Gunaian v. Magna Seating of America CA2/2
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 6, 2026
DocketB348071
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/6/26 Gunaian v. Magna Seating of America CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SUSAN GUNAIAN et al., B348071
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21STCV02112)
MAGNA SEATING OF AMERICA,
INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Melvin D. Sandvig, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Singleton Schreiber, Benjamin I. Siminou; Mardirossian
Akaragian, Armen Akaragian and Adam Feit for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Palmieri, Tyler, Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron, Douglas W.
Robinson, Kevin Castellanos and Alexandra N. Ardi for
Defendants and Respondents.
Appellant Susan Gunaian was paralyzed in a car accident
while driving a General Motors (GM) vehicle. Her lawsuit alleges
that respondents Magna Seating of America, Inc. (MSA) and
Magna Seating, Inc. (MSI) (collectively, Magna) supplied GM
with a driver’s seat that did not protect her spine.1 The trial
court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment.
The record shows Magna designs car seat foam and trim,
manufactures these products, and uses them to fabricate car
seats it supplies to GM. Gunaian’s experts opined that Magna’s
seats are defective and caused her injury. Assembling a defective
product and placing it in the stream of commerce is a sufficient
showing in a strict liability case. Magna cannot avoid liability by
claiming it merely followed GM’s specifications. We reverse the
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
FACTS
While driving a Chevrolet Equinox on Interstate 5 on
October 11, 2019, Gunaian was rear-ended by another motorist.
Gunaian’s seat reclined on impact and her spine struck a rear
passenger’s knees. She was paralyzed by the injury.
The Equinox is assembled by GM. The front seats consist
of a frame; cushion; tracks anchoring the seat to the vehicle; an
adjuster to move the seat forward and back; and a seat recliner.
The frame, tracks, adjuster, recliner and restraint system are not
made by Magna. MSI manufactures seat foam and trim that it
combines with other components to fabricate a completed seat.
1 The lawsuit also names GM, a car dealership, and the
motorist who struck Gunaian. They are not parties to this
appeal.
2
Magna’s collision analysis engineer Gregory Stephens has
analyzed over 2,500 auto accidents and published on auto safety,
including seat systems. He inspected the intact seat in Gunaian’s
car and saw no irregularity or failure of the seat foam. At a
second examination, the seat was deconstructed by mutual
agreement of the parties; the foam was removed, inspected,
assessed and measured. Stephens found no deformity or failure
of the foam, which complied with federal safety and industry
standards, with good overall performance and energy absorbing
characteristics. He concluded, “the benefits of the Seat Foam, in
association with the overall Subject Seat structure, outweigh any
risks.”
Jeffrey Corkins, chief engineer at MSA, declared that MSI
manufactures seat foam and trim for seat backs and cushions.
MSI’s product—along with other seat components from various
vendors—is assembled into a seat using GM’s design, material
specifications, and performance needs. GM gave Magna no
authority to modify or deviate from its design or specifications.
Corkins reviewed photos of the seat and saw no defects.
GM senior technical expert Robert Smith testified that
Magna assembles and supplies completed seats using GM’s
design, material, and performance requirements. GM installs
Magna’s seats during final assembly. He said, “[S]eat . . .
specifications are done by General Motors” and “Magna was not
involved in that.” Suppliers cannot alter designs. GM is
responsible for the entire vehicle and “It would be impossible to
engineer a vehicle if . . . suppliers were making changes.” GM
must approve any deviation from specifications.
According to Smith, GM does not dictate how MSA makes
seat foam, but it must “meet, in its final manufactured form, the
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material specifications and performance requirements set forth
by General Motors.” This includes durability and density
requirements. Magna “would have worked to [GM’s] design and
material specifications, and then what I call the final geometry of
the foam and trim that we wanted . . . would be what does
General Motors want the seat to look like when it’s all put
together. They would have had to work to that geometry.” “[T]he
final decision of how much [foam] needs to be in there to make
the finished appearance appear what we want would be at the
discretion of the supplier,” though Magna’s discretion is “not
unbounded.”
Gunaian’s responses to interrogatories were vague. She
identified “the occupant restraint system, including the seat” as
defective. Asked what component supplied or manufactured by
Magna failed to perform safely, she replied, “[D]uring a
foreseeable vehicular collision the seat should not fail and the
occupant restraint system should properly protect the occupant
using it.” Gunaian shed no further light on the basis for her
claims in subsequent discovery answers.
Gunaian’s automotive expert Steven Meyer explained that
the front seat reclines in a rear impact to “ride down” the force of
the crash. The frame center is open, to allow the occupant to
“ ‘pocket’ ” into it to avoid “ramping up and out of the seat
towards the rear compartment.” As designed, “[T]he driver’s seat
was allowed to recline sufficiently rearward such that the rear of
the seat back would have made contact with and interacted with
the second-row occupant’s legs.” And “without an effective
barrier or countermeasure preventing or protecting the open
perimeter frame from the rear seat occupant’s knees, the rear
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seat occupant’s knees would be allowed to intrude into the
pocket” and injure the driver’s back and spine.
Meyer concluded, “[I]njury risks are entirely foreseeable
and without sufficient design countermeasures to prevent such
interaction and intrusion of the rear seat occupant’s lower
extremities and knees, the driver’s seat is unreasonably
dangerous and, therefore, defective relative to rear impact crash
protection. The rear of the front ‘yielding’ seat at the open
perimeter frame is covered only by thin fabric which is
insufficient to prevent the dangerous intrusion of the rear seat
occupant’s knees into the back of the seat that is designed
purposefully and intentionally to deform/collapse rearward in
recline during the rear impact crash.”
Engineering expert Mariusz Ziejewski stated that Gunaian
suffered injury when her seatback reclined into the knees of her
rear passenger. He opined that the injury was caused by the
seat’s open perimeter frame: it placed a concentrated load on her
back and spine, which hyperextended and resulted in paralysis.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Gunaian sued GM and the dealership that sold her the
Equinox. She asserted causes of action for strict liability and
negligence, alleging that the defendants manufactured or sold a
defective car. She also sued the driver who caused the accident.
Two years later, she amended the pleading to name respondents
as Doe defendants. Her spouse, Ararat Issayan, sued for loss of
consortium. Magna answered and denied the allegations.
Magna sought summary judgment, claiming the seat did
not cause Gunaian’s injury and was built to GM’s specifications.
In discovery, she stated that the occupant restraint system was
defective. However, Magna does not manufacture restraint
5
systems and no evidence showed the seat foam was defective or
caused injuries.
Gunaian argued in opposition that she made a prima facie
showing that the driver’s seat is defectively designed and caused
or contributed to her injury. Magna offered only conclusory
statements that the seat complied with unspecified industry
standards and GM’s specifications. She asserted that Magna
“should have eliminated the risk in the open center seatback
design” and failed to show why it did not do so.
Magna replied that Gunaian offered no evidence that the
seat foam and trim were defective or caused her injuries, only
that the seat design was defective. Her experts did not mention
Magna or the seat foam. As a component supplier, Magna is not
liable for injuries caused by an end-product it did not design.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The court summarily adjudicated Gunaian’s claims. It
wrote that Gunaian’s experts did not identify defects in Magna’s
seat foam. Magna’s expert stated that the foam complied with
motor vehicle safety standards and the seat was assembled in
accordance with GM’s specifications. GM’s Smith confirmed that
GM sets the specifications and performance requirements for
foam and must approve any deviations. GM was responsible for
the design of Gunaian’s car, not Magna. The court entered
judgment for respondents.
DISCUSSION
1. Appeal and Standard of Review
The judgment is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 437c,
subd. (m)(1), 904.1., subd. (a)(1).) Summary judgment must be
granted if no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Id., § 437c,
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subd. (c).) The procedure enables courts “to cut through the
parties’ pleadings” to determine if trial is necessary. (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).)
We independently examine the record to determine if
triable issues exist. (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008)
43 Cal.4th 56, 64.) “Evidence presented in opposition to
summary judgment is liberally construed, with any doubts about
the evidence resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion.”
(Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4
Cal.5th 607, 618.)
2. Liability for a Design Defect
a. Theories of Recovery
“[M]anufacturers are not insurers of their products;” they
are liable “only when ‘defects’ in their products cause injury.”
(Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 568, fn. 5
(Soule); Harcourt v. Tesla, Inc. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 838, 846
(Harcourt).) “A manufacturer, distributor, or retailer is liable in
tort if a defect in the manufacture or design of its product causes
injury while the product is being used in a reasonably foreseeable
way. [Citations.] Because traffic accidents are foreseeable,
vehicle manufacturers must consider collision safety when they
design and build their products. Thus, whatever the cause of an
accident, a vehicle’s producer is liable for specific collision
injuries that would not have occurred but for a manufacturing or
design defect in the vehicle.” (Soule, at p. 560.) “Whether alleged
as a strict liability claim or a negligence claim, a plaintiff must
first establish the existence of a defective design.” (Demara v.
The Raymond Corp. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 545, 557 (Demara).)
Two theories underlie design defect claims. First, the
plaintiff may show a product failed to perform as safely as an
7
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
foreseeable manner (the consumer expectations test). Second, a
design is defective if risk inherent in the design outweighs its
benefit (the risk-benefit test). The focus is on the product, not on
the defendant’s conduct. (Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp. (2018) 6
Cal.5th 21, 30.)
The consumer expectations test applies if there is (1) no
common safety device in a common circumstance or (2) “an
extreme product failure or malfunction.” (Harcourt, supra, 119
Cal.App.5th at pp. 847–848.)2 The theory is used when “the
everyday experience of the product’s users permits a conclusion
that the product’s design violated minimum safety assumptions,
and is thus defective regardless of expert opinion about the merits
of the design.” (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 567; Ortiz v. Daimler
Truck North America LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 608, 619.)
Under the risk-benefit test, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the product’s design proximately caused injury. If this
burden is met, the defendant must show that, on balance, the
benefit of the design outweighs the risk inherent in the design.
(Harcourt, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 850.)
b. The Consumer Expectations Test Does Not Apply
Gunaian contends that the consumer-expectation test
applies, citing Romine v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 990 (Romine). It states, “Consumers have
expectations about whether a vehicle’s driver’s seat will collapse
2 An extreme defect is a car exploding while idling at a
stoplight; having sudden steering or brake failure as it leaves the
dealership; or rolling over and catching fire in a two-mile-per-
hour collision. (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 566, fn. 3.)
8
rearward in a rear-end collision, regardless of the speed of the
collision.” (Id. at p. 1004.)
The consumer expectations test is “not appropriate where,
as a matter of law, the evidence would not support a jury verdict
on that theory.” (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 568.) That is the
case here. “Plaintiff’s theory of design defect was one of technical
and mechanical detail. It sought to examine the precise behavior
of several obscure components of her car under the complex
circumstances of a particular accident.” (Id. at p. 570.) “[T]he
ordinary consumer of an automobile simply has ‘no idea’ how it
should perform in all foreseeable situations, or how safe it should
be made against all foreseeable hazards.” (Id. at p. 567.)
Gunaian’s claim does not implicate seat movement alone.
It concerns frame design, placement of foam, absence of an
adequate seat back barrier, seat assembly and crashworthiness.
Expert declarations demonstrate that case presents complex
technical issues. Ziejewski cited the seat’s “open perimeter frame
design” as a defect. Meyer also pointed to the frame, which “was
allowed to recline sufficiently rearward” that it contacted a
passenger’s legs without an “effective barrier or countermeasure.”
They did not specify if the defect could be cured by more padding,
or by a seat back made of rigid material, or by a seat that did not
fully recline. If Gunaian’s seat was assembled with deficient
material, reclined too far, or was affected by a rear passenger,
these are not issues within the everyday experience of consumers
and require expert opinion.
A jury would not know intuitively if car seats should or
should not have open perimeter frames, external barriers or
internal countermeasures, or be limited in rearward trajectory
when a vehicle is hit from behind. “[T]his determination involves
9
technical issues of feasibility, cost, practicality, risk, and benefit
[citation] which are ‘impossible’ to avoid [citation]. In such cases,
the jury must consider the manufacturer’s evidence of competing
design considerations [citation], and the issue of design defect
cannot fairly be resolved by standardless reference to the
‘expectations’ of an ‘ordinary consumer.’ ” (Soule, supra, 8
Cal.4th at p. 567.) The consumer expectations test does not apply
to the facts in this case because expert witnesses are needed.
(Ibid.)
This case is distinguishable from Demara, supra, 13
Cal.App.5th 545, in which the defendant designed and
manufactured a forklift that crushed the plaintiff’s foot. (Id. at p.
550.) Jurors could use their own judgment to decide whether the
forklift was defective because it should have had visible warning
lights and wheel guards to alert and protect bystanders. (Id. at
pp. 561–562.)
c. Strict Product Liability Rules
Magna offered no proof that the Equinox seat is free of
defects. Instead, it focused on its lack of control over GM’s seat
specifications and lack of discretion to change the design. Its
focus is misplaced in the context of a strict liability claim.
“If one is part of the overall production and marketing
enterprise, he may not escape liability by arguing he had no
control over the cause of the defect. To hold otherwise would
shift the focus from the product itself to an individual defendant’s
conduct. ‘California has utilized the enterprise stream of
commerce liability concept in the strict liability field without
regard for the individual defendant’s control over the cause of
defect in the product, although such control, if it exists, would
10
remain a significant factor.’ ” (Fortman v. Hemco, Inc. (1989) 211
Cal.App.3d 241, 252.)
“Design defects appear in products that, although properly
manufactured, are dangerous because they lack a critical feature
needed to ensure safe use.” (Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc.
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 180.) “A manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being.” (Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 62.) Strict liability falls “on all
parties who have mutually participated, in a dependent,
interrelated way, in designing, assembling, and marketing the
offending product.” (Gehl Brothers Manufacturing Co. v.
Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 178, 186.)
“It is the defendant’s participatory connection, for his
personal profit or other benefit, with the injury-producing
product and with the enterprise that created consumer demand
for and reliance upon the product . . . which calls for imposition of
strict liability.” (Kasel v. Remington Arms Co. (1972) 24
Cal.App.3d 711, 725.) Liability attaches even if a defendant has
no control “over the manner in which the product was designed or
manufactured.” (Bay Summit Community Assn. v. Shell Oil Co.
(1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 762, 774; Gonzalez v. Autoliv ASP, Inc.
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 780, 785–787 [airbag maker claimed it
followed the specifications of Ford Motor Company and did not
install the airbag in cars]; Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964)
61 Cal.2d 256, 261 [strict liability “encompasses defects
regardless of their source” and applies to retailers who sell
defective goods made by others].) “[E]very supplier . . . from
manufacturer to retailer, is potentially liable” but can seek
11
indemnity from other culpable defendants. (Edwards v. A.L.
Lease & Co. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033–1034.)
d. Magna Did Not Carry Its Burden of Proof
Magna claims it “did not manufacture” the Equinox seat. It
is mistaken. It did, in fact, manufacture the seat by taking
various components (frame, foam, trim) and fashioning them into
a completed seat. 3 As a seat supplier, Magna is a major
participant in bringing the Equinox to market.
Magna’s experts declared, at most, that the seat foam and
trim are defect-free. Magna disavowed responsibility for
designing the seat and blamed GM. This is not enough to sustain
summary judgment in a product liability case. GM’s Smith
testified that “the final decision of how much [foam] needs to be
in [the seat] . . . would be at the discretion of the supplier.” This
suggests that Magna may be directly responsible for the lack of
foam in the center of the seat.
MSA’s Corkins looked at post-accident photos and said,
without elaboration, that based on his “familiarity with MSI’s
manufacturing quality control procedures . . . the Subject Seat
was not defective in manufacture or design.” There is no showing
that Corkins is an expert in design safety. His familiarity with
seat foam quality control does not mean the seat performs safely
in a collision. Neither Corkins nor Stephens addressed technical
3 State statutes define a manufacturer as one who
manufactures, assembles or produces goods. (Civ. Code, § 1791,
subd. (j).) “ ‘To manufacture’ means to make, process . . . finish in
whole or in part, or to assemble . . . any articles or materials.”
(Lab. Code, § 2650, subd. (a); see Gund v. County of Trinity (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 185, 196 [courts may use interpretations of
similar words in state statutes].)
12
issues within the manufacturer’s knowledge such as the danger
posed by the design and the feasibility and cost of safer
alternative designs. (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20
Cal.3d 413, 431.) Without a risk-benefit showing, Magna’s
motion for summary judgment cannot be granted. (Ibid.;
Demara, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 562–563.)
Apart from not addressing the risks and benefits of its seat,
Magna presented no causation evidence. Ziejewski stated that
Gunaian suffered injury when her seatback reclined into the
knees of a rear passenger; the seat’s open perimeter frame placed
a concentrated load on her back and spine, which hyperextended
and caused paralysis. Magna offered no admissible evidence that
seat design or foam placement was unrelated to or did not cause
Gunaian’s injury.4 This is another basis for denying summary
judgment. (Demara, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 555.)
Blaming the motorist who struck Gunaian as the cause of
her injury does not insulate Magna from liability. “[A] car
manufacturer may be liable for injuries sustained in a car
accident where a defect, though not the cause of the accident,
causes or contributes to the plaintiff’s injuries.” (Union Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Ameron Pole Products LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th
4 Magna cites Gunaian’s vague discovery responses as proof
that the seat foam did not cause injury. The absence of
substantial responses to interrogatories does not “relieve[] [a
defendant] of his obligation to submit a reasoned expert opinion
in order to satisfy his initial burden on summary judgment.”
(Zaragoza v. Adam (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 113, 123; Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854 [a defendant moving for summary
judgment must “present evidence, and not simply point out that
the plaintiff does not possess” evidence].)
13
974, 982; Doupnik v. General Motors Corp. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d
849, 858–859 [the defendant’s defectively manufactured roof
collapsed and contributed to spinal cord injuries sustained by the
plaintiff, who negligently drove off the road and down an
embankment].)
e. The Component Part Defense Does Not Apply
“ ‘A component seller who simply designs a component to
its buyer’s specifications, and does not substantially participate
in the integration of the component into the design of the
product, is not liable’ ” to a consumer injured by a final product.
(Artiglio v. General Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 830, 841.)
The component part defense “applies (1) when a supplier provides
a component or raw material that is not itself defective (by virtue
of a manufacturing, design, or warning defect), (2) the component
or raw material is changed or transformed when incorporated
through the manufacturing process into a different finished or
end product, and (3) an end user of the finished product is
allegedly injured by a defect in the finished product.” (Ramos v.
Brenntag Specialties, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 500, 507–508.)
Gunaian’s experts declared that the car seat itself was
defective for lack of padding or a barrier between the seat back
and a passenger’s legs. The seat was not changed or transformed
when it was installed into a car. Gunaian was injured when her
spine contacted her passenger’s knees through the defective seat.
A car seat is “not a generic, fungible, multiuse, or off-the-
shelf component. [Citations.] Instead, it was a separate product
with a specific purpose and use.” (Romine, supra, 224
Cal.App.4th at p. 1007.) Romine’s seat collapsed in a rear-end
collision; her head struck the rear passenger seat and she was
paralyzed. (Id. at p. 994.) The court rejected the seat maker’s
14
claim that its seat (concededly designed by car manufacturer
Nissan) is a “component part.” (Id. at pp. 1006–1007.)
The component part defense does not apply here for the
reasons stated in Romine, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pages 1006–
1007. In attempting to distinguish Romine, Magna’s brief
muddies the waters, stating it “did not participate in the . . .
manufacture of the Subject Seat” and “supplied only the Seat
Foam and Trim.” However, Corkins declared, “MSI assembled
the Seat Foam & Trim . . . into the Subject Seat.” As in Romine,
Magna’s completed seat is not a “component” but a stand-alone
product that is ready to be installed in a vehicle and used by
consumers.
CONCLUSION
Magna has a substantial participatory connection to the
production of the Equinox, which could not be brought to market
without Magna’s seats. GM’s design of the alleged defect does
not immunize MSI from liability. GM gave Magna discretion to
decide how much foam to use when fabricating the seat. Magna
did not show that the benefits posed by the seat design outweigh
its risks. Gunaian has shown the existence of a triable material
fact as to Magna’s strict liability for its role in creating a
defective car seat—not just the foam and trim—and placing it in
the stream of commerce.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of Magna Seating of America, Inc.,
and Magna Seating, Inc., is reversed. The matter is remanded to
the trial court with instructions to enter an order denying
respondents’ motion for summary judgment. Appellants are
awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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