Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.; And Aaron Marvell Foster v. Frank McMillion, Allen Jones, Carlton Pettus, Hunter Bokker, Bengi Bokker, and Zack Billingsley

Cite as 2026 Ark. 169 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-22-305 Opinion Delivered: November 5, 2026 OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC.; AND AARON MARVELL FOSTER APPEAL FROM THE ST. FRANCIS APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 62CV-20-141] V. HONORABLE E. DION WILSON, FRANK MCMILLION, ALLEN JONES, JUDGE CARLTON PETTUS, HUNTER BOKKER, BENGI BOKKER, AND ZACK BILLINGSLEY AFFIRMED; COURT OF APPEALS’ APPELLEES OPINION VACATED. COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Associate Justice Appellants Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. (Old Dominion), and Aaron Marvel Foster appeal from the St. Francis County jury verdict awarding $75 million in damages to appellees Trooper Frank McMillion, Corporal Allen Jones, Carlton Pettus, Hunter Bokker, Bengi Bokker, and Zack Billingsley. For reversal, appellants argue that (1) the circuit court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in their favor on the basis of appellees’ failure to establish toxic-tort proximate causation through expert testimony; (2) the circuit court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in their favor or partially direct a verdict in their favor due to appellees’ failure to establish proximate causation; (3) the circuit court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in their favor on the basis that appellees’ claims were preempted by federal law; (4) the circuit court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in their favor on the basis of the professional-rescuer’s doctrine; (5) alternatively, the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the required showing of proximate cause and on the professional- rescuer’s doctrine; (6) the circuit court abused its discretion when it refused to exclude the testimony of appellees’ experts, Robert Richard, David Dorrity, and Dr. Scott Manaker; (7) the circuit court abused its discretion when it refused to allow them to cross-examine Trooper Ponder regarding prior specific instances of untruthfulness; (8) the circuit court abused its discretion when it refused to select a new jury pool that had not previously interacted with a court bailiff in his professional capacity when the bailiff was also an essential nonparty witness for appellees; (9) the circuit court abused its discretion when it excluded certain relevant evidence and allowed inadmissible evidence to be admitted; (10) the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial or give a curative instruction about appellees’ use of a “shadow jury”; (11) the circuit court abused its discretion in handling the punitive damages issue when it refused to bifurcate the punitive damages claim in its entirety and refused to preclude appellees’ counsel from utilizing the Reptile Theory; and (12) the circuit court erred when it denied their motion for new trial or remittitur. We affirm on all points. I. Factual and Procedural History This is a case about six men—two law enforcement officers and four members of a towing crew—who responded to a fatal accident involving a tractor-trailer carrying a toxic substance. Those first responders, some as young as twenty-five and twenty-six years old, now suffer from a variety of permanent injuries—reactive airway dysfunction syndrome (RADS), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), asthma, and gastroesophageal 2 reflux disease (GERD)—all of which were caused or exacerbated by their exposure to that toxic substance. Appellees’ injuries will only worsen with age and have already affected every aspect of their lives, from their ability to perform their jobs and serve their communities, to their relationships with friends and family, including their daily activities with their children and/or grandchildren, and even their most intimate interactions with their wives. Expert testimony established that these men will live the rest of their days as if “breathing through a straw.” The tractor-trailer accident occurred on Highway 70 in St. Francis County on April 20, 2018. At approximately 3:00 p.m. that afternoon, a pickup truck driven by Charles Henley crossed the center line and collided head-on with an Old Dominion semitruck driven by Foster, causing it to overturn and catch fire. The parties stipulated that Henley, who was killed in the collision, was the sole cause of the accident. Foster was able to kick out a window of the semitruck and escape. One of the double trailers that Foster was hauling contained a large barrel of formic acid, which is a hazardous material. The barrel weighed 565 pounds. Because the barrel weighed less than 1001 pounds, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) did not mandate that the trailer display a hazardous-materials placard, although Old Dominion could have chosen to do so under the federal permissive- placarding rule. Appellees filed suit against Old Dominion and Foster in July 2020, alleging negligence claims.1 Appellees requested compensatory damages for their permanent injuries 1 Univar Solutions, Inc., and Gary J. Mitchusson, as special administrator and personal representative of Henley’s estate, were also named as defendants but were later dismissed. 3 and pain and suffering. They also sought punitive damages. A jury trial was held on December 7–15, 2021. At the trial, St. Francis County Sheriff’s Deputy Jeff Goff testified that he arrived at the scene of the accident at approximately 3:30 p.m. He stated that he asked Foster whether there were any hazardous materials on the trailers and that Foster responded no. Deputy Goff then reported to dispatch that no hazardous materials were on board. Arkansas State Police Trooper Keith Ponder responded to the scene at 3:32 p.m. He testified that he had also asked Foster whether he had been hauling hazardous materials and that Foster replied that he had not. Trooper Ponder stated that he, too, notified dispatch that no hazardous materials were involved. Foster and another witness denied that Trooper Ponder had asked Foster about the presence of hazardous materials. Arkansas State Trooper Frank McMillion was the first appellee to arrive at the scene at 3:53 p.m. After an hour and a half to two hours, he smelled an unusual odor that he had not experienced when working other crashes involving smoke and fire. Trooper McMillion began feeling lightheaded, dizzy, and nauseous, and he retreated to his vehicle to get some fresh air. He continued his investigation after he began feeling better. Later, after the towing company began clearing the wreckage, Trooper McMillion smelled a strong, pungent odor similar to chlorine that burned his nose and his throat. He testified that it felt as if someone had put their hand over his nose and mouth and that he could not breathe. He also saw the towing company crew quickly leave the area. Trooper McMillion notified dispatch at 7:49 p.m. that they had all inhaled a foreign substance and requested an ambulance. 4  Corporal Allen Jones with the St. Francis County Sheriff’s Office responded to the scene at 6:45 p.m. He reported that at around 7:30 p.m., the towing crew quickly walked away from the wreckage, complaining about a chemical that had spilled. Although Corporal Jones was one hundred feet away from the trailer, he stated that when the wind changed direction, his nasal passages began burning and he had a metallic taste in his mouth. He then moved farther away to wait for the fire department and the ambulances to arrive. FleetNet America, Old Dominion’s provider for roadside and recovery services, contacted White Motor Company, a local family-owned and operated tow-truck company, to assist with cleanup. Bengi Bokker, Hunter Bokker, Zack Billingsley, and Carlton Pettus, the remaining appellees, were employed by White Motor Company and responded to the scene between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. Billingsley testified that as they were surveying the scene to determine whether the wreckage was cool enough to hook up the tow chains, they suddenly smelled a terrible odor. He described it “as if somebody came up to you with a wet washcloth and stuck it over your nose and mouth and just took your breath completely away.” Billingsley further testified that his nose and eyes were burning. Pettus stated that he had been around burning vehicles before; however, he described the odor that he suddenly experienced at this scene as similar to the smell of silicone but much stronger. He testified that it felt “like somebody stuck a sack” over his head because he could not breathe and that his eyes and nose were also burning. Bengi stated that he first noticed the odor after twenty to thirty minutes of working on the scene, and like the others, he described it as different from the smell of burning tires or other wreckage. He testified that, at one point, the 5 chemical odor became so intense it was like someone had put a pillow over his face. Bengi stated that he could not breathe and that he felt a burning sensation in his nose and mouth. The appellees all testified that they sought emergency medical treatment that evening. Old Dominion did not notify law enforcement that the trailer contained formic acid until 8:51 p.m. that night––more than five hours after the accident––which is when Trooper Ponder received an email from the company along with the bill of lading and safety data sheet for the formic acid. The safety data sheet indicated that formic acid is a corrosive substance that has “acute toxicity” when inhaled. Appellees also presented the testimony of several experts at trial. Robert Richard testified with regard to the hazardous-materials statutes and regulations applicable to transportation companies such as Old Dominion, which he stated is the third largest trucking company in the United States. David Dorrity testified about safety standards in the trucking industry, and Dr. Scott Manaker testified that appellees’ exposure to the formic acid caused them to suffer permanent injuries. This testimony, along with the evidence regarding each appellee’s specific injuries, will be discussed in more detail below. The trial was bifurcated, with phase one to determine liability for compensatory and punitive damages and the amount of compensatory damages, if any, and phase two to determine the amount of punitive damages, if any. At the conclusion of phase one, the jury returned a verdict finding that Old Dominion, through its employees, was negligent for not disclosing to the emergency-response authorities the presence of a hazardous material and that Old Dominion’s negligence was a proximate cause of appellees’ injuries. The jury awarded a total of $75 million in compensatory damages to appellees but determined that 6 Old Dominion was not liable for punitive damages. Therefore, no phase two was necessary. The judgment was entered on December 17, 2021. Appellants filed a timely motion for new trial or remittitur on December 22, arguing that the damages awarded were excessive. The circuit court did not rule on the motion, and it was deemed denied after thirty days. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment, as well as the deemed denial of their posttrial motion. Appellants also filed an amended notice of appeal from the circuit court’s May 5, 2022 order disposing of any unresolved claims or cross-claims. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and ordered a new trial. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. v. McMillion, 2025 Ark. App. 400, 715 S.W.3d 490 (substituted opinion on grant of rehearing). Specifically, the court of appeals held that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying the motion for new trial or remittitur because the damages awarded were not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 61, 715 S.W.3d at 530. The court of appeals affirmed the remaining points on appeal. We granted appellants’ petition for review on September 25, 2025.2 When we grant a petition for review, we treat the appeal as though it had been originally filed in this court. Cooper v. Kalkwarf, 2017 Ark. 331, 532 S.W.3d 58. II. Analysis A. Proximate Causation 2 This case was originally submitted on March 5, 2026, and it was orally argued on that date. It was pulled from submission on October 1, 2026, and Special Justice Cory Cox was appointed to replace Justice Barbara Webb. On October 8, Justice Rhonda Wood denied a motion to recuse filed by appellees. The case was then resubmitted on October 22, 2026. 7  In appellants’ first point on appeal, they argue that the circuit court erred by refusing to direct a verdict in their favor on the basis of appellees’ failure to establish toxic tort proximate causation through expert testimony. Specifically, appellants claim that in a case such as this one, appellees were required to prove both general and specific causation. Appellants further contend in their second point on appeal that even if a heightened toxic- tort standard was not required, appellees still did not prove proximate causation. Because these two points are related, we discuss them together. A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Calvary Christian Sch., Inc. v. Huffstuttler, 367 Ark. 117, 238 S.W.3d 58 (2006). We review the denial of a motion for directed verdict to determine whether the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence. City of Little Rock v. Nelson ex rel. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633. Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way or the other with reasonable certainty, and it must force the mind to pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Barber, 356 Ark. 268, 149 S.W.3d 325 (2004). When determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party on whose behalf judgment was entered, and we give that evidence the highest probative value. Huffstuttler, supra. In conducting our review, we do not try issues of fact; rather, we examine the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Nelson, supra. Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Id. 8  While we have not specifically addressed the need to present evidence of both general and specific causation in a toxic-tort case, the court of appeals discussed this issue in Richardson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2011 Ark. App. 562, at 3–4, 386 S.W.3d 77, 80: A toxic tort plaintiff must adduce evidence of both general and specific causation. [Aurand v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 802 F. Supp. 2d 950 (N.D. Ind. 2011).] General causation addresses whether a particular agent can cause a particular illness. Id. Specific causation addresses whether that agent in fact caused the particular plaintiff’s illness. Id. There is a two-step process in examining the admissibility of causation evidence in toxic-tort cases. First, the trial court must determine whether there is general causation; second, if it concludes that there is admissible general- causation evidence, it must determine whether there is admissible specific-causation evidence. Id. In toxic-tort cases, an expert may be able to testify that a chemical can cause the plaintiff’s illness, but not that this chemical caused this particular illness. Id. Differential etiology is a methodology commonly used to determine the cause of an illness. Id. The doctor rules in all of the potential causes, and then, by systematically ruling out causes that would not apply to this plaintiff, the doctor arrives at what is the likely cause of the illness. Id. Whether such a methodology supporting an expert’s opinion is reliable is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. The plaintiff in Richardson alleged that his multiple myeloma was caused by years of exposure to diesel fuel and exhaust, creosote, and pesticides while he was employed with the railroad. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant after ruling that plaintiff’s experts were not qualified to testify about the causal relationship, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 34, 386 S.W.3d at 99. In Chavers v. General Motors Corp., 349 Ark. 550, 79 S.W.3d 361 (2002), this court also applied a heightened causation standard in a toxic-tort case. The plaintiff in Chavers claimed that exposure to asbestos in the defendant’s products caused his mesothelioma. We adopted the “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test and held that the plaintiff was required to prove that (1) he was exposed to a particular asbestos-containing product made by the defendant; (2) with sufficient frequency and regularity; (3) in proximity to where he 9 actually worked, (4) such that it was probable that the exposure to the defendant’s products caused his injuries. Id. Then, in Green v. Alpharma, Inc., 373 Ark. 378, 284 S.W.3d 29 (2008), we extended the frequency, regularity, and proximity test to plaintiffs who alleged that their child had contracted leukemia due to exposure to arsenic-laced chicken litter that was spread on nearby farms and polluted the air, soil, and water in and around the town where they lived. While appellees’ negligence suit is clearly based on their exposure to a toxic chemical, we disagree with appellants that a heightened standard of proof of causation, as was required in Richardson, Chavers, and Green, is necessary in every toxic-tort case. As the court of appeals recognized in TMG Cattle Co., Inc. v. Parker Com. Spraying, LLC, 2018 Ark. App. 144, 540 S.W.3d 754, there is a significant difference between a case in which the plaintiff’s injuries are the result of long-term exposure to a toxic substance and a case involving isolated exposure. In TMG Cattle, the appellant discovered eighteen dead cows on his property, all located in and around a pond adjacent to where appellee had sprayed urea fertilizer on a wheat field several days earlier. A veterinarian testified on behalf of the appellant and concluded that “he was 95% certain that that the cows died from ammonia toxicosis, despite the lack of laboratory evidence.” Id. at 6, 540 S.W.3d at 758. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to the appellee, holding that the testimony that the cows were healthy before they died, that the deaths were sudden, that all eighteen cows died at the same time in the same area, that urea fertilizer had been sprayed within days of the deaths in the immediate vicinity of where the cows died, and that urea ingestion can cause the death of a cow were sufficient to raise a factual question on the proximate- 10 cause issue. Id. at 9–10, 540 S.W.3d at 760. The court of appeals rejected the appellee’s contention that the “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test applied to the isolated or one-time-exposure scenario in that case. All causal determinations require inferential reasoning, and reasonable inferences are left to the jury’s collective experience and common sense. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 28 cmt. b (2025). It is only when the inferential leap from the evidence to the conclusion is too great that courts will intervene to declare that juries may not speculate, and the matter is removed from the province of the jury. Id. As the Restatement notes, cases involving toxic substances can often pose difficult problems with respect to proof of causation as compared to other types of cases: In most traumatic-injury cases, the plaintiff can prove the causal role of the defendant’s tortious conduct by observation, based upon reasonable inferences drawn from everyday experience and a close temporal and spatial connection between that conduct and the harm. Often, no other potential causes of injury exist. When a passenger in an automobile collision suffers a broken limb, potential causal explanations other than the collision are easily ruled out; common experience reveals that the forces generated in a serious automobile collision are capable of causing a fracture. By contrast, the causes of some diseases, especially those with significant latency periods, are generally much less well understood. Id. cmt. c. However, not all toxic-tort cases involve the same level of proof, and circumstances in individual cases are sufficiently variable that courts must employ a flexible approach to proof of causation. Id. While courts often address “exposure,” “general causation,” and “specific causation,” these are not elements of a plaintiff’s cause of action and in some cases may not require separate proof. Id. “So long as the plaintiff introduces admissible and sufficient evidence of factual causation, the burden of production is satisfied.” Id. 11  This case involves isolated exposure to a toxic substance, and appellees sought immediate medical treatment following their exposure. This is not a long-term-exposure case and does not involve a disease with a significant latency period, such as in Richardson, Chavers, and Green. Instead, this case is more like TMG Cattle. As is explained in Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 Colum. J. Env’t L. 181, 188–89 (1993), an isolated-exposure case is more like a typical tort case in which the testimony of a treating physician can establish sufficient proof of causation: In isolated exposure cases, where only a single plaintiff or a few persons have allegedly suffered harm from a toxic exposure, it is fair and reasonable to allow the traditional sporadic accident model to exert greater influence. A medical doctor is permitted to render an opinion as to whether, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, exposure to Agent X caused the plaintiff’s physical disability. This standard of causation will be referred to as the “testifying treating physician” standard[.] . . . In rendering an opinion on causation under this standard, the expert is not typically required to demonstrate the existence of supporting epidemiological data (or even much other toxicological proof) in order to justify admission of that opinion and to reach a jury on that issue. Here, the testimony of Dr. Manaker, who examined appellees and reviewed their medical records, combined with appellees’ testimony and the remaining evidence establishing the close temporal and spatial connection between the toxic exposure and their injuries, presented sufficient evidence of causation to create an issue of fact for the jury. The circuit court therefore did not err by denying appellants’ motion for directed verdict based on their argument that a heightened standard of causation was required in this case. We also disagree with appellants’ second argument that appellees did not prove proximate causation even under the traditional standard. The jury was required to find that appellants were the proximate cause of appellees’ injuries. See AMI Civ. 203 (2022). 12 Proximate cause is defined as that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Neal v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 328, 422 S.W.3d 116. Proximate cause may be shown from circumstantial evidence, and such evidence is sufficient if the facts proved are of such a nature and are so connected and related to each other that the conclusion may fairly be inferred. Arthur v. Zearley, 337 Ark. 125, 992 S.W.2d 67 (1999). Proximate causation is usually a question of fact for the jury. Neal, supra. It is undisputed that Old Dominion’s trailer contained a barrel of formic acid, a corrosive substance that has acute toxicity when inhaled, and that this trailer overturned and caught fire. Appellees, all first responders, testified that they smelled an odor that was different from those they had previously experienced when responding to other fiery crash scenes and that the smell almost immediately rendered them unable to breathe and caused their eyes, noses, and mouths to burn. They all sought emergency medical treatment after leaving the scene. Dr. Manaker, a pulmonologist and critical-care physician, physically examined appellees, performed medical tests on them, and reviewed the other evidence in the case, including appellees’ medical histories and any preexisting conditions. He testified within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that appellees’ permanent injuries were caused by their exposure to the formic acid. Although he had not seen any scientific studies linking their injuries to formic acid or treated any other patients exposed to this specific acid, he described his forty years of experience in treating first responders and other patients with inhalation injuries caused by similar toxic acids. Dr. Manaker reviewed the material safety data sheets (MSDS) for formic acid and opined that all of the medical conditions 13 suffered by appellees—RADS, exacerbation of COPD, asthma, GERD, rhinosinusitis, and tonsil stones—were caused or worsened by inhaling and/or swallowing particles of the formic acid that had vaporized. He further testified that the stress of the incident exacerbated Trooper McMillion’s coronary artery disease. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellees, we hold that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of proximate causation in this case. B. Preemption Appellants next argue that the circuit court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in their favor on the basis that appellees’ claims were preempted by federal law. Appellants contend that appellees’ state common-law tort claims were preempted by the HMTA because they seek to impose additional handling, placarding, and transportation-related requirements for the hazardous materials that appellants transport. Specifically, appellants point to appellees’ arguments about permissive placarding and appellants’ failure to notify first responders about the presence of hazardous materials. The doctrine of federal preemption is based on the United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. United Food & Com. Workers Int’l Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2016 Ark. 397, 504 S.W.3d 573. Preemption can occur in three different ways: (1) express preemption, where Congress defines explicitly the extent to which its enactments preempt state law; (2) field preemption, where Congress’s regulation of a field is so pervasive or the federal interest is so dominant that an intent to occupy the entire field can be inferred; and (3) conflict preemption, where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of a federal statute. GSS, LLC v. CenterPoint Energy Gas 14 Transmission Co., 2014 Ark. 144, 432 S.W.3d 583. The overriding principle guiding our review in any preemption analysis is whether Congress intended to preempt state law, and the burden is on the moving party to prove preemption. Id. Because this is a legal issue, the standard of review is de novo. United Food & Co. Workers Int’l Union, supra. The purpose of the HMTA, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., is to protect against the risks to life, property, and the environment that are inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 1501. As appellants assert, § 5125(b)(1) of the HMTA contains an express preemption provision that prohibits states from imposing requirements that are not “substantively the same” as a provision of the HMTA or a regulation prescribed thereunder regarding the following subjects: (A) the designation, description, and classification of hazardous material. (B) the packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and placarding of hazardous material. (C) the preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents related to hazardous material and requirements related to the number, contents, and placement of those documents. (D) the written notification, recording, and reporting of the unintentional release in transportation of hazardous material and other written hazardous materials transportation incident reporting involving State or local emergency responders in the initial response to the incident. (E) the designing, manufacturing, fabricating, inspecting, marking, maintaining, reconditioning, repairing, or testing a package, container, or packaging component that is represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in transporting hazardous material in commerce. When a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, our focus is “on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive 15 intent.” Anderson v. BNSF Ry. Co., 375 Ark. 466, 469, 291 S.W.3d 586, 589 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). Appellants first assert that federal law did not require Old Dominion to placard its load of formic acid but that appellees sought to impose more stringent placarding requirements by arguing at trial about permissive placarding. Appellants claim that placarding is one of the subject areas set forth in § 5125(b)(1)(B) and that requiring additional placarding is clearly not “substantively the same” as no placarding. Appellees did not seek to impose placarding requirements in excess of federal law, however. The evidence was undisputed that Old Dominion was not required to placard its load, and appellees’ own expert agreed on this issue. Further, the jury instructions included the federal statute stating that placarding is permissive when the hazardous material weighs less than 1001 pounds, which it did here. Appellants’ argument is therefore without merit. Appellants also contend that the circuit court imposed a duty of notification in excess of what the HMTA requires and that this was expressly preempted by § 5125(b)(1)(D). According to appellants, 49 U.S.C. § 5110(c) states that they were required to notify others of hazardous materials only “upon request,” but appellees also claimed that appellants were negligent for not voluntarily providing the information to the first responders in this case. Appellants argue that “upon request” is not substantively the same as voluntarily disclosing that the load contained hazardous materials. Section 5110(c) states that when an incident involving the transportation of hazardous materials occurs, “the person transporting the material, immediately upon request on appropriate emergency response authorities, shall disclose to the authorities information 16 about the material.” 49 U.S.C. § 5110(c). The jury was instructed on § 5110(c), as well as 49 C.F.R. § 177.817, which provides that each driver and carrier shall ensure that the shipping papers are readily available to, and recognizable by, authorities in the event of an accident. Appellees presented the testimony of two different law enforcement witnesses, Trooper Ponder and Deputy Goff, who responded to the accident. Both of these witnesses stated that they asked Foster whether hazardous materials were present and that Foster responded no. It is also undisputed that it was not until hours later––after appellees suffered exposure injuries––that appellants provided the emergency response authorities with the shipping papers containing information about the presence of the formic acid. Appellees’ claim that appellants were negligent in failing to provide this information is substantively the same as the HMTA’s requirements. See Tipton v. CSX Transp., Inc., Nos. 3:15-CV-311- TAV-CCS, -337-TAV-CCS, -497-TAV-CCS & -346-TAV-CCS, 2016 WL 11501426 (E.D. Tenn. July 7, 2016) (holding that imposing a duty on CSX to immediately identify the toxic chemical involved in the derailment and report that identity to emergency responders was substantively similar to the HMTA’s requirements and was not preempted). Thus, the circuit court did not impose a duty on appellants in excess of federal law, and we hold that the circuit court did not err in denying appellants’ motion for directed motion on this issue. C. Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine In their fourth point on appeal, appellants contend that the circuit court erred when it denied appellants’ motion for directed verdict based on the professional-rescuer’s doctrine. The “fireman’s rule,” which is also known as the “professional-rescuers doctrine,” generally 17 provides that a professional firefighter may not recover damages from a private party for injuries that the firefighter sustained during the course of putting out a fire even though the private party’s negligence may have caused the fire and injury. E.g., Waggoner v. Troutman Oil Co., Inc., 320 Ark. 56, 894 S.W.2d 913 (1995). We adopted this rule on the basis of public-policy considerations, stating that “the party or parties who negligently started the fire had no legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very danger that the firefighter was employed to confront.” Id. at 60, 894 S.W.2d at 915. In Nowicki v. Pigue, we extended the professional-rescuer’s doctrine to a roadside-assistance worker. 2013 Ark. 499, 430 S.W.3d 765. We held that, in considering whether this doctrine applies, we must evaluate the facts bearing on whether the worker was paid to assume the risk in question. Id. Appellees argue that the professional-rescuer’s doctrine did not apply to them because they were not paid to assume the risk of exposure to hazardous materials and did not have a duty to accept that risk as part of their employment. We agree. With regard to the tow crew who responded to the wreck on behalf of White Motor Company, Bengi Bokker testified that he never would have taken his crew to the scene had he been aware that hazardous materials were present. He explained that there are other companies, such as Chemtech, that are specifically paid and trained to clean up hazardous materials and have special equipment, such as suits, gloves, and masks, and that one of these companies would have responded instead. Trooper McMillion testified that, when responding to accidents, he was trained by the Arkansas State Police to look for a hazardous-materials placard on a trailer and to ask the driver whether they were hauling any hazardous material. He stated that he was not 18 qualified to clean up hazardous materials and that had he known that the load contained formic acid, he would have looked it up in his emergency response guide, learned that he needed to evacuate the area, and set up a perimeter around the crash scene. He also testified that he would have notified an emergency manager so that an appropriate company could be called to clean up the toxic substance. While Corporal Allen did not testify about how he was trained to handle hazardous materials, Deputy Goff, who also worked for the St. Francis County Sheriff’s Office, stated that if he knew that the accident involved hazardous material, he would retreat and call the fire department to avoid any exposure. It is clear from appellees’ testimony that they were not trained, equipped, or paid to assume the risk of exposure to hazardous materials. Furthermore, we agree with appellees that, even if they had a duty to assume the risk of exposure as part of their employment, appellants’ failure to disclose the presence of the hazardous material in this case prevents the application of the professional-rescuer’s doctrine. See, e.g., Clark v. Corby, 249 N.W.2d 567 (Wis. 1977) (stating that the public-policy considerations behind the professional-rescuer’s doctrine do not apply to the added risk of encountering hidden perils, known to the private party and not known to the professional rescuer, when there was an opportunity for the private party to warn the rescuer); Bartels v. Cont’l Oil Co., 384 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1964). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of appellants’ motion for directed verdict based on the professional-rescuer’s doctrine. D. Jury Instructions Appellants next argue that the circuit court erred by rejecting their proffered jury instructions on toxic-exposure causation and the professional-rescuer’s doctrine. A party is 19 entitled to a jury instruction when it is a correct statement of the law, and there is some basis in the evidence to support giving the instruction. Boellner v. Clinical Study Ctrs., LLC, 2011 Ark. 83, 378 S.W.3d 745. We will not reverse the circuit court’s refusal to give a proffered instruction in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Id. 1. Toxic-exposure causation Appellants proffered the following jury instruction on causation: Each Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that exposure to a certain minimum amount of formic acid for a certain period of time can cause their particular claimed injuries in the general population and (2) that his actual amount of exposure to formic acid in this case was at least equal to that minimum level and length of time. Appellants contend that, if not resolved as a matter of law, the issue of toxic-exposure causation should have been presented to the jury through this proffered instruction to determine whether proximate-causation requirements had been met. However, as discussed above under appellants’ first point on appeal, a heightened standard of causation was not required in this case. Thus, appellants’ proffered instruction was not a correct statement of law, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give it. 2. Professional-rescuer’s doctrine Appellants also proffered a jury instruction on the professional-rescuer’s doctrine: If you find that any one of the Plaintiffs was a first responder paid