Scott King v. Courtenay Carty

2026 WL 3091619 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT. THE CASE WAS ENTERED IN THE WESTLAW DATABASE BEFORE THE TIME FOR REHEARING HAD EXPIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REHEARING HAS BEEN SOUGHT, GRANTED OR DENIED. Supreme Court of Alaska. SCOTT KING, Appellant, v. COURTENAY CARTY, Appellee. Supreme Court No. S-19268 October 16, 2026 Superior Court No. 3DI-23-00110 CI Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Dillingham, Stephen B. Wallace, Judge. Attorneys and Law Firms Appearances: Kara A. Nyquist, Nyquist Law Group, Anchorage, for Appellant. Patsy Shaha, Yuraq Legal Services LLC, Anchorage, for Appellee. Before: Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices. [Carney, Chief Justice, not participating.] OPINION BORGHESAN, Justice. I. INTRODUCTION Star page 1 *1 A man and a woman were in a romantic relationship for nearly eight years. After they separated, they disputed ownership of various property, and the man filed a lawsuit. The parties agreed that they had been in a domestic partnership, which is a committed relationship in which the parties agree to share the fruits of their relationship as though married. But they disagreed whether certain items of property belonged to the partnership and should be split between them. The superior court decided that all of the disputed property belonged to the partnership and divided that property's value between the parties. The man appeals the court's rulings that two items were partnership property: a building that the man owned before the relationship began; and a boat acquired during the relationship but titled in the man's name only and purchased with his separate funds. We hold that the special property rules that apply to domestic partnerships do not apply to property that was acquired before the partnership began. Because the man owned the building before the partnership began, it was not partnership property even though it was used as the site for the couple's vacation rental business. We also hold that the rules for tracing ownership of property that apply to married couples also apply to domestic partners. Applying these rules to the undisputed facts of this case establishes that the boat did not belong to the partnership. The boat was purchased during the partnership and used for the couple's joint charter business and family outings. But because it was titled in the man's name only and purchased and improved exclusively with his own separate funds, it was his separate property. Therefore, we reverse these portions of the judgment. II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Scott King and Courtenay Carty were in a romantic relationship from October 2015 until late July 2023. During this time they had a daughter together. King and Carty's relationship ended in 2023, and King filed a complaint in superior court seeking a division of domestic partnership assets. 1 At the start of trial, King and Carty stipulated to the existence of a domestic partnership. They then testified about their relationship, businesses, and property. They asked the court to decide whether two residences, two businesses, and a boat were partnership property. 2 King testified that he purchased unimproved land in Dillingham in 2008, before he and Carty began their relationship. By 2011 he had built a structure on the land; he did not take out a mortgage. The property is located on Highbush Drive and is a converted garage/shop with a living room, bedroom, full bathroom, full laundry, and full kitchen. Evidence in the record showed that King lived in the Highbush property both before and early in his relationship with Carty. Star page 2 *2 The parties testified that around the time their daughter was born in November 2016, King moved into a small home with Carty and her two children from a prior relationship. In 2019 they moved into a home on Wood River Road, which was purchased with joint funds and titled in Carty's name. King and Carty testified that they owned and operated two businesses during their domestic partnership: Lake Road Lodge and West Side Charters. They disputed ownership of these businesses at trial. Lake Road Lodge used the Highbush property as a short-term rental property that was primarily advertised through a short-term rental website. Both King and Carty were listed as owners on the Lake Road Lodge business license, which was purchased by Carty using her personal credit card. West Side Charters was a fishing guide business. The business license for West Side Charters was also purchased by Carty using her personal credit card in April 2017. The West Side Charters business license only lists King as the owner, but Carty applied for permits for West Side Charters and had the insurance receipts for the business sent to her personal email. Both businesses shared the same joint bank account to which both King and Carty had access. Carty prepared the city taxes while King handled the federal taxes for the businesses. In 2019 King purchased a boat, called the Carole Mae , for $25,000. The boat was titled in King's name only. He made the down payment and monthly loan payments using funds in his personal bank account. The boat was used for West Side Charters’ guiding operations. It was also used for family outings. King modified the boat by adding an enclosed cabin and bed. King and Carty separated in July 2023. When the final short-term tenant left in September 2023, King moved back into the Highbush property, where he resided at the time of trial. Carty remained at the Wood River house. The superior court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law in August 2024. It found that all of the disputed property — the Wood River house, the Highbush property, the Lake Road Lodge and West Side Charters businesses, and the Carole Mae — was partnership property. It found that the Highbush property was a partnership asset because “[t]here is no way to meaningfully segregate the operation” of the Lake Road Lodge rental business from the property where it was located, which was “essential to the operation of the lodge business.” Though “King maintained that the [Highbush property] was, and always has been, his separate property,” the superior court was “unable to view the property as anything other than an intended asset of the partnership businesses.” The court found that the Highbush property was therefore “an asset of the domestic partnership.” The court also found that the Carole Mae was partnership property. The boat was purchased “[a]s part of the West Side Charter business” and “used for charter fishing [and] ... family outings.” It ruled that “the boat was intended to be an asset of the domestic partnership and the two businesses [King and Carty] had formed and were operating together.” The court allocated the Highbush property, the boat, and the cash in the business account at the time of separation to King. It allocated the Wood River house's equity and debt to Carty. The court then ordered King to make an equalization payment of $100,688 to Carty to effectuate a 50/50 split of partnership assets. Star page 3 *3 King moved for reconsideration, arguing (among other things) that the court incorrectly valued the Highbush property and that neither the Highbush property nor the Carol Mae should have been considered a partnership asset. The court denied reconsideration. King appeals the court's classification of the Highbush property and the boat as partnership assets and the valuation of the Highbush property. III. DISCUSSION A. It Was Error To Classify The Highbush Property As Partnership Property. “Alaska has long recognized unique legal standards for property disputes between two people ending a domestic partnership.” 3 A domestic partnership forms between unmarried cohabitants when they “intend[ ] to share in the fruits of their relationship as though married.” 4 Property acquired during a domestic partnership is subject to a different property division scheme than property disputes between married parties or unmarried non-cohabitating parties. 5 When there is no dispute that a domestic partnership existed, the court must first classify property acquired during the domestic partnership as either separate property or partnership property. 6 “[P]roperty must be classified [as either partnership or separate] strictly according to the parties’ intent.” 7 “Partnership property generally must be distributed equally (or unequally if the parties intended unequal shares), while separate property must be distributed solely to its owner.” 8 The trial court's underlying findings about the parties’ intent with respect to disputed property items are factual findings that we review for clear error. 9 “We will find clear error only if ‘we are left with a definite and firm conviction on the entire record that a mistake has been made.’ ” 10 But “the legal significance of that intent” is an application of law to fact that we review de novo. 11 “Whether the superior court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law that we review de novo ....” 12 King argues that the court erred by classifying the Highbush property — property he owned prior to his relationship with Carty — as partnership property. He argues that Alaska's domestic partnership framework applies only to property acquired during a domestic partnership. King is correct: Because the Highbush property was not acquired during the domestic partnership, it was error to classify it as a partnership asset. The domestic partnership doctrine applies to property accumulated during the domestic partnership. 13 In Tomal v. Anderson we considered whether a domestic partner's pension was partnership property and described rules for “distributing property acquired during a domestic partnership.” 14 “Property acquired by domestic partners during a domestic partnership should be distributed according to the partners’ intent,” but “property acquired after the partnership terminates is governed by the ordinary rules of Alaska property law.” 15 Therefore, a key question in the domestic partnership analysis is determining “when the partnership began and ended.” 16 Applying these rules, we decided that “only the portion of the pension accumulated during the partnership” was partnership property. 17 Although Tomal involved portions of a pension that accumulated after the partnership ended, its logic supports the conclusion that property acquired before the partnership is not partnership property. Star page 4 *4 Our other decisions also reflect the rule that only property acquired during the domestic partnership is partnership property. We first recognized the domestic partnership doctrine in Wood v. Collins , holding that “property accumulated during cohabitation” should be divided according to the parties’ express or implied intent. 18 The decision cited Beal v. Beal , an Oregon case that also dealt with division of property “accumulated during a period of cohabitation.” 19 Neither case divided property acquired before a domestic partnership began. 20 Later, in McConville v. Otness , we considered whether “the parties intended property acquired in the course of the partnership to belong to the partnership,” 21 applying this inquiry only to property acquired during the alleged partnership. 22 And in Tolan v. Kimball , which the superior court quoted in its decision, we again resolved a dispute about “the property acquired during [the parties’] relationship.” 23 Notably, Carty does not cite any cases in which we have treated property acquired before the start of a domestic partnership as partnership property. Because the Highbush property was not acquired during King and Carty's domestic partnership, it was error to classify it as partnership property. The uncontroverted testimony and other evidence in the record show that King purchased the land on which the building sits in 2008 and that he completed construction on the building in 2011. King and Carty did not begin their romantic relationship until 2015. Neither party challenges the superior court's finding that their domestic partnership began in October 2015 and ended in July 2023. The superior court classified the Highbush property as partnership property because it was used by Lake Road Lodge, a partnership business. It reasoned that “[t]here is no way to meaningfully segregate the operation” of the Lake Road Lodge rental business from the Highbush property. This reasoning is not persuasive. The fact that a business operates out of property owned by one of the partners does not automatically transfer ownership of the property. Consider two friends who start a baking business out of a kitchen in one of their houses. If the friends decided to end their business partnership, one business owner would not own a share of the other's kitchen even though the space was essential to the bakery's operation. 24 The same logic applies here. The fact that the couple's business used King's property as a short-term rental did not, by itself, make the business or Carty an owner of the property. Nor does the close relationship between the lodge business and the real property make these distinct assets impossible to segregate for purposes of property division. Based on the parties’ testimony and other evidence in the record, Lake Road Lodge had assets that were acquired during the partnership, including cash in the business account and a sleeper sofa and a queen bed purchased for use by the business. Therefore, it would have been possible to separate the business's assets from the real property itself, treating only the former as partnership property subject to division. The domestic partnership doctrine applies only to property acquired during a domestic partnership, and any property acquired before or after a domestic partnership should be classified according to the ordinary rules of property law. 25 Because the Highbush property was not acquired during the parties’ domestic partnership, it was error to classify it as partnership property. 26 B. It Was Error To Classify The CAROLE MAE As Partnership Property. Star page 5 *5 King challenges the superior court's ruling that the Carole Mae is partnership property. The court found that “at the time of the purchase, the boat was intended to be an asset of the domestic partnership.” It found that the Carole Mae was purchased “[a]s part of the West Side Charter business,” which it classified as a partnership asset, 27 and “also was used for family outings.” King argues that this finding was error, primarily because it is undisputed that the boat was titled in his name only and that the money for the down payment, monthly loan payments, and improvements to the boat came from his personal account. He argues that he always intended for the Carole Mae to be his separate property. Property acquired during a domestic partnership must be distributed according to the parties’ intent; that is, the court must determine whether the parties intended to share the item of property as though married. 28 We have instructed courts to determine the parties’ intent by considering “the totality of the circumstances,” 29 using the factors identified in Bishop v. Clark to guide this analysis. 30 These factors are not exclusive, and explicit findings on each factor are not required. 31 In ruling on the Carole Mae , the superior court did not explicitly discuss the Bishop factors or make findings that correspond to most of them. Its decision rested on findings that King consulted Carty about which boat to buy and that the boat was used for both the charter business (which may be related to the Bishop factor concerning joint business ventures, although the court did not frame it as such) and family outings. And while the court noted King's testimony that the boat was purchased and improved entirely with money from his personal account, which was undisputedly his separate property, it did not discuss the significance of these facts. This prompts a legal question of whether such actions are sufficient to make property that was purchased during a domestic partnership, but with undisputedly separate assets, partnership property. Star page 6 *6 To answer this question, it is helpful to consider how the analysis would unfold if King and Carty had been married. Only marital property is subject to equitable distribution by the court, and the court must decide which assets are marital and which, if any, are separate. 32 “Assets acquired during marriage as compensation for marital services — most commonly salaries earned by either spouse during marriage — are considered primary marital assets.” 33 “Assets acquired by one spouse before marriage, property acquired by gift, and property acquired by inheritance are primary separate assets.” 34 “Assets acquired through exchange, appreciation, or income are secondary assets, and their classification as marital or separate depends on their source asset.” 35 “Tracing is the process of classifying a secondary asset by identifying its source asset. If a source asset is primary marital property, then the secondary asset is secondary marital property, while a source asset that is a primary separate asset yields a secondary separate asset.” 36 Had King and Carty been married, the tracing doctrine would apply to the classification of the Carole Mae . King testified that the Carole Mae was purchased with a $5,000 down payment and monthly loan payments made from funds in his personal account and that Carty did not make any payments toward the boat. Carty did not dispute this testimony. There was also no dispute that the funds in King's and Carty's personal bank accounts were their separate property; neither party made a claim that the other's personal bank account was partnership property. Under the tracing doctrine, these facts would mean that the Carole Mae was a separate asset because its source asset was separate property. 37 In the marital context, then, the only remaining question would be whether King had intended to gift the boat to the marital estate, resulting in its transmutation from separate to marital property. 38 The superior court did not apply the doctrine of transmutation, and Carty has disavowed any argument based on transmutation by implied gift. Therefore, we need not decide whether the doctrine of transmutation applies to domestic partnerships. But considering how transmutation might apply had King and Carty been married offers a helpful comparison. Transmutation by implied interspousal gift occurs when the owning spouse intends to gift the separate asset to the marital estate. 39 It is error for the court to focus on the couple's intent; the intent of the non-owning spouse is not controlling. 40 And the fact that the owning spouse shared the property during the marriage is not enough to prove transmutation. 41 The “mere use of a separate asset for marital purposes cannot transform the separate asset into a marital asset.” 42 Rather, it must be proved that the owning spouse intended to “ ‘donate’ or ‘convey’ separate property to the marital unit.” 43 Even contributions of effort or money by the non-owning spouse may not be enough to establish donative intent. These contributions to the upkeep or improvement of separate property must be significant enough to evince “an intent to operate jointly” in order to prove transmutation. 44 Star page 7 *7 Therefore, had King and Carty been married, Carty would have had to clear this high bar to prove that the Carole Mae , which was purchased entirely with King's separate funds and titled in his name only, was gifted to their partnership. This hypothetical analysis shows that even in marriage, with its formal commitment to union and default rule that property is shared, the law gives significant protection to people's separate property. Should the law of domestic partnership offer comparable protection for separate property? We think so, and there is some precedent for this approach. In Armstrong v. Woods , an unpublished decision, we stated that it would be “logical” to apply the doctrine of tracing to domestic partnerships. 45 We then applied the doctrine to a fishing vessel one partner purchased as the partnership was ending. 46 There was evidence that partnership funds were used to purchase the vessel, but the court had not made findings on this point. 47 Therefore, we vacated the trial court's ruling that the vessel was one partner's separate property and remanded for further consideration. 48 Applying the doctrine of tracing to domestic partnerships is logical not only because of the similarities between the two types of relationships but also because of the differences. Unlike marriage, there is no specific act that establishes a domestic partnership. Some people may not even know they have entered a relationship that supports another person's legal claim to their property. And sometimes people in a committed relationship choose not to marry because they want to protect their separate assets. Here, in fact, Carty testified that although she and King entered their relationship with the intention of a life-long commitment, they also consciously chose not to marry because “if [they] didn't marry on paper, [they] wouldn't have to divorce in court.” And, she continued, “if [they] maintained separate assets, [they] wouldn't have to divide them if [they] were ever to separate.” These aspects of a domestic partnership support a conclusion that the tracing doctrine — which protects married peoples’ interests in their separate property — should apply to domestic partnerships too. Therefore, we hold that the tracing doctrine applies to cases of disputed items of property acquired during a domestic partnership. If the disputed item is a secondary asset that is acquired using only one partner's separate assets, and it is titled only in that partner's name, 49 then the item remains that partner's separate property, regardless of what the Bishop factors show. 50 Because the superior court did not apply tracing to determine the ownership of the Carole Mae , and because it is undisputed that the vessel was titled in King's name only and purchased and improved using only King's undisputedly separate funds, we reverse the court's ruling that the vessel was partnership property. IV. CONCLUSION Star page 8 *8 The superior court's classification of the Highbush property as partnership property is REVERSED. Its classification of the Carole Mae is REVERSED. This matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Footnotes 1 King also sought custody of the parties’ daughter. Custody is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Neither party claimed that funds in the other's personal bank account were partnership property. 3 Tomal v. Anderson , 426 P.3d 915, 920 (Alaska 2018). 4 See Reed v. Parrish , 286 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Alaska 2012). 5 See Tomal , 426 P.3d at 922 n.4, 923-24. 6 Gallagher v. Majors , 559 P.3d 615, 619 (Alaska 2024); see also Tomal , 426 P.3d at 923, 925 . 7 Tomal , 426 P.3d at 923 . 8 Id. at 924 . 9 Id. at 923 . 10 Id. at 923 n.8 (quoting Wood v. Collins , 812 P.2d 951 , 954 n.2 (Alaska 1991)). 11 Id. at 923 n.15. 12 Rego v. Rego , 259 P.3d 447, 452 (Alaska 2011). 13 See, e.g. , Wright v. Dropik , 512 P.3d 655, 659, 663-65 (Alaska 2022) (applying Tomal to property acquired during purported domestic partnership); Bishop v. Clark , 54 P.3d 804, 810-11 (Alaska 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Tomal v. Anderson , 426 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2018) (considering “distribution of property accumulated during cohabitation”); Jaymot v. Skillings-Donat ; 216 P.3d 534, 544 (Alaska 2009) (“When two people reside together in an intimate relationship, the property they acquire while cohabiting should be distributed according to the parties’ express or implied intent.” (emphasis added)). 14 Tomal , 426 P.3d at 925 . 15 Id. at 922 (emphasis added). 16 Id. 17 Id. at 925 . 18 812 P.2d 951, 56 (Alaska 1991) (citing Beal v. Beal , 577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or. 1978) (en banc)). 19 577 P.2d at 510 . 20 See Wood , 812 P.2d 951 ; Beal , 577 P.2d 507 . 21 498 P.3d 632, 635 (Alaska 2021). 22 Id. at 634, 636-37 . 23 33 P.3d 1152, 1155 (Alaska 2001). 24 This analogy is meant only to illustrate the distinction between a business itself and the physical place of the business's operation. It is not meant to disregard the core element of a domestic partnership: that the partners intend to share the fruits of their relationship as if they were married. 25 See Tomal v. Anderson , 426 P.3d 915 , 922 n.4 (Alaska 2018). 26 Because the Highbush property is not partnership property, we need not address King's argument that the trial court improperly valued it. Only partnership property is subject to valuation and assignment by the court. Id. at 924 (“[S]eparate property must be distributed solely to its owner.”). 27 King's brief argues that the court erred in ruling that the charter business was partnership property. But because he did not raise this issue in his notice of appeal, it is waived, and we will not consider it. In re Estate of Fields , 219 P.3d 995, 1011 (Alaska 2009); Laughlin v. Laughlin , 229 P.3d 1002 , 1007 n.19 (Alaska 2010) (“[W]e will not treat issues that were argued in the brief but not set forth in the Points [on Appeal].” (alterations in original) (quoting Wetzler v. Wetzler , 570 P.2d 741 , 742 n.2 (Alaska 1977))); see also Alaska R. App. P. 204(e) (providing appellate court will only consider issues included in statement of points on appeal). 28 Tomal , 426 P.3d at 922 . 29 McConville v. Otness , 498 P.3d 632, 635 (Alaska 2021). 30 Id. at 635-36 . These factors are whether the parties (1) made joint financial arrangements such as joint savings or checking accounts, or jointly titled property; (2) filed joint tax returns; (3) held themselves out as husband and wife; (4) contributed to the payment of household expenses; (5) contributed to the improvement and maintenance of the disputed property; and (6) participated in a joint business venture. Whether they have raised children together or incurred joint debts is also important. Bishop v. Clark , 54 P.3d 804, 811 (Alaska 2002) (footnotes omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Tomal , 426 P.3d 915 . 31 See Boulds v. Nielsen , 323 P.3d 58, 64 (Alaska 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Tomal , 426 P.3d 915 . 32 Pasley v. Pasley , 442 P.3d 738, 745 (Alaska 2019). 33 Id. at 745 (quoting Schmitz v. Schmitz , 88 P.3d 1116, 1127 (Alaska 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. (footnote omitted). 37 Id . 38 See Kessler v. Kessler , 411 P.3d 616, 618-19 (Alaska 2018). 39 Id. at 619 . 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Odom v. Odom , 141 P.3d 324, 333 (Alaska 2006). 43 Kessler , 411 P.3d at 619 (quoting Sparks v. Sparks , 233 P.3d 1091, 1094 (Alaska 2010), overruled on other grounds by Engstrom v. Engstrom , 350 P.3d 766 (Alaska 2015)). 44 See id. at 620-21 (quoting Abood v. Abood , 119 P.3d 980, 988 (Alaska 2005)) (deciding that installing new countertops, windows, and blinds; painting; and buying new washer and dryer were “minor” upgrades by non-owning spouse that did not evidence owning spouse's intent to gift property to marriage); accord Pasley v. Pasley , 442 P.3d 738, 751 (Alaska 2019) (holding that owning spouse's apartment did not transmute to marital property even though non-owning spouse “installed a ban[n]ister, carpeted the stairs, installed vinyl in the kitchen and the bathroom, painted the bathroom, worked on creating an egress point for the basement, and redid the front wall and reinsulated it” (alteration in original)). 45 See No. S-16864, 2019 WL 2613433 , at *6 (Alaska June 26, 2019). 46 Id. 47 Id. at *6-7. 48 Id. at *7. 49 “[P]lacing the [disputed] property in joint title ... is presumptive evidence of intent and shifts the burden of proof to the owning spouse” to rebut the presumption of donative intent. See Kessler , 411 P.3d at 620 (emphasis in original). “If evidence is presented that is sufficient to overcome this presumption, tracing can take place.” Schmitz v. Schmitz , 88 P.3d 1116, 1128 (Alaska 2004). 50 In this case the superior court did not discuss the Bishop factors. It is worth noting that these factors do not offer strong support for the finding that the parties intended to share the Carole Mae . Bishop v. Clark , 54 P.3d 804, 811 (Alaska 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Tomal v. Anderson , 426 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2018) (listing partnership factors). Reviewing the factors that apply to the boat, it was not jointly titled; there was no testimony that Carty paid for its expenses or contributed to its improvement; and it was not jointly financed. The only relevant factor that arguably cuts in favor of intent to share is the fact that the boat was used for the charter business, which the court found to be partnership property, and for family outings. End of Document