radcliffe summarily denied Smith’s motion to reargue the denial of her first motion for summary judgment on August 10, 2020.  Ragsdale v. Driend v. Carroll, supra, 315 Conn. 830. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Driend operated the truck that struck her Accord on February 1, 2017, with the express consent, authority, knowledge and/or permission of Smith as the truck’s owner.10 The plaintiff also alleged vicarious liability against Smith in the second count of the complaint, but she subsequently withdrew that count on September 27, 2023, two days after the defendants moved for summary judgment. The sole remaining cause of action, therefore, is negligent operation of the truck by Driend. In granting Driend’s motion for summary judgment and concluding that § 52-593 did not apply to the pres- ent action, the court determined that, in the first action, the plaintiff had alleged, inter alia, a theory of liability against Smith as the owner of the truck that negligently struck her Accord on February 1, 2017. The court further reasoned that Smith was the “right defendant” for this theory. Next, it explained that, under our law, the failure to name all potentially liable defendants is “immaterial” for purposes of saving an untimely action pursuant to § 52-593. See Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 10–11; Isidro v. State, supra, 62 Conn. App. 550–51. We have reviewed the complaint filed in the first action, not for the purpose of determining whether that court properly rendered summary judgment in that matter,11 10 Our Supreme Court has stated that “the word owner is one of flexible meaning and it varies from an absolute proprietary interest to a mere possessory right” and has “held that [it] . . . includes both the legal and equitable owner, and any one having an interest in the automobile under a special title. Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer & Lighterage Terminal, Inc., 100 Conn. 114, 120, 123 A. 16 [(1923)]; Marciel v. Berman, 104 Conn. 165, 168, 169, 132 A. 397 [(1926)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hope v. Cavallo, 163 Conn. 576, 580–81, 316 A.2d 407 (1972). 11 W