Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 137 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-23-544 Opinion Delivered: October 8, 2026 ARKANSAS WINE AND SPIRITS WHOLESALE, LLC APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH DIVISION [NO. 60CV-22-827] V. HONORABLE HERBERT T. WRIGHT, JR., JUDGE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION; AFFIRMED. ARKANSAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL DIVISION; FREDDIE BLACK, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE ARKANSAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL DIVISION; PAMELA DEPRIEST, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE ARKANSAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL DIVISION; ALEX BLASS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE ARKANSAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL DIVISION; JAMIE ANDERSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE ARKANSAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL DIVISION; STEVEN SMITH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE ARKANSAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL DIVISION; MACH FLYNT, INC.; LEVECKE CORPORATION; AND MOON DISTRIBUTORS, INC. APPELLEES RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice This is a dispute over the extent to which each manufacturer of spirituous and vinous beverages (alcoholic beverages) shipped into or within Arkansas can choose a wholesale distributor in light of the exclusivity protections Arkansas law provides to licensed alcohol wholesalers. The Board of the Arkansas Alcoholic and Beverage Control (ABC) Division agreed with its Director’s decision that Kirkland Signature is a single brand and that Arkansas law requires all Kirkland Signature manufacturers to use the same designated wholesaler. This administrative decision granted two manufacturers’ change requests and removed Arkansas Wine and Spirits’ (AWS) designation as the wholesaler for Mach Flynt and Levecke’s Kirkland Signature alcoholic beverages. We hold that Kirkland Signature is a single brand for purposes of Arkansas Code Annotated section 3-2-403, and the statute requires distribution of the brand through one licensed wholesaler. As the ABC Board had substantial evidence to support its decision, and we find it was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, we affirm. I. Facts Arkansas has a three-tiered system for alcohol distribution and sales: tier 1 is the manufacturer (supplier/source of the alcohol); tier 2 is the Arkansas wholesaler (distributor); and tier 3 is the Arkansas retailer. Costco Wholesale Corporation is a large retailer. It has a registered trademark for its private label product, Kirkland Signature. After Costco opened its first Arkansas location, several manufacturers registered Kirkland Signature alcoholic beverage products with the ABC Division.1 Four manufacturers designated two wholesalers: 1 There was a different designated wholesaler for Kirkland Signature before the opening of a Costco in Arkansas. That is not relevant to our analysis as the wholesaler released the designation. 2 (1) On January 11, 2021, manufacturer Ethica Wines registered a Kirkland Signature Chianti to wholesaler Moon Distributors, Inc.; (2) on February 13, 2021, manufacturer Misa Imports registered a Kirkland Signature Pinot Grigio to wholesaler Moon Distributors; (3) on March 10, 2021, manufacturer Mach Flynt registered a Kirkland Signature Sauvignon Blanc to wholesaler AWS; and (4) on May 4, 2021, manufacturer Levecke registered a Kirkland Signature strawberry margarita to wholesaler AWS. The ABC approved these wholesaler designations. Later, the ABC Division realized that Kirkland Signature alcoholic beverages were registered to more than one wholesaler. The ABC Director sent a memorandum to Mach Flynt and Levecke, two Kirkland Signature manufacturers, about their wholesaler designations. The Director explained that only one licensed liquor-wholesaler in the state can distribute a specific brand or label. Since “the Kirkland Brand Label was first registered and assigned to Moon Distributors,” all Kirkland Signature products must use Moon. The Director added that any manufacturers “registering labels that inadvertently assigned another wholesaler will need to complete the required steps . . . to correct the error.” In other words, any manufacturer that registered Kirkland Signature alcoholic beverages with wholesalers other than Moon would need to submit a change request to designate Moon as its wholesaler. Mach Flynt and Levecke submitted “Wholesaler Change Requests,” citing the Director’s memorandum, yet both noted their preference for their original wholesaler choice, AWS. AWS objected to the Wholesaler Change Requests. The Director held a hearing on the requests and granted them both, thus terminating AWS’s ability to continue 3 distributing Kirkland Signature products for Mach Flynt and Levecke. AWS appealed to the ABC Board (Board). The Board conducted a hearing and issued an opinion upholding the Director’s decision. AWS filed a petition for review of the agency’s decision in circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. AWS appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, which in turn certified the case to this court, and we granted the certification. We affirm. II. Standard of Review On appeal, we review the Board’s determination directly, rather than the circuit court’s decision. Moore v. Ark. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 2016 Ark. 422, at 3, 503 S.W.3d 796, 799. We review the agency’s interpretation of statutes de novo as it is this court’s role to interpret statutes. Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., Ltd., 2020 Ark. 136, at 4–5, 597 S.W.3d 613, 616–17. We do not give special deference or weight to the agency’s determination. Id. If a statute is ambiguous, however, the agency’s interpretation is one of many tools that we can use to guide us. Id. In contrast, we review an agency’s factual determinations for substantial evidence, Moore, 2016 Ark. 422, at 3, 503 S.W.3d at 799. We will uphold an agency's decision when it is supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Id. III. Analysis AWS argues that the Board’s interpretation of the relevant statutes was clearly erroneous. To support this, it contends (1) Kirkland Signature alcoholic beverages are not the same brand for purposes of section 403; (2) even if Kirkland Signature is a brand, section 4 412 only prohibits a single manufacturer from choosing more than one wholesaler; (3) there was not substantial evidence to support the change requests; and (4) the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. We address each argument below. A. Must All Manufacturers of Kirkland Signature Alcoholic Beverages Use the Same Wholesaler? We combine appellant’s first and second arguments for purposes of analysis. Arkansas Code Annotated section 3-2-403 contains the process for manufacturers to register alcoholic beverages. A manufacturer submits to the ABC Division one Certificate of Label Approval (COLA) “for each brand” and “brand label extension” the first time it ships an alcoholic beverage into or within Arkansas. And the manufacturer must designate one licensed wholesaler as the exclusive wholesaler of it. (b)(1) Every manufacturer, importer, or producer of spirituous and vinous beverages, as defined by § 3-1-102, doing business in the State of Arkansas shall submit to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division one (1) United States Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau Certificate of Label Approval for each brand of spirituous and vinous beverages and the brand label extension of each brand of spirituous and vinous beverages to be shipped for the first time by the shipper into or within the state and shall designate in the application for registration one (1) licensed liquor wholesaler in the state, who shall be the exclusive distributor of such brand or label within the state. Ark. Code Ann. § 3-2-403(b)(1) (Supp. 2025). A designated wholesaler cannot be changed without a hearing and good cause found by the director. Id. The critical issue is: Can each manufacturer designate its one wholesaler-of-choice when registering, or is it stuck with the designated wholesaler another manufacturer has previously chosen for the same trademarked brand? We illustrate this in Chart 1 with initial wholesalers before the change requests and Chart 2 depicting the status after ABC granted the change requests. The key issue is whether 5 the Kirkland Signature brand name means all four of these manufacturers must use the same wholesaler or, as argued by AWS, does the fact that each of these has a different beverage label (Chianti, Pinot Grigio, Sauvignon Blanc, Strawberry Margarita) mean all four manufacturers can each designate a different wholesaler. Chart 1 Ethica Wines Misa Imports Mach Flynt Leveckeke Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer Kirkland Signature Kirkland Signature Kirkland Signature Kirkland Signature Chianti Pinot Grigio Sauvignon Blanc Strawberry Margarita Moon Distributers Moon Distributers Ark. Wine & Spirits Ark. Wine & Spirits Wholesaler Wholesaler Wholesaler Wholesaler Chart 2 Ethica Wines Misa Imports Mach Flynt Leveckeke Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer Kirkland Signature Kirkland Signature Kirkland Signature Kirkland Signature Chianti Pinot Grigio Sauvignon Blanc Strawberry Margarita Moon Distributers Moon Distributers Moon Distributers Moon Distributers Wholesaler Wholesaler Wholesaler Wholesaler 6 We begin with the statutes. We give words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning. Hudson v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 2024 Ark. 179, at 5, 700 S.W.3d 891, 896. A statute is ambiguous when the text could have more than one meaning. Id. at 11, 700 S.W.3d at 899. When this occurs, we look for legislative intent. Id.; see also Ark. Code Ann. § 1-2-202 (Repl. 2017) (“All general provisions, terms, phrases, and expressions used in any statute shall be liberally construed so that the true intent and meaning of the General Assembly may be fully carried out.”). We interpret an ambiguous statute by reading all subparts in context to find the legislative intent. Hudson, 2024 Ark. 179, at 11–12, 700 S.W.3d at 899. We reconcile statutory provisions so that they work together logically and give meaning to every part. Id. We find that section 3-2-403 is ambiguous. Indeed, rarely have we seen such confusing and internally inconsistent legislative language. The statute is ambiguous because it is open to more than one interpretation. Id. Because of this ambiguity, we must resort to rules of statutory construction. We begin with the definition. Section 3-2-403(a) defines a “brand label” as “the label carrying the distinctive design of a brand name of a spirituous liquor or vinous liquor.” (Emphasis added.) Yet the registration is for each “brand” and “brand label extension.” See generally Ark. Code Ann. § 3-2-403. We begin by looking at the word “brand” in its ordinary and usually accepted meaning. The American Heritage Dictionary’s definition for “brand” is “[a] trademark or distinctive name identifying a product, service, or organization.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 231 (3d ed. 1992). Black’s Law Dictionary likewise defines “brand” as a trademark: “[a] name or symbol used by a seller or manufacturer to identify 7 goods or services and to distinguish them from competitors’ goods or services; the term used colloquially in business and industry to refer to a corporate or product name, a business image, or a mark, regardless of whether it may legally qualify as a trademark.” Black’s Law Dictionary 231 (12th ed. 2024). This ordinary understanding of “brand” as a distinctive trademark, name, or symbol that distinguishes goods or services from its competitors allows us to make sense of the statutory scheme. ABC contends that the brand label is the distinctive trademark logo design––here Kirkland Signature. Opposing this, AWS argues that each distinct alcoholic beverage is a different brand because they are not the same or substantially the same product, and they have different product labels. AWS relies on the following: For the purposes of this subchapter, a “brand” means the same product or substantially the same product as evidenced by the product label that must be filed with the division. Ark. Code Ann. section 3-2-412(c)(1) (Repl. 2017). In effect, this would mean that each and every registered alcoholic beverage would be its own “brand.” Certainly, this adds to the ambiguity. Why would section 3-2-403 define “brand label” as the “distinctive design of a brand name” (emphasis added) if it meant the same or substantially product label for the same alcoholic beverage?2 To read sections 3-2-403 and 3-2-412 harmoniously, we find the ABC Division’s regulations helpful. These regulations suggest that the ABC views one product broadly and not specifically to a particular variety of beverages. The regulations state that “[a] brand for 2 Certainly, there is more ambiguity because of section 3-2-403’s requirement to file one COLA with each registration, and a COLA is not assigned one per trademarked brand. Yet all the relevant COLAs list Kirkland Signature as the brand 8 a product registered with the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division shall include the registered product as well as all derivatives or subcategories.” 3 Code Ark. R. 2-102. It adds that “‘[p]roduct’ shall mean a brewed, fermented, or distilled liquor” and “shall not be construed to mean a particular malt, spirituous or vinous liquor, or any variety, category, or subcategory thereof.” 3 Code Ark. R. 2-102. The regulation’s definition of product undercuts AWS’s argument that section 3-2-412’s brand definition is beverage-variety specific. We are also mindful of the General Assembly’s stated purpose to afford exclusivity to wholesalers. One objective listed in the statute was to prevent “undue control of such wholesalers by . . . manufacturers.” Ark. Code Ann. § 3-2-401(1) (Repl. 2017). And while AWS raises several policy arguments against this and its potential consequences, such as a wholesaler might treats some manufacturers of a brand better than others. But we are not the policy-making branch. Whether this is sound policy is not for us to determine. Certainly, there remains a procedure in place for a manufacturer to request a change in wholesaler. Mach Flynt and Levecke can petition the ABC Division for a change. AWS also argues that Arkansas Code Annotated section 3-2-412’s prohibition on dual distributorships only means a single manufacturer cannot designate more than one wholesaler for an alcoholic beverage. For example, AWS agrees that 3-2-412 would prohibit Ethica Wines from designating both Moon Distributors and Mach Flynt as wholesalers for its Kirkland Signature Chianti. But AWS argues 412 does not prohibit Ethica Wines from designating Moon Distributers for a Kirkland Signature Chianti the same time Mach Flynt designates AWS for its Kirkland Signature Sauvignon Blanc. But the ABC Board did not 9 rely on section 3-2-412 for its decision. Even if AWS is correct as to section 3-2-412’s limitation, the ABC Board’s decision rested on interpreting section 3-2-403. We conclude that section 3-2-403 provides one exclusive wholesale distributor for each brand or label and that means there can be only one wholesaler for the Kirkland Signature brand of a spirituous or vinous liquor. To interpret it otherwise would require this court to change the disjunctive “brand or label” to the conjunctive “brand and label.” All manufacturers of a Kirkland Signature brand or brand extension must designate the same wholesaler. Once a manufacturer of a brand selects a wholesaler, other manufacturers of that brand must also designate that wholesaler. B. Was There Substantial Evidence to Support the Board’s Decision, and Was Its Decision Arbitrary, Capricious or an Abuse of Discretion? AWS contends that even if the Board’s statutory interpretation was correct, there was no substantial evidence to support its decision. As stated above, this is a high standard to meet. The Board found that there was substantial evidence that the labels at issue are for the same brand and that it was good cause to grant the change request to comply with sections 3-2-401 and -403. This court cannot hold that granting a change request to comply with state statutes is anything other than substantial evidence of good cause. And while the statute sets out factors a director may consider, the director is not limited to those. Ark. Code Ann. § 3-2-404(5)(B)(iv) (Supp. 2025). The Board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. It conducted a hearing, considered the testimony, reviewed the record, and found that the Director granted the request to comply with state statutes. For these reasons, we affirm. 10 Special Justice CORY COX joins. WOMACK and BRONNI, JJ., dissent. WEBB, J., not participating. SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. The court should reverse the circuit court’s order and dismiss this case without reaching the merits. Article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution requires as much.1 Without an express constitutional provision to the contrary, the State can never properly be a defendant in any of its courts.2 None of the limited, constitutionally based exceptions applies here. 3 The circuit court therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear AWS’s suit, and this court lacks jurisdiction to reach its merits. The constitutional text controls. The General Assembly cannot create by statute an exception to sovereign immunity that the constitution itself does not permit. 4 When the people intended to permit suits against the State, the constitution says so. Habeas corpus and illegal-exaction claims are familiar examples.5 The constitution likewise grants this court 1 See Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Ark., 2022 Ark. 32, at 17, 639 S.W.3d 319, 327 (Womack, J., dissenting). 2 Id. 3 Id. at 17, 639 S.W.3d at 327. 4 See Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino P’ship, 2023 Ark. 153, at 10– 11, 676 S.W.3d 368, 375 (Womack, J., dissenting). 5 See Ark. Const. art. 2, § 11; art. 16, § 13; see also Rutledge v. Remmel, 2022 Ark. 86, at 10, 643 S.W.3d 5, 11 (Womack, J., concurring); Kimbrough v. Grieve, 2024 Ark. 34, at 15, 685 S.W.3d 225, 234 (Womack, J., dissenting). 11 jurisdiction over challenges to the sufficiency of statewide initiative and referendum petitions and proposed constitutional amendments.6 No comparable provision authorizes AWS’s suit. The Administrative Procedure Act cannot overcome article 5, section 20’s constitutional command.7 Sovereign immunity therefore bars this suit. NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Justice, dissenting. The statutes governing wholesaler exclusivity and distribution are unnecessarily complicated. They’re awkward, ungrammatical, and a textbook example of how not to write a statute. Indeed, the provision at the heart of this case, Arkansas Code Annotated section 3-2-403(b)(1), is basically one big run-on sentence. But “inartful legislative drafting . . . does not excuse us from the responsibility of construing a statute as faithfully as possible to its actual text.” DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 82 (2011). Nor does the fact that a “statute is awkward, and even ungrammatical . . . make it ambiguous,” Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004), or otherwise require us to defer to an agency’s unsupported view of the law. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 414 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“legal texts often contain ambiguities,” and it’s the role of judges, not agencies, to “resolve” them); Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., 2020 Ark. 136, at 5, 597 S.W.3d 613, 617 (rejecting agency deference because “it is the province and duty of this Court to determine what a statute means”). Yet that’s exactly what the majority does, “abdicat[ing] [its] job of interpreting the law” while 6 Ark. Const. art. 5, § 1; amend. 80, § 2(D)(4); see Armstrong v. Thurston, 2022 Ark. 167, at 17, 652 S.W.3d 167, 179 (Womack, J., concurring). 7 See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-212; see also Ark. Code Ann. § 3-2-216. 12 inventing new ways to do so. Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 593 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). Instead, I’d do what courts normally do when confronted with a difficult statute: read the various provisions governing wholesaler distribution in the only consistent way possible. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (courts should construe statutes as one consistent whole); Standridge v. Fort Smith Pub. Schs., 2025 Ark. 42, at 4, 708 S.W.3d 773, 777 (similar). Doing that, I’d hold that the provisions at issue here only prohibit entities from designating more than one wholesaler per product and any product extensions. Only that product-focused reading harmonizes section 412(c)’s unusual, product-level definition of “brand,” section 403(b)(1)’s requirement that entities file a product-specific federal certificate of label approval (or COLA), and section 403(b)(1)’s other requirement that entities designate an exclusive wholesaler on that basis. The majority, moreover, effectively concedes as much, recognizing that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division’s contrary reading—imposing exclusivity based on brand-moniker— renders the statutory scheme completely unintelligible. I’d then apply that logical, harmonious reading and reverse ABC’s conclusion that Mach Flynt and Levecke must use Moon to distribute any alcoholic beverage carrying the Kirkland Signature moniker. I therefore dissent from the majority’s contrary conclusion. 1. The alcohol distribution scheme at issue here is built around section 412(c)’s definition of “brand.” Like the majority, I think we have to begin by defining that term. But I wouldn’t go looking for my own definition; I’d just use section 412(c)’s definition. It says that “‘brand’ means the same product or substantially the same product as evidenced by 13 the product label that must be filed with [ABC].” Ark. Code Ann. § 3-2-412(c)(1). So whatever “brand” might mean in other contexts, “[f]or purposes of this subchapter,” id., it means product or substantially the same product. And to decide whether something is the same product or substantially the same product, we look at the label filed with ABC, as subsection 403(c)’s very next clause emphasizes with language stating that “[i]dentical or substantially identical labels will be considered and treated as the same brand.” Ark. Code Ann. § 3-2-412(c)(2). Once we accept that unusual definition of “brand,” the remainder of the subchapter—including, as discussed below, section 403(b)(1)’s language about designating exclusive wholesalers—makes more sense than the majority claims. Take, for instance, section 403’s various provisions requiring parties to file a “[COLA] for each brand label and brand label extension” with ABC. Ark. Code Ann. § 3-2-403(c). If “brand” carries its ordinary (dictionary) meaning, as the majority says, then that requirement doesn’t make sense because COLAs don’t exist at the brand-moniker level. Indeed, the facts of this case nicely illustrate this point because everyone agrees that there is no such thing as a Kirkland Signature COLA. Rather, as ABC confirmed at oral argument, under section 403, entities file product-specific COLAs. Thus, as ABC effectively conceded, section 403’s COLA filing requirements make sense only if the term “brand” in the provisions above means product and product extensions. To be sure, as the majority claims, the federal form used to apply for a COLA contains a box for “brand name,” and I don’t dispute that on that form, “brand name” means brand-moniker. Maj. Op. at 8 n.2. But that’s not the only thing the form requires. Instead, 14 that form requires entities to submit a broad range of product-specific information including a fanciful name (if any), an appellation (if on the label), and a “complete set of labels,” front and back. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.10 (cross-referencing requirements on federal form); Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, Dep’t of the Treasury, TTB Form 5100.31, Application for and Certification/Exemption of Label/Bottle Approval (2026). So it strains credulity to suggest that “brand” in section 403 means “brand name” just because it’s one of the boxes on the COLA form. Likewise, section 403(a)’s definition of “brand label” as “the label carrying the distinctive design of a brand name” strongly suggests that “brand” in section 403(b) doesn’t mean “brand name.” As does the fact that the record here contains multiple product-based COLAs—yet no single Kirkland Signature COLA. Having established that “brand” means what section 412(c) says it means, section 403(b)(1)’s exclusivity language can only mean one thing: an entity must designate an exclusive wholesaler for each product or substantially similar product. That’s the only way to harmonize section 403(b)(1)’s convoluted sentence requiring entities to simultaneously file a COLA “for each brand” and “brand label extension” and “designate . . . one (1) licensed liquor wholesaler in the state, who shall be the exclusive distributor of such brand or label within the state.” Indeed, if that’s not what that language means, the “such brand or label” cross-reference in the second half of the sentence doesn’t make sense. Highlighting that, ABC’s reading oddly suggests that “brand” as used in the COLA part of the sentence means one thing (a product-specific COLA) and something entirely different in the later, “such brand” part of the sentence (the brand-moniker, e.g., Kirkland Signature). That’s not how we read statutes—let alone single sentences. 15 So instead of construing the statutory text in the least obvious way, I’d go with the most coherent reading. I’d hold that section 403(b)(1) only bars entities from designating more than one wholesaler for each product and product-specific variant. Applying that coherent reading to the facts presented here, I’d reverse ABC’s decision requiring Mach Flynt and Levecke to use Moon as their wholesaler. As the majority explains, ABC grounded that decision entirely on its view that section 403(b)(1) imposes wholesaler exclusivity at the brand Kirkland Signature level. See Maj. Op. at 3. Since that’s wrong, the agency’s directive is wrong, and reversal is required. 2. The majority’s contrary view doesn’t make sense. It says that we must defer to ABC’s view of the law because some combination of common meaning, legislative intent, and agency experience renders the statutory framework ambiguous. That claim doesn’t withstand statutory or constitutional scrutiny. Begin with the majority’s claim that we’re required to use the dictionary definition or common understanding of “brand” and that, as a result, “brand” basically means brand- moniker. See Maj. Op. at 7. But “courts are bound by specific definitions of a word by the legislature in that act, regardless of the usual and ordinary meaning of that word.” Bird v. Pan W. Corp., 261 Ark. 56, 60, 546 S.W.2d 417, 419 (1977). For that reason, whatever “brand” might typically mean, we’re required to apply the statutory definition, and the majority cannot manufacture confusion by simply substituting its own definition. See Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (the “first” and “cardinal canon” of statutory construction is “that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says”). 16 This is not one of those “very rare [instances] that a defined meaning can be replaced with another permissible meaning of a word on the basis of other textual indications.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 228 (2012). If that were the case, the majority wouldn’t need to turn to atextual sources to generate ambiguity. At most, the majority’s case for confusion rests on its claim that the provisions at issue use overlapping terms (brand, brand label, brand name, and brand label extension) to refer to the same set of things or only slightly different things. See Maj. Op. at 5, 8, 10. I agree this isn’t the ideal way to write a statute, but as explained above, we can harmonize those various phrases. And when we can do that, we go with the best reading—not agency fiat. See Meredith v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 177 F.3d 1042, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“difficulty and ambiguity are not synonymous” and “the presence of a difficult question of statutory construction does not necessarily render that provision ambiguous for purposes of [agency deference determinations]”); Myers, 2020 Ark. 136, at 5, 597 S.W.3d at 617 (suggesting possible agency role where a statute is completely nonsensical). In its quest to override operative text, the majority also goes “look[ing] for legislative intent.” Maj. Op. at 6. But we’re never entitled to “replace the actual text with speculation as to [the legislature’s] intent.” Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 334 (2010). Nor can a statute’s statement of purpose—as the majority claims (Maj. Op. at 9)—supersede the most plausible, harmonious construction of statutory language. See Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U.S. 28, 57 (2019) (“[S]tatements of purpose . . . by their very nature ‘cannot override [a statute’s] operative language.’” (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra, at 220)); accord D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 578 n.3 (2008) (“[O]perative provisions should be given effect as operative 17 provisions, and prologues as prologues.”). Even if that weren’t the case, the various purposes listed in section 401 hardly support the majority’s conclusion that section 403(b)(1) means that anyone using the Kirkland Signature moniker must use the same wholesaler. For instance, immediately after the language the majority cites about protecting wholesalers from “undue control,” Maj. Op. at 9 (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 3-2-401(1)), the legislature also declared its desire to maintain “healthy competition,” Ark. Code Ann. § 3-2-401(2)—and nothing kills healthy competition like an even broader monopoly. As a grand closer to its argument, the majority invokes ABC’s own regulations. See Maj. Op. at 8–9. That’s a nifty trick, suggesting we should defer to the agency’s conclusion simply because it’s supported by the agency’s own regulations. Of course, that’s not the law; agencies don’t get “to dictate the outcome of cases through erroneous interpretations.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 414 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the majority’s suggestion to the contrary violates basic separation-of-powers principles—including the principle that agencies merely execute, not write laws—and ultimately undermines “individual liberty.” Id. at 416. Worse still, the regulations that the majority cites don’t even support ABC’s decision. They simply say that “a brand for a product registered with [ABC] shall include the registered product as well as all derivatives or subcategories” and then define product. Maj. Op. at 8–9 (quoting 3 Code Ark. R. 2- 102 (as altered)). That’s basically another way of saying that “‘brand’ means the same product or substantially the same product as evidenced by the product label that must be filed with [ABC].” Ark. Code Ann. § 3-2-412(c)(1) (emphasis added). 18 So it’s hard to understand why the majority even cites ABC’s regulations—unless its real goal is to resurrect deference to bureaucrats. Indeed, it’s hard to understand the majority’s entire analysis as anything other than an attempt to make this case more complex than it is and thereby hand the administrative state more power than our constitution does. But it’s our job to follow the constitution and apply plain statutory text. Doing that, I’d reverse ABC’s decision. I respectfully dissent. Castleberry Law Firm, PLLC, by: Kenneth P. “Casey” Castleberry; H. Baker Kurrus, PLLC, by: H. Baker Kurrus; Fuqua Campbell, P.A., by: Patrick L. Spivey, for appellant. Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: Cara D. Butler, for appellee Moon Distributors, Inc. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Lewis, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen.; and Jessica Kloss, Ass’t Att’y Gen.; and Drew Cousins, Arkansas Alcoholic Beverage Control Division, for appellees Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration; Arkansas Alcoholic Beverage Control Division; Freddie Black, in his official capacity as chairman of the board of the Arkansas Beverage Control Division; Pamela DePriest, in her official capacity as a member of the board of the Arkansas Beverage Control Division; Alex Blass, in his official capacity as a member of the Arkansas Beverage Control Division; Jamie Anderson, in his official capacity as a member of the board of the Arkansas Beverage Control Division; and Steven Smith, in his official capacity as a member of the board of the Arkansas Beverage Control Division. Quattlebaum, Grooms & Tull PLLC, by: Michael N. Shannon, for appellee Mach Flynt, Inc. 19