Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 140 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-25-806 Opinion Delivered: October 8, 2026 LAQUINCY D. NANCE APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 60CV-25-8096] ARKANSAS POST-PRISON HONORABLE PATRICIA JAMES, TRANSFER BOARD; LONA JUDGE MCCASTLAIN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON OF AFFIRMED. THE ARKANSAS POST-PRISON TRANSFER BOARD; AND DEXTER PAYNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE ARKANSAS DIVISION OF CORRECTION APPELLEES RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice LaQuincy D. Nance brought a petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus relief, arguing that the Arkansas Division of Correction (ADC) incorrectly determined that Nance is ineligible for parole on his second-degree-murder sentence. Nance argues that, under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609 (Supp. 2023), his residential-burglary conviction is not a “prior violent felony” that would render him ineligible for parole. We disagree. Because Nance was sentenced for second-degree murder in 2024—well after May 24, 2022—the subsection of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16- 93-609 that exempts certain residential-burglary convictions from the prior violent-felony rule does not apply. Nance pleaded guilty to a residential burglary that he had committed in 2013. Approximately ten years later, in January 2024, Nance pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. The ADC determined that Nance is not eligible for parole on his second-degree-murder sentence because of his prior violent felony––residential burglary. Nance filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment, injunction, and mandamus order that the ADC’s parole-eligibility determination was incorrect. Nance argued that his residential burglary is not a prior violent felony under the statute because (1) he committed it before 2015 and (2) because his sentencing order for his second-degree-murder conviction did not expressly designate that he was being sentenced under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609. The circuit court denied Nance’s petition, holding that the ADC did not exceed its legal authority in designating Nance ineligible for parole. Analyzing the statute, the circuit court found that it did not apply to Nance because the sentence for which he sought parole eligibility was imposed in 2024––after the statutory cutoff date of May 24, 2022. Nance timely appeals. We review an order dismissing a petition for declaratory judgment on the pleadings for abuse of discretion. Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., Div. of Corr., 2026 Ark. 95, at 4, 733 S.W.3d 133, 135–36. We review a circuit court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. Id. We generally described the history of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609 in Rodgers v. Arkansas Parole Board, 2024 Ark. 176, 700 S.W.3d 876. The General Assembly sought to eliminate parole eligibility for repeat violent offenders. In 2001, the legislature enacted Act 1805 of 2001, codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609, which 2 denied parole eligibility for anyone who committed a violent felony or sex offense and who already had a prior violent-felony offense or felony sex offense. Offenses designated as prior violent felonies were listed in a related provision, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4- 501(d)(2)(A). In 2015, residential burglary (which had not been included) was added to that list. Rodgers, 2024 Ark. 176, at 3–4 (citing Act 895 of 2015, §3). As a result, the ADC began calculating sentences such that only those residential burglaries committed in 2015 or later were considered violent felonies for purposes of parole eligibility. Id. In 2022, the Arkansas Attorney General issued a legal opinion stating that residential burglaries committed before 2015 could also be considered felonies of violence for purposes of parole eligibility. Id. (citing Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No. 010 (2022)). The ADC again changed its interpretation and recalculated prisoner sentences so that all residential burglary felonies negated parole eligibility. Id. Finally, the General Assembly amended the statute to address the issue. Id. at 4. The relevant section reads as follows: (2)(A) As used in this subsection, “a violent felony offense or any felony sex offense” means those offenses listed in § 5-4-501(d)(2). (B) Unless the sentencing order expressly designates that the defendant was sentenced under this section, “a violent felony offense or any felony sex offense” does not include residential burglary, § 5-39-201, committed before April 1, 2015, unless the defendant was sentenced on or after May 24, 2022. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-609 (amended by Act 683 of 2023) (emphasis added). We have held that this statute’s language is plain. Id. at 15. The General Assembly carved out an exception to the residential-burglary-is-a-violent-felony rule for residential burglaries committed before April 1, 2015. But it also requires that the sentence for which 3 the defendant seeks parole eligibility was imposed before May 24, 2022. (Additionally, the sentencing order must not expressly designate that it is under section 16-93-609). In Rogers, Wright, McGowan, and Norvel, we looked at whether certain language on the sentencing orders was an “express designation” for purposes of section 16-93- 609(b)(2)(B). See generally Rodgers, 2024 Ark. 176; Wright v. Ark. Post-Prison Transfer Bd., 2024 Ark. 173, at 1–2, 700 S.W.3d 724, 724; Ark. Post-Prison Transfer Bd. v. McGowan, 2024 Ark. 181, at 1; Ark. Post-Prison Transfer Bd. v. Norvel, 2025 Ark. 63, at 1–2. Nance argues that his case is like Rodgers and Norvel because he was convicted of residential burglary before 2015 and his sentencing order did not contain an express designation. But Nance ignores that this exception, to the residential-burglary-is-a-violent-felony rule, also requires the defendant to be sentenced before May 24, 2022. Because Nance was sentenced in 2024, the exception cannot apply, and the other factors are irrelevant. Given the statute’s plain language, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Nance’s declaratory-judgment petition and denying mandamus relief. Nance raises an ex post facto argument, but he did not raise it below. Accordingly, we will not address it for the first time on appeal. Robinson v. Payne, 2024 Ark. 94, 688 S.W.3d 409. Affirmed. Special Justice CORY COX joins. WOMACK, J., concurs. WEBB, J., not participating. SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, concurring. Although the circuit court was correct to dismiss Nance’s lawsuit against the State, it did so for the wrong reason. Instead 4 of dismissing Nance’s lawsuit on the merits, the circuit court should have dismissed the claims pursuant to sovereign immunity.1 Here, Nance improperly made the State a defendant when he petitioned for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief in a new civil action below, 60CV-25-8096.2 Instead, he should have petitioned in his related, underlying criminal case. Therefore, I respectfully concur in the judgment. LaQuincy Nance, pro se appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Walter K. Hawkins, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 1 See Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Ark., 2022 Ark. 32, at 17, 639 S.W.3d 319, 327 (Womack, J., dissenting). 2 See Perry v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 112, at 5 (Womack, J., dissenting) (reasoning article 5, section 20 required the dismissal of the appeal from denial of writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment). 5