162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall 162 SOUTH BRITAIN ROAD OPERATING COMPANY II, LLC v. ANITA MARSHALL (AC 48675) Moll, Wilson and Harper, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff, a nursing facility operator, appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying its application for a prejudgment remedy with respect to its claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit for care it had provided to the defendant, a patient at its facility. It claimed, inter alia, that the court incorrectly elevated the probable cause standard of proof. Held: The trial court improperly heightened the applicable probable cause standard of proof and, in doing so, committed clear error, as the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of the reasonable value of the benefit conferred on the defendant and the amount of restitution sought to establish probable cause as to the amount of its damages; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment. The trial court improperly placed the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s property was not exempt from an execution, as the plain language of the statute (§ 52-278c (g)) places the burden on the defendant to exert and establish the applicability of an exemption from execution. Submitted on briefs February 10—officially released October 13, 2026 Procedural History Application for a prejudgment remedy, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury and tried to the court, Cordani, J.; judgment denying the application, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings. Angelo Maragos filed a brief for the appellant (plain- tiff). Opinion WILSON, J. The plaintiff, 162 South Britain Road Operating Company II, LLC, appeals from the decision of the trial court denying its application for a prejudg- ment remedy against the self-represented defendant, Anita Marshall.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied its application because the 1 The defendant did not file a brief with this court or otherwise par- ticipate in the present appeal. We therefore decide the appeal on the  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall court incorrectly (1) elevated the probable cause stan- dard of proof and (2) shifted to the plaintiff the burden of establishing whether the defendant’s property was exempt from execution. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court. The following facts are either undisputed or were found by the trial court following a hearing on the plaintiff’s application for a prejudgment remedy. On November 20, 2023, the defendant was discharged from Danbury Hos- pital and transferred to the plaintiff’s nursing facility in Southbury, which does business as River Glen Health Care Center. At the time of the defendant’s admission, “her main diagnoses . . . [were] functional quadriplegia and chronic spinal stenosis, both leading to . . . severe malnutrition” necessitating a feeding tube, which was removed after the defendant had been at the facility for about two months. At the plaintiff’s facility, the defendant requires a mechanical lift to transfer out of bed, but she often refuses, necessitating additional treat- ment from the plaintiff’s staff, “so she doesn’t get any [muscle] breakdown from not getting out of bed.” “The defendant did not choose to be transferred to the plain- tiff’s facility and does not want to be there. Although she was asked several times, the defendant has never signed the plaintiff’s [admission] agreement, and the parties have not agreed on an appropriate daily charge.” In accordance with General Statutes § 52-278c, the plaintiff filed the underlying application for a prejudg- ment remedy along with a proposed writ, summons, and complaint on June 14, 2024.2 The proposed two count complaint sounds in unjust enrichment and quantum meruit and alleges that the plaintiff has provided care and services to the defendant while at the plaintiff’s basis of the record and the plaintiff’s brief. See Batista v. Cortes, 203 Conn. App. 365, 366 n.1, 248 A.3d 763 (2021). 2 The plaintiff commenced a civil action against the defendant by way of service of writ, summons, and complaint on the defendant on Sep- tember 24, 2024. The complaint alleges the same two counts of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit as alleged in the proposed complaint filed with the plaintiff’s application for a prejudgment remedy.  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall facility and that the defendant failed to pay the plaintiff $102,882 for her stay at the facility. The plaintiff sought a prejudgment remedy in the amount of $134,9073 and claimed that there was probable cause to believe that a judgment in that amount would be rendered in its favor. The defendant requested a hearing to contest the applica- tion on the ground that the amount sought therein was unreasonably high. A hearing on the application was held on April 21, 2025.4 In support of its application, the plaintiff presented the testimony of its administrator, Linda Urbanski. Urbanski testified that Medicare initially covered the defendant’s stay at the plaintiff’s facility from Novem- ber 20 through December 13, 2023, when the defendant no longer required skilled nursing services. Because the defendant had no other insurance coverage and declined the plaintiff’s offer to assist her in applying for Medicaid, the plaintiff thereafter treated her as a private paying resident. From December 14, 2023, through February 22, 2024, the plaintiff charged the defendant a daily rate of $717 while she resided in a short-term care unit, which provides a high level of care. On February 23, 2024, the plaintiff transferred the defendant to a long- term care unit, which provides a lower level of care, and thereafter charged her a daily rate of $525. That rate remained unchanged through March 2025, at which time the outstanding balance was $278,232. Urbanski further testified that, to her knowledge, the defendant had made 3 At the hearing held on the application on April 21, 2025, the plain- tiff’s administrator testified that the plaintiff was seeking a prejudg- ment remedy in the amount of $278,232; however, in its application, and in the trial court’s decision denying the application, the amount sought was $134,907. 4 The trial court held a “preliminary remote hearing” on July 29, 2024, and marked the application “off” because the defendant had “indicated that she was physically incapable of attending [an in-person] hearing.” The court then scheduled a hearing for February 24, 2025, which was continued to April 21, 2025, at the defendant’s request so that she could secure counsel. The defendant, however, never secured counsel and remains self-represented.  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall no plans to be discharged and had made no payments to the plaintiff during her admission to the facility. To substantiate the amount claimed in its application for a prejudgment remedy, the plaintiff, in addition to Urbanski’s testimony, presented the testimony of rep- resentatives from two local competing nursing facilities regarding their contemporaneous daily private pay rates for both skilled and custodial care during the period of the defendant’s admission to the plaintiff’s facility. The daily rates charged by those facilities ranged from $500 to $645 for semiprivate rooms and from $545 to $690 for private rooms, depending on the length of the patient’s admission. The defendant did not cross-examine any of the plain- tiff’s witnesses or call any witnesses of her own. The defendant testified that she did not want to remain at the plaintiff’s facility and that, after her feeding tube had been removed, she wanted to go home. She explained, however, that she had requested to consult with a law- yer before signing any documents because she did not understand that to which she was committing herself. The defendant further testified that she did not want to be transferred to the long-term care unit but that the plaintiff’s staff told her she could not remain in the short- term care unit. She testified that she did not receive the same level of care in the long-term care unit that she had received in the short-term care unit because “[n]obody positions me up here or . . . does anything . . . but bring me my food and take care of my hygiene . . . .” Although the defendant testified that “[a]ll [she] want[s] to do is go home,” she acknowledged that she “need[s] a little bit more . . . physical therapy.” On cross-examination, the defendant conceded that she had not made any payments to the plaintiff and had not asked her children to take her home, explaining that they were unable to care for her following her discharge. On April 22, 2025, the trial court, Cordani, J., denied the plaintiff’s application for a prejudgment remedy. The court found that “the plaintiff has failed to establish  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall that probable cause exists to believe that a judgment will issue in an amount equal to or higher than $134,907.” The court reasoned that, due to the absence of a contract, the plaintiff’s claims are claims of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, which “are equitable claims that require the court to assess the value of the services pro- vided to the defendant and [the] fair compensation” for those services. “The court attempted to gain data points beyond the private pay rate by inquiring about other rates for clients with private insurance, Medicare or Medi- caid, but the plaintiff’s witnesses failed to provide the requested information.” In light of the fact that the plain- tiff failed to provide information “about other rates for clients with private insurance, Medicare or Medicaid,” the court concluded that the plaintiff “failed to establish the fair compensation owed under the circumstances.” The court reasoned that more evidence was needed, as it “must consider the cost of the services, the value of the services to the plaintiff, [the plaintiff’s] profit margin,” as well as the plaintiff’s rate for insurers, both private and governmental. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff had “failed to establish that the property sought to be attached is not exempt from execution.” The plaintiff appeals from the court’s judgment denying its application for a prejudgment remedy.5 Before addressing the plaintiff’s claims, we set forth the applicable legal principles and standard of review relevant to our resolution of this appeal. “A prejudgment remedy means any remedy or combination of remedies that enables a person by way of attachment, foreign attachment, garnishment or replevin to deprive the defendant in a civil action of, or affect the use, possession or enjoyment by such defendant of, his property prior to final judgment . . . . General Statutes § 52-278a (d). A prejudgment remedy is available upon a finding by 5 In accordance with General Statutes § 52-278l, the plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the trial court’s denial of its application. See General Statutes § 52-278l (a) and (b) (providing that order denying prejudg- ment remedy following hearing “shall be deemed a final judgment for purposes of appeal,” which “shall be taken . . . within seven days”).  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall the court that there is probable cause that a judgment in the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, or in an amount greater than the amount of the prejudg- ment remedy sought, taking into account any defenses, counterclaims or setoffs, will be rendered in the matter in favor of the plaintiff . . . . General Statutes § 52-278d (a) (1). . . . “As for [the] standard of review [on appeal], [an appel- late] court’s role on review of the granting [or denial] of a prejudgment remedy is very circumscribed. . . . In its determination of probable cause, the trial court is vested with broad discretion which is not to be overruled in the absence of clear error. . . . In the absence of clear error, [a reviewing] court should not overrule the thoughtful decision of the trial court, which has had an opportunity to assess the legal issues which may be raised and to weigh the credibility of at least some of the witnesses. . . . We will not upset a prejudgment remedy order in the absence of clear error . . . viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. . . . “Section 52-278d (a) explicitly requires that a trial court’s determination of probable cause in granting a prejudgment remedy include the court’s taking into account any defenses, counterclaims or [setoffs] . . . . Therefore, it is well settled that, in determining whether to grant a prejudgment remedy, the trial court must evaluate both parties’ evidence as well as any defenses, counterclaims and setoffs.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) ASPIC, LLC v. Poitier, 179 Conn. App. 631, 639–40, 181 A.3d 593 (2018). In the present case, the plaintiff first claims that the trial court committed clear error by denying its appli- cation for a prejudgment remedy on the ground that it failed to present the facility’s reimbursement rates from Medicare and Medicaid, as well as its “profit margins,” to establish the amount of the remedy sought. The plain- tiff argues that these hypothetical “data points” sought by the court are not only irrelevant to determining the  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall reasonable value of the care and services it rendered to the defendant but also mischaracterize the nature of the plaintiff’s burden on its equitable claims and unduly elevates the probable cause burden of proof. The plaintiff further argues that the court compounded its error by disregarding the evidence presented by the plaintiff, which, according to the plaintiff, clearly satisfied the probable cause standard of proof at the prejudgment remedy stage, particularly with respect to the reasonable value of the services it rendered to the defendant. The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff to establish that the property sought to be attached is not exempt from execu- tion. We agree with the plaintiff that the court improp- erly elevated the probable cause standard of proof and shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff to establish that the property sought to be attached is not exempt from execution. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court. I We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court committed clear error by improperly elevating the burden of proof by requiring the plaintiff to pres- ent the facility’s reimbursement rates from Medicare and Medicaid, as well as its “profit margins,” to prove the amount sought to be attached. The plaintiff claims that, by requiring this evidence to establish probable cause, the court effectively elevated the probable cause burden of proof by requiring the plaintiff to establish with precision the amount of damages it sought at the prejudgment remedy stage. Resolution of the plaintiff’s first claim requires this court to interpret the trial court’s judgment. “The inter- pretation of a trial court’s judgment and the question of whether the trial court applied an incorrect legal stan- dard is subject to our plenary review. See, e.g., Thoma v. Watson, 228 Conn. App. 537, 555, 325 A.3d 955 (2024) (“[w]e construe the plaintiff’s claim as challeng- ing whether the court applied an incorrect legal standard,  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall which also requires us to interpret the decision rendered by the court, both of which invoke our plenary review”); see also Greenspan v. Greenspan, 241 Conn. App. 16, 24, ___ A.3d ___ (2026). As previously noted, “[a] prejudgment remedy is avail- able upon a finding by the court that there is probable cause that a judgment in the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, or in an amount greater than the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, taking into account any defenses, counterclaims or setoffs, will be rendered in the matter in favor of the plaintiff . . . . General Stat- utes § 52-278d (a) (1). . . . Proof of probable cause as a condition of obtaining a prejudgment remedy is not as demanding as proof by a fair preponderance of the evi- dence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. Chung Family Realty Partner- ship, LLC, 137 Conn. App. 359, 370, 48 A.3d 705, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 916, 54 A.3d 180 (2012). “Section 52-278d (a) requires that a trial court make a probable cause determination as to both the validity of the plaintiff’s claim and the amount of the remedy sought. . . . In other words, to justify issuance of a pre- judgment remedy, probable cause must be established both as to the merits of the cause of action and as to the amount of the requested attachment. That dual require- ment ensures that a person is not deprived of the use of property without due process of law. . . . Therefore, the party seeking the prejudgment remedy must present evidence that is sufficient to enable the court to deter- mine the probable amount of the damages involved. . . . Although the likely amount of damages need not be determined with mathematical precision . . . the plaintiff bears the burden of presenting evidence [that] affords a reasonable basis for measuring [its] loss.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) TES Franchising, LLC v. Feldman, 286 Conn. 132, 145–46, 943 A.2d 406 (2008). “A hearing in probable cause [at the prejudgment rem- edy stage] is not intended to be a full scale trial on the  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall merits of the [plaintiff’s] claim. The [plaintiff] does not have to establish that [it] will prevail, only that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim. . . . The court’s role in such a hearing is to determine prob- able success by weighing probabilities. . . . The legal idea of probable cause is a bona fide belief in the existence of the facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant a [person] of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances, in entertaining it. . . . Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard. It does not demand that a belief be cor- rect or more likely true than false.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greenspan v. Greenspan, supra, 241 Conn. App. 24. In the present case, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims are equitable claims of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment and that such claims require the court to assess “the value of the services provided to the defendant and fair compensation.” The court concluded that, because a prejudgment remedy is an equitable rem- edy, in order to determine equitable or fair compensation for the services and the enrichment of the defendant, it was required to consider “the cost of the services, the value of the services to the plaintiff, the profit margin being sought by the plaintiff, and the rates charged by the plaintiff for the same services when rendered to clients with private or public insurance which rates reflect negotiation between the parties,” none of which was provided by the plaintiff. Thus, it appears from the court’s decision that it acknowledged the validity of the plaintiff’s equitable claims of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment but found that the plaintiff failed to establish the specific amount of damages sought. See Valencis v. Nyberg, 160 Conn. App. 777, 795, 125 A.3d 1026 (2015) (“In undertaking the probable cause analysis . . . a court is required to consider not only the validity of the plaintiff’s claim but also the amount that is being sought. . . . [A]s a matter of general experience, a determination of a claim’s probable validity normally will entail at least some consideration of the amount of  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall damages which may be found upon a full trial.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Both “[q]uantum meruit and unjust enrichment are noncontractual means of recovery in restitution. Quan- tum meruit is a theory of recovery permitting restitution in the context of an otherwise unenforceable contract. In contrast, recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment applies in the absence of a quasi-contractual relationship. . . . Because both doctrines are restitutionary, the same equitable considerations apply to cases under either theory. The terms of an unenforceable contract will often be the best evidence for restitution of the reasonable value of services rendered in quantum meruit, although sometimes the equities may call for a more restrictive measure. . . . [Our Supreme Court] has used quantum meruit and unjust enrichment interchangeably, or as equivalent terms for recovery in restitution.” (Citations omitted.) Walpole Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manning, 307 Conn. 582, 587 n.9, 57 A.3d 730 (2012). “Quantum meruit is a theory of contract recovery that does not depend upon the existence of a contract, either express or implied in fact. . . . Rather, quantum meruit arises out of the need to avoid unjust enrichment to a party, even in the absence of an actual agreement. . . . Quantum meruit literally means as much as he has deserved . . . . Centered on the prevention of injustice, quantum meruit strikes the appropriate balance by evalu- ating the equities and guaranteeing that the party who has rendered services receives a reasonable sum for those services. Unjust enrichment applies whenever justice requires compensation to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract . . . . Indeed, lack of a remedy under the contract is a precondition for recovery based upon unjust enrichment. Not unlike quantum meruit, it is a doctrine based on the postulate that it is contrary to equity and fairness for a defendant to retain a ben- efit at the expense of the plaintiff.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Professional Electrical Contractors of  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall Connecticut, Inc. v. Stamford Hospital, 196 Conn. App. 430, 438–39, 230 A.3d 773 (2020). “[A]n implied in law contract is not a contract, but an obligation which the law creates out of the circum- stances present, even though a party did not assume the obligation . . . . It is based on equitable principles to operate whenever justice requires compensation to be made. . . . An implied in law contract may arise due to one party being unjustly enriched to the detriment of the other party. . . . Accordingly, an implied in law contract is another name for a claim for unjust enrichment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Proctor, 158 Conn. App. 248, 255, 118 A.3d 702 (2015), aff’d, 324 Conn. 245, 152 A.3d 470 (2016). “Unjust enrichment is a very broad and flexible equitable doctrine . . . . The doctrine’s three basic requirements are that (1) the defendant was benefited, (2) the defendant unjustly failed to pay the plaintiff for the benefits, and (3) the failure of payment was to the plaintiff’s detri- ment. . . . All the facts of each case must be examined to determine whether the circumstances render it just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or uncon- scionable, to apply the doctrine.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Professional Electrical Contractors of Connecticut, Inc. v. Stamford Hospital, supra, 196 Conn. App. 439. As previously noted, the trial court acknowledged the validity of the plaintiff’s equitable claims but concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish that probable cause exists that a judgment in the amount of the pre- judgment remedy sought, or in an amount greater than the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, would issue in the plaintiff’s favor. In other words, in its deter- mination that the plaintiff had failed to prove probable cause as to the amount sought, the court focused on the proof the plaintiff submitted in support of its claimed damages. “The measure of damages in restitution is the rea- sonable value of the benefit to the defendant. . . . [T]he  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall recovery of restitution may take several forms, including . . . the payment of the monetary value of the defendant’s gain . . . . [W]herever justice requires compensation to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract, restitution of the value of what has been given must be allowed. . . . “The measure of restitution [under quantum meruit and unjust enrichment] is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of another. . . . With no other test than what, under a given set of circumstances, is just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, it becomes necessary in any case where the benefit of the doctrine is claimed, to examine the circumstances and the conduct of the parties and apply this standard. . . . “A court may select from among several methods of determining the amount of recovery in restitution, depending on the circumstances and conduct of the par- ties in a particular case. . . . For example, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment lists the following measures of recovery: (a) [T]he value of the benefit in advancing the purposes of the defendant, (b) the cost to the claimant of conferring the benefit, (c) the market value of the benefit, or (d) a price the defendant has expressed a willingness to pay, if the defendant’s assent may be treated as valid on the question of price. . . . “Although not directly enforceable under [an unen- forceable] contract, the contract price is evidence of the reasonable value of the benefit the defendant received from the plaintiff.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Walpole Woodwork- ers, Inc. v. Manning, supra, 307 Conn. 589–90. Moreover, as “[w]e have stated [previously] . . . the amount of damages in an application for a prejudgment remedy need not be determined with mathematical  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall precision. . . . A fair and reasonable estimate of the likely potential damages is sufficient to support the entry of a prejudgment attachment. . . . [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of presenting evidence which affords a reasonable basis for measuring [its] loss.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kendall v. Amster, 108 Conn. App. 319, 331, 948 A.2d 1041 (2008). “Where damages are appropriate but [may be] difficult to prove the law eschews the necessity of mathematical exactitude. Such exactitude in the proof of damages is often impossible, and . . . all that can be required is that the evidence, with such certainty as the nature of the particular case may permit, lay a foundation which will enable the trier to make a fair and reasonable estimate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Whalers Hockey Club v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 231 Conn. 276, 285, 649 A.2d 518 (1994); see also Northwestern Electric, Inc. v. Rozbicki, 6 Conn. App. 417, 424, 505 A.2d 750 (1986) (“[p]roof of damages does not require mathematical certitude”). In support of its claim for damages, in addition to the testimony of Urbanski, the plaintiff presented the testimony of Heidi Sojka, the director of admissions at the plaintiff’s facility. Sojka and Urbanski both testified that, at the time of the defendant’s stay, the facility’s daily private pay rates were $717 for skilled care and $525 for custodial or long-term care. Sojka explained that the difference in rates was attributable to the higher level of care provided in the short-term rehabilitation units, which were subject to the higher rate, whereas the lower rate applied to the long-term care unit. Urbanski testi- fied that Medicare covered the cost of the defendant’s stay at the facility from her admission on November 20 through December 13, 2023. Following the expiration of her Medicare coverage, Urbanski testified that the defendant was billed at the facility’s private pay rate. She further testified that, from December 14, 2023, through February 22, 2024, the defendant was billed at the rate of $717 per day because she remained in the short-term rehabilitation unit. Beginning on February  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall 23, 2024, the defendant was billed at the rate of $525 per day after she was transferred to the long-term care unit, which has remained unchanged. Sojka testified that the facility’s rates were commu- nicated to the defendant multiple times during her stay and described the plaintiff’s repeated attempts to discuss room changes and options for reducing the defendant’s costs after her Medicare coverage ended on December 13, 2023. The plaintiff also presented evidence regard- ing the type, frequency, and intensity of care provided to the defendant while she was in the skilled care unit and after she transferred to the long-term care unit, including skilled nursing, physical and speech therapy, personal hygiene, oral hygiene, feeding tube manage- ment, transfers to and from bed using a Hoyer lift, and medication administration. In her testimony, the defen- dant conceded that she received, and continued to receive, daily care from the plaintiff, and admitted that she did not sign the admissions agreement, refused to apply for Medicaid, and delayed moving to a lower cost room when offered by the plaintiff. The plaintiff also presented testimony from repre- sentatives of two local competing nursing facilities to further demonstrate the reasonable value of the services its facility rendered to the defendant to establish that there was probable cause that a judgment for the amount sought would be rendered.6 Our review of the record persuades us that the plain- tiff presented sufficient evidence to establish probable 6 The plaintiff also claims that the trial court “erred by disregarding uncontroverted testimony from [representatives of] two local competi- tor nursing homes [who] . . . provided specific, contemporaneous daily private pay rates for both skilled and custodial care during the period the defendant has been admitted to the facility.” “[T]he trier [of fact] is bound to consider all the evidence which has been admitted, as far as admissible, for all the purposes for which it was offered and claimed. . . . [W]e are not justified in finding error upon pure assumptions as to what the court may have done. . . . We cannot assume that the court’s conclusions were reached without due weight having been given to the evidence presented and the facts found. . . . Unless the contrary  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall cause as to the amount of its damages. The plaintiff demonstrated, through the testimony of Sojka, Urban- ski, and representatives from local competing nursing facilities, the reasonable value of the benefit conferred on the defendant and the amount of restitution sought. Specifically, the plaintiff presented evidence demonstrat- ing the reasonable value of “the benefit in advancing the purposes of the defendant . . . the cost to the claimant of conferring the benefit . . . the market value of the benefit” and the “contract price” or private pay rates charged at its facility. (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Walpole Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manning, supra, 307 Conn. 589–90. By requiring the plaintiff to provide additional “data points,” including rates charged to patients with private insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid, the trial court effectively required a degree of precision beyond that contemplated by the probable cause standard. See Kendall v. Amster, supra, 108 Conn. App. 331 (“the amount of damages in an application for a prejudgment remedy need not be determined with mathematical pre- cision”). The court, therefore, improperly heightened appears, this court will assume that the court acted properly. . . . [Thus, if] . . . [a] statement [by the court may] suggest that the court did not consider [certain] testimony, we . . . are entitled to presume that the trial court acted properly and considered all the evidence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Moye v. Commissioner of Correction, 168 Conn. App. 207, 229–30, 145 A.3d 362 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 905, 153 A.3d 653 (2017). The fact that the court did not rely on or discuss in detail the evidence submitted by the plaintiff does not mean the court did not consider the evidence in reaching its decision and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the court ignored the trial testimony of the representatives from the two local competitor nursing homes. See In re Nevaeh G.-M., 217 Conn. App. 854, 881, 290 A.3d 867 (“[t]he fact that the court did not rely on or discuss in detail the respondent’s testimony does not mean the court did not consider it in reaching its decision”), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 925, 295 A.3d 418 (2023). We are, thus, not persuaded that the court did not consider this evidence. Our review of this claim requires us to determine only whether, based on all of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff, the probable cause standard of proof was met, and whether, by requiring the plaintiff to provide information “about other rates for clients with private insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid,” and “the profit margin being sought by the plaintiff,” the trial court improperly elevated that standard of proof.  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall the applicable probable cause standard of proof and, in so doing, committed clear error. II The plaintiff next claims that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff to disprove the applicability of an exemption from execution. We agree. Before addressing this claim, we set forth the appli- cable standard of review and relevant legal principles and statutory provisions. “When a party contests the burden of proof applied by the court, the standard of review is de novo because the matter is a question of law.” (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Papallo v. Lefebvre, 172 Conn. App. 746, 755, 161 A.3d 603 (2017). This court’s “[c]ase law and other authority provide . . . support for [the] determination that it is the judgment debtor’s burden to claim an exemption.” Colon-Collazo v. Cox, 193 Conn. App. 251, 259, 219 A.3d 512 (2019). Section 52-278c (g) provides in relevant part that “[a] defendant may request a hearing to contest the applica- tion for a prejudgment remedy [and] assert any exemp- tion . . . .” (Emphasis added.) See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1993) p. 69 (defining “assert” in part as “to demonstrate the existence of”). Moreover, the notice accompanying an application for a prejudgment remedy must advise the defendant that he or she has the right “to show that the property sought to be subjected to the prejudgment remedy is exempt from such a prejudgment remedy.” General Statutes § 52-278c (e). These statutory provisions make clear that it is the defendant who must assert and establish the applicability of an exemption. Because the plain language of § 52-278c (g) places the burden on the defendant to assert an exemption from execution, the burden to demonstrate that such an exemption exists clearly rests with the defendant. See Deer v. National General Ins. Co., 225 Conn. App. 656, 670–71, 317 A.3d 19 (2024) (“In seeking to determine [the meaning of a statute], General Statutes § 1-2z directs  162 South Britain Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. Marshall us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), aff’d, 353 Conn. 262, 341 A.3d 936 (2025). Allocation of this burden to the defendant is also consistent with the nature of exemp- tions from execution, which are matters within the par- ticular knowledge of the party claiming the exemption. See General Statutes § 52-352b (listing types of exempt property).7 Here, in denying the plaintiff’s application for a prejudgment remedy, the trial court found that the plaintiff “failed to establish the fair compensation owed under the circumstances,” and expressly found that “the plaintiff has failed to establish that the property sought to be attached is not exempt from execution.” In making this express finding, the court improperly placed the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the property was not exempt. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings. In this opinion the other judges concurred. 7 Although § 52-352b appears within chapter 906, governing post- judgment procedures, its provisions are also applicable in determining whether property is exempt from a prejudgment remedy. See Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms, 222 Conn. 361, 366, 610 A.2d 652 (“exemp- tions from post-judgment remedies, and therefore from prejudgment attachment, afforded by . . . § 52-352b, apply only to property of any natural person” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. dismissed, 505 U.S. 1247, 113 S. Ct. 28, 120 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1992); see also Con- necticut Novelty Co. v. Graichen, 233 Conn. App. 843, 849–50, 341 A.3d 362 (2025) (considering whether homestead exception under § 52-352b (21) applies in prejudgment remedy context).