Envoy Air, Inc. v. Jada Creagh

Rel: October 16, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ SC-2025-0022 _________________________ Envoy Air, Inc. v. Jada Creagh Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court (CV-19-902572) PER CURIAM. Envoy Air, Inc. ("Envoy"), has appealed from a final judgment that the Mobile Circuit Court entered in favor of Jada Creagh on her claim of SC-2025-0022 retaliatory discharge. That judgment, which was based on a jury's verdict, awarded Creagh $250,000 in compensatory damages for mental anguish and $425,000 in punitive damages. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment insofar as it holds Envoy liable for Creagh's harm, but we remand the case to the trial court with instructions for that court to provide written findings in support of its refusal to remit both the compensatory damages and the punitive damages. Facts and Procedural History In 2018, Creagh was an employee of Envoy, which operates commercial flights. On October 25, 2018, Creagh was working the final flight of the night at the Mobile Regional Airport when she slipped and fell on a set of stairs, which resulted in an injury to her shoulder. Creagh reported the injury to her shift supervisor, Cody Arthur, who, according to Creagh, told her that "the last person who had reported getting hurt on the job was no longer there." Arthur denied making any such statement and testified that he "didn't imply that [Creagh] c[ould] be terminated for getting hurt at work." Either way, Creagh told Arthur that she was "hurting," and Arthur "said okay" and left to attend to other 2 SC-2025-0022 duties. Creagh then went home. Pursuant to Envoy's policies in effect at that time, any on-the-job injury should have been documented "within two hours of the injury or as soon as possible." However, Arthur did not document Creagh's injury until sometime the following day because he was "unfamiliar with the process at the time" and because her injury had occurred "very late at night." Creagh was scheduled to work the following morning, but, when she awoke that morning, she telephoned her shift supervisor for that day -- someone other than Arthur -- "to let him know that [she] got hurt last night" and that she was "really in pain and need[ed] to call out." The shift supervisor told Creagh that "he didn't have any report of [her] being hurt," that "[Arthur] didn't mention it," and that there were "already … people out" that day so she "need[ed] to come in." Creagh thus went to work as scheduled, but, when her shift supervisor saw her, he "realized that [she] was hurt" and, at that point, told her that she "need[ed] to go see the doctor now." The doctor who treated Creagh told her that she needed to remain out of work for several weeks and restricted her from "lifting [anything] greater than 10 pounds" when she returned to work. 3 SC-2025-0022 However, Creagh's normal duties required her to be able to lift "50 pounds at least" and required much "[p]ushing, pulling, [and] lifting." Creagh's manager at Envoy was Brigitte Atkinson, and Creagh testified that she and Atkinson "got along great before [her] injury." Specifically, Creagh testified that Atkinson "seemed like a great woman" and was "[f]riendly," that Atkinson "would say good morning" and "would compliment [her]," and that she and Atkinson would "laugh about things in passing." In short, Creagh testified that she "didn't have any issues with [Atkinson] to begin with." However, Creagh testified that, when she returned to work on November 21, 2018, her interactions with Atkinson "were dry" and that Atkinson "seemed agitated," "no longer spoke to [her] in the morning," and "[s]ometimes … would walk past and not say anything." In addition, Creagh testified that she had reported to Atkinson that she was "having problems with pushing, pulling, [and] lifting anything over 10 pounds" but that Atkinson had failed to ensure that she was "always provided help," even though Envoy had agreed that "[a]ssistance w[ould] be provided [to Creagh] for lifting anything over 10 [pounds]." 4 SC-2025-0022 Creagh also testified regarding interactions she had witnessed between Atkinson and other Envoy employees around that time: "Q. Did you see Atkinson interact with other employees at Envoy before November 30, 2018? "A. Yes. "Q. Based upon that observation that you saw, what was she like? "…. "A. She was mean. She was terrifying. She would talk down to them. She would yell at them. A lot of us tried to avoid her, just to stay off her radar. "Q. When [Atkinson] came out of the office did you have an opportunity to see what the other employees did? "…. "A. They would scatter. They would try to stay out of her way. She would pick one person and zoom in -- we were already short staffed. She would threaten our jobs. Stated the Mobile station would no longer exist if we didn't do what she was telling us to do or if we didn't straighten up. "…. "Q. What were the time pressures that she was referring to? "…. "A. On-time departures. Delays. The lines at the ticket counter. Fuel. Even if the delay wasn't on us … she would still blame us and say [we] [were] not doing anything. 5 SC-2025-0022 "Q. Did you ever … before November 30 have an opportunity to hear her talk about people missing work? "A. Yes. "Q. Tell us about that. "…. "A. One day we were in the break room … in between flights. We had worked two morning flights and then we were relaxing or trying to relax before the next one. She came out of her office yelling and screaming, where is everyone; we are having to borrow employees from other stations. No one should be taking off work. It doesn't matter what they have going on. This is important. They need to be here so that we can get things done. You could hear her and passengers could hear her too." On November 30, 2018, Creagh returned to her doctor for a follow- up appointment and was given a return-to-work note that continued to place physical restrictions on her work. However, there are two return- to-work notes in evidence, both pictured below, and there is conflicting evidence as to which note Creagh gave to Atkinson. The first return-to- work note has two computer-generated X's in the boxes next to two preprinted restrictions, which restricted Creagh from "overhead work" and from lifting anything heavier than 10 pounds. The second return-to- work note, which we will refer to as "the altered note," has those same two computer-generated X's, but those two computer-generated X's have 6 SC-2025-0022 been partially covered by two handwritten X's. There is also a third handwritten X in the box next to the preprinted restriction against any "push/pull" activity, but no computer-generated X appears in that box on either return-to-work note. 7 SC-2025-0022 Creagh testified that she did not write the three handwritten X's on the altered note and that "that [is not] the note that [she] handed to [Atkinson]." Atkinson testified, however, that the altered note is the note she received from Creagh and that, either that same day or the next day, she telephoned Valerine Conerly -- one of Envoy's worker's compensation analysts stationed in Texas -- and "told her that [Creagh's return-to-work note] doesn't look right." Atkinson then sent a copy of the altered note to Conerly. Conerly later contacted Creagh's doctor and asked for a copy of the return-to-work note that had been given to Creagh, and the doctor sent Conerly a copy of the return-to-work note that does not contain the three handwritten X's. On December 3, 2018, Creagh arrived at the airport to work her scheduled shift. During that shift, Creagh reported to Atkinson that she was "not really getting the help" she needed and that other employees were "complaining," and Atkinson responded by telling Creagh that she had been "getting reports or complaints that [Creagh] [was] being combative." Creagh denied those allegations and insisted that she was "just asking for help." According to Creagh, Atkinson then asked her if she "fe[lt] like [Envoy] was a good fit for [her]," and Creagh said that she 8 SC-2025-0022 "like[d] working here" and "just need[ed] help until [she] g[ot] better." Creagh testified that, at that point, Atkinson "got mean or mad and … said [she] [would] find a way to get rid of [her]." According to Creagh, Atkinson did not "bring up the three [handwritten] X's" during that conversation or otherwise "make any complaint … whatsoever about the November 30, 2018, return-to-work slip." After that conversation, Creagh continued to work as scheduled, and at least once she reiterated to Atkinson during the following days that she was "still not getting the help that [she] needed." According to Creagh, Atkinson said that she was "working on it." On December 12, 2018, Conerly emailed Bridgette Warren-Murrell, Envoy's Director of Human Resources ("HR") Operations, who was stationed in Texas, and David Barrera, who also worked in Envoy's HR department in Texas. That email stated: "I'm looping you in on this. This employee has a worker's compensation claim. She presented a work status note from her physician. The GM, Brigitte Atkinson, stated it appeared to be tampered with. We requested the nurse on her claim obtain a work status note directly from her doctor. The notes are different. This appears to be fraud." That same day, Warren-Murrell replied with the following email: "FYI … In the past, we usually separate for falsifying documents as it violates 9 SC-2025-0022 our guiding principles." Later that day, Barrera sent Atkinson the following email: "When you return to your station, engage [Creagh] in conversation as to why there is a discrepancy in her Work Status Note that she presented. If her responses don't add up, we can set-up a debrief and compare so that we can talk about any disciplinary steps." On December 28, 2018, Atkinson called Creagh into her office and "started to question [Creagh] about [the] doctor's note." According to Creagh, "[Atkinson] showed me the doctor's note and it looked similar to mine. She asked me whose is this. I said, this is my doctor's note but that's not the one that I gave you. She showed me another one with just two computer-generated X's like the one that I had given her. She said, who put these X's on the other one? I said, I don't know. The doctor's nurse … just prints them out or she does that and gives them to me and I bring them here. She said, well, someone did it. I said, it wasn't me. She said, well, we are going to suspend you pending an investigation. I said, I didn't do this. She said, I'm going to need your badge and keys." Following that conversation, Atkinson emailed Conerly, Barrera, and Warren-Murrell. That email states, in pertinent part: "I just had a conversation with [Creagh] …. I gave her a copy of the form she gave me and asked her if this is the one [the doctor] gave [her] and … she replied yes. So I then gave her the second one and she said that it was a different one. I said this is what the doctor's office sent to us. She said she knows nothing about it that they gave her this one. She said [the 10 SC-2025-0022 nurse] printed it out and she was the one that put the X's in the box because there weren't any there and I said yes there were if you look you can see them underneath the original ones, she said well I don't know that is what they gave me. She said are you accusing me of doing it, I said I am asking you if you did it and she stated no [the nurse] put the X's in the boxes." It appears that Conerly shared that information with Johnathan Wilson, another of Envoy's HR employees stationed in Texas, and, that same day, Wilson sent Atkinson the following email: "Per our conversation, the employee has now been provided the opportunity to speak to the discrepancy between the document that she provided and the document that was provided by the doctor's office. The employee has not provided sufficient reason as to why the two documents are different. The resulting conclusion is that the document was altered after leaving the doctor's office, and prior to being turned in to Envoy. The altering of official documentation is considered a violation of Envoy Guiding Principles and Business Ethics. Specifically, the Guiding Principles say, 'We conduct ourselves with the highest standards of honesty, integrity and fairness -- obeying all the laws of the communities in which we work or do business. We must all understand and comply with our business ethics policies.' "Please suspend the employee immediately, and proceed with off-boarding based upon the above determination." Later that same day, Atkinson provided Creagh with a letter that stated, in pertinent part: "Effective today, December 28, 2018, you are being suspended pending the outcome of an investigation into the 11 SC-2025-0022 documents you provided to this office. We will conduct our investigation as expeditiously as possible and once we have the results will advise you accordingly." During Atkinson's deposition, parts of which were read into evidence, Creagh's counsel questioned Atkinson about that letter and the investigation to which it alluded, and Atkinson testified as follows: "Q. … [Y]ou say, 'We will conduct our investigation as expeditiously as possible and once we have the results will advise you accordingly.' Do you see that? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. Did you conduct an investigation regarding this matter after December 28, 2018? "A. It was more of the HR department did that. "Q. Okay. But … to your knowledge, what you're saying is the HR department conducted an investigation after December 28, 2018? "A. Yes, sir." Creagh likewise testified that Atkinson had told her during their December 28, 2018, meeting that "an investigation still needed to be done." On January 4, 2019, Atkinson sent Creagh the following email: "The investigation has been completed if you could please report back to work on Monday the 7th at 9 am." As requested, Creagh returned to 12 SC-2025-0022 work on January 7, 2019, and, after working part of her shift, went to Atkinson's office at Atkinson's request, at which point Atkinson told Creagh that she was "being let go." Atkinson also provided Creagh with a termination letter, which was signed by only Atkinson. That letter informed Creagh that her employment had been terminated for "falsification of documentation" because the return-to-work note that she had allegedly given to Atkinson "appeared to have been altered when compared to the one the doctor's office had sent." As noted, Creagh disputed the allegation that she had created the altered note, and she testified that she experienced -- and continues to experience -- mental anguish as a result of the allegedly wrongful termination of her employment. Regarding the termination letter that Atkinson provided to her, Creagh testified as follows: "Q. Now, on that letter that you received did it have anyone else's name on it other than [Atkinson]? "A. No. "Q. Who fired you? "A. [Atkinson]." Atkinson testified as follows regarding the termination letter: 13 SC-2025-0022 "Q. Anywhere in that [termination] letter does it say that this decision to fire [Creagh] is made by anyone other than you with your signature on there? "A. We can't terminate an employee without HR's -- "Q. Go ahead. Finish. "A. Sorry. I have to have HR's authorization in order to terminate an employee. "Q. Does -- and -- and my question was anywhere in that letter does it say that this is HR's decision? "A. No, sir. Let me see that. That was one was actually mine. "Q. Is there anything … that you want change about the testimony that you've given? "…. "A. Does it not … in the paragraph at the bottom represent that it's following the guiding principles of Envoy …? So -- "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah. "A. Okay. So that's -- they have to give me authorization to terminate her. I … can't do that on my own. If HR says no, then you don't do it. "…. "Q. I mean, so are you telling me … that the decision to fire [Creagh] was made by HR …? "A. I'm telling you that the decision to fire [Creagh] was made by HR, yes, sir, because they have to give me authorization." 14 SC-2025-0022 However, Charles Davis, one of Envoy's regional managing directors and a defense witness, testified that Atkinson did in fact have the authority to discharge an employee. Specifically, Davis testified as follows on direct examination: "Q. In a situation where a station manager has referred an employment matter to HR for investigation, for example, if an employee is thought to have … altered a doctor's note and then HR does an investigation, who makes the decision on discipline? "A. In that case it would be HR. As soon as we take the issue to HR it's going to be their decision. "Q. Did the station manager independently have authority to terminate any employee? "A. Technically they could. It's not our process." On cross-examination, Davis testified as follows: "Q. Technically they could terminate, correct? "A. Yes. "Q. That's part of the policies and procedures at Envoy, correct? "A. It's not. "Q. But technically they could. What do you mean by technically? "A. As the general manager if they sign a termination form they could terminate someone. However, our process would 15 SC-2025-0022 be to go through HR so we can ensure that everything is followed correctly." Davis was also asked on cross-examination about Envoy's response to Creagh's requests for production: "Q. Let's get back to the technicality that we talked about with the HR. Let me show you what has been marked as Plaintiff's [Exhibit] 178 where Envoy responded. Have you seen this document before? "A. No, I don't believe so. "Q. In the question it says, identify by name, address and job title the supervisory chain of command on the date of termination of the plaintiff from the plaintiff up to the highest ranking officer of the company. Can you read for the jury what Envoy's answer was? "A. The plaintiff was terminated by Brigitte Atkinson, station manager. "Q. Does it say anything else? "A. No. "Q. Is that a technicality? "…. "A. I'm not a lawyer. I'm not sure. "Q. You used the word. I didn't pick it. You picked it. "A. I didn't say technicality. I said technically an agent of the company, being Brigitte Atkinson, could have signed to hire an employee or signed to terminate an employee. However, 16 SC-2025-0022 our process is to ensure we go through our HR department or our recruiting department. "Q. Does it say what your policy is there? Does it say that HR was involved in this in any way? "A. It does not." During the cross-examination of Davis, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of Envoy's job description for its HR employees. That document states that an HR employee "provide[s] counsel and recommendations to supervisors and managers in matters of employee conduct, performance, corrective and disciplinary action, consistent with company policies and applicable federal and state labor laws." Davis then testified as follows regarding that document: "Q. Under here it says, key required skills: Ability to conduct and manage complex investigations and recommend action, provide counsel and recommendation to supervisors and managers. Did I read that correctly? "A. Yes. "Q. The word is 'recommendations,' correct? "A. Yes. "Q. Doesn't say final decision maker, does it? "A. It says recommendation. 17 SC-2025-0022 "Q. It specifically talks about applying to managers, which would be Brigitte Atkinson. Right? "A. Yes." As part of her case, Creagh read into evidence the following excerpts from Conerly's deposition: "Q. I just marked Exhibit 17, and it's a job description for HR consultant and business partners. Do you see that? "A. Yes. "…. "Q. If you go to the second page of Exhibit 17 where it has key required skills, do you see that? "A. Uh-huh. "…. "Q. It says, ability to conduct and manage complex investigation and recommend action. Did I read that correctly? "A. Yes. "Q. Okay. So you know you testified previously in response to a question about what your understanding of what HR did, is that consistent with your understanding, that HR would conduct and manage complex investigations and recommend action? "A. Yep. 18 SC-2025-0022 "Q. Okay. And they're recommending action to who, the operational people? "A. When you say operational, are you meaning like the station managers or leaders? "Q. Yes. "A. Yes, uh-huh. "…. "Q. And then it says, provide counsel and recommendations to supervisors and managers in matters of employee conduct, performance, corrective and disciplinary action consistent with company policies and applicable federal and state labor laws. Did I read that correctly? "A. That's the way I read it, uh-huh." Josh Hernandez, a "senior business partner for Envoy," testified for the defense regarding the email that Wilson sent to Atkinson and the investigation that occurred in conjunction with Creagh's discharge. Specifically, Hernandez testified as follows on direct examination: "Q. The last sentence of the email [that Wilson sent to Atkinson], that is a directive as I'm reading it from [Wilson] to [Atkinson]? "A. Yes. "Q. At any point in any of the materials that we have reviewed so far related to this investigation did [Atkinson] make the decision to terminate Creagh without anyone else's input? 19 SC-2025-0022 "A. No. "Q. Based on this email do you believe that Atkinson made the determination to terminate Creagh without input from anyone else? "A. No. "…. "Q. I'm going to hand you what has been admitted as Defendant's [Exhibit] 13. Do you recognize that? "…. "A. [It is the December 28, 2018,] suspension letter. "…. "Q. Read the last sentence of the first paragraph. "A. We will conduct our investigation as expeditiously as possible and once we have the results we will advise accordingly. "Q. Here is the question, once the findings that are put into … that email from Wilson, once that email is sent from an HR perspective at Envoy is that the end of the investigation? "A. It is not. "Q. What else has to happen before an investigation is concluded? "A. In a case where it would lead to termination there are a number of things we have to do to prepare to do that which include writing up a termination letter, putting it in our system to make sure that -- we are going to be removing this 20 SC-2025-0022 employee from several systems so a number of things have to happen before we can say this investigation is now closed or this investigation is completed. All of that wraps into when we say the investigation has not yet been completed. "Q. If there is a delay between the time that person is suspended and they are actually terminated, is that what is happening in terms of completing the investigation? "A. Yes, that's what is happening. "…. "Q. I show you Defendant's [Exhibit] 14. If you will, take a look at that for me. What is that? "A. A termination letter. "Q. Who is that letter to? "A. Jada Creagh. "Q. Who signed that termination letter? "A. Brigitte Atkinson. "Q. We just saw that email … where Wilson is the one who made the directive to terminate Creagh. Why did Atkinson sign the termination letter? "A. She signed it because [Creagh] reported to her. "Q. Is that in accordance with Envoy's policies; your direct supervisor is the one to sign the letter? "A. Yes." 21 SC-2025-0022 On cross-examination, Creagh's counsel reminded Hernandez, and Hernandez acknowledged, that Envoy's job description for its HR employees indicates that they "provide advice and recommendations regarding hiring and firing." However, Hernandez insisted that Wilson had made the decision to terminate Creagh's employment. Creagh's counsel then questioned Hernandez as follows: "Q. Well, where is Wilson, the guy you say made the decision? "A. He is no longer with Envoy. "…. "Q. So, you are in here testifying about a decision that Wilson allegedly made even though he is the consultant that provides recommendations and advice saying that he made a decision? "A. Yes." In May 2022 -- before the trial in this case occurred -- Envoy terminated Atkinson's employment. When asked why her employment had been terminated, Atkinson testified: "They told me -- I'm trying to remember. I don't honestly remember, but they told me -- I thought they told me that I had failed a couple of audits." However, Ann Marie De La Paz, one of Envoy's regional managing directors, testified in her deposition -- parts of which were read into evidence -- that she had 22 SC-2025-0022 terminated Atkinson's employment because Atkinson "was not a good manager," "didn't take any ownership for her failure to lead the team," did not "exercise the highest standards of integrity" and "fairness," did not "exercise good judgment," did not "act in the best interest of Envoy" and its customers, and did not "work as a team with other coworkers." The termination letter that De La Paz provided to Atkinson, which was admitted into evidence, corroborated De La Paz's testimony in that it indicated that Atkinson's employment had been terminated based on her "egregious" behavior, including a "lack[] [of] empathy," the "inability to provide a safe and productive work environment," "poor judgment," and the fact that "[her] outstation ha[d] failed multiple safety and compliance audits." In 2019, Creagh filed a complaint against Envoy, in which she asserted only a claim for worker's compensation benefits -- a claim the parties would eventually settle. During the course of discovery, Envoy's original counsel, Anthony Fox, provided Creagh with a set of unsigned answers to interrogatories, one of which -- the answer to Interrogatory 14 -- stated that Creagh had voluntarily resigned her employment. Fox later provided a signature page that purportedly contains Conerly's 23 SC-2025-0022 signature as the authorized agent of Envoy. However, it is undisputed that Creagh's employment was terminated and that the signature page was forged. Although Fox accepted responsibility for the incorrect answer to Interrogatory 14, contending that he had mistakenly assumed that Creagh had resigned, he denied responsibility for the forged signature page. Envoy also disavowed any responsibility for the forged signature page, and it subsequently dismissed Fox, retained new counsel, and amended its response to Interrogatory 14 to reflect that Creagh's employment had been terminated for "falsifying documents." In 2020, Creagh amended her complaint to assert a claim of retaliatory discharge, alleging that Envoy had terminated her employment "solely because she claimed or sought to recover worker's compensation benefits." Discovery in this case was contentious, to say the least, and not simply because of the issues with Envoy's original answer to Interrogatory 14, though that is the only discovery issue relevant to this appeal. Thus, the trial court appointed a special master to manage the discovery disputes. Following an evidentiary hearing, the special master entered a detailed order in which he found "that the responsibility for drafting the incorrect answer to Interrogatory 14 lies 24 SC-2025-0022 with Fox, not with any Envoy employee." The special master also stated that he was "unable to reach a conclusion as to who forged Conerly's signature" and that the forgery was a "mystery." Thus, in the opinion of the special master, Creagh should not "be permitted to put on evidence to the effect that the signature was forged" because that issue was "collateral to the question of whether Envoy had a legitimate basis … for terminating [Creagh]" and "[t]he salacious nature of the issue would be a distraction to the jury and would probably overwhelm every other issue in the case." After the special master entered his order, Envoy filed a motion in limine in which it sought to have its original answer to Interrogatory 14 excluded from evidence. The record does not contain a written order from the trial court ruling on that motion, but it appears that the parties discussed the motion before trial and that the court made some sort of ruling adverse to Envoy at that time. However, as Envoy's counsel noted during oral arguments before this Court, that discussion and oral ruling were not transcribed for the record. During the trial, but outside the presence of the jury, the trial court and the parties revisited the issue of Envoy's original answer to 25 SC-2025-0022 Interrogatory 14. During that discussion, Envoy's counsel stated that she "want[ed] some clarity" as to "what [the trial court] [was] doing with Interrogatory 14." The trial court ruled that Creagh would be permitted to "offer into evidence that [Envoy] stated early on in the litigation process" that Creagh had "voluntarily resigned her job." The trial court also ruled that Creagh could present the forged signature page, but the court clarified that Creagh could not "mention [one word] about [the signature page] being falsified or any of that." Following that discussion, and while still outside the presence of the jury, the trial court admitted Plaintiff's Exhibit 155 into evidence. At that time, the exhibit contained three pages -- the first page of Creagh's interrogatories, the page containing Envoy's original answer to Interrogatory 14, and the forged signature page. At the close of Creagh's evidence and again at the close of its own evidence, Envoy moved for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML"), arguing that Creagh had failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. The trial court denied the motion both times. During closing arguments, Creagh's counsel revisited Conerly's testimony and reminded the jury that, in response to Interrogatory 14, 26 SC-2025-0022 Envoy had originally answered that Creagh had voluntarily resigned her employment. Creagh's counsel then said: "Is that a witness swearing falsely to a material fact?" Envoy's counsel immediately objected and requested a mistrial, noting that the trial court had previously ruled that Creagh's counsel was "not allowed to argue [Conerly] had lied." After removing the jury from the courtroom, the trial court agreed that Creagh's counsel's argument "was in clear violation of [the court's] ruling," but the court declined to grant a mistrial. Instead, the trial court stated: "This is what I'm going to do. I want you to substitute that exhibit. It has not gone back to the jury. Take out the signature page of Conerly's signature, put an unsigned copy into evidence. I will do a limiting instruction to the jury. … I want the defense to give me what they propose that limiting instruction ought to be. I think it should be somewhere along the lines of letting the jury know that contrary to what [counsel] has said, Conerly never signed those interrogatory responses." When the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the trial court stated: "Ladies and gentlemen, contrary to what [Creagh's counsel] said, I want to point out that Valerine Conerly never submitted a response to Interrogatory 14 that was sworn to by her." In accord with the trial 27 SC-2025-0022 court's ruling, the version of Plaintiff's Exhibit 155 that was given to the jury contained a blank signature page. As noted, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Creagh and awarded her $250,000 in compensatory damages for mental anguish and $425,000 in punitive damages. Following the trial, Envoy filed a written motion for a JML, continuing to argue that Creagh had failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Envoy also challenged the damages awarded by the jury, arguing that both the compensatory damages and the punitive damages were excessive and that the issue of punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury in the first place. The trial court denied that motion following a hearing, and Envoy filed a timely notice of appeal. Discussion Envoy raises the following arguments on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a JML, (2) that the court erred with respect to several evidentiary rulings, (3) that the compensatory damages are excessive, and (4) that the evidence did not support any award of punitive damages or, alternatively, that the punitive damages are excessive. 28 SC-2025-0022 I. Envoy's Motion for a JML Envoy argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a JML because, it says, Creagh failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Alternatively, Envoy argues that, even if Creagh carried that burden, it "offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Creagh's termination (falsification of a medical note)" and that Creagh failed to prove that this reason was pretextual. Envoy's brief, p. 44. " 'We review as follows a trial court's ruling on a motion for a JML made after a verdict has been returned: " ' "The standard of review applicable to a ruling on a [renewed] motion for [a JML] is identical to the standard used by the trial court in granting or denying a motion for [a JML]. Thus, in reviewing the trial court's ruling on the motion, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we determine whether the party with the burden of proof has produced sufficient evidence to require a jury determination. " ' "…. " ' "… In ruling on a [renewed] motion for a [JML], the trial court is called upon to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to submit a question of fact to the jury; for the court to determine that it was, there must have been 'substantial evidence' before the jury to create a question of fact. '[S]ubstantial evidence is 29 SC-2025-0022 evidence of such weight and quality that fair- minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' " " 'American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 624 So. 2d 1362, 1366-67 (Ala. 1993) (citations omitted).' " Complete Cash Holdings, LLC v. Powell, 239 So. 3d 550, 556 (Ala. 2017) (quoting Lee v. Houser, 148 So. 3d 406, 414 (Ala. 2013)). "Additionally, this Court noted in Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Daugherty, 840 So. 2d 152, 156 (Ala. 2002): " ' " 'A judgment as a matter of law is proper only where there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue or where there are no controverted questions of fact on which reasonable people could differ and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' " Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505, 510-11 (Ala. 2000), quoting Locklear Dodge City, Inc. v. Kimbrell, 703 So. 2d 303, 304 (Ala. 1997).' " Lawson v. Moore, 25 So. 3d 417, 420 (Ala. 2008). To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must prove "1) an employment relationship, 2) an on-the-job injury, 3) knowledge on the part of the employer of the on-the-job injury, and 4) subsequent termination of employment based solely upon the employee's on-the-job injury and the filing of a workers' compensation claim." Alabama Power Co. v. Aldridge, 854 So. 2d 554, 563 (Ala. 2002) (emphasis 30 SC-2025-0022 added). See also § 25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975 (providing that "[n]o employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because the employee has instituted or maintained any action against the employer to recover workers' compensation benefits" (emphasis added)). "There is no dispute between the parties that [Creagh] established the first three elements of a retaliatory-discharge claim. The disagreement … concerns the fourth element, i.e., whether [Creagh] established that [she] was fired 'solely' because of [her] workplace injury and the filing of a workers' compensation claim. " 'Because direct evidence dem