Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 151 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-26-122 Opinion Delivered: October 15, 2026 WINDELL MCCLAIN APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE DESHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 21ACR-03-119] V. HONORABLE QUINCEY ROSS, STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED. SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice Windell McClain appeals from the denial of his petition to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2016). After a Desha County jury convicted McClain of one count of aggravated robbery, he was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment, and we affirmed.1 More than twenty years later, McClain filed a petition to correct an illegal sentence in which he argued that his sentence is illegal because his previous convictions in Tennessee for aggravated robbery and kidnapping should have been considered one conviction when determining his habitual- offender status. According to McClain, the prior convictions for robbery and kidnapping were part of the same criminal episode. The circuit court denied the petition, finding that McClain’s sentence was not facially illegal. Because the circuit court did not clearly err in denying McClain’s petition, we affirm. 1 McClain v. State, 361 Ark. 133, 134, 205 S.W.3d 123, 123 (2005). This court will not reverse the denial of a petition to correct an illegal sentence unless that decision is clearly erroneous.2 A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 3 McClain, however, has failed to make such a showing. Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111(a) permits a circuit court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. But to obtain relief under section 16-90-111(a), the petitioner must demonstrate that the sentence is illegal on its face—or, put another way, that the sentence “is void because it [was] beyond the trial court’s authority to impose and gives rise to a question of subject-matter jurisdiction.”4 The general rule is that a sentence imposed within the maximum term prescribed by law is not illegal on its face.5 McClain was convicted of aggravated robbery, and his sentence was enhanced because of two previous felony convictions. McClain contends, as he did in his petition filed in the circuit court, that his sentence is illegal because his previous convictions resulted from the same criminal episode and should have been counted as only one prior conviction. According to McClain, he was improperly considered a habitual offender with more than one previous felony, and therefore, his life sentence is illegal. The record contains two judgments of conviction reflecting that, in 1985, McClain was convicted of aggravated 2 McGill v. State, 2025 Ark. 66, at 2. 3 Millsap v. State, 2020 Ark. 38, at 2. 4 McGill, 2025 Ark. 66, at 2. 5 Carter v. State, 2023 Ark. 37, at 3, 660 S.W.3d 793, 795. 2 robbery and kidnapping in Tennessee. Further, the record contains an excerpt from the abstract of the transcript from McClain’s criminal trial, which shows that McClain’s previous felony convictions and their effect on his habitual-offender status were issues raised at trial and rejected. McClain’s sentencing order shows that he was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class Y felony, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-12-103 (Repl. 1997). A Class Y felony carries a maximum sentence of not more than forty years, or life.6 McClain’s sentence was enhanced because he is a habitual offender pursuant to section 5-4-501(c) (Supp. 2003), which prescribes a maximum sentence of sixty years or life for a Class Y felony if an offender has more than one previous felony conviction. Under these statutes, McClain’s sentence of life imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum penalty, so the circuit court did not clearly err when it denied McClain’s petition to correct an illegal sentence. Affirmed. Special Justice CORY COX joins. WEBB, J., not participating. Windell McClain, pro se appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Dalton Cook, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 6 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401 (Repl. 1997). 3