ROBINSON NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, D/B/A ROBINSON NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER; CENTRAL ARKANSAS NURSING CENTERS, INC.; NURSING CONSULTANTS, INC.; And MICHAEL MORTON v. ANDREW PHILLIPS, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DOROTHY PHILLIPS, AND ON BEHALF OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF DOROTHY PHILLIPS; AND ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. 196
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-25-452
Opinion Delivered: November 19, 2026
ROBINSON NURSING AND
REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
D/B/A ROBINSON NURSING AND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
REHABILITATION CENTER; TWELFTH DIVISION
CENTRAL ARKANSAS NURSING [NO. 60CV-14-4568]
CENTERS, INC.; NURSING
CONSULTANTS, INC.; AND HONORABLE CARA CONNORS,
MICHAEL MORTON JUDGE
APPELLANTS
V.
ANDREW PHILLIPS, AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF DOROTHY PHILLIPS, AND ON
BEHALF OF THE WRONGFUL AFFIRMED IN PART AND
DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF REVERSED AND REMANDED IN
DOROTHY PHILLIPS; AND ON PART ON DIRECT APPEAL; CROSS-
BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL APPEAL DISMISSED.
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
APPELLEES
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice
This is the sixth appeal in this decade-old class action against Robinson Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center. Once again, the dispute concerns Robinson’s efforts to compel its
residents to arbitrate their claims. Following our third remand, the circuit court considered
Robinson’s motions to compel arbitration involving 227 residents.1 The court granted the
1
Robinson originally sought to enforce agreements involving 229 residents. It later
withdrew its requests as to two residents, leaving 227 for decision. The circuit court granted
arbitration as to 112 residents and denied it as to 115.
motions as to 112 residents and denied them as to 115. Robinson appeals the denials, and
Phillips cross-appeals the grants.
We affirm in part and reverse in part on direct appeal. The circuit court exceeded
our mandate by reconsidering prior orders compelling arbitration as to three residents. We
affirm the remaining 112 denials on the alternative ground of procedural unconscionability.
We dismiss the cross-appeal because orders granting arbitration are not immediately
appealable.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
This litigation began in 2014. In September 2015, Andrew Phillips, as personal
representative of the Estate of Dorothy Phillips and on behalf of others similarly situated,
filed the operative amended class-action complaint against Robinson. Phillips alleged that
Robinson chronically understaffed its nursing facility and asserted claims for breach of
contract, violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), negligence,
civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. The circuit court certified a class in March of 2016
consisting of
[a]ll residents and estates of residents who resided at the Robinson Nursing
and Rehabilitation Center from June 11, 2010, to present.
Robinson appealed. In Robinson Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Phillips
(Phillips I), 2017 Ark. 162, 519 S.W.3d 291, this court affirmed certification of the breach-
of-contract, ADTPA, and unjust-enrichment claims but reversed certification of the
negligence claim.
The litigation then turned to arbitration. In 2017, Robinson moved to compel
arbitration for 544 residents. The circuit court denied the motions. On appeal, this court
2
affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. Robinson Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC
v. Phillips (Phillips II), 2019 Ark. 305, 586 S.W.3d 624. We affirmed the denial of arbitration
for agreements that lacked mutual assent, mutuality, or the signature of a person authorized
to bind the resident. As to the remaining agreements, we held that Robinson had established
valid contracts covering the class claims. Id.
The present appeal concerns a different group of residents admitted after the class
action began. Following Phillips II, the circuit court directed Robinson to provide discovery
concerning newly admitted residents. In March 2021, Robinson moved to compel
arbitration for 197 residents admitted between June 2017 and September 2020. Robinson
later filed a second motion involving 33 residents. One resident appeared in both motions,
leaving 229 unique residents.2
The circuit court granted arbitration for some residents and denied it for others. But
its orders failed to explain those decisions. In Robinson Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC
v. Phillips (Phillips III), 2022 Ark. 109, and Robinson Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v.
Phillips (Phillips IV), 2022 Ark. 193, this court remanded for findings sufficient to permit
appellate review.
The circuit court entered new orders, but those orders still lacked findings tied to
each resident and agreement. We therefore remanded a third time, directing the circuit
court to make specific findings concerning each agreement and resident. Robinson Nursing
2
See supra, note 1.
3
& Rehab. Ctr., LLC v. Phillips (Phillips V), 2023 Ark. 175, 678 S.W.3d 27. We also ordered
the case reassigned.3
On remand, the case was assigned to Judge Cara Boyd Connors. Following
additional briefing, the circuit court entered the April 3, 2025, order now on appeal. By
then, Robinson had withdrawn its requests concerning two residents, leaving 227
agreements for decision.
The circuit court granted Robinson’s motions to compel arbitration as to 112
residents and denied them as to 115. For the agreements it enforced, the court found that
the agreements identified the parties, contained the necessary signatures, and established the
signatories’ authority to bind the residents. For the agreements it refused to enforce, the
court found one or more defects concerning the identification of the parties, the signatories’
authority, or the capacity in which the representatives signed.
Specifically, the circuit court identified four grounds for denying arbitration: (1) a
health-care power of attorney did not authorize the agent to agree to arbitration; (2) the
agreement failed to identify the resident as a party; (3) the signatory lacked authority to bind
the resident; or (4) the agreement was ambiguous about the capacity in which the
representative signed.
3
The reassignment was prompted in part by the circuit court’s repeated failure to
provide adequate findings and its disparaging comments about members of this court. In
Phillips V, we admonished Judge Fox for those comments, concluding that they violated
Rules 1.2 and 2.2 of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct. 2023 Ark. 175, at 7–8, 678
S.W.3d at 32.
4
The circuit court also rejected Phillips’s broader challenges to enforcement. It
concluded that the agreements were not unconscionable, did not violate the ADTPA, and
were not rendered unenforceable by 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n). The court also rejected
Phillips’s argument that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred enforcement.
Robinson appeals the denial of arbitration as to 115 residents. Phillips cross-appeals
the orders compelling arbitration as to 112 residents. Robinson has moved to dismiss the
cross-appeal, arguing that an interlocutory order granting arbitration is not appealable.
II. Discussion
Robinson challenges the circuit court’s denial of arbitration as to 115 residents. It
argues that our decision in Phillips II established the validity of the agreements, that the
circuit court exceeded our mandate in Phillips V as to three residents, and that the remaining
agreements are enforceable under Arkansas contract law. Phillips disputes those arguments
and asserts unconscionability as an alternative ground for affirmance.
We first address Robinson’s arguments concerning the law of the case and the scope
of our mandate. We then consider whether the remaining agreements are unenforceable as
unconscionable. Finally, we turn to Phillips’s cross-appeal.
A. Law of the Case
Robinson first argues that Phillips II established the validity of the present arbitration
agreements as the law of the case. We disagree.
The law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits reconsideration of issues decided, or that
could have been decided, in an earlier appeal. Green v. George’s Farms, Inc., 2011 Ark. 70,
5
at 7, 378 S.W.3d 715, 720. The doctrine promotes finality within a continuing case; it does
not resolve the enforceability of contracts that were not before the court. Id. at 8.
Phillips II addressed motions involving 544 residents and the particular agreements
presented in that appeal. We held that Robinson established valid agreements covering the
class claims as to “the remainder of the arbitration agreements not already discussed.” 2019
Ark. 305, at 21, 586 S.W.3d at 637. That holding is binding as to the contracts it
adjudicated. The agreements here concern different residents admitted later. Phillips II did
not adjudicate the execution of their agreements or the defenses arising from their
execution.
Robinson correctly observes that the legal principles applied in Phillips II remain
controlling. But a rule governing contract formation is not a prospective finding that every
later agreement satisfies that rule. Nor does a finding that an agreement was formed
necessarily foreclose a generally applicable defense to its enforcement. See GGNSC
Holdings, LLC v. Lamb, 2016 Ark. 101, at 13–14, 487 S.W.3d 348, 356–57.
Phillips advances the opposite law-of-the-case argument: because the class definition
includes all residents during the class period, Robinson cannot later enforce arbitration
agreements against persons within that definition. That argument confuses class membership
with the contractual right to insist on an arbitral forum. Class certification is not a decision
on the merits or a determination whether each putative class member has an enforceable
arbitration agreement. Indeed, Phillips II considered arbitration after class certification. The
class definition neither validates nor invalidates these later agreements.
6
Thus, Phillips II supplies governing precedent, but neither it nor Phillips I decided
the enforceability of the agreements now before us. The law-of-the-case doctrine does not
bar Phillips’s unconscionability defense.
B. Scope of the Mandate
Robinson next argues that the circuit court exceeded the mandate in Phillips V by
reconsidering prior grants of arbitration as to Dorothy Jackson, Johnnie Jones, and Mona
Rea. We agree.
When an appellate court remands with specific instructions, the circuit court is bound
by the letter and spirit of the mandate and may act only within the authority conferred.
Dolphin v. Wilson, 335 Ark. 113, 983 S.W.2d 113 (1998). The mandate does not reopen
decisions outside the matters remanded.
Phillips V arose from Robinson’s appeal of orders denying arbitration. We remanded
for “specific findings with respect to each arbitration agreement and individual resident”
involved in that appeal. 2023 Ark. 175, at 5, 678 S.W.3d at 31. The circuit court had
previously granted arbitration as to Jackson, Jones, and Rea. Those grants were not before
us in Phillips V, and our direction to explain the denials did not authorize their
reconsideration. Yet the April 3 order denied arbitration as to all three.
Phillips contends that Robinson failed to preserve the mandate objection and invited
the error by submitting a proposed order. But Robinson’s January 22, 2024, reply expressly
asserted that the mandate covered only the agreements involved in Phillips V and objected
to reconsidering agreements outside that appeal. A party’s participation in drafting a
proposed order cannot expand a circuit court’s authority beyond the appellate mandate.
7
We therefore reverse the April 3 order as to Jackson, Jones, and Rea. The earlier
grants of arbitration remain in effect.
C. Unconscionability
Phillips argues that the agreements at issue are unconscionable. Robinson maintains
that the agreements are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Arkansas
contract law. The controlling question is whether the totality of the circumstances
surrounding their execution establishes unconscionability.
We review the denial of a motion to compel arbitration de novo on the record.
GGNSC Holdings, LLC v. Chappel, 2014 Ark. 545, at 5, 453 S.W.3d 645, 648. Ordinarily,
a court determines whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and whether the dispute
falls within its scope. Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 Ark. 223, at 4–5, 434 S.W.3d
357, 360.4 But even a valid agreement covering the dispute remains subject to generally
applicable contract defenses, including unconscionability. Id. at 5, 434 S.W.3d at 360. The
4
In Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 Ark. 223, at 7, 434 S.W.3d 357, 362, we
required circuit courts to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and
whether the dispute falls within its scope before considering a generally applicable contract
defense. The dissent warned against this rigid approach, explaining that our de novo
standard of review permits us to affirm a circuit court’s ruling on any ground supported by
the record, even when the circuit court relied on a different rationale. Id. at 7–12 (Hudson,
J., dissenting). The repeated remands in this decade-old litigation illustrate the practical
consequences of those concerns. We therefore overrule Bank of the Ozarks to the extent it
requires circuit courts to resolve questions of formation and scope before considering an
independently dispositive contract defense. When such a defense establishes that an
agreement would be unenforceable regardless of its formation or scope, findings on those
questions are unnecessary. Circuit courts need only make findings sufficient to permit
meaningful appellate review. Requiring more burdens already crowded circuit court
dockets, prolongs litigation, and delays resolution of the merits.
8
party asserting such a defense bears the burden of proof. Lamb, 2016 Ark. 101, at 14, 487
S.W.3d at 357.
The FAA expressly preserves these defenses. 9 U.S.C. § 2. It requires that arbitration
agreements be placed on the same footing as other contracts, not afforded preferential
treatment. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); Morgan v.
Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 418 (2022). Thus, courts may invalidate arbitration agreements
under ordinary contract principles but may not impose rules that disfavor arbitration or its
defining characteristics. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339; Kindred Nursing Ctrs., L.P. v. Clark,
581 U.S. 246 (2017). We therefore turn to Arkansas’s law of unconscionability to determine
whether the circumstances surrounding the execution of these agreements warrant their
invalidation.
Unconscionability is determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding
a contract’s negotiation and execution. Lamb, 2016 Ark. 101, at 13–14, 487 S.W.3d at 356–
57. It may be procedural or substantive. LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. McIllwain, 2013 Ark. 370,
at 6–7, 429 S.W.3d 261, 264. Procedural unconscionability concerns circumstances of
contract formation––namely, whether a party had a meaningful choice in accepting the
agreement. See Lamb, 2016 Ark. 101, at 13–15, 487 S.W.3d at 356–57. Substantive
unconscionability concerns the fairness of the contract’s terms, including whether they are
unreasonably one-sided or oppressive. LegalZoom, 2013 Ark. 370, at 7, 429 S.W.3d at 264.5
5
Procedural unconscionability involves an absence of meaningful choice together
with terms unreasonably favorable to the other party. See LegalZoom, 2013 Ark. 370, at 7,
429 S.W.3d at 264; Lamb, 2016 Ark. 101, at 13, 487 S.W.3d at 356. We clarify that these
are relevant considerations, not separate elements that must invariably be proven.
Sufficiently unfair circumstances surrounding contract formation may establish procedural
9
When conducting an unconscionability analysis, this court has noted that two of the
more important considerations are whether the parties possessed grossly unequal bargaining
power and whether the aggrieved party was made aware of and comprehended the provision
in question. Lamb, 2016 Ark. 101, at 14, 487 S.W.3d at 357 (citing Jordan v. Diamond Equip.
& Supply Co., 362 Ark. 142, 156, 207 S.W.3d 525, 535 (2005)).
Phillips contends that Robinson required arbitration as a condition of admission,
presented the agreements to vulnerable residents with little bargaining power, inadequately
explained their terms, and failed to disclose the pending class action while obtaining
agreements intended to remove residents’ claims from that litigation. Robinson responds
that the agreements disclosed arbitration and the waiver of a judicial forum, permitted
consultation with counsel, and acknowledged voluntary assent. It further emphasizes that
residents could obtain care elsewhere, that Robinson agreed to pay certain arbitration
expenses, and that Phillips offered no individualized evidence of coercion or
misunderstanding.
To be clear, neither the existence of a pending class action nor the inclusion of a
condition-of-admission provision automatically invalidates an arbitration agreement.
Likewise, the federal nursing-home regulation does not itself render an agreement
unenforceable. Northport Health Servs. of Ark., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
14 F.4th 856, 867–69 (8th Cir. 2021). But these circumstances remain relevant to whether
unconscionability without a separate showing of substantively oppressive terms. See, e.g.,
Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 432-33 (Mo. 2015) (rejecting a requirement
of separate findings of procedural and substantive unconscionability).
10
the residents had a meaningful choice in accepting arbitration, as does the failure to disclose
their potential class inclusion (discussed below).
Considered together, the circumstances surrounding these agreements establish
procedural unconscionability. The timing here is significant. This litigation began in 2014.
The circuit court certified the class in March 2016, and we affirmed certification in May
2017. Phillips I, 2017 Ark. 162, 519 S.W.3d 291. Robinson subsequently obtained the
agreements at issue from residents admitted between June 2017 and May 2021. Thus, when
Robinson solicited these agreements, it was already defending a certified class action
concerning its care of residents.
The agreements were presented during admission, when residents and their
representatives were arranging residential care. Arbitration appeared either in section 6 of
the admission agreement or in an incorporated addendum. Most agreements expressly
provided that “[s]igning this Arbitration Agreement, as a part of the Admission Agreement,
is a condition of admission.” Other versions used the phrase “as an addendum to and part
of the Admission Agreement.” For most residents, therefore, agreeing to arbitration was a
stated prerequisite to receiving care from Robinson.6 Although they could seek care
elsewhere, they could not obtain care from Robinson without accepting arbitration. This
distinguishes Lamb, where we rejected an unconscionability challenge to a nursing-home
6
For 82 of the 115 residents whose motions were denied, arbitration appeared in
section 6 of the admission agreement; for the remaining 33, it appeared in an addendum.
Of those 115 agreements, Robinson identifies only two that did not make arbitration a
condition of admission—those of Barbara Hoschouer and Waylon Lyons. See Robinson’s
Reply and Cross-Appellee’s Br., at 39 n.4.
11
agreement that expressly stated arbitration was not a condition of admission. 2016 Ark. 101,
at 15–16, 487 S.W.3d at 357–58.
That distinction matters to the residents’ bargaining power. By making arbitration
a condition of admission, Robinson limited residents’ ability to negotiate that provision.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) recognized this concern when it
promulgated a regulation prohibiting participating facilities from conditioning admission on
arbitration. 84 Fed. Reg. 34,718, 34,727–28 (July 18, 2019). Although the regulation does
not itself render the agreements unenforceable, the mandatory nature of the arbitration
provision remains relevant to whether residents had a meaningful choice in accepting them.
The disparity in bargaining power was compounded by a disparity in information.
Robinson knew of the pending class action but did not disclose it during admission. Its
admissions coordinator, Kelli Howard, testified that she knew about the lawsuit around
2015. Asked whether she informed residents or prospective residents of the litigation, she
answered, “Oh, no.”7 Asked whether she informed them of their potential representation
in the lawsuit, she responded, “Oh, no, I don’t discuss the lawsuit.” 8
That information was significant to the decision whether to arbitrate. Here, while
defending a certified class action regarding the care of its residents, Robinson was obtaining
agreements with new residents governing disputes over the same subject without disclosing
that the new residents could otherwise be made part of the class absent their consent to the
7
Pl.’s Suppl. Resp. to Defs.’ 229 Mots. to Compel Arb., Ex. B.
8
Id.
12
included terms. That omission is fatal. Robinson knew that the agreements could provide
a basis to compel individual arbitration of claims otherwise pursued in the class litigation.
Yet prospective residents were not informed of that litigation when deciding whether to
accept arbitration as part of their admission.9
Robinson argues that class counsel bore responsibility for notifying class members of
the pending litigation. But that argument overlooks the timing of the admission process.
As class counsel explained at oral argument, prospective residents could not be identified
and notified as members of the resident class before they became residents. By the time
they entered the class through admission, they had already been presented with the
agreements. Thus, whatever notice class counsel might later provide could not supply the
missing information when the residents decided whether to arbitrate. The relevant inquiry
concerns the circumstances existing when assent was obtained.
Robinson emphasizes that the agreements expressly disclosed the waiver of a judicial
forum. Indeed, they advised signatories that they were “GIVING UP AND WAIVING
THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE THEIR DISPUTES DECIDED IN
A COURT OF LAW BEFORE A JUDGE AND JURY.” The agreements also permitted
consultation with counsel and acknowledged voluntary assent. These provisions favor
enforcement. But understanding that an agreement requires arbitration is not necessarily
9
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, we impose no special disclosure requirement
on arbitration agreements. Nor do we hold that contracting parties must disclose every
pending lawsuit. The absence of such a disclosure is one circumstance relevant to our
application of Arkansas’s established unconscionability doctrine in this case. Our holding
rests on the totality of the circumstances, not on the violation of a newly created disclosure
duty.
13
the same as understanding its significance in light of existing litigation. The residents could
comprehend the general waiver of a judicial forum without knowing that Robinson was
already defending a certified class action involving claims arising from its care. Additionally,
an opportunity to ask questions does not eliminate the significance of information known
to the party controlling the admission process but not disclosed to the prospective resident.
Nor does our holding rest on the loss of class procedures. The FAA permits parties
to agree to individual arbitration, including arbitration of claims that might otherwise
proceed collectively. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 507–09 (2018). The
significance of the pending litigation is instead Robinson’s superior knowledge of an existing
controversy against which it sought to enforce the agreements. That knowledge, combined
with the circumstances of admission and the predominantly mandatory nature of the
agreements, distinguishes this case from an ordinary prospective arbitration agreement.
The circumstances bear directly on both considerations identified in Lamb. Most
residents could not obtain care from Robinson unless they agreed to arbitration, placing
them at a substantial disadvantage in bargaining power. And Robinson’s failure to disclose
the pending class action deprived prospective residents of information relevant to
understanding the significance of their agreements. The agreements, their placement in the
admission documents, and Howard’s testimony regarding nondisclosure of the potential
inclusion in an existing certified class establish these circumstances without requiring
speculation about any particular resident’s subjective understanding. Considering the
totality of the circumstances, we hold that the remaining 112 agreements were procedurally
unconscionable.
14
Because the circuit court reached the correct result in denying arbitration, albeit for
different reasons, we affirm those denials as procedurally unconscionable, notwithstanding
its rejection of the unconscionability defense. See Searcy Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Murphy,
2013 Ark. 463, at 6; Vowell v. Fairfield Bay Cmty. Club, Inc., 346 Ark. 270, 58 S.W.3d 324
(2001); Faulkner v. Ark. Children’s Hosp., 347 Ark. 941, 69 S.W.3d 393 (2002).10 We need
not address Robinson’s remaining challenges to the individual agreements.11
D. Cross-Appeal
Phillips cross-appeals the circuit court’s order granting the motions to arbitrate as to
112 residents. Robinson moves to dismiss the cross-appeal. We grant the motion.
An order is appealable only when a rule or statute authorizes review. Arkansas Code
Annotated section 16-108-228 (Repl. 2016) and Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–
Civil 2(a)(12) authorize an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration,
10
The dissent characterizes our application of Arkansas contract law as a departure
from settled precedent and a violation of the FAA. It is neither. The dissent’s rhetoric does
not change the governing law: arbitration agreements, like all contracts, remain subject to
generally applicable defenses to enforcement. Arkansas courts have long recognized
unconscionability as a defense to contract enforcement. See supra § II.C. And the FAA
expressly preserves generally applicable contract defenses, including unconscionability. 9
U.S.C. § 2. We neither disfavor arbitration nor impose a rule peculiar to arbitration
agreements. We apply established Arkansas contract principles to the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the agreements before us. The FAA requires no more—and
permits no less.
11
The dissent would compel arbitration under every agreement before us. But that
conclusion overlooks the circuit court’s independent findings that numerous agreements
failed to satisfy the basic requirements of contract formation. The circuit court identified
defects concerning the parties’ identities, the signatories’ authority, and the capacities in
which representatives executed the agreements. Those findings concern whether
enforceable contracts existed in the first place, not whether otherwise valid contracts were
unconscionable. The FAA does not require enforcement of an agreement that was never
validly formed.
15
but not from an order granting one. See Searcy Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Murphy, 2013 Ark.
463, at 6–7; see also England v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 306 Ark. 225, 227, 811 S.W.2d
313, 315 (1991) (“Most states . . . have held that an order compelling arbitration is not
appealable.”).
Phillips invokes decisions permitting review of related issues in interlocutory appeals,
including Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nesheim, 285 Ark. 253, 686 S.W.2d 777 (1985), SEECO,
Inc. v. Hales, 334 Ark. 307, 973 S.W.2d 818 (1998), and City of Fort Smith v. Merriott, 2020
Ark. 94, 594 S.W.3d 214. Those decisions do not convert every ruling made in a class
action into an appealable order. Here, the challenged grants compel identified residents to
arbitrate. They are not orders certifying or refusing to certify a class. The more specific
provision governing interlocutory arbitration appeals does not authorize their review.
Phillips also argues that the circuit court rejected unconscionability and other
defenses globally in a single order and that de novo review permits examination of the entire
order. We agree that an appellee may urge any preserved, record-supported ground for
affirming the denials properly before us. That is why we have considered unconscionability
on direct appeal. But an alternative ground for affirmance is not an independent basis to
reverse separate, nonappealable grants. De novo review determines how an appellate court
examines a matter within its jurisdiction; it does not supply jurisdiction over a matter the
rules currently exclude.
We therefore dismiss the cross-appeal without reaching the merits of the grants of
arbitration.
16
III. Conclusion
We affirm the circuit court’s denial of arbitration as to 112 residents because the
agreements were procedurally unconscionable. We reverse the denials as to Dorothy
Jackson, Johnnie Jones, and Mona Rea because the circuit court exceeded the scope of our
mandate. We dismiss Phillips’s cross-appeal for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part on direct appeal; cross-appeal
dismissed.
Special Justices BRIAN LESTER and CORY COX join.
HILAND and BRONNI, JJ., dissent.
WOOD and WEBB, JJ., not participating.
NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Justice, dissenting. “Well, it’s Groundhog Day . . . again
. . . .”1 After six appeals, two trial judges, and more than a decade of litigation, the majority
finds yet another way to undermine freedom of contract, extend this case, and violate the
Federal Arbitration Act. Like the majority’s previous decisions certifying a never-ending
class action and redefining mutuality, nothing supports the majority’s conclusion that any of
the challenged arbitration provisions are unconscionable. See Robinson Nursing & Rehab.
Ctr., LLC v. Phillips, 2019 Ark. 305, at 26–27, 586 S.W.3d 624, 639–40 (Womack, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part) (rejecting majority’s ad hoc approach to mutuality);
Robinson Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC v. Phillips, 2017 Ark. 162, 519 S.W.3d 291 (Hart, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part) (rejecting ill-defined, open-ended class definition).
1Groundhog Day, at approximately 00:32:00 (Columbia Pictures 1993).
17
Far from it, the majority’s unconscionability discussion contains about as much arbitration
law as Das Kapital.
That’s hardly surprising since the majority’s core conclusion is little more than a curt
declaration that arbitration is unfair and disfavored—perhaps, just in the nursing home
context. But whether limited to the nursing home setting or not, such “judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements” violates the FAA’s requirement that courts “place arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). Indeed, in the arbitration context, our role is limited to
determining “whether the parties have entered a valid agreement to arbitrate and, if so,
whether the existing dispute falls under the coverage of the agreement.” Gannon v. Cir.
City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2001). It’s not our job to make arbitration
more difficult or to decide whether arbitration—in general or in the nursing home setting—
is a good or bad idea. See Mendez v. Puerto Rican Int’l Cos., Inc., 553 F.3d 709, 711 (3d Cir.
2009) (“The purpose of [the FAA] . . . is to guarantee that a party who has secured the
agreement of another to arbitrate rather than litigate a dispute will reap the full benefits of
its bargain.”).
So rather than join the majority’s road to serfdom, I’d do what the FAA requires: I’d
enforce all the arbitration agreements at issue and end this case once and for all. Anything
less just sets up yet another appeal—and ultimately reversal on federal law grounds.
1. It may not be revolutionary enough for the majority, but I’ll start with the
law. The FAA “embodies a national policy favoring arbitration” and displaces “any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
18
U.S. 333, 346 (2011) (cleaned up). That law “was enacted in 1925 in response to
widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,” id. at 339, and its “principal purpose
. . . is to ‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.’”
Id. at 344 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989)). Reflecting that, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the FAA
“preclude[s] States” via legislation or, as more relevant here, judicial fiat “from singling out
arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed
‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’” Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,
687 (1996) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). Thus,
regardless of what the majority thinks of arbitration, “the FAA requires courts to honor
parties’ expectations” and enforce their agreement to arbitrate disputes. Concepcion, 563
U.S. at 351; accord Mendez, 553 F.3d at 711 (“[T]he liberal policy favoring arbitration
agreements is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual
arrangements.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
To be sure, “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening
[the FAA].” Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687. But that does not mean courts can sidestep
the FAA by relabeling hostility to arbitration as an unconscionability analysis. See Concepcion,
563 U.S. at 352–53 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“If [the FAA] means anything, it is that courts
cannot refuse to enforce arbitration agreements because of a state public policy against
arbitration, even if the policy nominally applies to ‘any contract.’”). On the contrary, as the
Supreme Court explained in rejecting an eerily similar state-unconscionability analysis used
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to void a provision barring class arbitration, the FAA prohibits courts from using “defenses
that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement
to arbitrate is at issue.” Id. at 339.
2. Recognizing that, the majority tries to obscure its conclusion that the
challenged provisions are invalid simply because they involve arbitration. Certainly, it never
says that outright; that wouldn’t be politically correct. Rather, it says they’re
unconscionable. Yet the majority’s reasons for finding unconscionability are all specific to
arbitration—or at least specific to nursing home arbitration. And, as discussed above, even
case law “ostensibly . . . apply[ing] general principles of contract law” cannot mask a
“hold[ing] that an agreement to arbitrate may be unconscionable simply because it is an
agreement to arbitrate.” Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 395 (3d Cir. 2007). So the
majority’s unconscionability conclusion conflicts with federal law and isn’t a basis for
refusing to enforce the challenged provisions.
a. Begin with the majority’s claim that the challenged provisions are, at least in
part, unconscionable because residents “could not obtain care from Robinson unless they
agreed to arbitration.” Maj. Op. at 14. That claim clashes with both law and logic.
First, take-it-or-leave-it contracts aren’t illegal or inherently unconscionable.
They’re actually quite common. Anyone downloading today’s opinion will probably agree
to several along the way. Yet the majority says that’s a problem here. It’s not clear why
unless the majority either means to say that (1) all those take-it-or-leave-it contracts that we
agree to daily are unconscionable; or (2) only take-it-or-leave-it arbitration agreements are
unconscionable. If it means the former, it has radically changed Arkansas law; if it means
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the latter, it has adopted a rule that violates federal law. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,
493 n.9 (1987) (courts may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a
basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable”). Either way, its
conclusion makes no sense and isn’t a basis for invalidating the challenged provisions.
Second, the analysis doesn’t change just because a take-it-or-leave-it arbitration
provision appears in a nursing home admission agreement. The Supreme Court has already
made that clear, holding that states can’t subject “an arbitration clause in a nursing home
admission agreement” to greater scrutiny simply because it involves nursing home claims.
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012); accord Kindred Nursing Ctrs.
Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246, 252 (2017) (“The FAA . . . preempts any state rule
discriminating on its face against arbitration—for example, a “‘law prohibit[ing] outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim.’” (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341)). Rather,
absent a reason to believe an agreement is exempt from the FAA, it is subject to that law’s
directive “plac[ing] arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contract[s]” and
requiring courts to honor the parties’ agreement. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24–25 (rejecting claim
that age discriminat