J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone J & G REALTY, LLC, ET AL. v. BRIDJAY CAPONE ET AL. (AC 48706) Alvord, Moll and Seeley, Js.* Syllabus The plaintiffs, J Co. and two other entities, appealed from the trial court’s summary judgments for the defendants B and L. In 2012, B and her mother, M, commenced an action against various individuals and business entities, including the plaintiffs, seeking, inter alia, to dissolve and to wind up the businesses. The trial court in the 2012 action granted a motion to dismiss M’s claims for lack of standing, finding that she had not demonstrated a specific, personal or legal interest in any of the entities at issue. This court subsequently affirmed the dismissal of M’s claims, and the Supreme Court denied M’s petition for certification to appeal. During the pendency of M’s appeal in the 2012 action, L appeared on behalf of B and M and, after the Supreme Court’s denial of M’s petition, he filed in the 2012 action, inter alia, an amended complaint that included claims asserted on M’s behalf and a motion to cite in M as a plaintiff, alleging that M held an economic interest in J Co. On appeal in the present action, the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly rendered summary judgment for L with respect to J Co.’s vexatious litigation claim against him. Held: The trial court applied the wrong legal standard for probable cause with respect to a vexatious litigation action, as the court, despite identifying the correct legal standard as an objective one, made statements indicating that it had inserted a subjective element into the probable cause standard. The trial court improperly concluded that L was entitled to summary judg- ment as a matter of law as to J Co.’s vexatious litigation claim against him, as, under the circumstances of the present case, a reasonable attorney familiar with Connecticut law would not have believed that, following the Supreme Court’s denial of M’s petition for certification to appeal from the dismissal of her claims in the 2012 action, probable cause existed to pursue the legal theory that M held an economic interest in J Co. The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for B with respect to the plaintiffs’ vexatious litigation claims against her, as this court con- cluded that there was a genuine factual issue as to whether B consulted with a particular attorney prior to commencing the 2012 action, which was material to the issue of whether she had probable cause to commence and to maintain the 2012 action, or, alternatively, that she relied in good faith on the advice of counsel. Argued March 16—officially released October 13, 2026 * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, vexatious litigation, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Hon. Edward T. Krumeich II, judge trial ref- eree, granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant Peter Lathouris and rendered judg- ment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court; thereafter, the court, Hon. Edward T. Krumeich II, judge trial referee, granted the named defendant’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, and the plaintiffs filed an amended appeal; sub- sequently, the plaintiffs withdrew their claims as against the defendant Marie Bongiorno; thereafter, the plaintiff Enterprise Park, LLC, et al. withdrew their appeals. Reversed; judgment directed; further proceedings. Peter J. Zarella, with whom was Jessica D. Bowman, for the appellants (named plaintiff et al.). Daniel T. Angelone, for the appellee (named defen- dant). Walter J. Klimczak III, for the appellee (defendant Peter Lathouris). Opinion MOLL, J. The plaintiffs J & G Realty, LLC (J & G Realty), 305 West Avenue, LLC, and 24 Ardmore Street, LLC,1 appeal following the summary judgments rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants Bridjay 1 The present action was commenced by J & G Realty, 305 West Avenue, LLC, 24 Ardmore Street, LLC, Enterprise Park, LLC, and JGBBNS Realty, LLC. These parties filed the original and amended appeals in the present action; however, following subsequent withdrawals filed by Enterprise Park, LLC, and JGBBNS Realty, LLC, the remaining appellants are J & G Realty, 305 West Avenue, LLC, and 24 Ardmore Street, LLC. In the interest of simplicity, we refer in this opinion to (1) J & G Realty, 305 West Avenue, LLC, and 24 Ardmore Street, LLC, collectively, as the plaintiffs and (2) J & G Realty, 305 West Avenue, LLC, 24 Ardmore Street, LLC, Enterprise Park, LLC, and JGBBNS Realty, LLC, collectively, as the five LLCs.  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone Capone (Bridjay) and Peter Lathouris.2 On appeal, (1) J & G Realty claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in Lathouris’ favor with respect to its vexatious litigation claim against him and (2) the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly rendered sum- mary judgment in Bridjay’s favor with respect to their vexatious litigation claims against her. We reverse the summary judgments of the trial court. The following factual background, as previously set forth by this court, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In 1957, “a partnership [was] initiated between now deceased brothers George Bongiorno (George) and John Bongiorno when they opened Bongiorno Supermarket in Stamford . . . . The brothers later purchased commercial properties and established a retail gas station, a car wash, a liquor store, and other businesses near the supermarket (Bongiorno businesses). “John Bongiorno had no children and allegedly agreed that, on his death, he would leave his interests in the Bongiorno businesses in equal shares to George’s chil- dren: Frank [R. Bongiorno (Frank)], John A. Bongiorno, Bridjay, and Michele B. Nizzardo. John Bongiorno died in 2003, but did not leave his interests in the Bongiorno businesses to George’s children. George, however, nego- tiated an agreement pursuant to which his children, [his son-in-law] Maurice [A. Nizzardo (Maurice)], and Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc., purchased John Bon- giorno’s interests from John Bongiorno’s estate in 2004. As part of the agreement, the estate of John Bongiorno assigned a 12.5 percent membership interest in [J & G Realty] to each of George’s children. At the time of the agreement, [J & G Realty] held title to real property that subsequently was owned by 305 West Avenue, LLC, and 24 Ardmore Street, LLC, businesses that were founded in 2004, following John Bongiorno’s death. The agreement 2 The original complaint also named Marie Bongiorno as a defendant; however, the five LLCs have withdrawn their claims against her, and she is not participating in this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer in this opinion to Bridjay and Lathouris as the defendants.  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone further provided that the estate of John Bongiorno would transfer 12.5 percent of the shares in those two properties to each of George’s four children. Thereafter, George also transferred his 50 percent interest in 305 West Avenue, LLC, and 24 Ardmore Street, LLC, in equal shares to his four children. On January 22, 2012, George transferred his 50 percent interest in [J & G Realty] in equal shares to his four children. Consequently, each of George’s four children held a 25 percent interest in each of [the plaintiffs].” Bongiorno v. J & G Realty, LLC, 211 Conn. App. 311, 314–15, 272 A.3d 700 (2022) (Bongiorno II). In June 2012, Bridjay and Marie Bongiorno (Marie), who was George’s wife, commenced an action against various individuals and business entities, including the plaintiffs,3 seeking, inter alia, to dissolve and to wind up the Bongiorno businesses.4 See Bongiorno v. J & G Realty, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (2012 action).5 On November 26, 2013, certain defendants in the 2012 action filed a motion to dismiss Marie’s claims for lack of standing. On May 30, 2014, following an evi- dentiary hearing, the trial court, Truglia, J., granted the motion to dismiss (May 30, 2014 decision). On June 18, 2014, Marie appealed from the May 30, 2014 decision, which this court affirmed on January 19, 2016. See Bon- giorno v. J & G Realty, LLC, 162 Conn. App. 430, 441, 131 A.3d 1230, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 924, 133 A.3d 878 (2016) (Bongiorno I). On February 8, 2016, Marie filed a 3 Bridjay and Marie brought the action in June 2012 against the fol- lowing individuals and business entities: the five LLCs; Harxter Realty, LLC; Bongiorno Gas Island, LLC; Glenbrook Center, LLC; Bongiorno Brothers, a general partnership; Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc.; The Bongiorno Family, LLC; 317 West Avenue, L.L.C.; 317 West Avenue, LLC; Weselleck, LLC; Bongiorno Childrens Joint Venture #3; Frank; Maurice; Michele B. Nizzardo; and certain Jane Doe entities. John A. Bongiorno later was cited into the action as an additional defendant. 4 The original complaint filed in the 2012 action also sought the appoint- ment of a receiver and/or custodian pendente lite, the imposition of a constructive trust over certain “Trust Property,” and “[s]uch other and further relief as may in law or equity appertain.” 5 George was an original plaintiff in the 2012 action; however, he withdrew his claims in 2013.  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone petition for certification to appeal (petition), which our Supreme Court denied on March 2, 2016. Bongiorno v. J & G Realty, LLC, 320 Conn. 924, 133 A.3d 878 (2016). In July 2014, while Marie’s appeal from the May 30, 2014 decision was pending, Lathouris, of the Peter V. Lathouris Law Office, LLC, appeared on behalf of Marie and Bridjay in the 2012 action.6 On February 10, 2015, Bridjay filed (1) a request for leave to file an amended complaint, which included claims asserted on behalf of Marie, and (2) a motion to cite in Marie as a plaintiff on the ground that she had “an interest in the claims set forth in [the] proposed amended complaint.” On March 16, 2015, over objection, the trial court, Hon. Kevin Tierney, judge trial referee, granted Bridjay’s motion to cite in Marie as a plaintiff, as well as Bridjay’s request for leave to amend the complaint.7 The 2012 action was tried to the trial court over the course of eighteen days between May 31 and July 24, 2018. Lathouris represented Marie and Bridjay at trial. After the trial had commenced, on July 5, 2018, with leave of the court, Marie and Bridjay filed a seventy-two count second amended complaint, which became their operative complaint in the 2012 action, alleging claims of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment.8 In addition, Bridjay, alone, alleged claims of oppression of a minority member/shareholder interest and sought to dissolve, to wind up, and to distribute the assets of the plaintiffs. 6 The original complaint filed in the 2012 action was signed by Richard S. Order and Angel Peterson of Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C., who represented Marie and Bridjay when they commenced the 2012 action. Between the commencement of the 2012 action and Lathouris’ appear- ance in July 2014, the following additional attorneys filed appearances on behalf of Bridjay and/or Marie: (1) Jack E. Robinson; (2) Joseph Michael Pastore III of Smith Gambrell & Russell LLP, and later of Pastore Shofi & Dailey, LLC, and of Pastore & Dailey, LLC; and (3) Mary Badoyannis. 7 The court originally granted the motion on March 13, 2015, but later amended its order on March 16, 2015. 8 Marie and Bridjay also alleged claims of statutory theft in violation of General Statutes § 52-564 and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; however, they subsequently abandoned those claims.  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone On March 12, 2019, the trial court rendered judg- ment against Marie and Bridjay on the entirety of the second amended complaint (March 12, 2019 decision). Thereafter, Marie and Bridjay filed separate appeals from the March 12, 2019 decision. On March 22, 2022, in Bongiorno II, this court (1) dismissed, as moot, Marie’s appeal on the ground that she failed to challenge all independent bases for the judgment rendered against her; Bongiorno v. J & G Realty, LLC, supra, 211 Conn. App. 320–24; and (2) dismissed, as moot, a portion of Bridjay’s appeal for failing to challenge all independent bases for the judgment rendered against her and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Id., 325–34. On July 15, 2022, the five LLCs commenced the present action against the defendants and Marie. In a twenty-two count third revised complaint dated February 29, 2024, which became their operative complaint in the present action, (1) the five LLCs asserted claims of statutory vex- atious litigation pursuant to General Statutes § 52-5689 against Marie and Bridjay, with and without allegations of malice, and (2) J & G Realty and JGBBNS Realty, LLC, asserted claims of statutory vexatious litigation pursu- ant to § 52-568, without allegations of malice, against Lathouris.10 On April 3, 2024, Lathouris filed an answer and a special defense directed to JGBBNS Realty, LLC’s claim against him. On April 24, 2024, the five LLCs filed a reply denying Lathouris’ special defense. On May 30, 2024, Marie and Bridjay jointly filed an answer and eight 9 General Statutes § 52-568 provides: “Any person who commences and prosecutes any civil action or complaint against another, in his own name or the name of others, or asserts a defense to any civil action or complaint commenced and prosecuted by another (1) without prob- able cause, shall pay such other person double damages, or (2) without probable cause, and with a malicious intent unjustly to vex and trouble such other person, shall pay him treble damages.” 10 Counts one through ten of the operative complaint filed in the pres- ent action set forth the five LLCs’ respective vexatious litigation claims against Marie, with counts six through ten including allegations of malice. Counts eleven through twenty set forth the five LLCs’ respective vexatious litigation claims against Bridjay, with counts sixteen through twenty including allegations of malice. Counts twenty-one and twenty- two set forth the vexatious litigation claims against Lathouris asserted by J & G Realty and JGBBNS Realty, LLC, respectively.  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone special defenses. On July 16, 2024, the five LLCs filed a reply denying Marie’s and Bridjay’s special defenses. On November 22, 2024, Lathouris filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a supporting mem- orandum of law and exhibits, as later supplemented, as to the vexatious litigation claims brought against him. On November 26, 2024, Marie and Bridjay jointly filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a memorandum of law and exhibits, as to the vexatious litigation claims brought against them. On January 10, 2025, the five LLCs filed memoranda of law, accompanied by exhibits, in opposition to the motions for summary judgment. On January 17, 2025, Lathouris filed a reply memorandum. The trial court, Hon. Edward T. Krumeich II, judge trial referee, subsequently heard argument on each motion for summary judgment. On April 14, 2025, the court granted Lathouris’ motion for summary judgment. On May 2, 2025, the five LLCs filed this appeal from the summary judgment rendered in Lathouris’ favor (original appeal). On May 13, 2025, in adjudicating the joint motion for summary judg- ment filed by Marie and Bridjay, the court granted the motion as to Bridjay but denied it as to Marie. On May 30, 2025, the five LLCs’ original appeal was amended to encompass the summary judgment rendered in Bridjay’s favor (amended appeal).11 Additional procedural history 11 On May 12, 2025, 305 West Avenue, LLC, 24 Ardmore Street, LLC, and Enterprise Park, LLC, withdrew the portion of the original appeal filed by them. On July 30, 2025, (1) JGBBNS Realty, LLC, withdrew the portions of the original and amended appeals filed by it and (2) Enterprise Park, LLC, withdrew the portion of the amended appeal filed by it. The plaintiffs, alone, filed a principal appellate brief and a reply brief. In their principal appellate brief, the plaintiffs state that “the counts [of the operative complaint filed in the present action] at issue in this appeal are counts [eleven through twenty] against [Bridjay] and counts [twenty-one and twenty-two] against Lathouris,” although they further state that JGBBNS Realty, LLC, “is not pursuing an appeal” with regard to the summary judgment rendered in Lathouris’ favor as to count twenty-two. In light of the above, the decisions at issue in this amended appeal are (1) the summary judgment rendered in Lathouris’ favor with respect to count twenty-one asserted by J & G Realty and (2) the summary judgment rendered in Bridjay’s favor as to (a) counts eleven  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone will be set forth as necessary.12 Before turning to the plaintiffs’ claims on appeal, we set forth the following relevant legal principles and stan- dard of review governing our analysis. “In Connecticut, the cause of action for vexatious litigation exists both at common law and pursuant to statute. Both the common law and statutory causes of action [require] proof that a civil action has been prosecuted . . . . Additionally, to establish a claim for vexatious litigation at common law, one must prove want of probable cause, malice and a termination of suit in the plaintiff’s favor. . . . The statu- tory cause of action for vexatious litigation exists under § 52-568, and differs from a common-law action only in that a finding of malice is not an essential element, but will serve as a basis for higher damages.” (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Virgulak, 233 Conn. App. 329, 348, 340 A.3d 521 (2025). “[A]ctions for vexatious litigation in Connecticut, both common-law and statutory, have been and can be based on a party’s conduct in the continuation of a civil or administrative proceeding without probable cause. . . . [O]ne who takes an active part in the continuation of a civil proceeding engages in conduct that prolongs or keeps that proceeding going.” (Citations omitted; foot- note omitted.) Dorfman v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 227 Conn. App. 347, 376–77, 322 A.3d 331 (2024), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 907, 330 A.3d 881 (2025), and cert. denied, 351 Conn. 907, 330 A.3d 882 (2025). “[T]he legal idea of probable cause is a bona fide belief in the existence of the facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant a person of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the and sixteen asserted by J & G Realty, (b) counts twelve and seventeen asserted by 24 Ardmore Street, LLC, and (c) counts thirteen and eighteen asserted by 305 West Avenue, LLC. See footnote 10 of this opinion. 12 On May 20, 2025, the court, Hon. John F. Kavanewsky, Jr., judge trial referee, issued an order stating that, as reported by counsel fol- lowing a pretrial conference, the five LLCs’ claims against Marie had been resolved and the present action would be dismissed in thirty days unless it was withdrawn before then. No dismissal was entered, and on July 1, 2025, the five LLCs withdrew their claims against Marie.  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone circumstances, in entertaining it. . . . Probable cause is the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man [or woman] in the belief that he [or she] has lawful grounds for prosecuting the defendant in the manner complained of. . . . Thus, in the context of a vexatious suit action, the defendant lacks probable cause if he [or she] lacks a reasonable, good faith belief in the facts alleged and the validity of the claim asserted. . . . [T]he existence of probable cause is an absolute protection against an action for [vexatious litigation], and what facts, and whether particular facts, constitute probable cause is always a question of law. . . . Because the question of whether there is probable cause in a vexatious litigation case is a question of law, our scope of review is plenary. . . . [T]he probable cause standard applied to a vexatious litigation action against a litigant is a purely objective one.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 407–408. “[In Falls Church Group, Ltd. v. Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, LLP, 281 Conn. 84, 912 A.2d 1019 (2007)] [o]ur Supreme Court . . . had the opportunity to consider whether a higher legal standard of probable cause should be applied to attorneys and law firms sued for vexatious litigation. . . . After considering the statute and the competing policy interests, the court concluded that a higher standard should not apply. . . . Instead, in assessing probable cause, the court phrased the critical question as whether on the basis of the facts known by the law firm, a reasonable attorney familiar with Connecticut law would believe he or she had probable cause to bring the lawsuit. . . . As is implied by its phrasing, the standard is an objective one that is necessarily dependent on what the attorney knew when he or she initiated the lawsuit. . . . “[P]robable cause may be present even where a suit lacks merit. Favorable termination of the suit often estab- lishes lack of merit, yet the plaintiff in [vexatious litiga- tion] must separately show lack of probable cause. . . . The lower threshold of probable cause allows attorneys and litigants to present issues that are arguably correct,  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone even if it is extremely unlikely that they will win . . . . Were we to conclude . . . that a claim is unreasonable wherever the law would clearly hold for the other side, we could stifle the willingness of a lawyer to challenge established precedent in an effort to change the law. The vitality of our [common-law] system is dependent upon the freedom of attorneys to pursue novel, although poten- tially unsuccessful, legal theories.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rousseau v. Wein- stein, 204 Conn. App. 833, 854, 254 A.3d 984 (2021). “Advice of counsel is a complete defense to an action of . . . [vexatious litigation] when it is shown that the [client] . . . instituted his [or her] civil action relying in good faith on such advice, given after a full and fair statement of all facts within his [or her] knowledge, or which he [or she] was charged with knowing. . . . [T]he defense [of advice of counsel] has five essential elements. First, the defendant must actually have consulted with legal counsel about his [or her] decision to institute a civil action . . . . Second, the consultation with legal counsel must be based on a full and fair disclosure by the defendant of all facts he [or she] knew or was charged with knowing concerning the basis for his [or her] con- templated . . . action . . . . Third, the lawyer to whom the defendant turns for advice must be one from whom the defendant can reasonably expect to receive an accurate, impartial opinion as to the viability of his [or her] claim . . . . The fourth element . . . is . . . that the defendant, having sought such advice, actually did rely upon it . . . . Fifth and finally, if all other elements of the defense are satisfactorily established, the defendant must show that his [or her] reliance on counsel’s advice was made in good faith.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Christian v. Iyer, 221 Conn. App. 869, 877–78, 303 A.3d 604 (2023). “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle [the movant] to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy [its] burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent. . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue. . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insuf- ficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant [or to deny a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes, 230 Conn. App. 1, 20–21, 329 A.3d 256 (2024); see also Dorfman v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., supra, 227 Conn. App. 408 (defendant seeking summary judgment on vexatious litigation claims “bore the initial burden to negate, with evidence, the factual claims as framed by the vexatious litigation counts of the complaint”). “Although the question of what facts constitute probable cause is one of law, over which our review is plenary . . . when the underlying facts that form the basis for probable cause are disputed and factual findings relating thereto must be made by the trier of fact, we cannot make a determi- nation of whether probable cause exists in the exercise of our plenary review, and summary judgment is not appropriate.” (Citation omitted.) Dorfman v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., supra, 416–17.  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone I We first address J & G Realty’s claim that the trial court improperly granted Lathouris’ motion for sum- mary judgment with respect to its vexatious litigation claim against him. For the reasons that follow, we agree. The following additional procedural history is rel- evant to our resolution of J & G Realty’s claim. In the original complaint filed in the 2012 action, which sought as relief, inter alia, to dissolve and to wind up the Bon- giorno businesses, Marie alleged that (1) she “ha[d] been, continue[d] to be and/or ha[d] a right to be a member of [J & G Realty, among other entities], either directly or by virtue of a durable power of attorney executed in her favor by George on or about July 2, 2010,” and (2) she and/or George “own[ed] interests in and [were] partners [in Bongiorno Brothers, a general partnership, and Bon- giorno Childrens Joint Venture #3].” In the November 26, 2013 motion to dismiss directed to Marie’s claims in the 2012 action, the movants asserted that (1) Marie did not own any interest in J & G Realty, JGBBNS Realty, LLC, Bongiorno Brothers, a general partnership, and/ or Bongiorno Gas Island, LLC (four entities), and (2) “because all of her allegations [were] dependent upon her having an ownership interest in [the four] entities, she ha[d] no standing to pursue her claims through the [2012] action.” In a posthearing memorandum, Marie relied on certain “fully executed assignment documents” to assert that George had conveyed his interests in the four entities to her in October 2010. In the May 30, 2014 decision, issued following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Truglia found as follows. “[Marie] commenced a dissolution of marriage action against [George] sometime prior to the fall of 2010. In October of 2010, after [Marie] had commenced the dissolution of marriage action, [George] executed four documents purporting to be assignments of his entire ownership interests in each of the four [entities] [(October 2010 assignments)]. . . . [The October 2010 assignments] were executed at [George and Marie’s] home, and the only  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone persons present at the time were [George], [Marie] and Mary Badoyannis, who at the time represented [Marie] in the dissolution of marriage action. One of the four instru- ments was executed on October 14, 2010, and three were executed on October 21, 2010. . . . Unaccountably, [the October 2010 assignments] were never delivered to any representative of the [four entities] but were retained in [Badoyannis’] files. . . . [Maurice] and [Frank] [credibly testified] that the first time they learned of the existence of [the October 2010 assignments] was in the spring of 2013, when they were produced as part of [Marie’s and Bridjay’s] discovery compliance in [the 2012] action.” (Citations omitted.) The court later stated that Marie’s claimed ownership interests in the four entities were “based primarily on the October 2010 assignments, but also on [her] testimony that she believed she had some type of interest in each of the [four entities], although she could not be sure of the exact nature of each interest.” The court determined that Marie was not a member or a partner of the four entities in June 2012, such that she was not statutorily aggrieved when she commenced the 2012 action. With respect to J & G Realty, the court determined that (1) pursuant to J & G Realty’s govern- ing operating agreement, the assignment of George’s interest in J & G Realty to Marie in October 2010 was “ ‘null and void and of no effect whatever’ ” as a result of the lack of notice of the assignment to J & G Realty’s members and (2) at no relevant time did George own any nonvoting units in J & G Realty, which units were “freely transferable to family members under the [governing] operating agreement . . . .” The court further determined that Marie had “not demonstrated a specific, personal or legal interest in any of the [four entities] sufficient to enable her, as a matter of law, to bring [a] derivative action for dissolution and winding up of [the four enti- ties]. The court respectfully disagree[d] with [Marie’s] argument that the mere existence of the [October 2010] assignments [was] sufficient evidence of ownership to confer standing in an action for dissolution and wind- ing up.” Additionally, the court determined that the  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone movants had “shown by a preponderance of the evidence that [Marie] could not prove a membership or partnership [interest] in any of the [four entities] if the [2012 action] proceeded further, and the issue of [Marie’s] standing [was] therefore properly before the court by motion to dismiss.” (Emphasis omitted.) In Bongiorno I, this court concluded that Judge Trug- lia properly granted the motion to dismiss in the May 30, 2014 decision, determining that, “in [June 2012], when [Marie] commenced the [2012] action, she did not have an ownership interest in any of the [four entities] . . . .” Bongiorno v. J & G Realty, LLC, supra, 162 Conn. App. 438. This court stated that the October 2010 assignments “were never delivered to any representatives of the [four entities], and the [four entities] first learned of these documents in the spring of 2013”; id., 437; and, with regard to J & G Realty, “[its] operating [agreement] . . . provide[d] that a transfer of interest is only effective once [it] has received notice, and that any transfer that does not provide notice will be ‘null and void.’ ” Id., 437–38. On July 21, 2014, while Marie’s appeal from the May 30, 2014 decision was pending and after Lathouris had filed an appearance in the 2012 action, Marie and Brid- jay filed a motion to open and to vacate the May 30, 2014 decision on the sole ground that the November 26, 2013 motion to dismiss should have been forwarded to and adjudicated by an arbitrator. On October 20, 2014, Lathouris filed a caseflow request seeking permission to submit supplemental legal authority in support of the motion to open and to vacate, stating that “[t]he gist of [Marie’s] submission will be that, even though the court found she was not a member or partner of the [four] entities, she is and was an assignee and/or transferee of [George’s] interests and therefore . . . entitled to the distributions attributable to George’s interests and thus she had standing to pursue her claims.” The trial court did not rule on the caseflow request. On November 14, 2014, the court denied the motion to open and to vacate.  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone On March 16, 2015, while Marie’s appeal from the May 30, 2014 decision remained pending, Judge Tierney granted Bridjay’s motion to cite in Marie as a plaintiff, as well as Bridjay’s simultaneous request for leave to file an eight count amended complaint, which, in addition to seeking to dissolve, to wind up, and to distribute the assets of the Bongiorno businesses along with injunc- tive relief, asserted claims sounding in oppression of a minority member/shareholder/partner interest, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, unjust enrichment, statutory theft in violation of General Statutes § 52-564, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. In support of each of the eight counts, Marie and Bridjay alleged that, “[a]t all times in and after October 2010, [Marie], pursuant to written transfers duly executed by George, claim[ed] an interest either as a member, partner, trans- feree or distributee, in [the four entities as well as certain ‘Loans Receivable’].” On May 5, 2016, following the release of Bongiorno I and our Supreme Court’s ensuing denial of the petition, Marie and Bridjay filed a 109 count second revised com- plaint13 in which they alleged claims sounding in breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, unjust enrichment, statutory theft in violation of § 52-564, and violations of CUTPA.14 Marie alleged in relevant part that she had an “interest as a transferee and/or distributee” of the four entities by virtue of the October 2010 assignments. On July 5, 2018, Marie and Bridjay filed their opera- tive complaint in the 2012 action, in which they asserted claims sounding in breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and 13 On October 26, 2015, Marie and Bridjay filed a revised complaint in response to a request to revise filed on September 17, 2015; however, the trial court later ruled that the revised complaint did not conform to the request to revise. 14 In addition, Bridjay, alone, alleged claims of oppression of a minor- ity member/shareholder interest and sought to dissolve, to wind up, and to distribute the assets of several business entities along with injunctive relief.  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone unjust enrichment.15 Marie alleged in relevant part that, as a result of the October 2010 assignments, she was a “transferee” with a “50 percent . . . interest in the economic distributions” of J & G Realty, Bongiorno Brothers, a general partnership, and Bongiorno Gas Island, LLC, and that she had “economic interests” in those three entities.16 In their posttrial brief filed in the 2012 action, Marie and Bridjay maintained that, by virtue of the October 2010 assignments, Marie was an “economic transferee” of George’s interests in J & G Realty, Bongiorno Gas Island, LLC, and Bongiorno Brothers, a general partnership. In the March 12, 2019 decision, Judge Tierney stated that it was “not necessary . . . to determine whether or not [Marie] possesses an economic interest in [J & G Realty, among other entities]” because he was “find[ing] the issues against [Marie on] all of her counts . . . for the following reasons: (1) [Marie] is prevented by res judicata from litigating [her] claim as an economic transferee . . . [because] she had the opportunity to litigate the claim earlier and the claim that was litigated was denied on the merits [in the May 30, 2014 decision] and affirmed by our appellate courts;17 (2) [t]here was no proof of any financial distribution that has or had been made to any of the members of [J & G Realty, among other enti- ties] after the date of the alleged transfer to [Marie]; (3) [t]here is no dissolution of [J & G Realty, among other entities] that has taken place and therefore an economic transferee is not entitled to share in that distribution, 15 Marie and Bridjay later abandoned claims of statutory theft in violation of § 52-564 and violations of CUTPA that they had raised in the operative complaint filed in the 2012 action. See footnote 8 of this opinion. Additionally, Bridjay, alone, alleged claims of oppression of a minority member/shareholder interest and sought to dissolve, to wind up, and to distribute the assets of the plaintiffs. 16 Before filing their operative complaint in the 2012 action, Marie and Bridjay withdrew their claims against JGBBNS Realty, LLC, in which Marie previously had alleged an interest. 17 Elsewhere in his decision, Judge Tierney noted that Marie’s economic interest claim was “based on the same documents, the same testimony, the same evidence, and the same facts” considered by Judge Truglia in the May 30, 2014 decision.  J & G Realty, LLC v. Capone and (4) [Marie] has no standing to make these claims against [J & G Realty, among other entities, because] those claims would be common to all individual mem- bers and partners” and had to be asserted in a derivative action.18 (Footnote added.) On appeal from the March 12, 2019 decision, Marie claimed error as to only two of the four bases underly- ing the judgment rendered against her, namely, that (1) her claims were barred pursuant to the doctrine of res