Full Opinion

Filed 10/19/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE THE PEOPLE, B354564 Petitioner, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. v. No. LB0758A) THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; C.M., Real Party in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. John C. Lawson II, Judge. Petition denied. Nathan J. Hochman, District Attorney, Cassandra Thorp and Matthew Brown, Deputy District Attorneys, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Ricardo D. Garcia, Public Defender of Los Angeles County, Albert J. Menaster, Head Deputy Public Defender, Robert Lu and Lorenmarie Manning, Deputy Public Defenders, for Real Party in Interest. The People challenge an order dismissing real party in interest C.M.’s juvenile delinquency petition and sealing the record under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. 1 Section 786, subdivision (a) generally provides for sealing after a juvenile offender satisfactorily completes probation; however, subdivision (d) prohibits dismissal of the petition and sealing of the record in limited circumstances, including where the petition was sustained based on the commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of section 707. The People contend the trial court lacked the statutory authority to issue its sealing order because C.M.’s offense, assault with a deadly weapon, is encompassed in section 707, subdivision (b), even if not expressly listed under that provision. We conclude the trial court did not err, and we deny the petition. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On February 13, 2025, the People filed a wardship petition in Riverside County alleging that C.M. (then age 16) committed attempted murder in violation of Penal Code section 664/187, subdivision (a), and assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The petition also alleged that C.M. personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a) and Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). On March 14, 2025, C.M. admitted the assault with a deadly weapon offense. He also admitted the allegations that he 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 personally inflicted great bodily injury. On motion of the People, the trial court dismissed the attempted murder paragraph. The Riverside County court transferred jurisdiction to Los Angeles County for disposition. On March 30, 2026, based on the recommendation of the probation department, the trial court in Los Angeles County found that C.M. had completed all the terms and conditions of his probation and ordered probation terminated. The court then ordered the record sealed under section 786. The People objected to the sealing order, citing section 786, subdivision (d), which prohibits the sealing of records of offenses listed in section 707, subdivision (b). The People asserted that although assault with a deadly weapon was not among the offenses listed in section 707, subdivision (b), C.M. had admitted the great bodily injury allegations, which meant the offense fell under section 707, subdivision (b)(14), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, even though that was not the charged offense. The trial court said it “disagree[d]” and sealed the record. The People filed a petition for writ of mandate on May 14, 2026. We then issued, on June 8, 2026, an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction Because the prosecution does not have the right to appeal from an order sealing a minor’s juvenile court records (In re K.W. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 467, 472), review by a petition for writ of 3 mandate is available, but only in a narrow set of circumstances. (People v. Superior Court (Manuel G.) (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 915, 925.) The trial court must have acted in excess of its jurisdiction, such as by misinterpreting, misapplying, or refusing to apply constitutional, statutory, or case law authority, and the need for such review must outweigh the risk of harassment of the accused. (Ibid.) We review a ruling regarding the release of juvenile records for abuse of discretion, but “we independently determine the proper interpretation of a statute. [Citation.]” (In re Jeffrey T. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1018.) “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ [Citation.]” (Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 165−166.) 4 B. Analysis 1. Statutory Language of Section 786 Section 786 prohibits the court from sealing a record or dismissing a juvenile petition under the statute “if the petition was sustained based on the commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 that was committed when the individual was 14 years of age or older.” (§ 786, subd. (d).) As relevant here, a court sustains a juvenile petition under section 602 when a minor between the ages of 12 and 17 is “adjudge[d] . . . a ward of the court” because he or she has violated “any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age.” (§ 602, subd. (a).) In this case, the petition was sustained after the court found that C.M. was a ward of the court based on his admissions that he committed assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. Assault with a deadly weapon is not listed in section 707, subdivision (b). As the petition was sustained based on the commission of an offense not expressly listed under section 707, subdivision (b), the plain language of section 786 indicates that the court could dismiss the petition and order the record sealed, once C.M. met the other requirements, including satisfactorily completing probation. The People concede that the charged offense to which C.M. pleaded guilty – assault with a deadly weapon in violation of 5 Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) – is not listed in section 707, subdivision (b). However, the People argue that assault with a deadly weapon is synonymous with an “[a]ssault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury”– an offense that is listed in section 707, subdivision (b)(14). As such, the People contend that the lower court was precluded from sealing C.M.’s record. In support of their argument, the People rely on In re Pedro C. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 174 (Pedro C.). In that case, a minor was alleged to have committed assault with a deadly weapon (i.e., a motor vehicle) upon a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (b). (Id. at p. 182.) The minor admitted the allegation but disputed whether the crime qualified him for commitment to the California Youth Authority because it was not enumerated in section 707, subdivision (b). 2 (Id. at pp. 177−178.) The Pedro C. court considered whether assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury under section 707, subdivision (b)(14) embraced assault with a deadly weapon under Penal Code section 245. (Id. at p. 182.) The court made its determination by considering the statutory scheme at issue, which tasked courts with deciding which minors were fit subjects to be dealt with under the juvenile court law and subsequently committed to the California Youth Authority subject to extended jurisdiction. These decisions were based on whether a minor had committed one of the serious felonies described in section 707, subdivision (b). The court held that to conclude assault with a deadly weapon was not a section 707, 2 Under section 1769, if the minor offender was adjudicated of an offense listed in section 707, subdivision (b), jurisdiction extends over him or her until his or her 25th birthday. 6 subdivision (b) offense would be to “elevate form over substance.” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “A deadly weapon is one likely to produce death or great bodily injury.” ’ [Citations.] Necessarily, then, assault with a deadly weapon includes assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury.” (Ibid.) Therefore, assault with a deadly weapon “falls within the purview of section 707, subdivision (b) . . . .” (Id. at p. 183.) We are not persuaded by the People’s contention, in reliance on Pedro C., that in every instance a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), is legally equivalent to assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury under section 707, subdivision (b)(14). Subsequent case law has discussed that not all assaults with a deadly weapon also meet the elements of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, depending on the nature of the weapon and how it was used. The California Supreme Court has acknowledged that there are “assaults involving weapons that are deadly per se, such as dirks and blackjacks, in which the prosecutor may argue for, and the jury convict of, aggravated assault based on the mere character of the weapon.” (People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1037, fn. 10.) Thus, “ ‘there are nonordinary uses to which one can put an inherently deadly weapon . . . without altering the weapon’s inherently deadly character.’ [Citation.]” (In re L.J. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 37, 50 (L.J.).) The court in L.J. illustrated this point with the following, oft-used hypothetical: if a defendant cuts a single strand of a sleeping person’s hair with an inherently 7 dangerous weapon 3 like a dagger, that defendant committed an assault with a deadly weapon but not an assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, because the defendant did not use the dagger in a manner likely to produce great bodily injury. (Ibid.) Here, at the time the juvenile petition was sustained, C.M. admitted to using a “ ‘stabbing weapon,’ ” but there is no further description of those proceedings. This weapon could possibly be deadly per se. (People v. Pack (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 218, 225 [where a defendant used a “ ‘stabbing weapon’ ” and was charged with assault with a deadly weapon, he was not sufficiently put on notice that the prosecution would seek to prove the elements of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, as “[a] weapon designed for stabbing is an inherently dangerous weapon”]; see also People v. Mowatt (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 713, 718−719 [discussing former Penal Code section 12020 (which outlawed carrying a concealed dirk or dagger) and the differences between “inherently dangerous stabbing weapons” and “instruments intended for harmless uses but also capable of inflicting serious harm”].) There is also no information in our record as to how C.M. used the stabbing weapon. While C.M. admitted he caused great bodily injury, that does not establish that he used the weapon to cause those injuries, or in a manner that was likely to produce such injury. On the record before this court, one cannot definitively conclude that C.M. committed 3 “Inherently deadly” and “inherently dangerous” are used interchangeably. (See, e.g., Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1023 at pp. 1028−1029, 1035.) 8 assault likely to produce great bodily injury pursuant to section 707, subdivision (b)(14). 4 But even if the juvenile court had sufficient information before it at the time C.M.’s probation was completed to determine that the offense conduct was sufficient to meet the elements of assault likely to produce great bodily injury, that does not mean that the court was permitted to refuse to seal the record of conviction on that ground. Pedro C. involved an entirely different stage of proceedings, which is critical. The juvenile court was issuing a commitment order pursuant to California Rules of Court, former rule 1373(c), which required the court to determine whether an offense comes “within the purview of section 707, subdivision (b).” (In re Pedro C., supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 179; In re Rodney F. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 177, 188 [“The commitment order must specify if the offense for which the defendant is convicted is listed in section 707, subdivision (b)”].) There is no language in section 786 or the rules of court to indicate the court retains this type of discretion when considering whether a case should be dismissed and the record sealed after completion of probation or supervision. Section 786, subdivision (d) prohibits dismissal and sealing of a record only if “the petition was sustained based on the commission” of a section 707, subdivision (b) offense. 4 We observe that the court in Pedro C. did not discuss cases involving inherently deadly weapons that may have been used in a non-ordinary way, and we note that the weapon in that case – a motor vehicle – was not an inherently deadly weapon. As such, the case necessarily involved the use of force likely to cause great bodily injury, unquestionably bringing it within the meaning of section 707, subdivision (b)(14). 9 (Emphasis added.) This language indicates that the adjudication of the offense as a section 707, subdivision (b) crime must have taken place at the time the juvenile petition was first sustained; in other words, by the time of the completion of probation, the determination of whether an offense was a section 707, subdivision (b) offense, must already have occurred. This reading of the statute is in line with how similar language was interpreted in In re Jensen (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 262. Jensen confronted two provisions of the Three Strikes Law concerning section 707. Penal Code section 667, subdivision (d)(3) provides that a prior juvenile adjudication could be considered a prior serious or violent felony or strike for sentencing enhancement purposes provided four conditions are met. Two of those conditions are: “(B) The prior offense is listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code . . . .” and “(D) The juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court within the meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” The question presented was whether a juvenile adjudication for voluntary manslaughter amounted to an assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury under section 707, subdivision (b)(14).5 The Jensen court discussed that while “a trial court can go behind the bare juvenile adjudication to determine whether it is a qualifying offense” under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(B), it could not do so to meet the requirement of subdivision (d)(3)(D). (Id. at p. 268.) “Regardless of whether Jensen’s conduct also constituted 5 At the relevant time, voluntary manslaughter was not listed in section 707, subdivision (b). 10 a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offense, the juvenile petition did not allege assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and no true finding was made on such an offense. . . . . Jensen was not ‘adjudged a ward of the juvenile court within the meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because’ he committed an assault by any means likely to produce great bodily injury. [Citation.] Paragraph (D) requires an adjudication of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offense; a showing the conduct includes the elements of such an offense is not adequate.” (Id. at p. 266.) Jensen demonstrates that even where the conduct at issue could potentially constitute a crime under section 707, subdivision (b), if the relevant statute does not require the court to make such a determination, the court cannot do so. There is a difference between being tasked with determining whether an offense is listed in section 707, subdivision (b), and being tasked with determining whether a wardship petition was sustained based on the commission of a section 707, subdivision (b) offense. The conclusion that a juvenile court implementing the sealing provisions of section 786 does not have the power to decide whether an offense is encompassed in section 707, subdivision (b) is bolstered by the fact that the statutory language of section 786 makes no mention of any requirement of a hearing. As discussed above, the determination whether an assault with a deadly weapon could also be considered an assault with force likely to produce bodily injury would require examination of the evidence. But section 786 does not provide for an evidentiary process; the statute only provides that the court must send “notice to the person and the person’s counsel that it 11 has ordered the petition dismissed and the records sealed in the case.” (§ 786, subd. (a).) Accordingly, based on the statutory language of section 786, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in ordering C.M.’s record to be sealed. 6 To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the statutory language, we also look to the legislative history to determine whether this provision should be read differently. 2. Legislative History Section 786, enacted through Senate Bill 1038 (SB 1038), was to apply broadly. The bill was to “further the dual purposes of the juvenile justice system: rehabilitation and reintegration, by better ensuring that juveniles have a clear pathway to clearing their records, when in compliance with existing statutory and probationary requirements. The bill recognizes the established role of California’s Juvenile Courts as institutions of reform, not punishment, and will help individuals with juvenile records to find and hold jobs, and become fully functioning members of society. [¶] Overwhelming research in the field of adolescent behavior indicates that developmental changes occurring during adolescence often make it difficult for juveniles to properly understand the consequences of their actions. It is therefore 6 In his return to our order to show cause, C.M. argues that two other provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code – sections 781 and 782 – provide a basis for the sealing of his records. Given our conclusion that the records were properly sealed pursuant to section 786, we do not address, and express no opinion on these other statutory arguments. 12 essential that as many youth as possible receive a second chance at rehabilitation, since young people can often turn their lives around before it is too late. SB 1038 will give them a second chance at a clean slate when pursuing higher education or entering the workforce, two of the best ways to ensure that a youthful offender does not return to the care of the State as an adult criminal later in life.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1038 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 28, 2014, pp. K−L.) The Legislature intended to achieve this purpose by improving upon the process for sealing that was provided under section 781. Section 781 requires the involvement of the probation office, the prosecutor, and the court, resulting in “lengthy delays as well as significant costs associated with sealing.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1038 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 28, 2014, p. K.) It was recognized that many eligible persons with juvenile records were unaware of their right to petition for sealing or had moved out of state and were unable to complete the process. SB 1038 sought “to remedy these shortcomings . . . by streamlining the process for sealing a juvenile’s record.” (Ibid.) The bill provided for “the automatic dismissal of juvenile petitions, and sealing of related records, in cases where the minor satisfactorily completed their term of probation.” (Id. at p. L.) There is nothing to indicate that this new streamlined process was to include looking beyond the fact of the adjudication of a crime to decide whether the conduct could also qualify as an offense under section 707, subdivision (b). Most of the direct references to section 707, subdivision (b) in the legislative history fail to indicate whether section 786 was 13 intended to exclude only section 707, subdivision (b) offenses adjudicated as such. (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1038 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 14, 2014, p. C [“This bill does not apply to juveniles who have committed ‘[section] 707[, subdivision] (b) offenses’ ”]; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1038 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 28, 2014, p. B [the bill provides for sealing in “non-[section] 707[, subdivision] (b) cases”]; id. at p. L [the bill “expressly excludes from these provisions any offense described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b)”].) But it was stated that the bill would allow sealing “if a minor satisfactorily completes informal or formal probation, as specified, for any offense not listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1038 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 28, 2014, p. G.) Probation can only be completed “for” an offense that was actually adjudicated. This statement thus indicates that section 786 directs the court to merely confirm probation was completed for an adjudicated offense not listed in section 707, subdivision (b) before dismissing the petition and sealing the record. A Q&A drafted by SB 1038’s author also urges this conclusion. One question posed was: “Won’t this bill apply to serious crimes, even if they are not listed under 707(b)?” (Sen. Mark Leno, Juvenile Record Sealing Q&A, Sen. Bill No. 1038 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), [p. 1.]) The answer: “No. Under Proposition 21, [Welfare and Institutions Code section,] 707 [subdivision] (b) was established as a comprehensive list of serious, violent crimes that should not be sealable, regardless of an offender’s age. This bill does not alter that fact in any way. Additionally, the DA has tremendous discretion in charging 14 juvenile court. If a youth does something that rises to that level of seriousness, the DA can (and will, as a matter of practice), charge the crime as such.” (Ibid.) This appears to be a firm statement that the criminal records ineligible for sealing were limited to those concerning crimes expressly listed in section 707, subdivision (b), even with the recognition that this meant records of other serious offenses, not expressly identified in section 707, would be sealed. We conclude from the statement of intent and analyses that the Legislature was focused on broadly assisting offenders with reintegration into society by means of a quick dismissal and sealing process, and not on expansive exclusions. If we have misunderstood the scope of the Legislature’s intent in enacting section 786 (or section 707, subdivision (b)), the Legislature has the authority to amend either statute with language that clarifies its intent. There is no evidence of any effort on the part of the Legislature in its enactments to date, however, to ensure that sealing was unavailable to offenders whose conduct might meet the description of section 707, subdivision (b) crimes they were not charged with. Accordingly, legislative history further supports affirmance of the juvenile court’s sealing order regarding C.M. 3. Reasonable Construction of Section 786 Even if it could be said that the statutory language and legislative history do not establish with certainty the proper procedure under section 786, we reject the People’s reading of the statute as it is one that would lead to unreasonable and arbitrary results. 15 The People’s interpretation would give the juvenile court the power, post-disposition, to adjudicate that a minor’s conduct constituted a crime other than the one he or she was already found to have committed. As discussed above, while assault with a deadly weapon may be encompassed within assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in some circumstances, that is not always the case. Courts would need to hold an evidentiary hearing with the parties present to determine whether the conduct alleged was within the purview of section 707, subdivision (b). This is exactly the sort of cumbersome proceeding the Legislature wished to avoid by drafting section 786. What makes the People’s position even more untenable is that this is not an issue peculiar to assault with a deadly weapon. Battery with serious bodily injury under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d), for example, is not listed in section 707, subdivision (b), but could potentially be encompassed by section 707, subdivision (b)(14), assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, if the force used during the battery was likely to produce bodily injury. Another example is rape of an intoxicated person under Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(3), also not listed in section 707, subdivision (b), but still a crime that could be within the purview of an offense listed under section 707, subdivision (b)(4), rape with force.7 Adopting the 7 “ ‘Force’ includes circumstances where the victim did not want to engage in the act and the evidence does not otherwise establish the victim’s positive cooperation in act or attitude. (People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 258.) It also includes the force used to accomplish ‘the penetration and the physical movement and positioning of [the victim’s] body in 16 People’s position means what the Legislature intended as a streamlined, automatic process could become a time-consuming series of hearings for more than just the occasional case. The statutory language, legislative purpose, and potential unreasonable consequences of the People’s proffered alternative interpretation all lead to the conclusion that section 786 allows the court to dismiss a juvenile petition and seal a record only where the offense adjudicated was one expressly listed in section 707, subdivision (b). DISPOSITION The petition for writ of mandate is denied. MOOR, J. WE CONCUR: HOFFSTADT, P. J. BAKER, J. accomplishing the act.’ (Ibid.)” (People v. Thomas (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1071.) 17