O'Brien v. Midway Rent-A-Car, Inc.

Filed 10/29/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE TORIN O’BRIEN, B342575 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23SMCV02168) v. MIDWAY RENT-A-CAR, INC., Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, H. Jay Ford III, Judge. Affirmed. M.R. Parker Law, Michael R. Parker, Kenneth R. Shy, Carla Green, Billy R. Paredes, and Erika M. Prager for Plaintiff and Appellant. The Molino Firm, Richard Scott, and Jessica V. Lauro for Defendant and Respondent. __________________________________  Vehicle Code section 17150 (Section 17150) imposes vicarious liability on a motor vehicle’s owner for a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle on the part of any person operating the vehicle with the owner’s permission. This appeal answers two questions: (1) Does the federal statute known as the Graves Amendment preempt Section 17150 when applied to rental car companies?1 (2) Can a rental car company be liable for negligent entrustment solely because it did not verify that the renter of a vehicle had automobile insurance? Respondent Midway Rent-a-Car Inc. (Midway or MRC) leased a car to defendant Eddie Loza, who is not a party to this appeal. Three days later, Loza and appellant Torin O’Brien were involved in a car accident. O’Brien sued both Midway and Loza. Both parties agree O’Brien is pursuing two theories of liability against Midway: (1) vicarious liability under Section 17150 and Vehicle Code section 17151 (Section 17151), and (2) negligent entrustment because Midway leased a car to Loza without verifying he had automobile insurance. Midway moved for summary judgment on the grounds that any vicarious liability was foreclosed by the Graves Amendment, 1 The Graves Amendment is “a federal tort reform statute which purports to shield rental car companies from certain vicarious liability suits.” (Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. (11th Cir. 2008) 540 F.3d 1242, 1244 (Garcia).) The Graves Amendment was enacted in 2005. (See, e.g., Windmill Distrib. Co. LP v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (2d Cir. 2012) 449 Fed.Appx. 81, 82 [“On August 10, 2005, President Bush signed into law the Graves Amendment, which banned the imposition of vicarious liability on lessors and renters of motor vehicles for harm resulting from the operation of the vehicles”].) 2 and that it had no duty to check whether Loza had automobile insurance. The trial court granted summary judgment. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. O’Brien Files a Complaint In May 2023, O’Brien filed a complaint against Midway and Loza. Although neither party includes the complaint in the appellate record, both parties agree it alleged two causes of action: Motor Vehicle Negligence and General Negligence. Midway answered the complaint, interposing several affirmative defenses, including “No Liability/Vicarious Liability,” whereby it alleged: “Pursuant to 49 USC Section 30106, there is no vicarious liability for an owner of a motor vehicle who is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles.” B. The Court Grants Summary Judgment In December 2023, Midway moved for summary judgment. Contending its liability to O’Brien was “predicated on, essentially: ownership of the VEHICLE . . . and negligently operating the VEHICLE,” Midway argued in part, that the Graves Amendment “removes vicarious liability for MRC in this case by its mere ownership of the VEHICLE.” It also argued that “[s]tatutory law in California is clear that no cause of a[]ction can be brought against a car rental company for ‘Negligent Entrustment’ if the renter presents a facially valid driver’s license.” O’Brien opposed the motion. In April 2024, the court granted the motion, finding that the Graves Amendment shielded Midway from vicarious liability 3 for any negligence Loza committed, and that Midway did not negligently entrust the vehicle to Loza as he had a driver’s license, matched the picture on that license, and did not seem unfit to drive. In June 2024, the court entered judgment in favor of Midway and against O’Brien. O’Brien timely appealed. DISCUSSION “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.” (Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 71 (Nieto).) “The general rule is that summary judgment is appropriate where ‘all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . .’ ” (Ibid.) “A defendant moving for summary judgment meets this burden by presenting evidence demonstrating that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the action.” (Ibid.) “Once the defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to that cause of action or defense.” (Ibid.) “To determine whether the parties have met their respective burdens, we consider ‘ “all of the evidence set forth in the [supporting and opposition] papers, except that to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all [uncontradicted] inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘A trial court’s stated reasons for granting summary judgment do not bind us; we review the court’s ruling, not its rationale.’ ” (Severin Mobile Towing, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 292, 302.) 4  “It is well established that the pleadings determine the scope of relevant issues on a summary judgment motion.” (Nieto, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 74.) Although the complaint is not in the appellate record, O’Brien asserted his “case is proceeding against MRC pursuant to the ownership liability provided by Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151 and under a negligent entrustment cause of action.” Because these are the issues the parties address in their appellate briefs, and because the material facts of this case are undisputed, we analyze: (a) whether the Graves Amendment precludes any liability from Midway to O’Brien under Sections 17150 and 17151; and (b) whether Midway can be liable for negligent entrustment for renting a car to Loza without checking if he had automobile insurance. A. Midway Is Not Vicariously Liable Based on Ownership of the Vehicle Section 17150 renders the owner of a vehicle liable “for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle . . . by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.” (Veh. Code, § 17150.2) When the car is driven by someone who is not an agent of the owner and only one person is injured, Section 17151 limits this liability to $15,000 for the death or injury. (Id., § 17151, subd. (a) [“[t]he liability of an owner . . . imposed by this 2 Vehicle Code “Section 402, enacted in 1935, is the predecessor of section 17150, which was passed in 1959.” (Galvis v. Petito (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 551, 558.) Section 17151 also appears to have been enacted in 1959. 5 chapter and not arising through the relationship of principal and agent or master and servant is limited to the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for the death of or injury to one person in any one accident and, subject to the limit as to one person, is limited to the amount of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) for the death of or injury to more than one person in any one accident”].) As previously noted, the Graves Amendment is “a federal tort reform statute which purports to shield rental car companies from certain vicarious liability suits.” (Garcia, supra, 540 F.3d at p. 1244.) Specifically, 49 United States Code section 30106(a) provides that “[a]n owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person . . . shall not be liable under the law of any State . . . , by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if— [¶] (1) the owner . . . is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and [¶] (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner . . . .” Subdivision (a) is known as the “preemption clause” of the Graves Amendment. (Garcia, at p. 1246.) Both parties agree the preemption clause would excuse Midway from liability under Section 17150 if it applied. O’Brien argues it does not apply because the “savings clause” of the Graves Amendment—contained in subdivision (b)—exempts statutes like Sections 17150 and 17151. Specifically, 49 United States Code section 30106(b) provides that “[n]othing in this section supersedes the law of any State . . . [¶] (1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a 6 motor vehicle; or [¶] (2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law.” By its terms, Section 17151 assigns no liability to any party, it only limits the amount of any liability “imposed by this chapter.” (Veh. Code, § 17151, subd. (a).) If the Graves Amendment preempts Section 17150 when applied to Midway, then the limits imposed in Section 17151 are irrelevant.3 Therefore, the question before us is whether the savings clause of the Graves Amendment “saves” Section 17150. 1. The Savings Clause Does Not “Save” Section 17150 In Tavares v. Zipcar, Inc., the appellate court agreed with the respondent who “argue[d] that liability predicated solely on its ownership of the vehicle is precluded by the Graves Amendment, which shields owners engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles from vicarious liability for the negligence of their drivers.” (Tavares v. Zipcar, Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 219, 236 (Tavares).) The Court of Appeal concisely explained that “[t]he Graves Amendment preempts state laws, such as Vehicle Code section 17150, which impose vicarious liability on the owners of leased or rented vehicles based solely on their ownership. (Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. (11th Cir. 2008) 540 F.3d 1242, 1246; Carton v. GMAC (8th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 451, 456–457.) 3 To the extent O’Brien is arguing Section 17151 required Midway to carry certain amounts of insurance, such a contention is simply unsupported by the text of the statute. 7 Although the Graves Amendment contains an exception for ‘financial responsibility’ laws (49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1)), Vehicle Code section 17150 is not a financial responsibility law. (Goodson v. Perfect Fit Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 508, 514 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 102]; Garcia, supra, at pp. 1247–1249; Subrogation Div. Inc. v. Brown (D.S.D. 2020) 446 F. Supp. 3d 542, 551–552; Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co. (Fla. 2011) 60 So.3d 1037, 1042–1043; Veh. Code, § 16020.) Rather, it is precisely the type of law the Graves Amendment was designed to preempt.” (Tavares, at pp. 236–237.) Although we agree with O’Brien that we are not bound by Tavares, we do agree with the Tavares court’s conclusion that the Graves Amendment preempts Section 17150 and we take this opportunity to contribute to the jurisprudence. The Graves Amendment “does not define the term ‘financial responsibility.’ ” (Garcia, supra, 540 F.3d at p. 1246.) In Garcia, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “Congress used the term ‘financial responsibility law’ to denote state laws which impose insurance-like requirements on owners or operators of motor vehicles, but permit them to carry, in lieu of liability insurance per se, its financial equivalent, such as a bond or self- insurance.” (Id. at p. 1247; see also Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) [defining “Financial Responsibility Act” as a “state statute conditioning license and registration of motor vehicles on proof of insurance or other financial accountability”].) Citing Garcia, O’Brien agrees that “ ‘financial responsibility law’ . . . denote[s] ‘insurance-like’ financial responsibility laws.” We agree that Congress used the term “financial responsibility law” to refer to laws that require owners or operators of motor vehicles to show financial responsibility for 8 negligent or wrongful acts or omissions committed in the operation of the motor vehicle, whether through carrying insurance, posting a bond, or some other method such as being self-insured. Thus, a law “imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle” (49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1)) is a law that conditions the ability of a car owner to register and operate that car on providing proof of insurance or other means of financial accountability such as a bond or self- insurance. Similarly, a law “imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law” (id., § 30106(b)(2)) is a law that imposes liability on a rental car company that fails to carry the requisite amount of insurance or show other means of financial accountability. Under this interpretation, the savings clause self-evidently does not include Section 17150. Section 17150 has nothing to do with requiring a car owner to show proof of insurance or other financial responsibility in order to register or operate that car, or with imposing liability on a rental car company for failing to carry insurance or its equivalent. Rather, Section 17150 “impose[s] vicarious liability on the owners of leased or rented vehicles based solely on their ownership.” (Tavares, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 236–237.) If the savings clause does not include Section 17150, then the preemption clause applies, and Midway is not liable to O’Brien under Section 17150. 9  2. O’Brien’s Arguments to the Contrary Are Unpersuasive O’Brien makes three arguments about why we should interpret the savings clause to include Section 17150: (a) Section 17150 is part of California’s financial responsibility law; (b) Congress enacted the savings clause “to ensure financial responsibility” (initial capitalization removed); and (c) interpreting the savings clause as we do precludes injured motorists from recovering under their own uninsured motorists’ coverage. In his reply brief, O’Brien also cites cases from the Supreme Courts of Nevada, Minnesota, and Connecticut, contending they support his arguments here. We address each contention in turn. (a) Whether Section 17150 Is Part of California’s Financial Responsibility Law Citing Wildman v. Government Employees’ Ins. Co. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 31 (Wildman), O’Brien argues that “Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151 are part of the financial responsibility laws for owners of motor vehicles in California,” and thus the savings clause of the Graves Amendment exempts them from the preemption clause.4 4 Although these sections are located in the Division of the Vehicle Code entitled “Civil Liability” (and not in the Division entitled “Financial Responsibility Laws”), O’Brien points out that Vehicle Code section 7 states: “Division, chapter, and article headings do not in any manner affect the scope, meaning, or intent of the provisions of this code.” 10  First, our task is not to determine whether California considers Section 17150 part of its financial responsibility law. Rather, we decide whether Congress intended to exempt laws like Section 17150 from the preemption clause of the Graves Amendment. (In re Marriage of Vaughn (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 451, 456 [in interpreting federal statute, “[o]ur goal is to give effect to Congress’s intent”].) On this question, Wildman provides no guidance. Second, even if Section 17150 were part of California’s financial responsibility law, as discussed above, it would not be “saved” because it is not a law “imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle” (49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1), italics added) or “imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law” (id., § 30106(b)(2), italics added). Section 17150 imposes vicarious liability on vehicle owners solely because they own the vehicle. In any case, Wildman does not hold that Sections 17150 or 17151 are part of California’s financial responsibility law. In Wildman, our Supreme Court analyzed an insurance policy provided by the defendant, which contained a provision that “[s]uch insurance as is afforded by this policy for bodily injury liability or property damage liability shall comply with the provisions of the motor vehicle financial responsibility law of any state or province which shall be applicable . . . .” (Wildman, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 38.) Our high court then discussed former Vehicle Code section 415—entitled “Requisites of Motor Vehicle Liability Policy”—and quoted a lower court’s statement that 11 “ ‘Section 415 is a part of the Financial Responsibility Law.’ ” (Id. at pp. 37, 38.) The Supreme Court also discussed former Vehicle Code section 402, which, similar to the present section 17150, provided: “ ‘Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or injury to person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner, and the negligence of such person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil damages.’ ” (Wildman, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 39.) The court concluded that “for an insurer to issue a policy of insurance which does not cover an accident which occurs when a person, other than the insured, is driving with the permission and consent of the insured is a violation of the public policy of this state as set forth in sections 402 and 415 of the Vehicle Code.” (Ibid.) “Inasmuch as sections 402 and 415 of the Vehicle Code set forth the public policy of this state such laws must be considered a part of every policy of liability insurance even though the policy itself does not specifically make such laws a part thereof.” (Id. at p. 40.) But although Wildman quoted with approval an appellate court case that stated former Vehicle Code section 415 was part of the “Financial Responsibility Law,” no such statement was made about section 402. Moreover, O’Brien misses the mark with his arguments that “[w]hen Vehicle Code section 402 was changed to Vehicle Code section 17150, the public policy regarding ownership liability did not change, as evidenced by the nearly identical language in the new code provision” and that Section 17150 must be part of California’s financial responsibility law because the 12 Legislature “did not enact financial responsibility laws for the empty purpose of establishing an ability to pay for damages that could never be accessed.” The question before us is not whether California’s public policy endorses vicarious ownership liability, or whether, decades before the Graves Amendment, the Legislature enacted a scheme for compensating car accident victims that includes Section 17150. The question is whether Congress preempted that purported public policy or scheme by enacting the Graves Amendment. (b) Congress’s Intent O’Brien argues that when Congress exempted laws “imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law,” “it is significant that Congress used the term ‘liability’ rather than a term like ‘a fine’ or ‘a penalty,’ . . . as it connotes accountability to the victim of a tort rather than merely to the State.” O’Brien does not explain what this significance is. To the extent he contends the Graves Amendment exempts laws imposing liability on rental car companies that fail to meet their state’s insurance requirements, Section 17150 is not such a law. It imposes liability due to the status of ownership, not because the owner failed to carry sufficient insurance or its equivalent. O’Brien also argues that if Section 17150 is not covered by the savings clause then “the saving clause in the Graves Amendment has little meaning.” He asks rhetorically that “[i]f Congress did not intend to exempt a law like California’s Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151 from the Graves Amendment, what did it have in mind? Surely Congress did not intend to 13 impose a bare requirement to maintain insurance or self- insurance that would never be available.” As to what laws Congress had in mind when it enacted the savings clause, the Eleventh Circuit gave two examples: “States may require insurance or its equivalent as a condition of licensing or registration, or may impose such a requirement after an accident or unpaid judgment. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1). They may suspend the license and registration of, or otherwise penalize, a car owner who fails to meet the requirement, or who fails to pay a judgment resulting from a collision. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2). They simply may not impose such judgments against rental car companies based on the negligence of their lessees. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a).” (Garcia, supra, 540 F.3d at p. 1249.) Nor is there any merit to O’Brien’s contention that our interpretation of the savings clause would create a situation in which Midway would be required to obtain insurance (or self- insure) but then would never have reason to use this insurance. The preemption clause of the Graves Amendment preempts only laws when “there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner.” (49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2).) In other words, if Midway were negligent in its actions (either because it was Midway’s employee who negligently caused an accident or because Midway negligently entrusted the vehicle to a renter), the Graves Amendment would be inapplicable. In such situations, Midway’s insurance (or self-insurance) would presumably be available. (c) Uninsured Motorists’ Coverage Finally, O’Brien argues that if we interpret the Graves Amendment as Midway urges, “individuals injured in auto 14 accidents involving rented vehicles would be unable to recover under their own uninsured motorist policies” because “rental car companies [would] never have to pay their policies, thus barring uninsured motorist coverage.” O’Brien forfeits this argument for failing to cite any legal authority or provide any reasoned argument supporting it. (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 [“we may disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority”]; Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545 [“ ‘an appellate brief “should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration” ’ ”]; Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [“We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants”].) “The theory behind uninsured motorist coverage is to place the injured insured motorist in approximately the same position as he or she would have been, had the tortfeasor complied with the law and had carried, at least, the minimum statutorily required insurance coverage.” (Weston Reid, LLC v. American Ins. Group, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 940, 949.) Thus, if a rental car company leases a car to an uninsured driver who is then negligently involved in an accident that injures someone, O’Brien does not explain why the injured party’s uninsured motorist coverage would not apply given that the tortfeasor—the negligent driver—was uninsured. (d) O’Brien’s Reply Citations In his reply brief, O’Brien cites Malco Enterprises of Nevada, Inc. v. Woldeyohannes (2024) 559 P.3d 875 (Malco), 15 Meyer v. Nwokedi (2010) 777 N.W.2d 218 (Meyer), and Rodriguez v. Testa (2010) 993 A.2d 955 (Rodriguez) in support of his arguments. All are inapposite or support our analysis. (i) Malco Enterprises of Nevada, Inc. v. Woldeyohannes Nevada Revised Statutes section 482.295 provides that a car intended to be leased to a short-term renter cannot be registered until the owner of the car demonstrates the financial ability to “respond to damages” by providing evidence of insurance.5 Nevada Revised Statutes section 482.305 in turn provides that a rental car company who permits a renter to drive on the highways and has not shown it has obtained insurance to cover the renter arising out of the renter’s negligence “is jointly and severally liable” with the car renter for damages caused by the latter’s negligence in driving the vehicle.6 5 (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 482.295 [“The Department or a registered dealer shall not register a vehicle intended to be leased by a short-term lessor until the owner demonstrates to the Department the owner’s financial ability to respond to damages by providing evidence of insurance as that term is defined in NRS 485.034”].) Nevada Revised Statutes section 485.034 defines “Evidence of Insurance” to mean either the information provided by an insurer in an approved form, or a certificate of self- insurance issued by the state. 6 (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 482.305 [“[t]he short-term lessor of a motor vehicle who permits the short-term lessee to operate the vehicle upon the highways, and who has not complied with NRS 482.295 insuring or otherwise covering the short-term lessee against liability arising out of his or her negligence in the (Fn. is continued on the next page.) 16  In Malco, the Nevada Supreme Court analyzed whether the Graves Amendment preempted Nevada Revised Statutes section 482.305 and concluded it did not. (Malco, supra, 559 P.3d at p. 876.) Citing a previous decision, the Nevada Supreme Court explained that “NRS 482.295 requires short-term lessors to provide evidence of minimum coverage on rental vehicles as a condition of DMV registration. In turn, NRS 482.305 requires that the independent minimum coverage provided under NRS 482.295 must also cover short-term lessees in order for the lessor to avoid joint and several liability to the injured third-party claimant for damages caused by the lessee.” (Id. at p. 880.) Additionally, “the lessor’s coverage under NRS 482.305 only serves to ‘step in’ and compensate the victim when damages ‘exceed the lessee’s personal insurance limits,’ ” and therefore “NRS 482.305 does not impose strict vicarious liability upon lessors ‘based on the negligence of their lessees.’ ” (Id. at p. 881.) Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that Nevada Revised Statutes 482.305 was a law “ ‘imposing liability [on lessors] . . . for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability operation of the rented vehicle in limits of not less than $25,000 for any one person injured or killed and $50,000 for any number more than one, injured or killed in any one crash, and against liability of the short-term lessee for property damage in the limit of not less than $20,000 for one crash, is jointly and severally liable with the short-term lessee for any damages caused by the negligence of the latter in operating the vehicle and for any damages caused by the negligence of any person operating the vehicle by or with the permission of the short-term lessee, except that the foregoing provisions do not confer any right of action upon any passenger in the rented vehicle against the short-term lessor”].) 17 insurance requirements under State law’ pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2).” (Malco, at p. 881.) Here, unlike Nevada Revised Statutes section 482.305, Section 17150 imposes no liability on Midway for failing to meet the insurance requirements for registering a car with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Nor does coverage under Section 17150 only “step in” when a renter’s insurance is insufficient. Section 17150 simply makes a car owner vicariously liable (subject to the limits established in Section 17151) in a way preempted by the Graves Amendment. (ii) Meyer v. Nwokedi and Rodriguez v. Testa In Meyer, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed Minnesota Statutes section 169.09, subdivision 5a, which provides: “Whenever any motor vehicle shall be operated within this state, by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle in the operation thereof.” (Meyer, supra, 777 N.W.2d at p. 227.) The court noted that “[t]his statute has consistently been interpreted as creating vicarious liability as to vehicle owners when none existed at common law” and thus “is not a financial responsibility law that limits, or conditions liability of the rental- vehicle owner for failure to meet insurance-like requirements or liability insurance requirements within the meaning of the (b)(2) savings clause” of the Graves Amendment, and thus was preempted by the Graves Amendment. (Id. at pp. 227–228.) Similarly, in Rodriguez, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined whether General Statutes section 14–154a was preempted by the Graves Amendment. (Rodriguez, supra, 993 18 A.2d at p. 957.) Subdivision (a) of that statute provides in relevant part: “ ‘Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner.’ ” (Rodriguez, at p. 964.) The Connecticut Supreme Court found the Graves Amendment preempted this statute. (Ibid.) Here, Section 17150 also creates vicarious liability as to vehicle owners and “is not a financial responsibility law that limits, or conditions liability of the rental-vehicle owner for failure to meet insurance-like requirements or liability insurance requirements within the meaning of the (b)(2) savings clause.” (Meyer, supra, 777 N.W.2d at pp. 227–228.) It is similarly preempted by the Graves Amendment. The savings clause of the Graves Amendment does not “save” Sections 17150 or 17151 when those statutes are used to impose vicarious liability on rental car companies. Therefore, as a matter of law, O’Brien cannot prevail against Midway on a theory of vicarious liability. B. Midway Is Not Liable to O’Brien for Negligent Entrustment “ ‘ “ ‘Liability for the negligence of the incompetent driver to whom an automobile is entrusted does not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known by the owner.’ ” ’ ” (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565; see also CACI No. 724 (2026 ed.) (“Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle”) [element of cause of 19 action includes that defendant knew or should have known driver “was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle”].) O’Brien points to no evidence that Loza displayed any incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness that was either known or should have been known to Midway. Instead, he argues that if Midway “knew that its self-insurance did not cover the uninsured driver of its vehicle, then it had a duty to determine whether the driver had insurance.” This is because “[i[t is foreseeable that some of [Midway’s] renters will cause motor vehicle accidents” and if Midway’s self-insurance does not cover renters of the vehicle, and Midway fails to obtain proof that its renters are insured, “then it is foreseeable that it will rent to uninsured motorists that cause accidents.” “To allow rental car companies to make money by renting a vehicle they own to uninsured motorists, while being immune from liability as an owner, goes against public policy of this state.” O’Brien cites no authority to support his assertion that Midway owes the public a duty to check whether its renters have automobile insurance. To the extent he asks us to interpret “incompetency” to include the state of lacking automobile insurance, or to otherwise create a previously unrecognized duty for rental car companies to check the insurance status of its renters, this question “should be addressed to the Legislature.” (Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 711, fn. 5; see also Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1069 [“because the Legislature is better suited to ‘weigh the competing consumer, business, and public safety considerations that present themselves in the rental car context’ [citation], any expansion of the duty of investigation imposed on rental car agencies is a matter for legislative, not judicial, action”].) 20  This is especially so because the Legislature has already imposed various requirements relating to car rentals without requiring the lessor to verify the lessee has the requisite insurance. For example, Vehicle Code section 14608 prohibits a lessor from renting a vehicle to someone unless the person has a license and the lessor has inspected the license to ensure it is the lessee’s.7 Vehicle Code section 14609 specifies the records a lessor is required to keep.8 Additionally, Division 3, Part 4, Title 5, Chapter 1.5 of the Civil Code (i.e., sections 1939.01 through 1939.39) is entitled “Rental Passenger Vehicle Transactions” and sets forth various rules and regulations governing car rentals, some having to do with insurance. For example, Civil Code section 1939.13 provides that “[a] rental company shall not require the purchase of a damage waiver, optional insurance, or another optional good or 7 (Veh. Code, § 14608, subd. (a) [“A person shall not rent a motor vehicle to another person unless both of the following requirements have been met: [¶] (1) The person to whom the vehicle is rented is licensed under this code or is a nonresident who is licensed under the laws of the state or country of his or her residence. [¶] (2) The person renting to another person has inspected the driver’s license of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented and compared either the signature thereon with that of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented or the photograph thereon with the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented”].) 8 (Veh. Code, § 14609, subd. (a) [“Every person renting a motor vehicle to another person shall keep a record of the registration number of the motor vehicle rented, the name and address of the person to whom the vehicle is rented, his or her driver’s license number, the jurisdiction that issued the driver’s license, and the expiration date of the driver’s license”].) 21 service” and “shall not engage in any unfair, deceptive, or coercive conduct to induce a renter to purchase the damage waiver, optional insurance, or another optional good or service.” (Id., subds. (a) & (b).) However, we have found no section that requires a rental car company to check whether a renter has automobile insurance. As the law currently stands, O’Brien has failed to demonstrate Midway owed him a duty to check Loza’s automobile insurance status, and therefore O’Brien cannot prevail against Midway on a theory of negligent entrustment. Because, as a matter of law, O’Brien cannot recover against Midway on the theories of liability he asserts, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Midway. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION M. KIM, J. We concur: ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J. 22