Collins v. Ember

25CA1944 Collins v Ember 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA1944 Arapahoe County District Court No. 24CV30104 Honorable Don J. Toussaint, Judge Michaya Collins, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mustafa Adam and Stephani Ember, Defendants-Appellees. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division III Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Dunn and Brenton, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Michaya Collins, Pro Se Campbell, Wagner & Frazier, LLC, Emmett P. Newton, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Mustafa Adam Pearl Schneider Young, LLC, Laura Trask Schneider, Lakewood, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Stephani Ember ¶1 Plaintiff, Michaya Collins, appeals the dismissal without prejudice of her negligence claims against defendants, Stephani Ember and Mustafa Adam. The district court issued the dismissal order as a sanction based on Collins’s persistent failures to comply with the court’s discovery orders. We affirm. ¶2 Collins also presents a myriad of grievances against defendants, opposing counsel, and the district court that were not presented to the district court and are thus not preserved. Because we generally do not consider unpreserved arguments in civil cases, Wilburn v. Guthrie, 2026 COA 13, ¶ 32, we consider only the district court’s dismissal order. I. Background ¶3 Collins’s complaint arose from a 2022 car accident involving a collision between a car Ember was driving and Adam’s vehicle, in which Collins was riding as a Lyft passenger. Collins alleged both Adam and Ember drove carelessly, recklessly, and negligently. Collins also claimed Lyft, Inc., was vicariously liable for Adam’s 1  alleged negligence.1 Collins sought damages for, among other things, medical expenses, lost wages, and physical impairment. ¶4 The district court set an initial trial date in March 2025. The trial was later continued until September 2025, and again to November 2025 because of Collins’s failures to comply with various discovery obligations and orders. ¶5 Defense counsel deposed Collins in early April 2025. During the deposition, Collins raised various unpled allegations against Adam, and the deposition was eventually terminated before its completion. The parties agreed to reconvene at a future time. ¶6 Ten days later, Collins’s attorneys filed a motion to withdraw, citing “irreconcilable differences” with Collins. The court granted the motion. Collins proceeded from that point without attorney representation. ¶7 Shortly after Collins’s initial deposition, Ember and Adam filed a status report alerting the court to their efforts to obtain missing discovery documents from Collins. The court heard arguments from all parties about the discovery disputes and ordered Collins to 1 The district court granted Lyft, Inc.’s, motion to compel arbitration, and it is not a party to this appeal. 2  produce specific documents regarding medical care costs, employment, and disability and to attend her rescheduled deposition. Collins responded that she had produced all the requested documents and alleged that defense counsel was harassing and abusing her. She also requested a protective order. ¶8 Later, Ember and Adam made another detailed request for documents. Collins ignored the request and instead responded that she believed Adam and others were engaging in “witchcraft,” emotional torture, sexual exploitation, and human trafficking of her and that unidentified “bad guys” were following and threatening her. ¶9 On October 1, 2025, Ember and Adam filed a joint status update advising the court that Collins still hadn’t produced many of the documents it had ordered her to produce and that she had not attended her continued deposition. ¶ 10 In a written order, the district court detailed Collins’s failure to comply with the court’s order to produce documents, her failure to appear for her continued deposition, and her assertion of numerous irrational allegations against Adam and law enforcement. Based on 3  Collins’s “willful disregard” of its orders, the court dismissed the case without prejudice. Collins appeals the dismissal order. II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶ 11 We review the imposition of discovery sanctions, including dismissal, for an abuse of discretion. Pullen v. Walker, 228 P.3d 158, 161 (Colo. App. 2008). A sanctions order exceeds the court’s discretion if it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Daley, 97 P.3d 295, 298 (Colo. App. 2004). ¶ 12 “Dismissal is a drastic sanction and must be reserved for situations where no other sanction will ‘restore as nearly as possible the level playing field that existed before the discovery violation.’” Id. (quoting People v. Dist. Ct., 808 P.2d 831, 837 (Colo. 1991)). Courts typically address discovery violations with less severe sanctions; however, C.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(C) authorizes a court to impose sanctions for a party’s failure to comply with a discovery order, including the sanction of dismissal. In addition, dismissal may be imposed as a valid sanction when a party willfully or flagrantly disobeys the discovery rules or their discovery obligations. Pullen, 228 P.3d at 161. 4 ¶ 13 Courts afford self-represented parties latitude concerning the form in which they present their arguments. See Warnick v. Ct. Admin., 2025 COA 7, ¶ 16. However, self-represented “litigants are bound by the same rules of civil procedure as attorneys licensed to practice law in this state.” Negron v. Golder, 111 P.3d 538, 541 (Colo. App. 2004). Specifically, regarding discovery obligations, a party’s lack of legal representation “neither excuses . . . noncompliance with the discovery rules nor renders the trial court’s dismissal based on that noncompliance an abuse of discretion.” Prefer v. PharmNetRx, LLC, 18 P.3d 844, 850 (Colo. App. 2000). III. Analysis ¶ 14 The record reflects that the district court afforded Collins leeway as a pro se party. The court narrowed the discovery requested by defendants. It explained to Collins that she had an obligation to comply with the discovery rules and that her failure to do so could result in dismissal of the case. And it extended the trial date to allow Collins additional time to comply with the discovery order. Despite these accommodations, Collins persistently and repeatedly violated her discovery obligations and the district court’s direct discovery orders. 5 ¶ 15 Collins’s defiance of the discovery rules and the court’s orders prejudiced defendants’ ability to defend the action and the court’s efforts to efficiently manage the case. As noted by counsel for Adam and Ember, they could not “adequately prepare their defenses,” and the matter could not proceed to trial because of Collins’s failure to produce the required documents or attend her deposition. The documents requested by Ember and Adam concerned Collins’s medical expenses, claimed losses, and damages. When Collins disregarded the discovery order, the lack of essential information impacted Ember’s and Adam’s ability to mount a defense. ¶ 16 Collins fails to explain her failure to comply with the court’s discovery orders or to attend her rescheduled deposition. Collins instead meanders through a plethora of allegations and authorities that are not at issue in this case. See Westrac, Inc. v. Walker Field, 812 P.2d 714, 718 (Colo. App. 1991) (“Because defendant has failed to specify why the trial court erred, we will not review the ruling . . . .”). ¶ 17 The district court recognized that unrepresented parties may have reduced comprehension of the legal process but ultimately ordered that the case be dismissed because of Collins’s “willful 6  disregard” of the district court’s order to produce discoverable documents. Given Collins’s long course of obstreperous conduct in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering the dismissal order. IV. Disposition ¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed. JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE BRENTON concur. 7