Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 468 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CV-25-488 BROOKLYN HERMES AND HUNTER Opinion Delivered October 7, 2026 HERMES APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 23CV-24-1839] V. HONORABLE SUSAN WEAVER, CRISTIN BEENE AND CENTRAL JUDGE CHRISTIAN ACADEMY CLUBHOUSE, LLC AFFIRMED APPELLEES ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge Brooklyn Hermes and Hunter Hermes appeal from the June 18, 2025 order of the Faulkner County Circuit Court finding them in contempt of a February 21, 2025 preliminary injunction and awarding appellees Cristin Beene and Central Christian Academy Clubhouse, LLC, $3,864.50 in attorney’s fees and costs incurred in obtaining compliance with the injunction. On appeal, the Hermeses contend that (1) the preliminary injunction was void because appellees failed to post security as required by Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) (2025); (2) a void injunction cannot support a finding of contempt or an award of attorney’s fees; and (3) the injunction constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. We affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History This case arises from a dispute concerning statements the Hermeses made on social media regarding appellees’ daycare and preschool facility. Appellees filed suit on September 19, 2024, alleging defamation, slander, libel, and tortious interference with business expectancy and seeking injunctive relief. The Hermeses answered and asserted counterclaims for abuse of process and battery. On November 1, 2024, appellees petitioned for a temporary restraining order and mandatory preliminary injunction pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 65. An amended petition followed. The Hermeses responded to the original request for injunctive relief but did not separately respond to the amended petition. On February 21, 2025, the circuit court entered an order granting appellees’ amended petition for a temporary restraining order and mandatory preliminary injunction. The circuit court found that appellees had demonstrated irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits and that the Hermeses had failed to rebut that showing. The order directed the Hermeses to remove social-media posts “regarding this matter” and to cease further social-media posts regarding appellees until further order of the court. The order did not require appellees to provide security pursuant to Rule 65(c). The same day, the Hermeses filed a notice of compliance stating that they had been advised of, and agreed to remove, social-media posts and video recordings concerning their experience with appellees, that they had previously agreed to discontinue future posting, and that they would continue to abide by the circuit court’s order. 2 On March 5, appellees moved for contempt, alleging that the Hermeses had failed to remove all material covered by the injunction. The following day, the Hermeses’ then counsel moved to withdraw. The record reflects that counsel stated that the materials attached to the contempt motion demonstrated that not all posts and videos had been removed despite counsel’s advice. The Hermeses responded to the contempt motion on March 21. In addition to asserting that they had complied with the circuit court’s order, they argued that the injunction was unenforceable because no security had been required under Rule 65(c). the circuit court subsequently set a show-cause hearing for April 15 limited to the issue of contempt. At that hearing, the Hermeses again raised the Rule 65(c) issue and additionally questioned the constitutionality of the restrictions on their speech. The circuit court informed the parties that the matter then before it was contempt and that any request to dissolve the injunction would require a separate motion and hearing. Following the contempt hearing, the Hermeses moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and again argued that the injunction was unenforceable for failure to require security. They also asserted their constitutional objections to the injunction. Appellees responded. The Hermeses, however, did not obtain a hearing or ruling on their motion. On June 18, the circuit court entered an order finding that the Hermeses were in contempt of the February 21 injunction. The circuit court noted that the contempt had been 3 cured before the contempt hearing but awarded appellees $3,864.50 in attorney’s fees and costs incurred in obtaining compliance. The Hermeses filed their notice of appeal on July 15, and it designated the June 18 contempt order and invoked Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(a)(13) (2025). They did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the initial February 21 injunction. II. Standard of Review An order that imposes a sanction and constitutes the final disposition of a contempt matter is immediately appealable pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(a)(13). Whether an issue has been preserved for appellate review presents a question of law. Questions of law are reviewed de novo, and we give no deference to the circuit court’s conclusions on questions of law. See Muruaga-Atkins v. Foster, 2026 Ark. App. 336, 740 S.W.3d 277. Our standard of review for civil contempt is whether the circuit court’s finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Greenwood v. Greenwood, 2026 Ark. App. 306, 739 S.W.3d 381. To establish civil contempt, there must be willful disobedience of a valid court order, and the order must be definite in its terms and clear about what duties it imposes. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Bass, 2017 Ark. App. 166, 519 S.W.3d 336. A circuit court has inherent authority to award attorney’s fees in contempt proceedings, and both the decision to award fees and the amount awarded are matters within 4 the circuit court’s discretion. See Motal v. City of Little Rock, 2024 Ark. App. 598, 703 S.W.3d 177. We therefore review such an award for abuse of discretion. Id. III. Analysis A. Scope of Appeal We begin with the procedural issue in this case because it determines the issues that are properly before us. An order granting an injunction is immediately appealable under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(a)(6) (2025). A notice of appeal generally must be filed within thirty days from entry of the order from which the appeal is taken. Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 4(a) (2025). The circuit court entered the preliminary injunction on February 21, 2025. The Hermeses did not appeal that order within thirty days. Instead, after appellees sought to hold them in contempt, the Hermeses raised objections to the injunction in the contempt proceeding and later filed a separate motion seeking to dissolve it. That motion does not place the merits of the injunction before us. The circuit court expressly limited the April 15, 2025 hearing to the issue of contempt, and although the Hermeses subsequently filed a motion to dissolve the injunction, they never obtained a ruling on that motion. It is well settled that an appellant must obtain a ruling from the circuit court to preserve an issue for appellate review, and this requirement applies even to constitutional arguments. See Briley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark. App. 302, 715 S.W.3d 471. 5 Moreover, the notice of appeal filed on July 15, 2025, specifically designates the June 18, 2025 contempt order and invokes Rule 2(a)(13). Accordingly, this is an appeal from the contempt order and does not constitute a timely direct appeal from the February 21, 2025 injunction or an appeal from an order granting or denying the Hermeses’ motion to dissolve that injunction—because no such ruling exists. To the extent the Hermeses first and third points on appeal seek direct review of whether the circuit court erred in issuing the original injunction or whether the restrictions imposed by that injunction violate the First Amendment, those questions are not properly before us. B. Rule 65(c) Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that a circuit court “may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” It is undisputed that appellees did not provide security nor did the February 21 order set an amount of security. The Hermeses rely primarily on Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. Heslep, 2019 Ark. 226, 577 S.W.3d 1, for this issue. In Heslep, our supreme court concluded that an injunction failed to comply with Rule 65 because, among other deficiencies, the circuit court failed to require the recipients of the injunction to provide security. The supreme court reversed the injunction and remanded for further proceedings. Id. 6 Heslep establishes that Rule 65(c)’s security requirement is mandatory and that the failure to comply with that requirement constitutes reversible error when the injunction is properly before the appellate court. It does not, however, hold that the omission of security deprives the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction or renders the injunction a nullity that a party is free to disregard while it remains in effect. To the contrary, the remedy established in Heslep was appellate reversal of the injunction. The distinction is dispositive here. The circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties’ civil action and authority to consider a request for injunctive relief. The asserted Rule 65(c) deficiency therefore concerns the correctness of the circuit court’s exercise of that authority, not the existence of its jurisdiction. The Arkansas Supreme Court has recently reiterated the settled rule applicable when contempt is based on disobedience of an existing court order: “When a person is held in contempt for failure or refusal to abide by a judge’s order, the reviewing court will not look behind that order to determine whether it is valid.” Comstock v. State, 2024 Ark. 112, at 9, 689 S.W.3d 652, 658 (quoting James v. Pulaski Cnty. Cir. Ct., 2014 Ark. 305, at 5, 439 S.W.3d 19, 23). An alleged error in the underlying order must be challenged through the procedural steps available to obtain modification, dissolution, a stay, or appellate reversal rather than though a party’s unilateral noncompliance with the order. Here, the Hermeses had several options available to challenge the injunction. They could have timely appealed the February 21 order pursuant to Rule 2(a)(6). They could have sought appropriate relief from the circuit court and obtained a ruling on their subsequently 7 filed motion to dissolve the injunction. They also could have sought a stay while such relief was pursued. The Hermeses did none of those things before the alleged noncompliance that gave rise to appellees’ contempt motion. Instead, the Hermeses initially chose the opposite course of action. On the day the injunction was entered, they filed a notice specifically stating that they had agreed to remove the challenged material and would continue to abide by the circuit court’s order. We therefore reject the Hermeses’ contention that the absence of Rule 65(c) security rendered the February 21 order void ab initio and subject to disregard. Heslep demonstrates that the omission presented grounds for challenging the injunction on proper direct review, but it does not transform the order into a jurisdictional nullity. C. Contempt and Attorney’s Fees Having determined that the February 21 injunction remained enforceable unless and until it was dissolved, stayed, or reversed, we next turn to the contempt order that is properly before us. The Hermeses do not develop a separate argument that the circuit court’s factual finding of noncompliance was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. The record reflects that appellees sought a contempt finding because material covered by the injunction remained available after the February 21 order and after the Hermeses had filed their notice of compliance. The record further reflects that the Hermeses’ former counsel acknowledged that not all the social-media posts and videos had been removed despite counsel’s advice. The circuit court found that the Hermeses had been in contempt but that the contempt had been cured before the hearing on appellees’ motion. On this record, and in 8 the absence of a developed challenge to the circuit court’s finding of noncompliance, we cannot say that its contempt finding was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Nor do we find reversible error in the award of $3,864.50 in attorney’s fees and costs incurred in securing compliance. In Motal, supra, we reaffirmed that circuit courts possess inherent authority to award attorney’s fees as a remedial sanction in contempt proceedings and that the decision whether to award such fees, as well as the amount, lies within the circuit court’s discretion. The award here was payable to appellees for expenses incurred in pursuing compliance with the injunction and was therefore remedial in character. The Hermeses’ argument against the fee award depends on their premise that the underlying injunction was void and unenforceable. Because we reject that premise, and because they present no independent developed challenge to the reasonableness of the amount awarded, we affirm the fee award. D. Prior Restraint on Speech Finally, the Hermeses contend that the February 21 injunction constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. We do not address that argument. The circuit court informed the Hermeses during the contempt proceeding that the hearing concerned only contempt and that a challenge seeking dissolution of the injunction would have to be separately presented. Although the Hermeses later filed such a motion and raised their constitutional objections, they obtained neither a hearing nor a ruling on that motion. 9 An argument, including a constitutional one, must be raised and ruled on below before it may be considered on appeal. See, e.g., Briley, supra. Moreover, the Hermeses failed to timely appeal the February 21 injunction pursuant to Rule 2(a)6). We therefor express no opinion regarding the constitutionality of the restrictions contained in the February 21 order. Affirmed. THYER and MURPHY, JJ., agree. Warden Law Firm, by: Harry Warden; and Ludwig Law Firm, PLC, by: Kale Ludwig, for appellants. Owens & Parker Law Firm P.A., by: Michael A. Mosley and Brooklyn Parker, for appellees. 10