Full Opinion

Filed 11/13/26 Poulter v. Albertsons Safeway, LLC CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE ROBERT POULTER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, A171016 v. ALBERTSONS SAFEWAY, LLC et (Contra Costa County al., Super. Ct. No. C22-02646) Defendants and Respondents. Plaintiffs Robert Poulter and Allison Poulter (jointly, the Poulters) filed a claim with defendant Albertsons Safeway, LLC (Safeway) after Robert Poulter slipped and fell in a Safeway store. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (Sedgwick) investigated the claim on behalf of Safeway and made a settlement offer to the Poulters, which they rejected. The Poulters subsequently sued Safeway and Sedgwick (jointly, defendants). Defendants filed a demurrer, alleging the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and failed to state a claim, along with a motion to strike punitive damages. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and granted the motion. On appeal, the Poulters argue that defendants were barred from asserting a statute of limitations defense based upon equitable estoppel. They further allege they adequately asserted causes of action for negligent 1 misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, the trial court erred in granting the motion to strike, and they should have been granted leave to amend. We disagree and affirm. BACKGROUND Factual Background The following facts are taken from the Poulters’ third amended complaint and attached exhibits, and we accept them as true in reviewing whether the trial court properly sustained defendants’ demurrer. (Center for Environmental Health v. Perrigo Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1, 13–14.) We refer to the plaintiffs individually by their first names in the interest of clarity and with no disrespect. In August 2020, Robert was walking through a Safeway store while shopping when he slipped and fell on spilled salsa. He suffered severe injuries that prevented him from resuming his employment. Robert’s wife, Allison, suffered the loss of love, companionship, comfort, care, assistance, protection, affection, society, moral support, and the enjoyment of sexual relations since the incident. The Poulters were diligent in presenting their claim to Sedgwick “shortly after the accident.” The earliest correspondence attached to the complaint is from 2021. That correspondence indicates that Sedgwick began collecting documentation regarding the Poulters’ claim in late 2021 but “there were some delays due to Covid.” Allison offered to help provide documents and keep Sedgwick updated on Robert’s medical treatments. In February 2022, Allison reported to Sedgwick that Robert was “released from the care of his orthopedic doctor.” She then asked, “I think that is what we were waiting for in order for this to move forward[,] yes? What is the next step?” Sedgwick responded that if Robert had completed 2 treatment, it would review the records and bills and let her know if any information was missing. In late March and early May 2022, Allison sought an update from Sedgwick on the status of their claim. In response to the May inquiry, the Sedgwick claims examiner confirmed she was still handling the claim but had been out of the office for a few weeks. She stated, “I don’t think I need anything further from you but I will advise tomorrow if so.” Sedgwick then provided a list of information it was missing, including a wage loss authorization form, out-of-pocket expenses, and certain medical billings. The Poulters provided some of the requested materials and asked for an estimated resolution date. Their e-mail to Sedgwick stated, “Even an approximate date would be helpful. We have been very patient, but we are closing in on two years since the injury and close to 6 months since the Orthopedic surgeon stated there was nothing else he could do and discharged him.” In response, the claims examiner wrote, “Once I receive the remaining information I will review it and we should be able to resolve the claim fairly quickly.” The e-mail correspondence indicates Sedgwick was waiting to receive information from the Poulters during the months of June and July, which it finally received on August 1, 2022. On September 20, 2022, the Poulters contacted Sedgwick and noted that all requested information had been provided, and it had been over two years since the injury. The e-mail stated, “I would appreciate resolution on this as quickly as possible.” A week later, Sedgwick offered $30,000 to resolve the claim. It informed the Poulters that it had authority to negotiate a settlement, but its offer was “based off questionable liability and questionable injury.” The offer concluded with a note that Sedgwick had “a 3 little more room to move” so was amenable “to try to negotiate to resolve the claim,” but it was limited to the authority provided by Safeway. The Poulters responded that they were “unable to accept this settlement offer,” and found it “unacceptable, bordering on egregious.” They asserted the medical expenses and lost wages were not due to prior injury, but the result of his fall which “forced disability.” They further responded to Sedgwick’s note that it was still missing some records with a comment that they signed medical releases to allow Sedgwick access to any necessary medical information. In November 2022, Sedgwick reaffirmed that its “offer stands at $30,000,” stating, “If you have a counter offer let me know and we can try to negotiate.” Procedural History In December 2022, the Poulters filed a complaint against Safeway alleging premises liability (negligence, willful failure to warn, and dangerous condition of public property), general negligence, and loss of consortium. The complaint alleged Robert suffered severe injuries because of slipping and falling on spilled salsa while shopping. After Safeway filed a demurrer to the complaint, which argued that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations, the Poulters filed a first amended complaint. The first amended complaint again alleged causes of action for premises liability, negligence, and loss of consortium. It also purported to allege claims for equitable estoppel and equitable tolling/waiver. In connection with those claims, the Poulters asserted they were “diligent in presenting” their injury claim to Sedgwick shortly after the accident, the claims examiner made repeated information requests “to stretch out negotiations,” the claims examiner affirmatively led the Poulters to believe 4 the claim would be settled, and Sedgwick intended the Poulters to rely on these statements and they did so. Shortly thereafter, the Poulters filed a second amended complaint. In the supporting declaration, counsel stated an amendment was necessary to “add specificity” regarding the basis for equitable estoppel to avoid defendants’ proposed demurrer. The amended complaint added Sedgwick as a defendant and, as relevant to this appeal, expanded on the equitable estoppel “claim.” Specifically, the second amended complaint alleged Sedgwick engaged in “dilatory and deceptive tactics in negotiating with the Poulters,” such as by having significant delays in communications, requesting the Poulters to retrieve and provide certain medical information, and providing slow responses to the Poulters. The parties subsequently stipulated to the Poulters filing a third amended complaint. The third amended complaint added further allegations in connection with the Poulters’ equitable estoppel argument, including details about communication delays and allegations that the claims examiner (1) concealed that she was the Poulters’ adversary, (2) omitted that she owed no duty to the Poulters and had conflicting interests, and (3) intended to run out the clock on the statute of limitations. The complaint further alleged the Poulters did not understand Sedgwick was not a neutral evaluator but employed by Safeway, which made the Poulters over-rely on Sedgwick and induced their reliance to their detriment. In response, defendants filed a demurrer to the third amended complaint, asserting that the Poulters’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the Poulters failed to state facts sufficient to support their estoppel, waiver, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment claims. Defendants also moved to strike the provision in the 5 prayer for relief requesting “all damages proximately caused by [Sedgwick’s] acts of fraudulent concealment” and exemplary damages. The Poulters opposed the demurrer and motion to strike. In relevant part, they asserted that the complaint set forth “prolonged communication gaps,” “erroneous, if not malicious advice from [Sedgwick] to the effect that the Poulters were better off obtaining records themselves rather than relying on Sedgwick professionals,” and Sedgwick’s misrepresentation that it was “a disinterested party if not a fiduciary of the [Poulters] which led the [Poulters] to over-rely on the representations and omissions of Sedgwick professionals.” The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend. The court initially noted that the Poulters’ claims “appear to be based on the misunderstanding that Sedgwick … somehow had a duty to [the Poulters] to analyze their legal claims and provide legal advice regarding those claims,” a position taken without the support of any legal authority. The court concluded that the complaint was untimely, and defendants were not estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. Specifically, the complaint did not allege that Sedgwick made materially misleading statements or conduct, Sedgwick did not state it represented or was acting on behalf of the Poulters, and there was no discussion between the parties regarding legal claims or the statute of limitations. The court also found the complaint did not adequately allege that Sedgwick waived the statute of limitations defense as neither settlement offer addressed the statute of limitations or proposed waiving any claim or defense. Finally, the court concluded the complaint failed to adequately allege causes of action for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment because the Poulters did not demonstrate Sedgwick owed any duty to them. 6 It also granted defendants’ motion to strike because the Poulters had failed to adequately allege a claim for fraudulent concealment. The court denied leave to amend because the Poulters did not request leave and had “not even attempted to meet their burden of proving there [was] a reasonable possibility of amendment.” The court dismissed the action with prejudice, and the Poulters timely appealed. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review We independently review the complaint to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action and overcome the demurrer. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1405–1406.) If a proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists, we will affirm the order even if the trial court relied on an improper ground. (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 880, fn. 10.) We assume all material facts properly pleaded in the complaint are true and interpret the complaint in its entirety and with its parts in their context. (Schmier v. City of Berkeley (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 549, 553, fn. 4; Gibbs v. County of Humboldt (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 565, 572.) However, we disregard contentions, deductions, and conclusions of fact or law. (Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 152.) Likewise, “we are not bound to respect a pleader’s ‘legal characterization’ of events or transactions.” (O’Grady v. Merchant Exchange Productions, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 771, 777.) Even if we find a demurrer was properly sustained, we must determine whether it was an abuse of discretion to deny the plaintiff leave to amend. (Lee v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 848, 854.) In so doing, we determine “ ‘ “whether there is a 7 reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” ’ ” (Gibbs v. County of Humboldt, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 572.) Plaintiffs bear the burden of identifying allegations that can cure the defect and may meet this burden for the first time on appeal. (Ibid.) II. Statute of Limitations The Poulters do not dispute that their complaint was filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations. However, they contend the trial court erred by declining to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent defendants from asserting a statute of limitations defense. They also assert California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2695.7, subdivision (f) (section 2695.7(f)) required Sedgwick to inform them of the applicable limitations periods for their claims, and its failure to do so prohibits enforcement of the statute of limitations. We disagree. A. Equitable Estoppel We review the ruling de novo as the trial court decided the matter on demurrer. (Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1315 (Steinhart) [when the facts are undisputed, estoppel is a question of law].) To establish equitable estoppel, the Poulters were required to allege “ ‘the following elements: (a) a representation or concealment of material facts (b) made with knowledge, actual or virtual, of the facts (c) to a party ignorant, actually and permissibly, of the truth (d) with the intention, actual or virtual, that the ignorant party act on it, and (e) that party was induced to act on it.’ ” (Behnke v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1462.) “ ‘The essence of an estoppel is that the party to be estopped has by false language or conduct “led another to do that which he [or she] would not otherwise have done and as a result thereof that he [or she] has suffered injury.” ’ ” (Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1315.) An estoppel may arise 8 even absent intentional fraud. (Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 384 (Lantzy).) The Poulters contend equitable estoppel bars defendants from asserting the statute of limitations because Sedgwick’s investigation, requests for information, and statement that the claim would be resolved “fairly quickly” led them to believe the parties would resolve their claims without litigation. The question is whether these allegations describe conduct that reasonably induced the Poulters to forgo timely suit. In deciding that question, we must analyze whether the Poulters’ alleged reliance on representations made by Sedgwick was reasonable. (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 384–385 [requiring plaintiff to have been reasonably induced to forbear suing within a statutory limitations period].) We also analyze whether Sedgwick’s statements were sufficiently clear to justify a reasonable person’s reliance, as “ ‘[c]ertainty is essential to all estoppels.’ ” (Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1318, italics omitted.) Courts have applied equitable estoppel when a defendant made affirmative representations that it knew were false, which reasonably induced a plaintiff to delay filing suit. In Vu v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1142, for example, an insurance company inspector advised the plaintiff not to file a claim because the total cost of repairs was less than the policy’s deductible. (Id. at p. 1152.) The California Supreme Court concluded estoppel was appropriate if the plaintiff could prove he reasonably relied on the defendant’s representations. (Id. at pp. 1153–1154.) Similarly, in Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 907, the defendant promised to pay any actual future damages, and the court concluded the plaintiffs acted reasonably in refraining from filing suit while the defendant was complying with its promise. (Id. at 9 pp. 925–927.) In Union Oil Co. of California v. Greka Energy Corp. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 129, 138, the court found equitable estoppel appropriate where the defendant “urged” the plaintiff to suspend legal action pending completion of the settlement negotiations. (Ibid.; see also Battuello v. Battuello (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 842, 847–848 [equitable estoppel applied where defendant made express promises during settlement negotiations that induced plaintiff’s forbearance from filing suit within the applicable limitations period]; but see Benner v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 346, 349 [employer was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense where, in discussions with employee’s husband, the employer had expressed a preference to settle, and the employer and its insurance carrier made repeated requests for “ ‘more time’ ” to complete their investigation and asked the husband “to wait” until the medical examination].) Similarly, in Muraoka v. Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc. (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 107, the court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel where the defendant “ ‘promise[d] that plaintiff would be fully compensated for his damages.’ ” (Id. at p. 116.) By contrast, courts have declined to apply equitable estoppel when a defendant’s conduct fails to clearly indicate that a timely lawsuit is unnecessary. For example, in Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th 363, the Court of Appeal noted “ ‘[the plaintiffs] alleged in their complaint that Centex had repeatedly promised to repair the damage to their homes,’ ” and it concluded that allegation was sufficient to equitably estop the defendants from asserting the statute of limitations. (Id. at p. 385.) The California Supreme Court disagreed. It explained the complaint alleged that the defendants attempted to make various repairs, advised the plaintiffs that the defective windows were not defective and not to file a lawsuit, but did not properly repair the windows and associated damage. (Ibid.) But these allegations 10 nevertheless failed to establish estoppel because the complaint was “devoid of any indication that defendants’ conduct actually and reasonably induced plaintiffs to forbear suing” or that such repairs “would have obviated the need for suit.” (Ibid., italics omitted.) The same principle applies to ongoing claim review. In Kumar v. Mid- Century Ins. Co. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1208, the plaintiff alleged that Mid- Century “intended to mislead him by ‘repeatedly telling’ him to ‘ “please submit any additional information for our review.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1226.) The court concluded these allegations were insufficient to support equitable estoppel. (Ibid.) As similarly recognized in Vishva Dev, M.D., Inc. v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1225, allowing an insurer’s consideration of inquiries or new information to extend the limitations period could undermine the public policy of encouraging insurers to reconsider claim denials when presented with potentially new facts. Here, the complaint does not allege conduct that reasonably induced the Poulters to believe they could forgo timely suit. Sedgwick investigated their claim, requested information, and, when asked about timing, stated that they believed it would be resolved “fairly quickly” after the receipt of additional information. But defendants never made any representation about the outcome of the investigation. They did not agree to pay all the damages sought by the Poulters, represent that particular categories of damages would be covered, or otherwise indicate that the claim would be fully resolved without litigation. Nor does the complaint allege any promise or assurance concerning the ultimate disposition of the claim or any requests to forgo the filing of a legal action. 11 The statement that the claim would be resolved “fairly quickly” and for an uncertain sum is not enough as it lacks the clarity necessary for reasonable reliance. At most, it conveyed an expectation about the timing of the claims process. It did not assure the Poulters that defendants would pay all the claimed damages or resolve every aspect of the claim in a manner that would eliminate the need for a lawsuit. As in Lantzy, the complaint does not allege facts showing that defendants’ conduct reasonably induced the Poulters to forgo litigation or that the anticipated claim resolution would obviate the need to sue. And, as Kumar confirms, requests for information and continued claim review, without more, do not establish equitable estoppel. Courts distinguish between affirmative assurances that reasonably lead a plaintiff to believe litigation is unnecessary and claim-related communications that do not support that inference. We conclude that the investigation of a claim, coupled with a statement that the claim is expected to resolve “fairly quickly,” does not estop defendants from asserting the statute of limitations. The complaint fails to allege a misrepresentation on which the Poulters reasonably relied concerning the necessity of bringing a timely action. (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 384, fn. 18.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting the Poulters’ equitable estoppel theory.1 B. California Code of Regulations, Title 10, Section 2695.7, Subdivision (f) The Poulters contend section 2695.7(f) supports their equitable estoppel claim because it requires an insurer to provide advanced written notice of any 1 Because we conclude the complaint fails to allege a misrepresentation bearing on the necessity of bringing a timely suit, we need not reach the Poulters’ arguments regarding reasonable reliance or agency. 12 limitations period on which it may rely to deny a claim. Section 2695.7(f) requires that “every insurer shall provide written notice of any statute of limitation or other time period requirement upon which the insurer may rely to deny a claim,” except where a claim has been settled by payment. “The term ‘claimant’ is defined to include both a ‘first party claimant,’ . . . and a ‘third party claimant,’ ” the latter of which is defined as “ ‘any person asserting a claim against any person or the interests insured under an insurance policy.’ ” (Superior Dispatch, Inc. v. Insurance Corp. of New York (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 175, 188.) The regulation, however, does not establish a basis for equitable estoppel under the circumstances alleged here. First, the complaint does not allege facts establishing that either defendant is an “insurer” subject to section 2695.7(f). The regulation expressly applies to insurers, which the California Code of Regulations defines, in relevant part, as “a person licensed to issue or that issues an insurance policy or surety bond in this state, or that otherwise transacts the business of insurance in the state.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2695.2, subd. (i).) The definition expressly excludes insurance agents and brokers. (Ibid.) In reviewing a demurrer, we treat the complaint as containing judicially noticeable facts, even if a pleading “ ‘ “ ‘contains an express allegation to the contrary.’ ” ’ ” (State of California ex rel. Metz v. CCC Information Services, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 402, 412.) A plaintiff also may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended complaint that contradict the facts pleaded in the original complaint. (Ibid.) Here, the third amended complaint alleges that Safeway is a “corporation” and Sedgwick is “in the business of third-party claims adjustment.” It further alleges that, after the Poulters submitted a personal injury claim to 13 Safeway, Sedgwick “acted as the authorized agent of Safeway and as the adversarial adjuster of the Poulter’s [sic] claim.” The complaint does not allege that either defendant is licensed to issue insurance policies, issues such policies, or otherwise transacts the business of insurance. Nor does it allege that an insurer was involved in processing the Poulters’ claim. The Poulters contend Sedgwick performed functions ordinarily undertaken by an insurer or its claims representative. But performing claims-adjustment functions does not, without more, establish that Sedgwick or Safeway falls within the regulation’s definition of an insurer. The complaint’s allegations thus do not establish that either defendant is subject to section 2695.7(f). Second, the complaint does not allege that defendants relied on a limitations period to deny the Poulters’ claim. To the contrary, Sedgwick made a settlement offer, which the Poulters rejected. Defendants invoked the statute of limitations only after the Poulters filed a tort action against them. Thus, defendants did not invoke the limitations period to deny the underlying claim. Rather, they asserted it as a defense to the subsequent lawsuit. The circumstances alleged do not bring defendants’ conduct within the notice requirement on which the Poulters rely. Third, the cases cited by the Poulters do not support extending section 2695.7(f) to require notice of the limitations period governing a potential tort action and, in fact, demonstrate its inapplicability to tort causes of action. Neither Spray, Gould & Bowers v. Associated Internat. Ins. Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1260 nor Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076 addresses the applicability of section 2695.7(f). Although Spray, Gould & Bowers considered a related provision of the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations (Cal. Code 14 Regs., tit. 10, § 2695.4, subd. (a)2), the court explained the purpose of the regulations was to require insurers to notify claimants of applicable time limits under their insurance policies. (Spray, Gould & Bowers, at p. 1269.) Specifically, the court described the regulation as imposing “an unmistakable duty to advise . . . claimant insureds of applicable claim time limits,” because its purpose is “designed to alert insureds to their insurance policy obligations.” (Ibid.) That reasoning does not support the Poulters’ broader interpretation of section 2695.7(f). The provision at issue requires notice of a limitations period on which an insurer may rely to deny a claim. It does not require an insurer to advise a claimant of the limitation periods governing unspecified tort causes of action that the claimant might later assert against the insurer or another party. Finally, the Poulters contend that application of section 2695.7(f) presents a factual question that cannot be resolved on demurrer. We disagree. Whether section 2695.7(f) applies to the facts alleged is a question of law. Although we accept properly pleaded factual allegations as true, those allegations do not establish that either defendant is an insurer subject to the regulation, that defendants relied on a limitations period to deny the Poulters’ claim, or that the regulation requires notice of the limitations period governing a subsequent tort action. The Poulters’ reliance on section 2695.7(f) therefore does not provide a basis for equitable estoppel. 2 Section 2695.4, subdivision (a) states, “Every insurer shall disclose to a first party claimant or beneficiary, all benefits, coverage, time limits or other provisions of any insurance policy issued by that insurer that may apply to the claim presented by the claimant.” 15 III. Failure To State a Claim Plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s ruling that the third amended complaint failed to state a claim as to the fraudulent concealment and negligent misrepresentation causes of action. We address each in turn. A. Fraudulent Concealment “[T]he elements of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are: ‘ “(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” ’ ” (Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 830, 850.) The Poulters assert that, once Sedgwick began communicating with them about their claim, it “had a duty not to omit material facts necessary to make those communications not misleading.” They identify three alleged omissions: Sedgwick’s failure to disclose the statute of limitations, its ability to obtain requested records directly from providers, and its continued requests for information that it either did not need or could have obtained independently. None supports a cause of action for fraudulent concealment. First, as discussed above, section 2695.7(f) does not require Sedgwick to disclose the statute of limitations governing a potential tort action. The Poulters cannot establish a duty to disclose the limitations period on that basis. 16 Second, the e-mail correspondence attached as exhibits to the third amended complaint contradict the Poulters’ argument that Sedgwick misled them about its ability to obtain records independently. In reviewing a demurrer, we accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint, including the contents of exhibits incorporated thereto. (Building Permit Consultants, Inc. v. Mazur (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1409.) And when an exhibit’s contents conflict with an allegation in the pleading, the exhibit controls. (Ibid.) Here, although Sedgwick asked the Poulters to provide certain information, the parties’ communications do not indicate that Sedgwick represented it was unable to obtain records directly from providers. To the contrary, the e-mails show that Sedgwick was obtaining records directly from providers. Sedgwick informed the Poulters that records were “trickling in,” and it obtained various release authorization forms from them. The correspondence further shows that Sedgwick’s requests for additional information were in response to Allison’s offer to assist with the process and her inquiry whether there was anything she could do to expedite the requested information. Sedgwick responded that billing documents were missing from records it had received and explained, “It will expedite the process if you are able to get the billing instead of [Sedgwick] having to go through our retrieval company again.” Read in context, these communications do not support the allegation that Sedgwick misrepresented its ability to obtain records or concealed that it was able to pursue records independently. Rather, they indicate that Sedgwick was attempting to gather the necessary documentation and explained that the Poulters’ assistance in doing so could expedite the process. The fact that Sedgwick requested information that the Poulters believed it 17 could have obtained independently does not, without more, establish that Sedgwick intentionally concealed a material fact with the intent to defraud them. Nor do the communications support the broader allegation that Sedgwick deliberately continued to request unnecessary information to mislead the Poulters. The e-mails reflect requests for missing documentation and efforts to expedite the retrieval process, not an intentional concealment of material facts. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the third amended complaint failed to state a cause of action for fraudulent concealment. B. Negligent Misrepresentation The Poulters raise similar arguments in support of their negligent misrepresentation claim. They contend Sedgwick represented that certain documentation and records were necessary to evaluate and resolve their claim, that those representations were unreasonable because Sedgwick could obtain the records directly, and that Sedgwick’s statements were misleading because it failed to disclose the applicable statute of limitations if settlement efforts were unsuccessful. These allegations do not establish a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. Generally, the elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation are “ ‘(1) a misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, (2) made without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) made with the intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage.’ ” (Alafi v. Cohen (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 46, 65.) The Poulters’ allegations fail 18 at the first element because they do not identify an actionable misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact. First, the complaint does not allege that Sedgwick falsely represented that the requested documentation was necessary to evaluate the Poulters’ claim. Nor do the e-mails attached to the complaint support their contention that Sedgwick misrepresented its ability to obtain the records directly. As explained above, the correspondence shows that Sedgwick was in fact obtaining records from providers and that its requests for additional documentation were an attempt to speed up the process. The exhibits therefore do not support the allegation that Sedgwick falsely represented that it could not obtain the records independently. Second, Sedgwick’s statement that the claim would be quickly resolved once the records had been reviewed does not constitute a misrepresentation of a past or existing fact. Rather, it expresses an expectation about the future resolution of the claim. A prediction about a future event, even if it ultimately proves inaccurate, is not an actionable misrepresentation of an existing fact. (See Brakke v. Economic Concepts, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 761, 769 [“to be actionable, a misrepresentation must be of an existing fact, not an opinion or prediction of future events”]; see also Neu-Visions Sports, Inc. v. Soren/McAdam/Bartells (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 303, 308 [“expressions of opinion are not generally treated as representations of fact, and thus are not grounds for a misrepresentation cause of action”].) Finally, Sedgwick’s failure to disclose the statute of limitations does not supply the missing misrepresentation. As discussed above, section 2695.7(f) did not require Sedgwick to advise the Poulters of the limitations period governing a potential tort action. In any event, an alleged omission does not 19 transform Sedgwick’s statements about the claims-review process or its anticipated timing into a false representation of past or existing fact. The trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer as to the negligent misrepresentation cause of action. IV. Motion To Strike The Poulters contend the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants’ motion to strike their punitive damages claim because they adequately alleged fraudulent concealment. We reject this contention. As explained above, the trial court properly sustained defendants’ demurrer as to the fraudulent concealment cause of action. Because the complaint does not support a claim for fraud, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking punitive damages. (See Abbott Laboratories v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 642, 651 [we review an order striking all or part of a pleading for abuse of discretion].) V. Leave To Amend Finally, the Poulters argue they are entitled to amend their complaint in the event the demurrer was properly sustained. But the Poulters have the burden to demonstrate precisely how their complaint could be amended. (Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1153.) “Allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary.” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 44.) Here, the Poulters assert they can “allege additional facts” concerning the following topics: (1) their lack of knowledge of the statute of limitations and ongoing reliance on pursuing settlement; (2) Sedgwick’s awareness of the statute of limitations and claim that additional information was needed to evaluate the claim; (3) Sedgwick’s duty to disclose the statute of limitations and its failure to do so; and (4) Sedgwick’s role in evaluating and resolving 20 the Poulters’ claim, including facts supporting application of section 2695.7(f). But apart from identifying these broad categories, the Poulters fail to identify specific facts that would bolster these causes of action. Their conclusory statements that further facts would support these claims are insufficient because they do not explain what those facts are, how they would resolve the deficiencies identified by the trial court, and why they were not previously alleged in the prior three iterations of the complaint. Accordingly, the Poulters have not met their burden to demonstrate they can amend the complaint to state valid causes of action. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Defendants may recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).) PETROU, J. WE CONCUR: FUJISAKI, Acting P. J. RODRÍGUEZ, J. A171016 / Poulter v. Albertsons Safeway, LLC 21