Full Opinion

Filed 10/12/26 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION* COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA K.R. et al., D088471 Petitioners, (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. J521474A-B) v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest. * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts II and III of the DISCUSSION. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate after reference to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 hearing. Devon L. Lomayesva, Judge. Petition denied. Law Office of Berta Zangari, Dominika Campbell, and Julie Wolff, for Petitioner K.R. Dependency Legal Services of San Diego, Melissa A. Chaitin; Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Inc. and Nicole J. Johnson for Petitioner D.R. No appearance for Respondent. Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Madonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Dana Shoffner, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest. K.R. (Mother) petitions for extraordinary relief from a juvenile court order sustaining section 387 supplemental petitions, terminating family reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) She asserts the court erred in ruling that she exhausted her reunification time because a recent amendment to section 361.49 applied which entitled her to additional reunification services. She also challenges the juvenile court’s: (1) disposition order removing her daughter, Ly.R., and son, Li.R. (the children) from her custody and (2) failure to consider continuation of family reunification services. D.R. (Father) joins in Mother’s arguments, raising no independent issues. In the published portion of this opinion, we disagree with Mother’s interpretation of amended section 361.49. In the unpublished 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 portion of this opinion, we reject her remaining arguments and deny the writ petition. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In early August 2024, law enforcement responded to the family home following a domestic violence incident. Mother reported that Father had become violent a few days earlier, causing her to suffer a blackeye and laceration to her lower lip. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) provided Mother and the children with an emergency protective order (EPO). After the EPO expired, the Agency developed a new safety plan involving both parents after Mother admitted that she continued to have contact with Father and they engaged in verbal altercations. Although Mother obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO), a neighbor reported daily verbal altercations between the parents. In late August 2024, the Agency filed section 300 petitions alleging ongoing domestic violence, violations of the safety plan and TRO, and a risk of serious harm to the children. The juvenile court detained the children from both parents and sustained the petitions. The juvenile court removed the children and ordered liberal supervised visitation In the interim, a substance use specialist screened Mother and required her to enroll in a treatment program that included random toxicology screenings. Mother was also ordered to participate in dependency drug court. At the six-month review hearing in late July 2025, the juvenile court ordered the children placed with the parents under family maintenance services. After the children were returned to the parents, Mother completed the dependency drug court program. In early January 2026, however, Mother described coercive control and emotional abuse by Father and sought help to separate from him. Mother and the children entered a domestic 3 violence shelter but Father tracked her location and made suicidal threats before the police required him to leave the shelter. At a late January 2026 family maintenance review hearing, the juvenile court continued placement with Mother on the condition she did not reside with Father. The court authorized announced and unannounced checks, prohibited Father from tracking Mother’s phone, and issued a TRO protecting Mother and children from Father. In February 2026, the children’s attorney filed a section 388 petition requesting the juvenile court place the children with Mother and provide reunification services to Father. In early March 2026, the juvenile court granted the petition, removed the children from Father, continued their placement with Mother, and issued a six-month TRO. In mid-March 2026, the Agency filed section 387 supplemental petitions alleging Mother had relapsed several days earlier by smoking methamphetamine in a public restroom while the children were present. She also refused to submit to testing or undergo an assessment and stated she could not care for the children. Li.R. later tested positive for methamphetamine, and tin foil consistent with drug use was found in Mother’s room at the shelter. The juvenile court detained the children from Mother and ordered supervised visitation. Mother subsequently completed an outpatient treatment program, tested negative on two drug tests, attended weekly individual counseling sessions, and met with a therapist to address her mental and emotional well- being. In mid-May 2026, Mother and Father purchased a recreational vehicle (RV) to use as the family’s home. Father planned to park the RV near the children’s school or homeschool them. 4 In late June 2026, the juvenile court held a contested adjudication hearing and took the matter under submission. At a hearing in early July 2026, the juvenile court sustained the supplemental petitions and found by clear and convincing evidence that removal from Mother was warranted because there was or would be a substantial danger to the children’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if returned home, and there were no reasonable means to protect them without removal. The juvenile court terminated reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing. 5 DISCUSSION I. Mother Misconstrues Section 361.49 Mother challenges the juvenile court’s determination that she had exhausted her reunification time at the section 387 disposition hearing in July 2026. She contends this conclusion is inconsistent with the Legislature’s recent amendment to section 361.49, adding subdivisions to section 361.49, including subdivision (b)(2), which provides that the disposition on a section 387 petition is considered the initial disposition for purposes of calculating the six-month review period. We disagree. Whether the reunification services provided to Mother satisfied the statutory requirements is a question of statutory interpretation subject to de novo review. (Tyrone W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 849.) In interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent. (John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 95– 96.) We begin with the statutory language, which is the most reliable indicator of that intent, and construe the words in context, harmonizing related provisions to avoid absurd results. (Ibid.) Section 361.5 requires the juvenile court, upon removing a child from a parent’s custody, to order the provision of child welfare services to the child, the child’s mother, and the statutorily presumed father. (Id., subd. (a).) For a child under three years old when initially removed from parental custody, reunification services are limited to six months, subject to statutory extensions of up to 12, 18 or 24 months. (Ibid.) As relevant here, section 361.5, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part: “(1) Family reunification services, when provided, shall be provided as follows: [¶] ... [¶] (B) For a child who, on the date of initial removal from the physical custody of the child’s parent or guardian, was under three years of age, court-ordered services shall 6 be provided for a period of 6 months from the dispositional hearing as provided in subdivision (e) of [s]ection 366.21, but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care, as provided in [s]ection 361.49, unless the child is returned to the home of the parent or guardian.” (Italics added.) Before 2025, section 361.49 provided that a child is “deemed to have entered foster care on the earlier of the date of the jurisdictional hearing … or the date that is 60 days after the date on which the child was initially removed from the physical custody of his or her parent.” (Former § 361.49.) Effective January 1, 2025, the Legislature amended section 361.49 to include subdivisions. The amended statute now reads: “(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), regardless of their age, a child shall be deemed to have entered foster care on the earlier of the date of the jurisdictional hearing held pursuant to Section 356 or the date that is 60 days after the date on which the child was initially removed from the physical custody of their parent or guardian. “(b)(1) When the court orders the custody of a child to be retained by the parent or guardian at disposition, even if the child was initially detained, and then subsequently removes the child at disposition on a petition brought under Section 342 or 387, the child is deemed to have entered foster care on the earlier of the date of the jurisdictional hearing held pursuant to Section 342 or 387 or the date that is 60 days after the date the child was initially removed from the physical custody of their parent or guardian on a petition brought under Section 342 or 387. “(2) The disposition on a petition brought under Section 342 or 387 shall be considered the initial disposition for purposes of paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 366.21. 7 “(c) For the purpose of calculating the date of a continued permanency review hearing pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (g) of Section 366.21 or a subsequent permanency review hearing pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 366.22, the child shall be deemed to have been originally removed from the physical custody of their parent or guardian on the date they were taken into custody by the social worker based on a petition brought under Section 342 or 387.” (§ 361.49, italics added.) The plain language of new subdivision (b)(1) limits its application to a specific circumstance, the juvenile court must have ordered the child’s custody “to be retained by the parent or guardian at disposition,” followed by a later removal at a disposition on a section 342 or 387 petition. (§ 361.49, subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (b)(2) of section 361.49 operates within that framework. It provides that the subsequent section 342 or 387 disposition is deemed the initial disposition for purposes of section 366.21, subdivision (e)(1), but it does not independently reset the reunification services period whenever a child is later removed under a section 387 petition. (§ 361.49, subd. (b)(2).) The circumstance described in section 361.49, subdivision (b) is not present here. The children were initially detained and voluntary services ordered in September 2024, but Mother did not retain custody at disposition. Rather, after a continuance, the juvenile court removed the children and ordered reunification services to the parents at a contested disposition hearing on January 24, 2025. Consistent with section 361.5, the court set the six-month review hearing for July 23, 2025. Thus, the reunification period began with the January 2025 disposition order, and the plain language of new subdivision (b)(1) of section 361.49 does not apply because Mother did not retain custody at the initial disposition. 8 The legislative history confirms this reading. To the extent new subdivision (b)(1) of section 361.49 is ambiguous, its stated purpose was to clarify “that the deadline for family reunification should not start until the dispositional hearing where reunification services are actually ordered.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2664 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 23, 2024, p. 4. (Sen. Rules Com.).) The author identified In re Damian L. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 357 (Damian L.) as the source of the confusion the amendment was intended to address, explaining that the case involved a dispute over how to calculate the date the child entered foster care after a section 387 removal. (Sen. Rules Com., at p. 5.) The author reviewed the timeline in Damian L., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th 357, noting that the children were initially removed in September 2019 but returned to their mother with family maintenance services at the June 2020 disposition hearing. (Sen. Rules Com., at p. 5.) The children were subsequently removed in January 2021 after their mother tested positive for methamphetamines. (Ibid.) At the November 2021 disposition hearing on a section 387 petition, the court ordered reunification services and set a 12- month review hearing for March 2022. (Ibid.; Damian L., at p. 368.) The county argued that the juvenile court erred in ordering reunification services because more than 24 months had elapsed since the children’s initial removal in September of 2019. (Sen. Rules Com., at p. 6.) The appellate court agreed, concluding the juvenile court erred in ordering reunification services, explaining the juvenile court should have included the period following the children’s initial removal when calculating the 18-month statutory time limit on reunification services. (Ibid.) 9 In a situation such as the one presented in Damian L., where a child is initially detained, returned to a parent at disposition, and later removed from the parent at the disposition on a section 387 petition, the intent of the Legislature was to amend section 361.49 to clarify that the statutory timelines begin to run where the initial removal from parental custody occurs on the subsequent petition. (Sen. Rules Com., at p. 6.) The Senate Judiciary Committee bill likewise explained that the bill was intended to ensure the reunification timeline does not begin when a child is returned to a parent at the initial dispositional hearing. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2664 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 14, 2024, p. 9.) It expressly distinguished that circumstance from a parent who regains custody only after reunification services have already been ordered, explaining that the amendment was not intended to cause the reunification clock to “start and stop” each time a child is returned home. (Ibid.) The instant case is unlike Damian L. Here, after their detention, the children were not returned to Mother at the initial disposition hearing and later removed from her custody at the section 387 disposition in July 2026. Instead, the children were initially removed from Mother’s custody at the contested disposition hearing in January 2025, at which time the court ordered reunification services. Mother therefore received reunification services beginning in January 2025 and continued receiving those services between the January 2025 disposition and the July 2026 section 387 disposition. Under these circumstances, treating the July 2026 section 387 disposition as a new starting point for the reunification period would extend the statutory reunification period beyond the period authorized by section 361.5. It would also disregard the condition expressly stated in section 10 361.49, subdivision (b)(1), that the parent must have retained custody at the initial disposition. Nothing in section 361.49, subdivision (b)(2) purports to create a new reunification period whenever a section 387 petition results in removal. Rather, read in context with section 361.49, subdivision (b)(1) and the legislative history, subdivision (b)(2) addresses the distinct circumstance in which the child remained in the parent’s custody at the original disposition and was later removed under a section 387 petition. Because that circumstance is not present here, the July 2026 section 387 disposition did not restart Mother’s reunification period. The juvenile court therefore correctly determined that Mother had exhausted her reunification time. II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Section 387 Disposition Order A section 387 supplemental petition permits the juvenile court to change the placement of a dependent child from the physical custody of a parent to a more restrictive level of court-ordered care. (§ 387; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.560(c).) If the court finds the allegations true, it conducts a dispositional hearing to determine whether a change in placement is warranted. (§ 387, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.565(e)(2).) The only fact necessary to modify a previous placement is that the previous disposition has not been effective in protecting the child. (§ 387, subd. (b); In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1200.) A removal order is proper if supported by clear and convincing evidence of: (1) parental inability to provide proper care for the minor; and (2) potential detriment to the minor if the child remains in the parent’s custody. (In re Jeannette S. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 52, 60.) Removal may be appropriate even without evidence that the parent is dangerous or that the minor has already been harmed. The statutory focus is instead on preventing harm before it occurs. (In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.) Thus, 11 when a supplemental petition seeks to remove the child from a parent, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the [child] if the [child] were returned home,” there are no reasonable means short of removal to protect the minor, and the Agency made reasonable efforts to avoid removal. (§ 361, subds. (c)(1) & (e).) We review the juvenile court’s findings for substantial evidence. (In re T.W., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161.) “We do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or weigh the evidence. Instead, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record in favor of the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order even if other evidence supports a contrary finding.” (Id. at pp. 1161– 1162.) When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question is whether the record “contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) Ultimately, “[t]he appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or order” on a section 387 petition. (In re T.W., at p. 1162.) At the disposition hearing on the section 387 petition, the juvenile court ordered the children removed after finding that the conditions leading to removal have not been mitigated. It found no meaningful or sustained behavioral change relating to the children’s safety. In particular, it found that Mother’s substance abuse remained unresolved because she could not explain how Li.R. had been exposed to methamphetamine. The court viewed this as evidence of a lack of insight, continuing poor judgment, and limited protective capacity. It also found continuing domestic violence and 12 codependency concerns involving both parents, noting that Mother continued to spend overnights with Father. Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s removal order because reasonable means short of removal existed under subdivision (c) of section 361. She identifies several alternatives, including intensified family maintenance while one parent lived in the RV or program housing with the children, frequent unannounced or announced checks, continued separation from Father enforced by the restraining order, frequent testing, in-home services, and structured outpatient and sober-living programs under Agency oversight. The record, however, supports the juvenile court’s finding that these alternatives were insufficient to protect the children. The evidence demonstrated not merely isolated lapses but a continuing pattern of substance abuse, poor judgment, and inability to maintain a safe separation from Father despite repeated court intervention and substantial services. Against that record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude additional conditions or services short of removal would not adequately protect the children. Mother admitted using methamphetamine in March 2026, claiming she obtained the drug for free from a stranger. By then, Mother had completed dependency drug court and a drug treatment program. Nevertheless, she relapsed and exposed Li.R. to methamphetamine, giving inconsistent responses regarding how he encountered the drug. Mother initially stated she used the drug inside a bathroom stall at a fast food restaurant while the children remained outside the stall. After Li.R. tested positive for methamphetamine, however, Mother stated she snorted the methamphetamine from the bathroom counter and Li.R. “ ‘wiped his hand 13 across the counter when I was finished.’ ” Although Mother acknowledged concern about losing her children, she also declined drug treatment. This evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that Mother’s substance abuse remained unresolved, she continued to exercise poor judgment, and lacked sufficient protective capacity to keep the children safe. The circumstances surrounding Mother’s relapse are significant because they occurred after she had already completed substantial services designed to address her substance abuse. Thus, the issue was not simply whether Mother could benefit from additional treatment. The juvenile court had evidence that prior treatment and court-ordered services had not prevented a subsequent relapse which exposed one child to methamphetamine. The court could reasonably conclude adding more outpatient services or testing, without removing the children from Mother’s physical custody, would not adequately address the demonstrated risk. Substantial evidence likewise supports the juvenile court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother continued to spend overnights with Father, raising continuing concerns about domestic violence and the parents’ codependent relationship. Those concerns were grounded in a lengthy history of domestic violence and repeated failures to maintain court- ordered separation. The family’s history of domestic violence dates back to 2020, when there were reports that the parents fought daily in front of the children and Ly.R. tried to intervene, screaming at them to stop. The family again came to the Agency’s attention after reports of screaming at their home. When law enforcement responded, they learned that Father had struck Mother in the face several days earlier while holding Li.R. Mother then stated Father could not return to the home unless he changed and got help. Yet, despite the 14 Agency’s intervention and an EPO, Mother picked Father up from jail with the children. When the EPO expired the following day, the parents were seen together outside the home, verbally fighting. After a TRO was issued, a neighbor reported that Father lived at the family’s home and the parents fought “daily.” The parents subsequently participated in domestic violence services, and the Agency reported they were “excelling in domestic violence groups.” The juvenile court therefore placed the children with the parents at the six- month review hearing in late July 2025. But approximately six months later, in early January 2026, Mother reported coercive control and emotional abuse by Father and sought help in separating from him. Mother entered a domestic violence shelter with the children expressing fear that if she returned to the family home Father would “not allow her to leave.” Yet the following day, Mother returned to the family home with the children. During a telephone call with a social worker, the parents argued while the children could be heard screaming and crying. When a social worker later visited the home to check on the children’s welfare, the parents argued in her presence. The social worker took Mother back to the shelter but she returned to the family home a few days later. In the June 2026 addendum report, Mother admitted she continued to visit Father and stay overnight with him. Although Mother initially expressed uncertainty about whether she would stay with Father, she subsequently stated the family would live together in an RV. This history provided substantial evidence from which the juvenile court could find that the parents’ domestic violence and codependent relationship remained unresolved despite repeated interventions, court orders, and services. More importantly, Mother’s conduct demonstrated that 15 court-ordered separation had not proved an effective means of protecting the children. The January 2026 TRO and restrictions on contact did not prevent Mother from resuming contact with Father or staying overnight with him. By June 2026, she was contemplating living with Father and the children in an RV. The juvenile court therefore had a reasonable basis to conclude that simply imposing the same restrictions again, without removing the children from Mother’s custody, would not sufficiently protect them. Considering the entire record, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding the conditions that had previously necessitated court intervention had not been sufficiently mitigated. Mother’s relapse and exposure of Li.R. to methamphetamine demonstrated an unresolved substance abuse and protective capacity problem, while her continued contact and overnight stays with Father despite repeated court orders demonstrated that separation from him had not been effective to safeguard the children. Given this history, the juvenile court reasonably found that no alternative means short of removal would adequately protect the children and the Agency had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal. Accordingly, the removal order is supported by substantial evidence. III. No Abuse in Denying Continuance of Reunification Services During closing argument, Mother’s counsel requested the children be placed with Mother or that reunification services be continued under section 352. Mother now contends the juvenile court erred by failing to consider continuing reunification services under section 352 because further reunification services were in the children’s best interest. A juvenile court may continue a hearing if it is not “contrary to the interest of the minor.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).) The court may also rely on 16 section 352 to extend family reunification services beyond statutory limits where “ ‘extraordinary circumstances’ ” justify an extension. (In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 762.) Such circumstances may exist when the child welfare agency has provided “ ‘inadequate services’ ” or “ ‘an external force over which [the parent has] no control’ prevented the parent from completing a case plan.” (Ibid.) When assessing the child’s interests, the court must give substantial weight to the need to promptly resolve custody, provide a stable home environment, and prevent the harm associated with extended temporary placement. (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).) A continuance may be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for the period that the evidence presented at the hearing establishes is necessary. (§ 352, subd. (a)(2).) A motion to continue ordinarily requires written notice filed at least two court days before the hearing, supported by affidavits or declarations setting forth specific facts establishing the necessity of a continuance, unless the court, for good cause, permits an oral motion. (§ 352, subd. (a)(3).) We review the denial of a request for continuance for abuse of discretion. (In re B.C. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 129, 143–144.) As an initial matter, Mother did not file a written motion to continue reunification services, as required by section 352, subdivision (a)(3). Even putting this procedural deficiency aside, however, Mother identifies no extraordinary circumstances warranting an extension of services, and none is apparent from the record. Mother emphasizes her consistent visitation and bond with the children. We do not dispute that the record supports those assertions. But a parent’s bond with the children and regular visitation, without more, do not establish extraordinary circumstances necessary to extend reunification services beyond the statutory period. The cases finding 17 extraordinary circumstances have involved circumstances materially different from those presented here, such as a parent who never received reunification services, a parent who was hospitalized for most of the reunification period while substantially complying with the reunification plan, or a parent for whom no reunification plan was ever developed. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1017 [listing cases].) Here, nothing external to Mother’s control prevented reunification, nor does the record demonstrate that the Agency failed to provide adequate services. To the contrary, Mother received and participated in substantial reunification services, including outpatient treatment, weekly individual counseling with an alcohol and drug counselor, and recovery-focused groups addressing recovery skills, substance education, and harm reduction. Despite those services, Mother relapsed on methamphetamine while the children were present, and Li.R. tested positive for methamphetamine. Thus, the evidence does not show Mother was prevented from completing her case plan by inadequate services or circumstances beyond her control. Rather, it shows the services provided had not eliminated the substance abuse and protective capacity concerns that continued to place the children at risk. Nor does Mother’s argument that additional services would have been in the children’s best interest demonstrate good cause for extending reunification services. Section 352 requires the court to weigh the potential benefit of further delay against the children’s interest in promptly achieving a stable and permanent placement. (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).) By the time of the hearing, Mother had already received extensive services, yet her relapse demonstrated that the underlying safety concerns remained unresolved. On this record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude extending 18 reunification services would prolong the children’s temporary status without a sufficient showing that additional time would result in reunification. Accordingly, even assuming the juvenile court considered Mother’s request on the merits, the record does not establish the extraordinary circumstances or good cause necessary to extend reunification services under section 352. The court acted within its discretion in declining to continue services, and we find no abuse of discretion. DISPOSITION The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. This opinion shall become final immediately upon filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) MCCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR: DO, J. CASTILLO, J. 19