State v. Ramos

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Ramos STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRANDON RAMOS (AC 47779) Suarez, Westbrook and Wilson, Js. Syllabus Convicted, after a trial to the court, of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of statute ((Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217 (a) (1)), the defendant appealed. He claimed that the court improperly denied his motion to set aside its find- ing of guilty because his conviction, which was based on a prior conviction of misdemeanor assault in the third degree, rendered § 53a-217 (a) (1) uncon- stitutional, facially and as applied to him, under the second amendment to the United States constitution and New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (597 U.S. 1). Held: This court concluded that the record was inadequate to review the defendant’s constitutional claims under the framework announced in Bruen, as the trial court denied the defendant’s motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing or making factual findings concerning the conduct underlying the defendant’s prior assault conviction, the nature of the conduct encompassed by the misdemeanor assault provision in (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217 (a) (1), or the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation relevant to that provi- sion; accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing during which the parties were to have an opportunity to develop the factual and historical record necessary for the trial court to determine whether the challenged provision of (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217 (a) (1) was consistent with the second amendment and withstands the consti- tutional scrutiny required by Bruen. Argued June 1—officially released October 13, 2026 Procedural History Substitute informations charging the defendant with the crimes of murder, carrying a pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a firearm, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the charges of murder and carrying a pistol with- out a permit were tried to the jury before P. Brown, J.; verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense of man- slaughter in the first degree with a firearm and carrying a pistol without a permit; thereafter, the court granted the defendant’s motion for a mistrial; subsequently, the charge of criminal possession of a firearm was tried to the court; finding of guilty; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the court’s guilty  State v. Ramos finding and rendered judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings. Kayla R. Stephen, deputy assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant). Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s attor- ney, Seth R. Garbarsky, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, and Alexander C. Beck, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion WILSON, J. The defendant, Brandon Ramos, appeals from the judgment of conviction of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217 (a) (1).1 On appeal, the defendant claims that 1 In his principal brief on appeal, the defendant challenges the con- stitutionality of “§ 53a-217 (a) (1) (C).” We note, however, that the offense underlying the defendant’s conviction occurred in 2021, he was arrested in 2021, and he was charged pursuant to the revision of § 53a-217 then in effect. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217 (a) (“[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm . . . when such person possesses a firearm . . . and (1) has been convicted of . . . a violation of section . . . 53a-61”). Number 21-67, § 6, of the 2021 Public Acts (P.A. 21-67, § 6), effec- tive June 1, 2022, amended subsection (a) (1) of § 53a-217 by, inter alia, adding subparagraph (C), which limited the statute’s disqualify- ing misdemeanors to offenses committed during the preceding twenty years. The amendment did not otherwise materially alter the statute in a manner relevant to the defendant’s constitutional challenges in the present case. See P.A. 21-67, § 6 (“[s]ection 53a-217 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof . . . (a) [a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm . . . when such person possesses a firearm . . . and (1) has been convicted of . . . (C) a misdemeanor violation of section . . . 53a-61”). We note, too, that § 53a-217 has been amended subsequent to P.A. 21-67, § 6. See Public Acts 2023, No. 23-53, § 1; Public Acts 2023, No. 23-203, § 1. Because the 2023 amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal and the addition of subparagraph (C) in P.A. 21-67, § 6, does not materially impact the defendant’s constitutional challenges, all references to § 53a-217 in this opinion are to the revision of the statute under which the defendant was charged and convicted. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217 (a) (1).  State v. Ramos the trial court improperly denied his motion to set aside its guilty finding, rendered after a trial to the court, because § 53a-217 (a) (1) is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to him, under the second amendment to the United States constitution and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pis- tol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2022). We conclude that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed and the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion. The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the present appeal. Following the shooting death of the victim, Jyineez Cruz, on August 22, 2021, the defendant was charged in a substitute information with criminal possession of a firearm in violation of § 53a-217 (a) (1). The defendant elected to be tried to the court on that charge. At the conclusion of the evidence, on March 25, 2024, the court, P. Brown, J., found the defendant guilty of criminal possession of a firearm. In articulating the basis for its finding, the court stated that the fact that the charge had been tried to the court did not affect the validity of the parties’ stipulation as to the defendant’s previous misdemeanor conviction of assault in the third degree and specifically referenced the stipulation, which was admitted as court exhibit 6 and stated: “As to the [t]hird [c]ount of the [i]nformation in which the defendant is charged with [c]riminal [p]osses- sion of a [f]irearm, the parties hereby stipulate that the defendant had been previously convicted (on August 17, 2018) of a misdemeanor offense, to wit: [a]ssault 3rd.”2 2 In a separate substitute information, the defendant was charged with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 29-35 (a). The defendant elected a jury trial on these charges. The jury found the defendant not guilty of murder but guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55a and carrying a pistol without a permit. After the jury delivered its verdict and was excused, and as the trial court began to render its finding on the criminal possession of a fire- arm charge, the clerk notified the court and the parties that court exhibit 6 had been included in the evidence that was brought to the jury  State v. Ramos Subsequently, on May 30, 2024, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the trial court’s finding of guilty on the charge of criminal possession of a firearm, arguing that his conviction violated the second amendment to the United States constitution both facially and as applied to him.3 Specifically, the defendant argued that the state could not satisfy its burden of proving, pursuant to New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 1, that criminalizing his possession of a firearm based on his prior conviction of misdemeanor assault in the third degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a- 61,4 is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation because, according to the defendant, assault in the third degree is a nonviolent, nondomestic violence misdemeanor. The defendant “[requested] that the court set aside the defendant’s conviction, order fur- ther briefing on the merits of this nuanced legal issue, and [hold] an evidentiary hearing thereafter.” deliberation room along with the other “full” exhibits. The defendant immediately moved for a mistrial due to the jury’s exposure to the information regarding his prior misdemeanor conviction. The prosecu- tor opposed the motion and, instead, requested that the court recall the jurors to inquire whether they had considered court exhibit 6 during their deliberations. After hearing argument from the parties, the court granted the defendant’s motion for a mistrial on the jury’s verdict. 3 The defendant also asserted in his motion to set aside the trial court’s guilty finding that it violated article first, § 17, of the Connecticut constitution. The defendant has not raised or briefed any state con- stitutional claim on appeal, and, therefore, we deem any such claim abandoned. See, e.g., State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 766, 91 A.3d 862 (2014) (“to receive review, a claim must be raised and briefed adequately in a party’s principal brief, and . . . the failure to do so constitutes the abandonment of the claim”); State v. Thompson, 98 Conn. App. 245, 248, 907 A.2d 1257 (“[o]ur practice requires an appellant to raise claims of error in his original brief” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 946, 912 A.2d 482 (2006). 4 General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) provides: “A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) he recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person; or (3) with criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon, a dangerous instrument or an electronic defense weapon.”  State v. Ramos On May 31, 2024, prior to the defendant’s sentenc- ing, the trial court heard oral argument on the defen- dant’s motion. Defense counsel argued that, although no Connecticut court has addressed whether criminal- izing firearm possession based on a prior conviction of misdemeanor assault in the third degree is consistent with the second amendment, several federal jurisdic- tions have invalidated “felon-in-possession” statutes in cases where those disqualifying felonies were nonviolent. Defense counsel again requested that the court set aside its finding “or, at a minimum, order further briefing and a hearing on [the] matter given the recent influx of cases addressing these types of issues.” In response, the prosecutor argued that the court should deny the motion because there was “nothing specifically about [the defendant’s] case that should set him apart from other individuals who have been convicted of a violent offense, albeit a misdemeanor.” The court denied the motion, stating: “Having considered the defense argument in support of its motion to set aside the verdict, the court denies the motion on the grounds that the charge of which the defendant was found guilty, criminal possession of a firearm, [§] 53a-217, is constitutional both facially and as applied to [the defendant].” Thereafter, the court sentenced the defendant to ten years of incarceration, execution suspended after eight years, two years and one day of which were mandatory, followed by five years of probation. This appeal followed. On appeal, the defendant claims that § 53a-217 (a) (1) is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him, and, therefore, his conviction of criminal possession of a firearm must be vacated.5 Specifically, the defendant argues that the state cannot satisfy its burden of dem- onstrating, pursuant to Bruen, that criminalizing his 5 In his motion to set aside the trial court’s finding of guilty on the criminal possession of a firearm charge, the defendant specifically stated that he is challenging only the portion of § 53a-217 (a) (1) that applies following a conviction of assault in the third degree under § 53a-61. The defendant is not challenging any other portion of § 53a-217 (a) (1).  State v. Ramos possession of a firearm based on his prior conviction of assault in the third degree is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation because, accord- ing to the defendant, assault in the third degree is a nonviolent, nondomestic violence misdemeanor. As to the defendant’s facial challenge, the state contends that the defendant cannot establish that § 53a-217 (a) (1) is facially unconstitutional because, even assuming that the second amendment protects individuals convicted of misdemeanor assault, there may be circumstances in which the violent nature of the conduct underlying such a conviction constitutionally permits disarmament. With respect to the defendant’s as applied challenge, the state advances three arguments: (1) the defendant has inadequately briefed the claim; (2) the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to support it; and (3) the collateral bar rule precludes our review of the claim.6 We conclude that, because the record was not adequately developed in the trial court as to whether § 53a-217 (a) (1) is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied to the defendant, the case must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, specifically, an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s constitutional challenge to § 53a-217 (a) (1) as raised in his motion to set aside the court’s guilty finding. Before addressing the parties’ arguments, we set forth the applicable standard of review and relevant legal principles. Generally, “[t]he proper appellate standard of review when considering the action of a trial court granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict . . . is the abuse of discretion standard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sunila, 98 Conn. App. 847, 6 The collateral bar rule generally applies when a defendant seeks to challenge “the validity of a [prior] court order” in a subsequent pro- ceeding arising from the defendant’s violation of that order. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Enrrique H., 353 Conn. 823, 840, 347 A.3d 1156 (2025); see also State v. Wright, 273 Conn. 418, 426–27, 870 A.2d 1039 (2005). In the present case, however, the defendant does not challenge the validity of his prior conviction of assault in the third degree. Rather, he challenges the constitutionality of § 53a-217 (a) (1)  State v. Ramos 850, 911 A.2d 773 (2006). “The constitutionality of a statute [however] presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Meadows, 185 Conn. App. 287, 302–303, 197 A.3d 464 (2018), aff’d sub nom. State v. Cody M., 337 Conn. 92, 259 A.3d 576 (2020). It is well established “that [l]egislative enactments carry with them a strong presumption of constitution- ality. . . . A party challenging the constitutionality of a validly enacted statute bears the heavy burden of prov- ing the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . In the absence of weighty countervailing circumstances, it is improvident for the court to invali- date a statute on its face. . . . This burden is especially heavy in the context of a facial challenge. . . . Addi- tionally, we indulge every presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the statute and approach a claim of unconstitutionality with caution, examine it with care, and sustain the [statute] unless its invalidity is clear.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Russo, 221 Conn. App. 729, 757, 303 A.3d 279 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 938, 307 A.3d 273 (2024). “The United States Supreme Court has noted that to mount a facial challenge to a statute, one must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid. The fact that the [statute] might operate unconstitution- ally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms, 222 Conn. 361, 368, 610 A.2d 652, cert. dismissed, 505 U.S. 1247, 113 S. Ct. 28, 120 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1992). “A facial challenge . . . means a claim that the law is invalid in toto—and therefore incapable of any valid application. . . . A facial challenge, as compared to an as applied challenge is not dependent on the facts of a particular case.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 522 n.21, insofar as it criminalizes possession of a firearm based on that convic- tion. The collateral bar rule, therefore, does not apply.  State v. Ramos 847 A.2d 862, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S. Ct. 424, 160 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2004).7 “On the other hand, [a]n as-applied attack . . . does not contend that a law is unconstitutional as written but that its application to a particular person under particular circumstances deprived that person of a con- stitutional right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 405 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1275, 132 S. Ct. 1741, 182 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2012). “An as applied challenge requires an analysis of the facts of a particular case to determine whether the application of a statute, even one constitu- tional on its face, deprived the [defendant] to whom it was applied of a protected right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Goe v. McDonald, 598 U.S. 1211, 143 S. Ct. 1020, 215 L. Ed. 2d 188 (2023). The second amendment to the United States constitu- tion provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const., amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 635, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008), the United States Supreme Court held “that the [s]econd [a]mendment [confers] an individual right to keep and 7 To successfully challenge the facial validity of a statute, however, “a party is required to demonstrate as a threshold matter that the statute may not be applied constitutionally to the facts of [the] case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lewis, 273 Conn. 509, 515, 871 A.2d 986 (2005); see also State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 499–500, 915 A.2d 822 (limiting analysis to defendant’s as applied challenge in case in which defendant’s claim encompassed both facial challenge and as applied challenge to constitutionality of statute) (overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014), and overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538, 34 A.3d 370 (2012)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888, 128 S. Ct. 248, 169 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2007); Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 849 n.4, 761 A.2d 705 (2000) (Sullivan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result) (“although the nonexistence of a factual record is not fatal to a facial challenge, the perilous endeavor of forging constitutional doctrine in a factual vacuum should cause us to consider facial chal- lenges only in exceptional circumstances”).  State v. Ramos bear arms” and “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Thereafter, in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010), the Supreme Court reaffirmed Heller and extended the individual second amendment right to the states through the fourteenth amendment. After Heller and McDonald, courts coalesced around a two step framework for assessing second amendment challenges. “That two step framework required a court first to assess whether the challenged statute burdened conduct protected by the second amendment. . . . If the first step was satisfied, the court would move to the sec- ond step of the inquiry, at which it would [evaluate] the law under some form of means-end scrutiny. If the law passe[d] muster under that standard, it [was] constitu- tional. If it fail[ed], it [was] invalid.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Giannone, 228 Conn. App. 11, 16–17, 323 A.3d 360 (2024). In Bruen, however, the Supreme Court concluded that “Heller and McDonald do not support applying means-end scrutiny in the [s]econd [a]mendment context. Instead, the government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradi- tion that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 19. The court held that, “when the [s]econd [a]mendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the [c]onstitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the govern- ment must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this [n]ation’s historical tradition of firearm regu- lation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this [n]ation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the [s]econd [a]mendment’s unqualified command.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Id., 17.  State v. Ramos Thus, Bruen “requires courts to assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the [s]econd [a]mendment’s text and historical understanding.” Id., 26. “When confronting such present-day firearm regula- tions, this historical inquiry that courts must conduct will often involve reasoning by analogy—a commonplace task for any lawyer or judge.” Id., 28. “[A]nalogical reasoning requires only that the government identify a well-established and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 30. In other words, “a modern-day regulation” need not be a “dead ringer for historical precursors . . . to pass con- stitutional muster.” Id. Instead, the regulations must be “relevantly similar” in light of “at least two metrics: how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” Id., 29. More recently, in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 690, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 219 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2024), the United States Supreme Court again addressed the scope of the second amendment and held that, when an indi- vidual has been found by a court to pose a “credible threat to the physical safety” of others, that individual may be temporarily disarmed “consistent with the [s]econd [a]mendment . . . .” In so holding, the court provided some additional guidance on the Bruen test and explained that “the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the prin- ciples that underpin our regulatory tradition. . . . A court must ascertain whether the new law is relevantly similar to laws that our tradition is understood to permit, apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the found- ing generation to modern circumstances. . . . Why and how the regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 692. Accordingly, under Bruen and Rahimi, “[t]he initial step requires that the defendant, as the party challenging the statutes at issue . . . show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conduct falls within the plain text of  State v. Ramos the second amendment, i.e., that the items at issue, first, are ‘arms,’ and second, are in common use or typically possessed for lawful purposes like self-defense. . . . If the defendant makes the necessary threshold showing as to any of the firearms or related components at issue, then the plain text of the second amendment ‘presumptively protects’ the defendant’s right to keep and bear that firearm or related component.8 . . . The second step then requires the state to affirmatively prove, by presenting ‘relevantly similar’ historical analogues, that its regula- tion of the protected ‘arm’ is nonetheless ‘consistent with the [n]ation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation’ and is, therefore, constitutional.” (Citations omitted; footnote added.) State v. Giannone, supra, 228 Conn. App. 38–39. In the present case, the defendant first claims that § 53a-217 (a) (1) is facially unconstitutional because it categorically prohibits firearm possession by individuals who have been convicted of misdemeanor assault in the third degree, including persons whose prior convictions involved nonviolent, nondomestic violence conduct. The state responds that the statute cannot be held to be facially unconstitutional because there may be circum- stances in which the conduct underlying a misdemeanor assault in the third degree conviction is sufficiently violent to justify disarmament under the second amend- ment. We conclude that the present record is inadequate to resolve the parties’ competing constitutional claims. 8 We note that the analysis of the historical tradition is relevant “only if the [s]econd [a]mendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct . . . and this threshold inquiry requires courts to consider three issues: whether the conduct at issue is protected, whether the weapon concerned is in common use, and whether the affected individuals are ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens and thus part of the people whom the [s]econd [a]mendment protects.” (Citation omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941, 981 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 1900, 221 L. Ed. 2d 646 (2025); see also New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 31–32 (resolving all three of these questions before proceeding to historical analysis).  State v. Ramos As previously outlined, a facial challenge presents the question of whether a statute is unconstitutional in all of its applications. See State v. Long, supra, 268 Conn. 522 n.21. Thus, to resolve the defendant’s facial challenge, we must determine whether § 53a-217 (a) (1) categorically requires the disarmament of persons with qualifying misdemeanor convictions and, if so, whether that is “consistent with this [n]ation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 17. In making that determination, we must consider the historical evidence presented by the parties and determine whether the challenged regulation is “relevantly similar” to histori- cal regulations that our tradition permits. See United States v. Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. 692. In the present case, however, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to set aside its guilty finding without conducting an evidentiary hearing or making factual findings concerning the challenged statute, the nature of the conduct encompassed by its misdemeanor assault disqualification, or the historical tradition of firearm regulation relevant to that disqualification. Rather, without conducting an evidentiary hearing and apply- ing the Bruen test, the court, in a conclusory manner, simply stated: “Having considered the defense argument in support of its motion to set aside the verdict, the court denies the motion on the grounds that the charge of which the defendant was found guilty, criminal possession of a firearm, [§] 53a-217, is constitutional both facially and as applied to [the defendant].” The court, therefore, did not make the necessary factual findings to conclude that the second amendment presumptively protects the defendant’s conduct; see Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941, 981 (2d Cir. 2024) (noting that, under Bruen, court must first consider whether second amendment’s plain text covers individual’s conduct), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 1900, 221 L. Ed. 2d 646 (2025); nor did it conduct the historical analysis required to determine whether the challenged categorical disqualification is  State v. Ramos “consistent with this [n]ation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 17. Consequently, the record before us is inadequate to review the defendant’s constitutional claims under the framework announced in Bruen and Rahimi. In State v. Giannone, supra, 228 Conn. App. 11, this court confronted a similar deficiency. There, the trial court had rejected the defendant’s constitutional chal- lenges under the pre-Bruen framework without holding an evidentiary hearing or making the factual findings necessary to apply the framework established in Bruen. See id., 31. This court concluded that it was “necessary to remand” the case “to the trial court to give the parties the opportunity to develop the evidentiary record and to allow the court to consider the defendant’s claim under Bruen in the first instance.” Id., 31–32. We further explained that, on remand, the trial court was required to consider evidence presented by the parties and to make factual findings consistent with Bruen. See id., 35–39. The same considerations apply in the present case. As in Giannone, the parties here have presented compet- ing arguments concerning the constitutionality of the challenged firearm regulation, but the trial court has not afforded the parties an opportunity to develop the factual and historical record necessary to resolve those arguments, nor has it made relevant findings in this regard. Bruen instructs that courts “are not obliged to sift the historical materials for evidence to sustain [a] statute.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 60. Rather, “[c]ourts are . . . entitled to decide a [second amendment] case based on the historical record compiled by the parties.” Id., 26 n.6; see also State v. Giannone, supra, 228 Conn. App. 35 (“we decline to resolve the present appeal by apply- ing other courts’ factual findings and sifting through historical materials as a substitute for the development of an evidentiary record compiled by the parties, which we find is necessary to conduct the analysis that Bruen  State v. Ramos requires”). We therefore decline to undertake the histori- cal inquiry in the first instance on the basis of a record that was never developed. The defendant next argues that § 53a-217 (a) (1) is unconstitutional as applied to him. As to his as applied challenge, the defendant argues that “[t]he only facts necessary for this court to conduct the necessary [as applied] Bruen analysis here are that: the defendant was previously convicted of assault in the third degree . . . § 53a-61; assault in the third degree is not a crime of family violence, nor does it contain any elements related to the assault of an intimate partner; the defendant possessed a firearm; Connecticut’s criminal possession of a firearm statute . . . § 53a-217 (a) (1) criminalized the defendant’s possession of a firearm because of his predicate misdemeanor assault conviction; and the rel- evant history and tradition of firearms regulation in this nation.” We disagree that the existing record is sufficient to resolve the defendant’s as applied challenge. An as applied challenge requires the trial court to analyze “the facts of a particular case to determine whether the application of a statute, even one constitutional on its face, deprived the [defendant] to whom it was applied of a protected right.” (Emphasis added; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Goe v. Zucker, supra, 43 F.4th 30. Here, however, the court did not afford the defendant an opportunity to develop and present evidence concerning the particular circumstances of his predicate misde- meanor conviction or to explain why, in light of those circumstances, application of § 53a-217 (a) (1) to him is inconsistent with the second amendment. The court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, did not make find- ings concerning the conduct underlying the defendant’s prior assault conviction, and did not otherwise develop a record concerning the facts relevant to his as applied claim. Because those facts bear directly on whether the state can establish through “relevantly similar” historical analogues that disarming the defendant is “consistent  State v. Ramos with this [n]ation’s historical tradition of firearm regula- tion”; New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 17; the trial court’s failure to afford the defendant an opportunity to develop that factual record precludes us from resolving his as applied challenge in the first instance. Consequently, the record before us is inadequate for our review of the parties’ as applied claims under the framework announced in Bruen and Rahimi.9 Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and further proceedings on the defendant’s facial and as applied challenges con- sistent with Bruen, Rahimi and Giannone.10 See, e.g., Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018, 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2023) (“the best course is to remand to allow the [D]istrict [C]ourt to undertake the Bruen analysis in the first instance” and to allow “proper, fulsome analysis of the historical tradition”). On remand, the parties shall have an opportunity to develop the factual and historical record necessary to determine whether the challenged 9 The state contends that the defendant inadequately briefed his as applied constitutional challenge. We recognize that the defendant does not identify the specific facts underlying his prior conviction of assault in the third degree, explain how the circumstances of that offense affect the constitutional analysis, or otherwise distinguish his as applied claim from his facial challenge. Nevertheless, under the unique circumstances of this case, we decline to deny appellate review on this ground. The defendant did not have an opportunity in the trial court to develop the factual record underlying his as applied claim because the trial court denied his request for an evidentiary hearing and summarily rejected his constitutional claims without making the appropriate factual findings. Under these circumstances, the limitations in the defendant’s briefing are, at least in some part, a consequence of the trial court’s failure to provide the parties with an opportunity to develop the record neces- sary for the claim. Therefore, we conclude that the appropriate course is to remand the as applied challenge, as well as the facial challenge, to permit the parties to develop the factual and historical record and to allow the trial court to consider the claims in the first instance under Bruen and Rahimi. 10 Although the court in Giannone “construe[d] the defendant’s claim as to each statute to be that it is unconstitutional as applied to the par- ticular facts of his cases,” the court “[d]id not . . . intend to preclude the defendant from arguing on remand that the statutes are unconstitu- tional on their face . . . .” State v. Giannone, supra, 228 Conn. 21 n.12.  State v. Ramos provision of § 53a-217 (a) (1) is consistent with the second amendment both facially and as applied to the defendant. The trial court shall consider the evidence presented by the parties, make such factual findings as are necessary, and determine in the first instance whether the stat- ute withstands the constitutional scrutiny required by Bruen, Rahimi and Giannone. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In this opinion the other judges concurred.