Varela v. Martinez

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE JESUS MANUEL VARELA, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. FIDEL GONZALEZ MARTINEZ, Defendant/Appellee. No. 1 CA-CV 25-0620 FILED 11-10-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV 2023-001117 The Honorable Randall H. Warner, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL IBF Law Group, PLLC, Phoenix By Sheree D. Wright Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Donaldson Law PLC, Carefree By Brett T. Donaldson, Iman R. Donaldson Counsel for Defendant/Appellee  VARELA v. MARTINEZ Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined. F U R U Y A, Judge: ¶1 Jesus Manuel Varela and Valentina Varela (collectively “the Varelas”) appeal from the superior court’s denial of their motion for additur or a new trial. For the reasons explained below, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The Varelas sued Fidel Gonzalez Martinez for negligence arising from a car accident involving Mr. Varela and Mr. Martinez that occurred in December 2021. The parties participated in mandatory arbitration, and the arbitrator found Mr. Martinez 100% liable, awarding the Varelas $48,000. Mr. Martinez appealed the award and went to trial. ¶3 At trial, the jury heard testimony about the accident, saw photos of the damaged vehicles, and reviewed Mr. Varela’s chiropractic bills and other documents. The jury heard testimony from expert witnesses and three fact witnesses, including Mr. Varela, Mr. Martinez, and the treating chiropractor. During deliberations, the jury asked if it could find Mr. Martinez at fault and award no damages. The court explained the jury’s verdict would be for Mr. Martinez if it found Mr. Varela was not injured. After deliberating for four hours, the jury found Mr. Martinez was 100% at fault and awarded the Varelas $1 in damages. ¶4 The Varelas moved for additur or a new trial based on insufficient damages, which the court denied. Ariz. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 59(a)(1). The court explained that while the award “looks” nominal, the jury must have found Mr. Varela’s injury was “very slight” and evidence supported that finding. The Varelas timely appealed. Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 9(a). They ask us to reverse the court’s denial of their motion, vacate the jury award, and remand for a damages-only trial. ¶5 We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 12- 2101(A)(5)(a). See also Hall Fam. Props. v. Gosnell Dev. Corp., 185 Ariz. 382, 386–87 (App. 1995) (signed orders granting or refusing new trials are appealable). 2  VARELA v. MARTINEZ Decision of the Court DISCUSSION ¶6 Whether to modify a jury’s verdict through additur is committed to the trial judge’s hands with “the greatest possible discretion.” Creamer v. Troiano, 108 Ariz. 573, 577 (1972). We will not disturb the court’s decision “except for a clear abuse of discretion.” Bond v. Cartwright Little League, Inc., 112 Ariz. 9, 16 (1975). In making its decision, the trial court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the jury’s. See Soto v. Sacco, 242 Ariz. 474, 477–78 ¶ 7 (2017) (citing cases). This reticence preserves the jury’s vital role and protects the right to a jury trial. Id. ¶7 The Varelas argue that, given the evidence admitted at trial, the jury’s award constitutes impermissible nominal damages. We cannot agree. Though the Varelas may view the $1 award incredulously, the standard of review compels us to defer to the jury’s “good sense and unbiased judgment[,]” Soto, 242 Ariz. at 481 ¶ 19 (quoting Meyer v. Ricklick, 99 Ariz. 355, 358 (1965)), as well as the court’s expansive and sound discretion as it reviews that judgment, see Soto, 242 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 8; Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 164 (1978). And our hands are further tied when an appellant fails to ensure the record has everything necessary to fully consider the issues raised on appeal. See Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995) (citations omitted); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 11. When the record on appeal is incomplete—such as when an appellant fails to file necessary transcripts—we presume that the missing parts support the court’s findings and that the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain the verdict. See Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73; Bryant v. Thunderbird Acad., 103 Ariz. 247, 249 (1968). ¶8 During deliberations, the jury asked whether it could find “Defendant at fault and award $0 compensation to the Plaintiff[.]” The court responded with a legally accurate answer. See supra ¶ 3. The Varelas contend the jury remained confused even after the court answered its question because the award was a nominal amount, $1. But the jury took careful notes throughout trial and spent four hours deliberating before it returned a verdict. Moreover, we presume the jury followed the trial court’s proper instruction on damages. See Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v. Winston & Strawn, 184 Ariz. 120, 140 (App. 1995). Thus, because it was instructed to find in favor of Martinez if the Varelas had failed to prove they were damaged at all, we can infer the jury found the Varelas’ actual damages totaled $1 in value when it concluded Mr. Martinez was at fault. ¶9 Further, the “amount of damages for personal injury is a question particularly within the province of the jury.” Meyer, 99 Ariz. at 357. And though the Varelas point to evidence in the record inconsistent with 3  VARELA v. MARTINEZ Decision of the Court the very low value expressed in the verdict, where the record contains conflicting evidence, the jury may choose what testimony or evidence to believe or ignore when deciding the case. Creamer, 108 Ariz. at 576. We will not disturb a verdict if adequate evidence supports it. Id. at 577; see Kimminau L. Firm, P.C. v. Hoopes, __ Ariz. __, __, 2026 WL 2016992, at *6 ¶ 25 (Ariz. App. July 13, 2026) (any substantial evidence leading a reasonable person to find the facts support the verdict is sufficient). ¶10 Here, the Varelas failed to provide trial transcripts necessary to consider the issues they raise on appeal. They highlight Mr. Varela’s chiropractic bills totaling over $12,500 and claim these were the only evidence regarding his damages. But Mr. Martinez observed that trial testimony contradicted Mr. Varela’s alleged damages. The jury heard the chiropractor, defense expert witnesses, and others testify about the accident and damages. Because we do not have them to review, we presume the missing transcripts of this testimony support the jury’s award of $1 in damages. See Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73. And in any event, other evidence in the record shows that Mr. Varela was in a car accident 10 years before this accident and had surgery. So, the jury could have limited its verdict based on Mr. Varela’s medical history. Further, the jury may have disbelieved Mr. Varela’s testimony about the severity of his condition because he continued working as an electrician after this accident, not taking any time off or seeking any significant treatment until after he had consulted with an attorney. Cf. Creamer, 108 Ariz. at 574, 576 (jury may have believed witness testimony suggesting plaintiff exaggerated his injuries). ¶11 Because we have an incomplete record, we presume the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain the verdict. Bryant, 103 Ariz. at 249. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in upholding the verdict because adequate evidence supports the verdict. Creamer, 108 Ariz. at 577. ¶12 Moreover, wherever appropriate, we must defer to a trial court’s discretion. Though it must do so sparingly, the judge serves in a role akin to a “ninth” juror when ruling on a Rule 59 motion for a new trial. Soto, 242 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 8. “The judge . . . has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.” Reeves, 119 Ariz. at 163. In considering a motion for a new trial based on insufficient damages, the judge should not disturb a jury’s damage award unless firmly convinced it is inadequate and contrary to the weight of the evidence. Soto, 242 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 8. 4  VARELA v. MARTINEZ Decision of the Court ¶13 Here, the judge acknowledged that negligence actions prohibit nominal damages and also commented that the award “looks a lot like nominal damages,” indicating he thoughtfully considered that possibility. The judge’s role as “ninth juror” provided him with a special perspective we do not have and cannot recreate from the record. See Reeves, 119 Ariz. at 163. With that perspective, he nevertheless decided the “jury must have found [Mr. Varela] was injured, but his injury was very slight.” The judge also stated the evidence supports such a finding. The judge’s comments and ruling demonstrate appropriate reserve required to safeguard the jury’s role. See Soto, 242 Ariz. at 477–78 ¶¶ 7–8. ¶14 The Varelas argue that allowing the verdict to stand results in a miscarriage of justice. But the court serves as the primary buffer against unjust verdicts, and it stood fast here. Soto, 242 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 8 (citation omitted). We will not disturb a judge’s ruling on a motion for a new trial unless the jury’s award is so inadequate that it must have resulted from passion or prejudice. Carr v. Florian, 43 Ariz. 149, 155 (1934); Rule 59(1)(G). ¶15 Here, the trial judge was in the best position to evaluate whether the damages award was unjust enough to require a new trial. He heard contradictory testimony related to damages from the treating chiropractor, defense experts, and Mr. Varela. Presuming at least some of that testimony substantiated the jury’s award—as we must without transcripts—we defer to the judge’s discretion. Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73. And nothing in this record suggests the verdict resulted from extrinsic bias, passion, or prejudice on the jury’s part. Assertions to the contrary are speculation without specific citations to establish otherwise. Thus, the court was within its discretion to deny the Varelas’ motion for additur or a new trial based on insufficient damages. CONCLUSION ¶16 We affirm. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 5