Poulter v. Albertsons Safeway, LLC CA1/3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketA171016
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/13/26 Poulter v. Albertsons Safeway, LLC CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ROBERT POULTER et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
A171016
v.
ALBERTSONS SAFEWAY, LLC et (Contra Costa County
al., Super. Ct. No. C22-02646)
Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiffs Robert Poulter and Allison Poulter (jointly, the Poulters) filed
a claim with defendant Albertsons Safeway, LLC (Safeway) after Robert
Poulter slipped and fell in a Safeway store. Sedgwick Claims Management
Services, Inc. (Sedgwick) investigated the claim on behalf of Safeway and
made a settlement offer to the Poulters, which they rejected.
The Poulters subsequently sued Safeway and Sedgwick (jointly,
defendants). Defendants filed a demurrer, alleging the complaint was barred
by the statute of limitations and failed to state a claim, along with a motion
to strike punitive damages. The court sustained the demurrer without leave
to amend and granted the motion.
On appeal, the Poulters argue that defendants were barred from
asserting a statute of limitations defense based upon equitable estoppel.
They further allege they adequately asserted causes of action for negligent
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misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, the trial court erred in
granting the motion to strike, and they should have been granted leave to
amend. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the Poulters’ third amended
complaint and attached exhibits, and we accept them as true in reviewing
whether the trial court properly sustained defendants’ demurrer. (Center for
Environmental Health v. Perrigo Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1, 13–14.) We
refer to the plaintiffs individually by their first names in the interest of
clarity and with no disrespect.
In August 2020, Robert was walking through a Safeway store while
shopping when he slipped and fell on spilled salsa. He suffered severe
injuries that prevented him from resuming his employment. Robert’s wife,
Allison, suffered the loss of love, companionship, comfort, care, assistance,
protection, affection, society, moral support, and the enjoyment of sexual
relations since the incident. The Poulters were diligent in presenting their
claim to Sedgwick “shortly after the accident.”
The earliest correspondence attached to the complaint is from 2021.
That correspondence indicates that Sedgwick began collecting documentation
regarding the Poulters’ claim in late 2021 but “there were some delays due to
Covid.” Allison offered to help provide documents and keep Sedgwick
updated on Robert’s medical treatments.
In February 2022, Allison reported to Sedgwick that Robert was
“released from the care of his orthopedic doctor.” She then asked, “I think
that is what we were waiting for in order for this to move forward[,] yes?
What is the next step?” Sedgwick responded that if Robert had completed
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treatment, it would review the records and bills and let her know if any
information was missing.
In late March and early May 2022, Allison sought an update from
Sedgwick on the status of their claim. In response to the May inquiry, the
Sedgwick claims examiner confirmed she was still handling the claim but had
been out of the office for a few weeks. She stated, “I don’t think I need
anything further from you but I will advise tomorrow if so.” Sedgwick then
provided a list of information it was missing, including a wage loss
authorization form, out-of-pocket expenses, and certain medical billings.
The Poulters provided some of the requested materials and asked for
an estimated resolution date. Their e-mail to Sedgwick stated, “Even an
approximate date would be helpful. We have been very patient, but we are
closing in on two years since the injury and close to 6 months since the
Orthopedic surgeon stated there was nothing else he could do and discharged
him.” In response, the claims examiner wrote, “Once I receive the remaining
information I will review it and we should be able to resolve the claim fairly
quickly.” The e-mail correspondence indicates Sedgwick was waiting to
receive information from the Poulters during the months of June and July,
which it finally received on August 1, 2022.
On September 20, 2022, the Poulters contacted Sedgwick and noted
that all requested information had been provided, and it had been over two
years since the injury. The e-mail stated, “I would appreciate resolution on
this as quickly as possible.” A week later, Sedgwick offered $30,000 to
resolve the claim. It informed the Poulters that it had authority to negotiate
a settlement, but its offer was “based off questionable liability and
questionable injury.” The offer concluded with a note that Sedgwick had “a
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little more room to move” so was amenable “to try to negotiate to resolve the
claim,” but it was limited to the authority provided by Safeway.
The Poulters responded that they were “unable to accept this
settlement offer,” and found it “unacceptable, bordering on egregious.” They
asserted the medical expenses and lost wages were not due to prior injury,
but the result of his fall which “forced disability.” They further responded to
Sedgwick’s note that it was still missing some records with a comment that
they signed medical releases to allow Sedgwick access to any necessary
medical information.
In November 2022, Sedgwick reaffirmed that its “offer stands at
$30,000,” stating, “If you have a counter offer let me know and we can try to
negotiate.”
Procedural History
In December 2022, the Poulters filed a complaint against Safeway
alleging premises liability (negligence, willful failure to warn, and dangerous
condition of public property), general negligence, and loss of consortium. The
complaint alleged Robert suffered severe injuries because of slipping and
falling on spilled salsa while shopping.
After Safeway filed a demurrer to the complaint, which argued that the
complaint was barred by the statute of limitations, the Poulters filed a first
amended complaint. The first amended complaint again alleged causes of
action for premises liability, negligence, and loss of consortium. It also
purported to allege claims for equitable estoppel and equitable tolling/waiver.
In connection with those claims, the Poulters asserted they were “diligent in
presenting” their injury claim to Sedgwick shortly after the accident, the
claims examiner made repeated information requests “to stretch out
negotiations,” the claims examiner affirmatively led the Poulters to believe
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the claim would be settled, and Sedgwick intended the Poulters to rely on
these statements and they did so.
Shortly thereafter, the Poulters filed a second amended complaint. In
the supporting declaration, counsel stated an amendment was necessary to
“add specificity” regarding the basis for equitable estoppel to avoid
defendants’ proposed demurrer. The amended complaint added Sedgwick as
a defendant and, as relevant to this appeal, expanded on the equitable
estoppel “claim.” Specifically, the second amended complaint alleged
Sedgwick engaged in “dilatory and deceptive tactics in negotiating with the
Poulters,” such as by having significant delays in communications, requesting
the Poulters to retrieve and provide certain medical information, and
providing slow responses to the Poulters.
The parties subsequently stipulated to the Poulters filing a third
amended complaint. The third amended complaint added further allegations
in connection with the Poulters’ equitable estoppel argument, including
details about communication delays and allegations that the claims examiner
(1) concealed that she was the Poulters’ adversary, (2) omitted that she owed
no duty to the Poulters and had conflicting interests, and (3) intended to run
out the clock on the statute of limitations. The complaint further alleged the
Poulters did not understand Sedgwick was not a neutral evaluator but
employed by Safeway, which made the Poulters over-rely on Sedgwick and
induced their reliance to their detriment.
In response, defendants filed a demurrer to the third amended
complaint, asserting that the Poulters’ claims were barred by the statute of
limitations and that the Poulters failed to state facts sufficient to support
their estoppel, waiver, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent
concealment claims. Defendants also moved to strike the provision in the
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prayer for relief requesting “all damages proximately caused by [Sedgwick’s]
acts of fraudulent concealment” and exemplary damages.
The Poulters opposed the demurrer and motion to strike. In relevant
part, they asserted that the complaint set forth “prolonged communication
gaps,” “erroneous, if not malicious advice from [Sedgwick] to the effect that
the Poulters were better off obtaining records themselves rather than relying
on Sedgwick professionals,” and Sedgwick’s misrepresentation that it was “a
disinterested party if not a fiduciary of the [Poulters] which led the [Poulters]
to over-rely on the representations and omissions of Sedgwick professionals.”
The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the third amended
complaint without leave to amend. The court initially noted that the
Poulters’ claims “appear to be based on the misunderstanding that
Sedgwick … somehow had a duty to [the Poulters] to analyze their legal
claims and provide legal advice regarding those claims,” a position taken
without the support of any legal authority. The court concluded that the
complaint was untimely, and defendants were not estopped from asserting
the statute of limitations as a defense. Specifically, the complaint did not
allege that Sedgwick made materially misleading statements or conduct,
Sedgwick did not state it represented or was acting on behalf of the Poulters,
and there was no discussion between the parties regarding legal claims or the
statute of limitations. The court also found the complaint did not adequately
allege that Sedgwick waived the statute of limitations defense as neither
settlement offer addressed the statute of limitations or proposed waiving any
claim or defense.
Finally, the court concluded the complaint failed to adequately allege
causes of action for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment
because the Poulters did not demonstrate Sedgwick owed any duty to them.
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It also granted defendants’ motion to strike because the Poulters had failed to
adequately allege a claim for fraudulent concealment. The court denied leave
to amend because the Poulters did not request leave and had “not even
attempted to meet their burden of proving there [was] a reasonable
possibility of amendment.”
The court dismissed the action with prejudice, and the Poulters timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We independently review the complaint to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action and overcome the demurrer. (Nolte
v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1405–1406.) If
a proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists, we will affirm the order
even if the trial court relied on an improper ground. (Cantu v. Resolution
Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 880, fn. 10.) We assume all material
facts properly pleaded in the complaint are true and interpret the complaint
in its entirety and with its parts in their context. (Schmier v. City of Berkeley
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 549, 553, fn. 4; Gibbs v. County of Humboldt (2026) 120
Cal.App.5th 565, 572.) However, we disregard contentions, deductions, and
conclusions of fact or law. (Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63
Cal.4th 148, 152.) Likewise, “we are not bound to respect a pleader’s ‘legal
characterization’ of events or transactions.” (O’Grady v. Merchant Exchange
Productions, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 771, 777.)
Even if we find a demurrer was properly sustained, we must determine
whether it was an abuse of discretion to deny the plaintiff leave to amend.
(Lee v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 848, 854.) In so doing, we determine “ ‘ “whether there is a
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reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” ’ ” (Gibbs
v. County of Humboldt, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 572.) Plaintiffs bear the
burden of identifying allegations that can cure the defect and may meet this
burden for the first time on appeal. (Ibid.)
II. Statute of Limitations
The Poulters do not dispute that their complaint was filed beyond the
applicable statute of limitations. However, they contend the trial court erred
by declining to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent defendants
from asserting a statute of limitations defense. They also assert California
Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2695.7, subdivision (f) (section 2695.7(f))
required Sedgwick to inform them of the applicable limitations periods for
their claims, and its failure to do so prohibits enforcement of the statute of
limitations. We disagree.
A. Equitable Estoppel
We review the ruling de novo as the trial court decided the matter on
demurrer. (Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1315
(Steinhart) [when the facts are undisputed, estoppel is a question of law].)
To establish equitable estoppel, the Poulters were required to allege
“ ‘the following elements: (a) a representation or concealment of material
facts (b) made with knowledge, actual or virtual, of the facts (c) to a party
ignorant, actually and permissibly, of the truth (d) with the intention, actual
or virtual, that the ignorant party act on it, and (e) that party was induced to
act on it.’ ” (Behnke v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th
1443, 1462.) “ ‘The essence of an estoppel is that the party to be estopped has
by false language or conduct “led another to do that which he [or she] would
not otherwise have done and as a result thereof that he [or she] has suffered
injury.” ’ ” (Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1315.) An estoppel may arise
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even absent intentional fraud. (Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th
363, 384 (Lantzy).)
The Poulters contend equitable estoppel bars defendants from asserting
the statute of limitations because Sedgwick’s investigation, requests for
information, and statement that the claim would be resolved “fairly quickly”
led them to believe the parties would resolve their claims without litigation.
The question is whether these allegations describe conduct that reasonably
induced the Poulters to forgo timely suit. In deciding that question, we must
analyze whether the Poulters’ alleged reliance on representations made by
Sedgwick was reasonable. (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 384–385
[requiring plaintiff to have been reasonably induced to forbear suing within a
statutory limitations period].) We also analyze whether Sedgwick’s
statements were sufficiently clear to justify a reasonable person’s reliance, as
“ ‘[c]ertainty is essential to all estoppels.’ ” (Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 1318, italics omitted.)
Courts have applied equitable estoppel when a defendant made
affirmative representations that it knew were false, which reasonably
induced a plaintiff to delay filing suit. In Vu v. Prudential Property &
Casualty Ins. Co., (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1142, for example, an insurance company
inspector advised the plaintiff not to file a claim because the total cost of
repairs was less than the policy’s deductible. (Id. at p. 1152.) The California
Supreme Court concluded estoppel was appropriate if the plaintiff could
prove he reasonably relied on the defendant’s representations. (Id. at
pp. 1153–1154.) Similarly, in Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp. (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 907, the defendant promised to pay any actual future damages,
and the court concluded the plaintiffs acted reasonably in refraining from
filing suit while the defendant was complying with its promise. (Id. at
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pp. 925–927.) In Union Oil Co. of California v. Greka Energy Corp. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 129, 138, the court found equitable estoppel appropriate
where the defendant “urged” the plaintiff to suspend legal action pending
completion of the settlement negotiations. (Ibid.; see also Battuello v.
Battuello (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 842, 847–848 [equitable estoppel applied
where defendant made express promises during settlement negotiations that
induced plaintiff’s forbearance from filing suit within the applicable
limitations period]; but see Benner v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1945) 26 Cal.2d
346, 349 [employer was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as
a defense where, in discussions with employee’s husband, the employer had
expressed a preference to settle, and the employer and its insurance carrier
made repeated requests for “ ‘more time’ ” to complete their investigation and
asked the husband “to wait” until the medical examination].) Similarly, in
Muraoka v. Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc. (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 107, the court
applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel where the defendant “ ‘promise[d]
that plaintiff would be fully compensated for his damages.’ ” (Id. at p. 116.)
By contrast, courts have declined to apply equitable estoppel when a
defendant’s conduct fails to clearly indicate that a timely lawsuit is
unnecessary. For example, in Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th 363, the Court of
Appeal noted “ ‘[the plaintiffs] alleged in their complaint that Centex had
repeatedly promised to repair the damage to their homes,’ ” and it concluded
that allegation was sufficient to equitably estop the defendants from
asserting the statute of limitations. (Id. at p. 385.) The California Supreme
Court disagreed. It explained the complaint alleged that the defendants
attempted to make various repairs, advised the plaintiffs that the defective
windows were not defective and not to file a lawsuit, but did not properly
repair the windows and associated damage. (Ibid.) But these allegations
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nevertheless failed to establish estoppel because the complaint was “devoid of
any indication that defendants’ conduct actually and reasonably induced
plaintiffs to forbear suing” or that such repairs “would have obviated the need
for suit.” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
The same principle applies to ongoing claim review. In Kumar v. Mid-
Century Ins. Co. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1208, the plaintiff alleged that Mid-
Century “intended to mislead him by ‘repeatedly telling’ him to ‘ “please
submit any additional information for our review.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1226.) The
court concluded these allegations were insufficient to support equitable
estoppel. (Ibid.) As similarly recognized in Vishva Dev, M.D., Inc. v. Blue
Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1225,
allowing an insurer’s consideration of inquiries or new information to extend
the limitations period could undermine the public policy of encouraging
insurers to reconsider claim denials when presented with potentially new
facts.
Here, the complaint does not allege conduct that reasonably induced
the Poulters to believe they could forgo timely suit. Sedgwick investigated
their claim, requested information, and, when asked about timing, stated
that they believed it would be resolved “fairly quickly” after the receipt of
additional information. But defendants never made any representation
about the outcome of the investigation. They did not agree to pay all the
damages sought by the Poulters, represent that particular categories of
damages would be covered, or otherwise indicate that the claim would be
fully resolved without litigation. Nor does the complaint allege any promise
or assurance concerning the ultimate disposition of the claim or any requests
to forgo the filing of a legal action.
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The statement that the claim would be resolved “fairly quickly” and for
an uncertain sum is not enough as it lacks the clarity necessary for
reasonable reliance. At most, it conveyed an expectation about the timing of
the claims process. It did not assure the Poulters that defendants would pay
all the claimed damages or resolve every aspect of the claim in a manner that
would eliminate the need for a lawsuit. As in Lantzy, the complaint does not
allege facts showing that defendants’ conduct reasonably induced the
Poulters to forgo litigation or that the anticipated claim resolution would
obviate the need to sue. And, as Kumar confirms, requests for information
and continued claim review, without more, do not establish equitable
estoppel.
Courts distinguish between affirmative assurances that reasonably
lead a plaintiff to believe litigation is unnecessary and claim-related
communications that do not support that inference. We conclude that the
investigation of a claim, coupled with a statement that the claim is expected
to resolve “fairly quickly,” does not estop defendants from asserting the
statute of limitations. The complaint fails to allege a misrepresentation on
which the Poulters reasonably relied concerning the necessity of bringing a
timely action. (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 384, fn. 18.) Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in rejecting the Poulters’ equitable estoppel theory.1
B. California Code of Regulations, Title 10, Section 2695.7,
Subdivision (f)
The Poulters contend section 2695.7(f) supports their equitable estoppel
claim because it requires an insurer to provide advanced written notice of any
1 Because we conclude the complaint fails to allege a misrepresentation
bearing on the necessity of bringing a timely suit, we need not reach the
Poulters’ arguments regarding reasonable reliance or agency.
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limitations period on which it may rely to deny a claim. Section 2695.7(f)
requires that “every insurer shall provide written notice of any statute of
limitation or other time period requirement upon which the insurer may rely
to deny a claim,” except where a claim has been settled by payment. “The
term ‘claimant’ is defined to include both a ‘first party claimant,’ . . . and a
‘third party claimant,’ ” the latter of which is defined as “ ‘any person
asserting a claim against any person or the interests insured under an
insurance policy.’ ” (Superior Dispatch, Inc. v. Insurance Corp. of New York
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 175, 188.) The regulation, however, does not
establish a basis for equitable estoppel under the circumstances alleged here.
First, the complaint does not allege facts establishing that either
defendant is an “insurer” subject to section 2695.7(f). The regulation
expressly applies to insurers, which the California Code of Regulations
defines, in relevant part, as “a person licensed to issue or that issues an
insurance policy or surety bond in this state, or that otherwise transacts the
business of insurance in the state.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2695.2,
subd. (i).) The definition expressly excludes insurance agents and brokers.
(Ibid.)
In reviewing a demurrer, we treat the complaint as containing
judicially noticeable facts, even if a pleading “ ‘ “ ‘contains an express
allegation to the contrary.’ ” ’ ” (State of California ex rel. Metz v. CCC
Information Services, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 402, 412.) A plaintiff also
may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended
complaint that contradict the facts pleaded in the original complaint. (Ibid.)
Here, the third amended complaint alleges that Safeway is a “corporation”
and Sedgwick is “in the business of third-party claims adjustment.” It
further alleges that, after the Poulters submitted a personal injury claim to
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Safeway, Sedgwick “acted as the authorized agent of Safeway and as the
adversarial adjuster of the Poulter’s [sic] claim.” The complaint does not
allege that either defendant is licensed to issue insurance policies, issues
such policies, or otherwise transacts the business of insurance. Nor does it
allege that an insurer was involved in processing the Poulters’ claim.
The Poulters contend Sedgwick performed functions ordinarily
undertaken by an insurer or its claims representative. But performing
claims-adjustment functions does not, without more, establish that Sedgwick
or Safeway falls within the regulation’s definition of an insurer. The
complaint’s allegations thus do not establish that either defendant is subject
to section 2695.7(f).
Second, the complaint does not allege that defendants relied on a
limitations period to deny the Poulters’ claim. To the contrary, Sedgwick
made a settlement offer, which the Poulters rejected. Defendants invoked the
statute of limitations only after the Poulters filed a tort action against them.
Thus, defendants did not invoke the limitations period to deny the underlying
claim. Rather, they asserted it as a defense to the subsequent lawsuit. The
circumstances alleged do not bring defendants’ conduct within the notice
requirement on which the Poulters rely.
Third, the cases cited by the Poulters do not support extending section
2695.7(f) to require notice of the limitations period governing a potential tort
action and, in fact, demonstrate its inapplicability to tort causes of action.
Neither Spray, Gould & Bowers v. Associated Internat. Ins. Co. (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 1260 nor Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck
Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076 addresses the applicability of
section 2695.7(f). Although Spray, Gould & Bowers considered a related
provision of the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations (Cal. Code
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Regs., tit. 10, § 2695.4, subd. (a)2), the court explained the purpose of the
regulations was to require insurers to notify claimants of applicable time
limits under their insurance policies. (Spray, Gould & Bowers, at p. 1269.)
Specifically, the court described the regulation as imposing “an unmistakable
duty to advise . . . claimant insureds of applicable claim time limits,” because
its purpose is “designed to alert insureds to their insurance policy
obligations.” (Ibid.)
That reasoning does not support the Poulters’ broader interpretation of
section 2695.7(f). The provision at issue requires notice of a limitations
period on which an insurer may rely to deny a claim. It does not require an
insurer to advise a claimant of the limitation periods governing unspecified
tort causes of action that the claimant might later assert against the insurer
or another party.
Finally, the Poulters contend that application of section 2695.7(f)
presents a factual question that cannot be resolved on demurrer. We
disagree. Whether section 2695.7(f) applies to the facts alleged is a question
of law. Although we accept properly pleaded factual allegations as true,
those allegations do not establish that either defendant is an insurer subject
to the regulation, that defendants relied on a limitations period to deny the
Poulters’ claim, or that the regulation requires notice of the limitations
period governing a subsequent tort action. The Poulters’ reliance on section
2695.7(f) therefore does not provide a basis for equitable estoppel.
2 Section 2695.4, subdivision (a) states, “Every insurer shall disclose to
a first party claimant or beneficiary, all benefits, coverage, time limits or
other provisions of any insurance policy issued by that insurer that may
apply to the claim presented by the claimant.”
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III. Failure To State a Claim
Plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s ruling that the third amended
complaint failed to state a claim as to the fraudulent concealment and
negligent misrepresentation causes of action. We address each in turn.
A. Fraudulent Concealment
“[T]he elements of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are:
‘ “(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the
defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff,
(3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact
with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been
unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of
the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or
suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” ’ ”
(Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 830,
850.)
The Poulters assert that, once Sedgwick began communicating with
them about their claim, it “had a duty not to omit material facts necessary to
make those communications not misleading.” They identify three alleged
omissions: Sedgwick’s failure to disclose the statute of limitations, its ability
to obtain requested records directly from providers, and its continued
requests for information that it either did not need or could have obtained
independently. None supports a cause of action for fraudulent concealment.
First, as discussed above, section 2695.7(f) does not require Sedgwick to
disclose the statute of limitations governing a potential tort action. The
Poulters cannot establish a duty to disclose the limitations period on that
basis.
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Second, the e-mail correspondence attached as exhibits to the third
amended complaint contradict the Poulters’ argument that Sedgwick misled
them about its ability to obtain records independently. In reviewing a
demurrer, we accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint,
including the contents of exhibits incorporated thereto. (Building Permit
Consultants, Inc. v. Mazur (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1409.) And when an
exhibit’s contents conflict with an allegation in the pleading, the exhibit
controls. (Ibid.)
Here, although Sedgwick asked the Poulters to provide certain
information, the parties’ communications do not indicate that Sedgwick
represented it was unable to obtain records directly from providers. To the
contrary, the e-mails show that Sedgwick was obtaining records directly from
providers. Sedgwick informed the Poulters that records were “trickling in,”
and it obtained various release authorization forms from them. The
correspondence further shows that Sedgwick’s requests for additional
information were in response to Allison’s offer to assist with the process and
her inquiry whether there was anything she could do to expedite the
requested information. Sedgwick responded that billing documents were
missing from records it had received and explained, “It will expedite the
process if you are able to get the billing instead of [Sedgwick] having to go
through our retrieval company again.”
Read in context, these communications do not support the allegation
that Sedgwick misrepresented its ability to obtain records or concealed that it
was able to pursue records independently. Rather, they indicate that
Sedgwick was attempting to gather the necessary documentation and
explained that the Poulters’ assistance in doing so could expedite the process.
The fact that Sedgwick requested information that the Poulters believed it
17
could have obtained independently does not, without more, establish that
Sedgwick intentionally concealed a material fact with the intent to defraud
them.
Nor do the communications support the broader allegation that
Sedgwick deliberately continued to request unnecessary information to
mislead the Poulters. The e-mails reflect requests for missing documentation
and efforts to expedite the retrieval process, not an intentional concealment
of material facts.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the third
amended complaint failed to state a cause of action for fraudulent
concealment.
B. Negligent Misrepresentation
The Poulters raise similar arguments in support of their negligent
misrepresentation claim. They contend Sedgwick represented that certain
documentation and records were necessary to evaluate and resolve their
claim, that those representations were unreasonable because Sedgwick could
obtain the records directly, and that Sedgwick’s statements were misleading
because it failed to disclose the applicable statute of limitations if settlement
efforts were unsuccessful. These allegations do not establish a cause of action
for negligent misrepresentation.
Generally, the elements of a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation are “ ‘(1) a misrepresentation of a past or existing material
fact, (2) made without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) made
with the intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented,
(4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage.’ ”
(Alafi v. Cohen (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 46, 65.) The Poulters’ allegations fail
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at the first element because they do not identify an actionable
misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact.
First, the complaint does not allege that Sedgwick falsely represented
that the requested documentation was necessary to evaluate the Poulters’
claim. Nor do the e-mails attached to the complaint support their contention
that Sedgwick misrepresented its ability to obtain the records directly. As
explained above, the correspondence shows that Sedgwick was in fact
obtaining records from providers and that its requests for additional
documentation were an attempt to speed up the process. The exhibits
therefore do not support the allegation that Sedgwick falsely represented
that it could not obtain the records independently.
Second, Sedgwick’s statement that the claim would be quickly resolved
once the records had been reviewed does not constitute a misrepresentation
of a past or existing fact. Rather, it expresses an expectation about the
future resolution of the claim. A prediction about a future event, even if it
ultimately proves inaccurate, is not an actionable misrepresentation of an
existing fact. (See Brakke v. Economic Concepts, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th
761, 769 [“to be actionable, a misrepresentation must be of an existing fact,
not an opinion or prediction of future events”]; see also Neu-Visions Sports,
Inc. v. Soren/McAdam/Bartells (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 303, 308 [“expressions
of opinion are not generally treated as representations of fact, and thus are
not grounds for a misrepresentation cause of action”].)
Finally, Sedgwick’s failure to disclose the statute of limitations does not
supply the missing misrepresentation. As discussed above, section 2695.7(f)
did not require Sedgwick to advise the Poulters of the limitations period
governing a potential tort action. In any event, an alleged omission does not
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transform Sedgwick’s statements about the claims-review process or its
anticipated timing into a false representation of past or existing fact.
The trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer as to the
negligent misrepresentation cause of action.
IV. Motion To Strike
The Poulters contend the trial court abused its discretion in granting
defendants’ motion to strike their punitive damages claim because they
adequately alleged fraudulent concealment.
We reject this contention. As explained above, the trial court properly
sustained defendants’ demurrer as to the fraudulent concealment cause of
action. Because the complaint does not support a claim for fraud, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in striking punitive damages. (See Abbott
Laboratories v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 642, 651 [we review an order
striking all or part of a pleading for abuse of discretion].)
V. Leave To Amend
Finally, the Poulters argue they are entitled to amend their complaint
in the event the demurrer was properly sustained. But the Poulters have the
burden to demonstrate precisely how their complaint could be amended.
(Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1153.)
“Allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary.”
(Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 44.)
Here, the Poulters assert they can “allege additional facts” concerning
the following topics: (1) their lack of knowledge of the statute of limitations
and ongoing reliance on pursuing settlement; (2) Sedgwick’s awareness of the
statute of limitations and claim that additional information was needed to
evaluate the claim; (3) Sedgwick’s duty to disclose the statute of limitations
and its failure to do so; and (4) Sedgwick’s role in evaluating and resolving
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the Poulters’ claim, including facts supporting application of section 2695.7(f).
But apart from identifying these broad categories, the Poulters fail to identify
specific facts that would bolster these causes of action. Their conclusory
statements that further facts would support these claims are insufficient
because they do not explain what those facts are, how they would resolve the
deficiencies identified by the trial court, and why they were not previously
alleged in the prior three iterations of the complaint. Accordingly, the
Poulters have not met their burden to demonstrate they can amend the
complaint to state valid causes of action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants may recover their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
PETROU, J.
WE CONCUR:
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
A171016 / Poulter v. Albertsons Safeway, LLC
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