Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 485 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-25-521 DANIEL GREISEN, RONALD DAVID Opinion Delivered October 7, 2026 KIMBROUGH, AND MITZI KIMBROUGH APPEAL FROM THE BENTON APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 04CV-24-3463] V. RODERICK GRIEVE, IN HIS OFFICAL CAPACITY AS THE BENTON COUNTY HONORABLE CHRISTINE ASSESSOR; CARL ALEXANDER; AND HORWART, JUDGE BESSIE ALEXANDER APPELLEES AFFIRMED WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge Appellants Daniel Greisen, Ronald Kimbrough, and Mitzi Kimbrough appeal the Benton County Circuit Court’s March 20, 2025 order denying their request for permissive intervention in an action filed by appellees Bessie and Carl Alexander against appellee Roderick Grieve, Benton County assessor. They also appeal the circuit court’s July 2 order denying their motion for reconsideration. They argue on appeal that the circuit court erred by not granting them permissive intervention and by denying their request for reconsideration. We affirm. The Alexanders requested an adjustment of the market value, assessed value, and/or taxable value of their homestead property by Grieve following a 2024 reappraisal. They purchased their property in 2023 and received a notice of real estate value change in July 2024 informing them that the market value of their property was $575,745, which was an increase of approximately 52 percent from tax year 2023 when it was assessed as $378,180. This caused the Alexanders’ assessed value and taxable value to increase from $75,636 in 2023 to $115,149 for 2024. They contended that the new assessed value was in error because they were entitled to a 5 percent limitation on the increase of taxable value from 2023 to 2024 as guaranteed by amendment 79, section 1(c)(1) of the Arkansas Constitution, which states in pertinent part: Except as provided in subsection (d), if the parcel is a taxpayer’s homestead used as the taxpayer’s principal place of residence then for the first assessment following reappraisal, any increase in the assessed value of the parcel shall be limited to not more than five percent (5%) of the assessed value of the parcel for the previous year. In each year thereafter the assessed value shall increase by an additional five percent (5%) of the assessed value of the parcel for the year prior to the first assessment that resulted from reappraisal but shall not exceed the assessed value determined by the reappraisal prior to adjustment under this subsection. The Benton County Board of Equalization denied their request for adjustment, and the Alexanders appealed that decision to the Benton County Court, which affirmed the Board’s decision. That decision was appealed to the Benton County Circuit Court on November 4. The Alexanders filed their first amended complaint on November 5. In their complaint, the Alexanders contended that the Grieve’s calculation of their ad valorem tax is erroneous; that Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-26-11231 is unconstitutional due to the plain language found in amendment 79; and that Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-26-1123 1 (Repl. 2020). 2 is unconstitutional as applied to their parcel. They asked that the assessor be ordered to apply amendment 79 limitations to their parcel and set their taxable value at $79,417.80 for tax year 2024, and they asked to circuit court to declare Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-26-1123 unconstitutional. The assessor denied the material allegations of the Alexanders’ complaint and took no position in regard to the constitutionality of section 26-26-1123 or to whether the Alexanders were entitled to declaratory judgment. He did, however, maintain that he had assessed the property as required by Arkansas Code Annotated sections 26-26- 11202 and -1123 and had no discretion or authority to disregard Arkansas law. He argued that if the circuit court found either or both of the listed statutes unconstitutional, it should direct the assessor to disregard those statutes to the extent that they increase the assessed value of a property beyond amendment 79 limitation in the year after purchase. He also argued that the circuit court should direct the assessor to continue to reset property values to 20 percent of full appraisal value in the year of purchase but apply the 5 percent limitation in amendment 79 and other amendment 79 benefits where applicable on the first assessment date after the transfer of title instead of on the second assessment date after the transfer of title. The parties reached an agreement, and the circuit court entered an order for declaratory judgment and prospective injunction on February 10, 2025. The order stated that in addition to section 1(c)(1) of amendment 79, subsection (b) allows for a 10 percent 2 (Repl. 2020). 3 limitation on increases in the assessed value of nonhomestead property, and subsection (d) provides a freeze on assessed value for property owners who are disabled or sixty-five years or older. The order further stated: 10. The Court grants declaratory judgment that Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26- 1120(b)(2) and Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-1123(b) are unconstitutional to the extent that they use a greater than 5% increase in the assessed value of a homestead property in the year after sale in violation of Amendment 79 § I(c). The Court grants declaratory judgment that Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-1120(b)(2) and Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-1123(b) are unconstitutional to the extent that they cause a greater than 10% increase in the assessed value of a property in the year after sale in violation of Amendment 79 § I(b). The Court grants declaratory judgment that Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-1120(b)(2) and Ark. Code Ann.§ 26-26-1123(b) are unconstitutional to the extent that they cause an increase in the assessed value of a property in the year after sale where the property was purchased by a person who qualifies for a freeze of the assessed value of the property under Amendment 79 § I(d), and the property was properly assessed at 20% of full appraised value for the year of purchase. Under Amendment 79 § 1(d), if the new owner qualifies for a freeze under Amendment 79, the property should be assessed at 20% of full appraised value in the year of purchase, then the (same) assessed value should be frozen in the year after purchase. 11. The Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for a prospective injunction. In the 2025 assessment year and moving forward , the Assessor (and his successors) is ordered to disregard Ark. Code Ann.§ 26-26-1120(b)(2) and Ark. Code Ann.§ 26-26- 1123(b) to the extent that the statutes violate Amendment 79 as described in paragraph 10 above. 12. This injunction does not prohibit the Assessor from assessing property at 20% of full appraised value when a property is sold, for the year of sale. If the year of sale is also a countywide reappraisal year, then the property should be reappraised and assessed at 20% of the reappraised value for the sale year. If the year after sale is a reappraisal year (as in this case), then the new owner should enjoy the Amendment 79 § 1(c) cap on any increase in the assessed value arising from the reappraisal in the year after purchase. Similarly, when a property is purchased by a person who qualifies for a freeze of assessed value under Amendment 79 § 1(d), and the year of purchase is also a countywide reappraisal year, then the property should be reappraised and assessed at 20% of the reappraised value for the sale year, and the new owner should be allowed to freeze that value moving forward, beginning in the next assessment year 4 the assessed value should not increase due to a countywide reappraisal in the year after sale. Appellants moved to intervene on February 12. They claimed that they are disabled as defined by Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-26-1120 and are, therefore, entitled to the protections found in amendment 79. They contended that they had separately challenged the manner in which Benton County taxes individuals who are over sixty-five or disabled (Qualified Individuals) and that those actions were making their way through the court system.3 They argued that their complaints challenge the Benton County assessor’s disregard of amendment 79, section (d)(1)(A) when it comes to applying the freeze on purchases made by Qualified Individuals and that, although that issue was not before the circuit court in the action filed by the Alexanders, the parties inserted the issue into their agreed order submitted to the circuit court. Appellants pointed to Judge Arnold’s order of dismissal in the Kimbroughs’ complaint, which stated, 3 Greisen’s complaint was in circuit court, and the Kimbroughs’ complaint was still in county court. The Kimbroughs brought an action for illegal exaction for themselves and similarly situated taxpayers in circuit court against counties seeking declaration that amendment 79 prohibits counties from increasing assessed value of a homestead purchased by a person who is disabled or over the age of sixty-five above the assessed value of the homestead as the date of purchase or, in the alternative, that amendment 79 required counties to freeze the assessed value of a homestead purchased by a person who is disabled or over the age of sixty-five at 20 percent of the appraised value as of the date of purchase, not after a subsequent reappraisal. Every judge in Benton County recused, so the Arkansas Supreme Court appointed retired judge Gary Arnold to hear the case. Judge Arnold dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Kimbroughs appealed. The supreme court affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that the circuit court lacked subject- matter jurisdiction. See Kimbrough v. Grieve, 2024 Ark. 34, 685 S.W.3d 225. 5 [I]f this Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain this suit, however, it would conclude that the Plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief and, further, that Act 49 of 2017 is unconstitutional and the Defendants have been acting in continued violation of Amendment 79. .... Based on the plain language of the Amendment, counties cannot adjust the assessed value upwards in the year following the date of purchase. Nor can the next reappraisal that occurs after the purchase result in a reassessment that is higher than the assessed value as of the date of purchase; .... Subsequent acts of the Arkansas Legislature—such as Act 1544 of 2001 and Act 2284 of 2005—did not eliminate the constitutional protections of Amendment 79. When appellant Greisen initiated his action for himself and similarly situated taxpayers, the circuit court issued an order of recusal, and Gary Arnold was appointed by the supreme court on January 3, 2025, to hear Greisen’s case. The parties alleged that Grieve had the language concerning amendment 79, section 1(d) placed in the Alexanders’ order to manipulate the outcomes of the appellants’ actions. Appellants acknowledged that there was no commonality between their action and the Alexanders’ action because appellants’ actions concern illegal exactions brought by Qualified Individuals seeking a refund of the money collected in violation of section 1(d) of amendment 79, which involves constitutionally mandated freezes. Appellants maintained that the order in the Alexanders’ case included issues unique to appellants’ cases and not presented in the Alexanders’ case. They further contended that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to issue an order addressing issues not before it. They claimed that although the order addressed issues unique to their 6 lawsuits, they were never notified that the circuit court would be asked to rule on those issues; thus, they were never given the opportunity to argue the issues. Again, they argue that the issues raised in the Alexanders’ amended complaint did not impact their interests and were not common to their interests; however, they contended that they should be allowed to intervene because the order went beyond the issues presented by the Alexanders and directly affected legal issues associated with the appellants’ claims. They stated that unless they were allowed to intervene, their interests and the interests of others similarly situated would be significantly impaired and/or impeded. They also asked to be allowed to intervene so that they could file a motion to modify or vacate under Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and/or Rule 60. Appellants’ motion for new trial or to obtain relief for judgment was also filed on February 12. Grieve filed a response on February 14 denying the material allegations of appellants’ motion. He further argued that Judge Arnold’s ruling in the Kimbroughs’ first case was void, as was the remainder of his opinion about the merit of their claims. Thus, that order is not legal authority, and the circuit court does not have to consider it. Grieve stated that although he was under no legal obligation to inform the circuit court of pending litigation, he informed the circuit court about the Kimbroughs’ action and said that the circuit court had knowledge of Greisen’s action because it had recused from that case. He admitted that the freeze found in amendment 79 is not directly implicated by the facts in the Alexanders’ case but stated that the order provides comprehensive direction to the assessor with full consideration of the entire body of law at issue, including the caps and freeze found in 7 amendment 79, as requested by Grieve in his answer. He contended that appellants failed to make a convincing argument for permissive intervention and that their motion to intervene contained only conclusory statements. He stated that the motion to intervene should be denied. Appellants replied on February 19, contending that they should be allowed to intervene. The Alexanders filed a response to appellants’ motion to intervene on February 20. They argued that the motion was untimely and failed to demonstrate how the judgment affects the appellants, how it binds them, or how it could even be enforced against them. The Alexanders asked the circuit court to deny appellants’ motion to intervene. Appellants replied on February 25, contending that the motion was timely and that they had properly claimed an interest in the subject of the action because the order entered in the Alexanders’ case approved the County’s actions as it relates to appellants and allows the County to continue to engage in that practice in direct violation of amendment 79. They also took issue with the provision in the order stating that the assessor did not have to amend the 2024 assessment of any other Benton County properties and had to apply the circuit court’s ruling only to tax year 2025. They argued that the order directly impacts the relief they sought and that the order created artificial hurdles for appellants in the prosecution of their independent and unrelated claims. They stated that they should be allowed to intervene because the parties did not inform the circuit court of the ramifications of its order. The hearing took place on March 20 with only arguments of counsel. Appellants’ counsel went through the legislative history of certain statutes and their relation to 8 amendment 79. He argued that the circuit court’s order contradicts Judge Arnold’s order issued in the first Kimbrough case. He contended that by ruling on issues not properly before it, the circuit court had issued an advisory opinion. Grieve’s attorney argued that there was nothing wrong with the parties presenting the circuit court with an agreed order. He contended that he asked the circuit court to give direction on how to handle the statutes as issue when it came to addressing the way assessed values were calculated under amendment 79 so that there would not be a delay. He admitted that no other property owners received notice of the case but stated that there was no duty to give notice. He argued that appellants had no right to intervene and that the circuit court should deny their motion. He informed the circuit court that the Alexanders’ 2024 assessment had already been amended and that the assessor had every intention of complying with the court’s injunction moving forward. Appellee Carl Alexander, an attorney representing himself and Mitzi, argued that appellants should not be allowed to intervene because appellants had failed to demonstrate why permissive intervention would be appropriate. He contended that appellants were not bound by the order, and to the extent that they were, they benefited from it. Appellants’ attorney argued in rebuttal that the language in question was added to the Alexanders’ order because the assessor wanted to gain an advantage and manipulate the outcome in the pending litigations. He denied that the order benefited appellants. Appellants’ attorney argued that appellants had an interest in the outcome of the Alexanders’ case as found in the order. He said that both groups of appellants had pending litigation and that Greisen’s case was currently before Judge Arnold. When asked whether he believed 9 the circuit court’s order had some control over Judge Arnold, counsel responded that he did not believe “it [had] control in the sense that it’s not like he’s bound by precedence and he has to follow it.” However, he stated that he did believe it had an impact in that the assessor will be able to argue that he was doing what he was ordered to do and will use the order as a basis for denying the parties a refund. The circuit court denied appellants’ motion to intervene, stating that it considered appellants’ assertions that the claims raised by the Alexanders were not in common with appellants’ claims and did not impact their interests. An order denying appellants’ motion for permissive intervention was filed on March 20. Appellants’ motion for new trial or to obtain relief from judgment was denied as moot. Appellants filed a notice of appeal on April 3. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration in light of new evidence on May 6, contending that Grieve’s attorney had emailed a copy of the February 10 order to Judge Arnold in an attempt to prevent Greisen from obtaining the relief he seeks in his current case. Grieve filed a response on May 13, arguing that the motion to reconsider should be denied because the order was not new evidence and because appellants are not parties to the action. Carl responded on May 14, arguing that the motion should be denied because appellants admitted at the hearing that the order did not bind them. According to Carl, the so-called new evidence does not change the admitted fact. The circuit court filed an order on July 2 denying appellants’ motion to reconsider. Appellants amended their notice of appeal on July 10. Appellants argue that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying permissive intervention under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). An order denying permissive 10 intervention is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.4 Amendment 79 was approved by the voters in the November 7, 2000 election and became effective on January 1, 2001. Ark. Const. amend. 79, § 5. Section 1 of amendment 79 places caps on how much an assessment can increase following a reappraisal of real property. 5 The amendment distinguishes between a homestead or principal place of residence and nonhomestead property. Section 1(d) of amendment 79 is at issue in the instant case. Section 1(d)(1)(A) provides that a homestead used as the taxpayer’s principal place of residence purchased or constructed on or after January 1, 2001, by a disabled person or by a person sixty-five years of age or older shall be assessed thereafter based on the lower of the assessed value as of the date of purchase or construction or a later assessed value.6 Appellants moved for permissive intervention two days after the circuit court issued the order in the Alexanders’ case. Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) provides that, upon timely application, anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action (1) when a statute of this state confers a conditional right to intervene or (2) when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. In exercising its 4 Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Bass, 2015 Ark. 178, 461 S.W.3d 317. 5 Ark. Const. amend. 79, § 1. 6 Id. § 1(d)(1)(A). 11 discretion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.7 The threshold issue that must first be addressed is whether the motion to intervene was timely.8 The timeliness of the petition is to be determined from all of the circumstances, and there are three factors to be considered: (1) how far the proceedings have progressed; (2) any prejudice to other parties caused by the delay; and (3) the reason for the delay. 9 There is a strong reluctance by Arkansas courts to grant intervention after final judgment has already been entered, and postjudgment intervention is generally allowed only upon a strong showing of entitlement by the petitioner or a demonstration of unusual or compelling circumstances.10 Here, appellants’ motion to intervene was filed two days after the final order in the Alexanders’ case was filed. The circuit court ruled from the bench that intervention would prejudice the parties. This could be true, considering that the assessor had already acted to amend the Alexanders’ assessment as ordered. Appellants claimed that they were not aware of the Alexanders’ litigation; regardless, the assessor did not have a duty to inform them. Since the final judgment was already issued, appellants had to show an unusual or 7 Ark. R. Civ. P. 24(b). 8 Kelly v. Est. of Edwards, 2009 Ark. 78, 312 S.W.3d 316. 9 Id.; Lowell v. Lowell, 55 Ark. App. 211, 934 S.W.2d 540 (1996). 10 Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes, and Lerach, LLP v. State, 342 Ark. 303, 28 S.W.3d 842 (2000). 12 compelling circumstances to be allowed to intervene. They failed to meet this burden because they made only conclusory statements and never informed the circuit court exactly how their independent litigation would be affected by the order issued in the Alexanders’ case. Appellants argued in their answer that they did not have any issues in common with the Alexanders, and they never argued that they were given a conditional right to intervene by a statute. This was enough to prevent them from intervening in the action. Additionally, their attorney argued at the hearing that the order did not have any control over the judge in Greisen’s case because it was not binding precedent that had to be followed. Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ motion to intervene. Without citing any authority, appellants contend that the circuit court erred by denying their motion for reconsideration. Appellants’ entire argument is ten sentences long. We will not consider arguments not supported by convincing argument or citation to authority.11 Because we affirm the order denying appellants’ request for permissive intervention, their argument that their Rule 59 and 60 motion must be considered on remand is moot. Affirmed. HARRISON and BARRETT, JJ., agree. RMP LLP, by: Timothy C. Hutchinson and Mallory D. Shamoon, for appellants. 11 Sanders v. JLP, LLC, 2024 Ark. App. 65, 683 S.W.3d 607. 13 Colin R. Jorgenson, Association of Arkansas Counties, for separate appellee Roderick Grieve. Carl G. Alexander, for separate appellees Carl Alexander and Bessie Alexander. 14