Dash D. v. State

2026 WL 3032099 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT. THE CASE WAS ENTERED IN THE WESTLAW DATABASE BEFORE THE TIME FOR REHEARING HAD EXPIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REHEARING HAS BEEN SOUGHT, GRANTED OR DENIED. Supreme Court of Alaska. DASH D., Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children's Services, Appellee. Supreme Court No. S-19641 October 9, 2026 Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Kristen C. Stohler, Judge. Superior Court Nos. 3PA-20-00239/00240/00241/00242/00243/00244 CN Attorneys and Law Firms Dash D., pro se, Palmer, Appellant. Mary Ann Lundquist, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Fairbanks, and Stephen J. Cox, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee. Reux Stearns, Assistant Public Advocate, and James Stinson, Public Advocate, Anchorage, for Guardian Ad Litem. Before: Carney, Chief Justice, and Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices. OPINION BORGHESAN, Justice. I. INTRODUCTION Star page 1 *1 A father appeals the order terminating his parental rights in a case governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). He does not challenge the termination order's factual findings or legal conclusions. Instead, he raises three procedural arguments as grounds for invalidating the termination order. First, the father argues that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) failed to provide him discovery and access to the court record as required by ICWA. The superior court rejected this argument, and we see no indication that the court erred. Second, the father argues that OCS's emergency removal of his children was improper and that the superior court should have declined jurisdiction and returned the children to his care under ICWA § 1920. This provision “is aimed at those persons who improperly secure or improperly retain custody of the child without the consent of the parent ... and without the sanction of law.” 1 In this case OCS followed the procedures in ICWA and Alaska law for emergency removal. It did not act without the sanction of law, so there was no basis for the superior court to decline jurisdiction under § 1920. Third, the father asserts that the initial stages of the proceedings in which OCS removed the children from his custody were marred by violations of ICWA. Citing ICWA § 1914, which authorizes a court to invalidate an action that violates other key provisions of ICWA, the father argues that the termination order must be vacated. But the errors he asserts pertain to the action for foster care placement — that is, the action in which the children were removed from his custody and placed in a foster home. Because the later action to terminate his parental rights was a separate action, the asserted errors in the earlier action are not grounds to invalidate the termination order. We therefore affirm the termination order. II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS A. Facts 1. Emergency removal and placement Dash 2 is the father of six children, who have two different mothers. 3 The children are enrolled members of an Indian tribe and are Indian children as defined by ICWA. 4 OCS received a protective services report on December 8, 2020, alleging that Dash was neglecting the children. The next day, two OCS workers went to the home. They found the home in a state of disarray. The septic system was broken, there was standing water in the sinks and shower, and the toilet was backed up. The children told the workers that they went to bed without food and would be hungry until going to school the next day. They also told the workers that Dash heard voices and drank every night to make the voices stop. Dash agreed to do a mouth swab for evidence of drug use, and he tested positive for THC, methamphetamine, and opioids. Dash denied substance abuse and claimed he had not used drugs in over a year. Star page 2 *2 OCS attempted an out-of-home safety plan with the children's paternal grandmother, but the plan proved unsuccessful. On December 9 OCS took emergency custody of the children and placed them temporarily in two foster homes. A few weeks later, OCS placed all the children with their aunt, a preferred placement under ICWA. 5 On December 10 OCS filed an emergency petition for temporary custody with the superior court. A copy of the petition was served on Dash. A temporary custody hearing was held the next day. Because of the expedited nature of the hearing, none of the children's parents had been notified of the hearing. The superior court attempted to contact all three parents but was unsuccessful. The court then preliminarily determined that there was probable cause that the children were in need of aid and committed them to the temporary custody of OCS. The court also determined that removal was necessary “to prevent imminent physical damage or harm.” 6 The court then continued the temporary custody hearing until December 15 to allow the parents to appear and participate. The temporary custody hearing scheduled for December 15 was continued again because Dash failed to appear. Dash appeared at the third hearing on December 18, and the superior court appointed counsel for him. To give Dash an opportunity to consult with counsel about his case, the court again continued the temporary custody hearing until December 29, 2020. At the December 29 hearing, Dash stipulated that there was probable cause to find that the children were in need of aid without admitting OCS's allegations, reserving the right to contest them at the adjudication hearing. Based on this stipulation, the court found probable cause that the children were in need of aid and committed them to the temporary custody of OCS. The court also found that the children's removal from the home was necessary to protect them from imminent physical damage or harm. A pretrial conference for the adjudication hearing was held in August 2021. The attorney for each of the two mothers agreed to stipulate that the children were in need of aid and that the standards for removal under ICWA would be satisfied. 7 Dash's attorney stated that she was unable to take a position on the stipulation because she had been unable to communicate with Dash. Based on stipulations from the children's mothers and Dash's failure to take a position, the superior court found that the children were in need of aid and that removal from the home was necessary to prevent imminent physical harm. A disposition and permanency hearing was held in November 2021 to decide whether the children should continue to be committed to the custody of OCS and whether OCS's plan for permanent placement of the children was in their best interests. Neither mother contested the disposition or permanency plan. Dash's attorney again told the court that she was not able to take a position due to his lack of attendance. The superior court approved OCS custody of the children for up to two years and approved OCS's permanency plan, which was adoption by the children's aunt and uncle, who had been serving as their foster parents. 2. Case planning and petition to terminate parental rights Star page 3 *3 In February 2021 OCS created a case plan for Dash. The plan instructed Dash to engage in mental health services, participate in a domestic violence and anger management assessment and a substance abuse assessment, and complete a parenting course. The plan also required Dash to submit to urinalysis, provide a safe home for his children, and regularly attend visits with his children. The caseworker regularly reached out to Dash through email, phone calls, and his attorneys to try to engage him in his case plan. Dash often refused to speak with his caseworker and refused to participate in any of the activities required by his case plan. OCS evaluated Dash's progress on his case plan roughly every six months, from August 2021 through May 2023. Notes from these evaluations indicate that Dash made no progress on his case plan. OCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of all three parents in February 2022. 3. Discovery and representation As noted above, Dash was appointed counsel in December 2020, and his first attorney confirmed that discovery was up to date in February 2021. By July 2022 Dash had been allowed to represent himself, but he requested that counsel be reassigned to help him analyze approximately 680 pages of discovery he had received. In January 2023 Dash requested and received a new attorney, citing a communication breakdown with his current counsel. But in July 2023 Dash's newest attorney informed the superior court that Dash wished to represent himself again. The court instructed the attorney to provide Dash with all copies of discovery he did not currently have. In August 2023 Dash, now representing himself again, expressed uncertainty about whether he had received all of the discovery materials. OCS agreed to send him all these materials again. In March 2024 Dash again asserted that he had not received discovery. Out of an “abundance of caution,” the court ordered OCS to resend all the discovery. OCS sent the discovery via email to an address at which Dash had previously received discovery. OCS also mailed a compact disc containing the discovery to Dash via priority mail. The court postponed the upcoming trial to allow Dash to review the discovery. In July 2024 Dash again told the court that he had not received all the materials to which he was entitled and that there was “absolutely no way” he could be ready for trial later that month. OCS responded that “documents dated up to July 8th from the Department [were] sent out.” The superior court ruled that OCS would be permitted to rely, in the termination trial, only on documents served on Dash before July 9. 4. Dash's motions Dash filed a number of motions over the course of his case. Relevant to this appeal, he filed motions to recuse the superior court judge and motions to vacate the CINA petition, the termination petition, and the termination trial for ICWA violations. Dash's motions seeking to vacate the CINA petition, termination petition, and termination trial made virtually identical arguments. 8 He argued that the removal and continued custody of his children by OCS violated ICWA, his right to due process, and other constitutional rights. He asserted violations of ICWA §§ 1912, 1914, and 1922, along with violations of the federal regulations implementing these sections. He also claimed that the superior court had violated several canons of judicial conduct by accepting documents during the discovery process. He argued that these violations amounted to a conspiracy to “kidnap[ ] with intent to traffic [his] children.” In his motion to recuse the superior court judge, Dash again made similar arguments. 9 Star page 4 *4 The superior court denied the motion to recuse, ruling that Dash's claim of bias was not supported by the record and that no canons of judicial conduct had been violated. The court also rejected Dash's claims that it had violated §§ 1912, 1914, and 1922 of ICWA because “findings ha[d] been entered at each stage of these proceedings based on the stipulation of one or both parents to each child, and the court has applied the provisions of the ICWA at all stages of these proceedings.” In a later order the court denied Dash's motions to vacate. The court again rejected Dash's argument that it had violated ICWA or Dash's right to due process. 5. Termination trial The termination trial was held over nine days from July 2024 to May 2025. The superior court heard testimony from the aunt who had been serving as the children's foster parent; a law enforcement officer who responded to a violent incident involving Dash; a psychiatrist and emergency room doctor who treated Dash at the hospital; and the family's OCS caseworker. The court also heard testimony from an expert in child welfare and a cultural expert. The child welfare expert testified about the impact of Dash's substance abuse and mental health issues on the children. She expressed concern for the children because of their food insecurity and the unsanitary living conditions they experienced with Dash. The cultural expert testified about the cultural values and childrearing practices of the children's tribe and opined that, in light of these values and practices, Dash's continued custody of the children would likely cause them serious harm. She also testified that OCS had appropriately accounted for the children's needs. After trial, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children had been abandoned and that Dash had not remedied the conduct that placed the children at risk of harm. It determined that OCS had made active efforts to reunite the family. The court also found that OCS proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Dash's continued custody was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children. The court concluded that the termination of Dash's parental rights was in the children's best interests. Accordingly, it issued an order terminating his parental rights. In the termination order, the court also denied Dash's motion seeking to dismiss the proceedings. The court noted that this motion raised issues already ruled on when the court denied Dash's motion for recusal, and the court incorporated these earlier rulings in its denial of Dash's motion to dismiss. Dash appeals. III. DISCUSSION Dash does not challenge the factual findings or legal conclusions in the superior court's order terminating parental rights. He does not contest the superior court's finding that he abandoned or neglected his children; that he failed to remedy his conduct; that OCS made active efforts to reunify his family; that expert testimony proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his continued custody of the children would likely cause them to suffer serious damage; or that terminating his parental rights was in his children's best interests. Instead, Dash challenges the termination order on primarily procedural grounds: (1) He claims he was denied discovery and access to the trial court record in the termination proceedings; and (2) he asserts that legal errors in the emergency removal, temporary custody, adjudication, and disposition proceedings require that the termination order be reversed. A. Dash Fails To Establish That He Was Denied Discovery. Dash argues that he was denied discovery and access to the record. “We review discovery orders under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” 10 We will reverse a discovery order “only when, after reviewing the whole record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the superior court erred.” 11 Dash does not convince us that a reversible discovery error occurred here. Star page 5 *5 Before the superior court, Dash repeatedly claimed that he had not received discovery. To accommodate these concerns, the court ordered OCS to resend all discovery to Dash multiple times. OCS represented that it had done so. In July 2024, a few weeks before trial, Dash again told the court that he had not received all the materials to which he was entitled and that there was “absolutely no way” he could be ready for trial later that month. OCS responded that it had sent discovery current through July 8, 2024, to Dash. The court ruled that OCS could rely only on documents served on Dash before July 9, 2024. We view the superior court's ruling as implicitly rejecting Dash's assertion about missing discovery. The court appears to have credited OCS's assertion that all discovery through July 8, 2025, had been served on Dash. Our review of the record shows that OCS sent discovery to Dash at the mailing address and the email address he provided to the superior court. By forbidding OCS from relying on any discovery served on Dash after July 9, 2024, the court appears to have been attempting to ensure that the termination trial would go forward using only information both sides had received. Dash's brief on appeal does not leave us with a firm conviction that he was denied discovery. He points to nothing other than his own assertions to prove that the materials that OCS represented had been sent — including via email and priority mail — were not sent or received. The superior court was not convinced by these assertions, and we are not firmly convinced that the court made a mistake. We see no basis to vacate the termination order due to inadequate discovery. B. Asserted Errors In Emergency Removal And Foster Care Proceedings Do Not Warrant Reversing The Termination Order. Dash argues that legal errors in initial proceedings require that we reverse the termination order entered years later, after a multi-day trial. He claims that OCS's emergency removal of the children and the superior court's temporary custody, adjudication, and disposition hearings violated ICWA. Because of these asserted errors, Dash argues that the superior court had “a non-discretionary duty to invalidate the foster care placement and termination orders, decline jurisdiction, and order the immediate return of the children” to him under ICWA §§ 1914 and 1920. 12 Interpretation of ICWA, and the question of whether the superior court's findings satisfy ICWA's requirements, are questions of law. 13 We review questions of law de novo, applying our independent judgment. 14 Under this standard, we “adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason and policy.” 15 1. Section 1920 Star page 6 *6 Dash cites § 1920 of ICWA in his bid to invalidate the termination order. 16 This statute does not entitle him to the relief he seeks. Section 1920 provides an immediate remedy for improper removal of an Indian child: Where any petitioner in an Indian child custody proceeding ... has improperly removed the child from custody of the parent ... or has improperly retained custody after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of custody, the court shall decline jurisdiction over such petition and shall forthwith return the child to his parent ... unless returning the child to his parent ... would subject the child to a substantial and immediate danger. [ 17 ] Legislative history indicates that § 1920 “establishes a ‘clean hands’ doctrine with respect to petitions in State court for the custody of an Indian child” that is “aimed at those persons who improperly secure or improperly retain custody of the child without the consent of the parent ... and without the sanction of law.” 18 The statute is intended to “bar such persons from taking advantage of their wrongful conduct.” 19 In light of these purposes, we held in D.E.D. v. State that § 1920 was “not the proper remedy” for a mother's allegation that OCS improperly removed the child from her custody because the record showed that OCS had acted in accordance with court rules and court orders. 20 In that case the mother agreed to grant OCS custody of the child for 30 days; when the 30-day period expired and the mother could not be found, OCS assumed emergency custody of the child. 21 OCS petitioned for custody promptly after the voluntary agreement expired and petitioned for an extension when the temporary custody order was ending. 22 We reasoned that the superior court had an adequate basis to grant the petition for temporary custody and the requested extension based on the representations in OCS's filings, which the mother had not opposed. 23 Given the circumstances, we held that “no removal or retention of [the child] occurred ‘without the sanction of law.’ ” 24 Similarly, in this case we cannot say that OCS removed or retained Dash's children “without the sanction of law.” Dash argues that the circumstances failed to justify emergency removal of the children from his care, in violation of ICWA § 1922. Therefore, he argues, the court was required by § 1920 to decline jurisdiction and return the children to him. But OCS's emergency removal of the children was consistent with § 1922. Section 1922 provides that nothing in ICWA “shall be construed to prevent the emergency removal of an Indian child ... in order to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child.” 25 OCS must “insure that the emergency removal or placement terminates immediately when such removal or placement is no longer necessary” and must “expeditiously initiate a child custody proceeding subject to the provisions” of ICWA. 26 Under § 1922, OCS may immediately remove a child to prevent imminent harm without first initiating a proceeding subject to ICWA's other requirements, like notice and the right to counsel. 27 OCS must then promptly initiate an action for a foster care placement subject to those requirements. 28 Star page 7 *7 That is what OCS did here. OCS initiated emergency removal of the children on December 9, 2020, alleging that the children were hungry, living in unsanitary conditions, and being cared for by a parent who drank alcohol to quiet the voices in his head and had tested positive for drugs. 29 OCS filed an emergency petition for temporary custody the next day, requesting a hearing within 24 hours, as required by the CINA Rules. 30 The first temporary custody hearing was held on December 11, within the 48-hour limit set by the CINA Rules. 31 At the hearing the court preliminarily adjudicated the children in need of aid and committed them to the temporary custody of OCS. It also determined that “removal [was] necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm” to the children. The court continued the hearing twice to give the parents a chance to obtain counsel and to prepare to contest OCS's allegations. At the continued hearing on December 29, Dash, represented by counsel as required by § 1912(b), stipulated to temporary custody without conceding OCS's allegations. Based on this stipulation, the court found probable cause to believe that the children were in need of aid and that the children's removal from the home was necessary to protect them from “imminent physical damage or harm.” 32 This record shows that OCS complied with § 1922’s requirements for emergency removal and for promptly initiating a foster care proceeding according to the procedures of Alaska law and ICWA. OCS did not act without “the sanction of law.” 33 The superior court had no basis to decline jurisdiction and return the children to Dash under § 1920. Dash also argues that the superior court should have granted relief under § 1920 due to asserted ICWA violations when accepting the stipulation for adjudication and removal in August 2021. 34 The superior court held a hearing to decide whether the children were in need of aid under Alaska law and whether their removal from Dash's custody was warranted under ICWA, as provided in the CINA rules. 35 At this hearing the children's mothers stipulated to adjudication and removal orders, and Dash's counsel declined to take a position because she had been unable to communicate with Dash. The superior court entered the adjudication and removal order. Perhaps, given Dash's absence from court and his lawyer's inability to take a position, the court should have required an offer of proof from OCS before issuing the order. 36 But we cannot say that OCS acted with “unclean hands” or that its removal of the children was “without the sanction of law.” 37 Star page 8 *8 For these reasons, the superior court did not err in rejecting Dash's motions to dismiss the termination proceeding and return custody to him. 2. Section 1914 Section 1914 authorizes a court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate an “action for foster care placement or termination of parental rights” “upon a showing that such action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912, and 1913” of ICWA. 38 Dash asserts several violations of ICWA § 1912: that he was not appointed counsel until after temporary removal and foster-care placement findings were entered, in violation of ICWA § 1912(b); 39 that the superior court's approval of temporary custody was “unsupported by evidence” in violation of the clear and convincing evidence standard required by § 1912(e); 40 and that the superior court issued an adjudication and disposition order based on a stipulation by the children's mothers, but not by him, in violation of § 1912(e), which requires testimony from a qualified expert witness before foster care placement may be ordered. 41 Based on these asserted violations of ICWA, he maintains that § 1914 requires invalidation of the termination order. We are not persuaded by this argument. By its own terms, § 1914 authorizes the court to invalidate the specific action that violated the provisions of ICWA: “Any ... parent or Indian custodian from whose custody [an Indian] child was removed ... may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 of this title.” 42 Section 1914 does not authorize a court to invalidate a later separate action in which no violations of ICWA occurred. All the errors Dash identifies pertained to actions for foster care placement. 43 Because he identifies no errors in the action to terminate his parental rights (apart from the discovery argument we rejected above), there is no basis under § 1914 to invalidate the termination order. Star page 9 *9 According to both ICWA and Alaska law, the action to terminate Dash's parental rights is separate from the earlier action in which the claimed violations of § 1912 occurred. ICWA separately addresses “foster care placement” and “termination of parental rights.” It defines them differently and has separate sections addressing their separate burdens of proof. ICWA defines foster care placement as “any action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian guardian for temporary placement in a foster home.” 44 A foster care placement may be ordered upon a showing by “clear and convincing evidence ... that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” 45 By contrast, termination of parental rights occurs when there is an “action resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship.” 46 While the court must make the same finding as in a foster care placement — that continued custody is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child — the finding must be supported “by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.” 47 These actions are also separate under Alaska law, although our laws use different terminology. Alaska's CINA rules establish procedures to place a child in temporary custody, 48 to adjudicate a child as in need of aid, 49 and to determine the appropriate disposition for a child in need of aid 50 — all proceedings that fall under ICWA's definition of “foster care placement.” 51 To terminate parental rights, OCS must file a separate petition. 52 OCS must not only prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child was in need of aid, it must also show that the parent has not remedied the conduct or conditions that caused the child to be in need of aid and that termination of parental rights would be in the child's best interests. 53 Although an adjudication hearing can be consolidated with a termination trial upon a showing of good cause and with adequate notice, 54 this provision merely confirms that termination is generally separate from adjudication. Consistent with the legal distinction between foster care placement and termination of parental rights, we held in D.E.D. that alleged defects in temporary custody proceedings did not invalidate a later, procedurally proper termination. 55 In that case a parent appealed the order terminating her parental rights, arguing that she was deprived of her right to counsel because the notice requirements of § 1912(a) were not met during the temporary custody proceedings. 56 But we concluded that “even if the procedural and jurisdictional defects asserted by [the parent] existed in the earlier temporary custody hearings, they were cured by the subsequent procedurally correct final dispositional hearing.” 57 Star page 10 *10 Although our decision in D.E.D. did not cite § 1914, we relied on a Montana Supreme Court decision, In re M.E.M. , that did address § 1914. In that case a mother challenged the termination of her parental rights by arguing there had been violations of ICWA in the earlier temporary custody proceedings involving the child. 58 The court assumed for purposes of argument that the alleged violations occurred but held that “violations of the Indian Child Welfare Act in temporary legal custody proceedings do not invalidate the later permanent custody proceedings.” 59 The court reasoned that § 1914 allows for the “invalidation of an action which violates the provisions” of ICWA, but that it “does not provide for invalidation of a valid separate action because of an invalid prior one.” 60 The court explained that temporary and permanent proceedings were different actions with different legal standards and remedies. 61 Because the actions were separate, and because the trial court did not rely on the temporary proceedings in terminating the mother's parental rights, the Montana Supreme Court held that the termination order should not be vacated. 62 Consistent with our decision in D.E.D. and with the reasoning of In re M.E.M. , we hold that, under § 1914, ICWA violations in a foster care placement do not require invalidation of a later, error-free termination of parental rights, so long as the termination order does not rely on evidence presented or findings made in the earlier foster care placement. Accordingly, there is no basis under § 1914 to invalidate the order terminating Dash's parental rights. As explained above, the action to terminate Dash's parental rights was separate from the earlier foster care placement action (comprising the temporary custody, adjudication, and disposition proceedings under Alaska law) in which the alleged errors occurred. And Dash has not shown that the superior court's termination order relied on findings made or evidence presented in the earlier foster care placement. Dash does not challenge the findings of fact or conclusions of law in the termination order, nor does he identify any ICWA violations in the action to terminate his parental rights. For these reasons, his attempt to invalidate the termination order under § 1914 fails. Dash also argues that OCS violated ICWA § 1915(b) placement preferences 63 by placing the children with their aunt instead of their paternal grandmother and that this violation mandates reversal of the termination order under § 1914. But § 1914 does not authorize a court to invalidate an action to terminate parental rights based on violations of § 1915. 64 Moreover, Dash fails to show that OCS's decision to place the children with their aunt — a first-tier placement under ICWA — affected the termination proceedings. Generally, “whether a placement decision complies with ICWA's placement preferences will not be germane to the elements of termination.” 65 There is an exception for instances when “placement directly impacts a parent's ability to participate in remedial efforts.” 66 But Dash does not argue that the choice of placement affected his ability to participate in remedial efforts. His placement argument therefore fails as well. Star page 11 *11 Because asserted errors in the foster care placement are not a basis for invalidating the termination order under § 1914, we reject Dash's argument that the superior court erred in declining to invalidate the termination of his parental rights. 67 IV. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the order terminating Dash's parental rights. Footnotes 1 D.E.D. v. State , 704 P.2d 774, 782 (Alaska 1985). 2 Pseudonyms are used to protect the parties’ privacy. 3 One of the mothers relinquished her parental rights, and the other's parental rights were terminated at trial. Neither mother is participating in this appeal. One of the children turned 19 years old before trial and was not subject to the termination order. 4 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (4). 5 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(i). 6 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (e) (authorizing emergency removal of Indian child from parent “in order to prevent imminent physical damage or harm”). 7 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (e). 8 In fact, these motions appear to have been copied and pasted; they share identical language. 9 This motion also appears to share identical language with Dash's earlier motions. 10 Lee v. State , 141 P.3d 342, 346 (Alaska 2006) (citing Coulson v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc. , 973 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Alaska 1999)). 11 Id. at 347 (citing Nelson-Lizardi v. Lizardi , 49 P.3d 236, 239 (Alaska 2002)). 12 Dash also argues that “cumulative structural ICWA violations require mandatory invalidation.” To the extent this argument is distinct from his arguments based on §§ 1914 and 1920, Dash fails to offer any legal authority or explanation for applying the structural error doctrine to his case. Therefore, the argument is waived due to inadequate briefing. Griswold v. City of Homer , 556 P.3d 252 , 273 n.99 (Alaska 2024) (explaining that even self-represented litigants must cite legal authority and articulate legal theory). 13 Ruby C. v. State, Dep't of Fam. & Cmty. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 590 P.3d 1248 , 1256-57 (Alaska 2026); Walker E. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 480 P.3d 598, 606 (Alaska 2021). 14 Walker E. , 480 P.3d at 606 . 15 Ruby C. , 590 P.3d at 1256-57. 16 It is not clear whether Dash cited § 1920 in his motions to the superior court, but he did cite 25 C.F.R. § 23.114 , which is the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ regulation implementing § 1920. 17 25 U.S.C. § 1920 . 18 D.E.D. v. State , 704 P.2d 774, 782 (Alaska 1985) (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7548). 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. at 777, 782 . 24 Id. at 782 . 25 25 U.S.C. § 1922 . 26 Id. 27 D.E.D. , 704 P.2d at 779 (holding that notice requirements of § 1912(a) did not apply to emergency removal proceedings). 28 Id. ; 25 U.S.C. § 1922 . 29 CINA Rule 6(a) (“The Department may take emergency custody of a child pursuant to AS 47.10.142 without a court order.”); AS 47.10.142 (authorizing OCS to take emergency custody of child upon discovering that child was abandoned, neglected, or subjected to physical harm or sexual abuse). 30 CINA Rule 6(a) (“If the Department determines that continued custody is necessary to protect the child, the Department shall notify the court of the emergency custody by filing, within 24 hours after custody was assumed, a petition alleging that the child is a child in need of aid.”). 31 CINA Rule 10(a)(1)(A). 32 25 U.S.C. § 1922 . 33 D.E.D. , 704 P.2d at 782 . 34 We assume, without deciding, that asserted ICWA violations occurring after the initial removal of the child from the home are grounds for the court to decline jurisdiction and return the child under § 1920. 35 See CINA Rule 14; CINA Rule 15 (standards for adjudication); CINA Rule 17 (standards for disposition). 36 Cf. Norman S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 459 P.3d 464, 467 (Alaska 2020) (recognizing that termination of parental rights may be based on offer of proof but holding that “[i]f any party disputes the offer of proof, then there must be a trial on the disputed issues”). 37 D.E.D. , 704 P.2d at 782 . 38 25 U.S.C § 1914. As discussed above, Dash argues that emergency removal of his children violated ICWA. Emergency removal is governed by ICWA § 1922, D.E.D. , 704 P.2d at 779 , which is not a basis for invalidation under § 1914. 39 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (b) (requiring appointment of counsel “in any removal, placement, or termination proceeding” if parent is determined to be indigent). 40 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (e) (“No foster care placement may be ordered ... in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence , including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” (emphasis added)). 41 Id. (“No foster care placement may be ordered ... in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses , that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” (emphasis added)). 42 See id. (emphasis added). 43 Dash makes an additional, closely related, argument. He argues the superior court violated CINA Rule 20 by “failing to conduct a meaningful dispositional hearing.” CINA Rule 20 allows a party to petition for the invalidation of an order under § 1914. Because Dash's § 1914 claim fails for the reasons described below, his CINA Rule 20 argument fails as well. 44 § 1903(1)(i). 45 § 1912(e). 46 § 1903(1)(ii). 47 § 1912(f). 48 CINA Rule 10(c) (allowing court to order child placed in temporary custody of OCS upon finding probable cause that child is in need of aid). 49 CINA Rule 7 (describing procedure for petition to adjudicate child in need of aid). 50 CINA Rule 17 (allowing court to approve removal of child from home if remaining in home is “contrary to the welfare of the child,” or, for Indian children, if there is “clear and convincing evidence” that, absent removal, there is likelihood of “serious emotional or physical damage to the child”). 51 The emergency removal of an Indian child from the child's parent pursuant to § 1922 is not a “foster care placement” to which the protections of § 1912 apply. D.E.D. v. State , 704 P.2d 774, 779 (Alaska 1985). 52 CINA Rule 18(a). 53 AS 47.10.088(a)-(b); CINA Rule 18(c). 54 CINA Rule 18(b). 55 D.E.D. , 704 P.2d at 782 (citing In re M.E.M. , 209 Mont. 192 , 679 P.2d 1241, 1243 (1984)). 56 Id. at 776, 779. 57 Id. at 782 (citing In re M.E.M. , 679 P.2d at 1243 ). 58 679 P.2d at 1243 . 59 Id. at 1243, 1245. While the court in In re M.E.M. referred to the proceedings as “temporary custody proceedings” and “permanent custody proceedings,” it is clear that the temporary custody proceedings were a foster care placement action and the permanent custody proceeding was a termination of parental rights within the meaning of ICWA. See id. at 1242-43 (describing various temporary legal custody proceedings as separate from “termination of parental rights and granting of permanent legal custody”). 60 Id. at 1243. 61 Id. at 1243-44. 62 Id. at 1244. 63 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (b) (listing preferred foster care placements, in order of descending preference, as members of child's extended family, foster home approved by child's tribe or non-Indian licensing authority, or institution approved by child's tribe). 64 See 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (authorizing court to invalidate action “upon a showing that such action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 of this title”). 65 David S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. , Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 270 P.3d 767, 779 (Alaska 2012). 66 Thea G. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 291 P.3d 957, 963 (Alaska 2013) (citing David S. , 270 P.3d at 779 ). 67 Dash asserts that the superior court erred by “pathologizing objective forensic DNA evidence as a ‘delusional disorder’ ” in violation of Alaska Bar Ethics Opinion 97-2 (Opinion 97-2); Opinion 97-2 concerns the “Use Of Threats Of Criminal Prosecution In Connection With A Civil Matter” and ultimately concludes that “it is not unethical for a lawyer to use the possibility of presenting criminal charges against the opposing party in a private civil matter to gain relief for a client” under certain conditions. Alaska Bar Association, Formal Op. 97-2 (1997). This discussion has no clear connection