Full Opinion

Rel: October 16, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ SC-2026-0410 _________________________ James McConico, Jr. v. Jonathan Haynes and Latasha Jackson Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court (CV-25-351) WISE, Justice. James McConico, Jr., appeals from a summary judgment the Montgomery Circuit Court entered in favor of Jonathan Haynes and SC-2026-0410 Latasha Jackson. We reverse the Montgomery Circuit Court's judgment and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Facts and Procedural History On August 12, 2025, McConico, an inmate incarcerated at Easterling Correctional Facility, filed a complaint in the Barbour Circuit Court against Michele McConico, his former wife, and Agent Jonathan Haynes and Officer Latasha Jackson, who were employed at the Alabama Department of Corrections. In his complaint, McConico alleged that Michele had called Haynes and falsely stated that McConico had hired someone to kill her; that Haynes had not exercised due diligence; and that Haynes had falsely imprisoned McConico in the segregation unit at Easterling without any notice of charge or due process. McConico also alleged that he had tried to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his alleged false imprisonment. He further alleged that Jackson had defamed him, denied him access to the courts, and libeled and slandered him by reading his petition after refusing to notarize it. Finally, McConico alleged that Michele had libeled, slandered, and defamed him. 2 SC-2026-0410 On June 13, 2025, Haynes and Jackson filed a motion for a change of venue, arguing that the complaint was, "in substance," a petition for a writ of certiorari and asking the Barbour Circuit Court to transfer the case to the Montgomery Circuit Court. On June 23, 2025, McConico filed a response in opposition to the motion for a change of venue. On August 4, 2025, the Barbour Circuit Court granted the motion for a change of venue and transferred the case to the Montgomery Circuit Court. On September 10, 2025, Haynes and Jackson filed a motion for a summary judgment. On September 15, 2025, the Montgomery Circuit Court granted the motion. On September 26, 2025, McConico filed a motion for an extension of time -- until October 10, 2025 -- to respond to the motion for a summary judgment. On September 29, 2025, the Montgomery Circuit Court granted McConico's motion for an extension of time. On October 15, 2025, McConico filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment. In that motion, he stated that he had received the motion for a summary judgment on September 17, 2025, and that he had immediately filed a request for an extension of time to file a response to the motion. Citing Rule 56(c)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., he argued 3 SC-2026-0410 that the Montgomery Circuit Court had erred in granting the motion for a summary judgment five days after it was filed and without giving him an opportunity to respond to the motion. On October 17, 2025, the Montgomery Circuit Court denied McConico's motion to alter, amend, or vacate. On October 28, 2025, McConico filed a motion asking for another extension -- until November 3, 2025 -- to file a response to the motion for a summary judgment. On October 29, 2025, the Montgomery Circuit Court denied that motion. On November 12, 2025, McConico filed yet another motion for an extension -- until November 27, 2025 -- to file a response to the motion for a summary judgment. On November 13, 2025, the Montgomery Circuit Court denied that motion as moot. This appeal followed.1 Discussion I. 1Although Michele McConico was named as a defendant in the complaint, the record does not indicate that she was ever served in the proceeding below. Even though she was not served, because "the judgment as to [Haynes and Jackson] is final in all other respects, it [is] a final judgment." Rule 4(f), Ala. R. Civ. P. 4 SC-2026-0410 McConico argues that venue was proper in the Barbour Circuit Court and that that court improperly transferred the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court. However, although he cites some caselaw and makes arguments about the merits of the motion for a summary judgment, he has not presented any authority to establish that venue was actually proper in Barbour County, in contravention of Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P. " ' "The purpose of Rule 28, Ala. R. App. P., outlining the requirements for appellate briefs, is to conserve the time and energy of the appellate court and to advise the opposing party of the points he or she is obligated to make. United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing the rule that issues not briefed are waived and Rule 28, Fed. R. App. P., which sets out the requirements for appellate briefs in the federal courts). Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., provides that the argument section of the appellant's brief shall set out 'the contentions of the appellant/petitioner with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts of the record relied on.' Additionally, ' "[i]t is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general 5 SC-2026-0410 propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument." ' Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994))." " 'Ex parte Borden, 60 So. 3d 940, 943 (Ala. 2007). …' "Van Voorst v. Federal Express Corp., 16 So. 3d 86, 92-93 (Ala. 2008). " ' "It is well established that general propositions of law are not considered 'supporting authority' for purposes of Rule 28. Ex parte Riley, 464 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 1985)." S.B. v. Saint James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 89 (Ala. 2006). This Court will not "create legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions unsupported by authority or argument." Spradlin v. Spradlin, 601 So. 2d 76, 79 (Ala. 1992). Further, it is well settled that " '[w]here an appellant fails to cite any authority for an argument, this Court may affirm the judgment as to those issues, for it is neither this Court's duty nor its function to perform all the legal research for an appellant.' " Spradlin v. Birmingham Airport Auth., 613 So. 2d 347, 348 (Ala. 1993)(quoting Sea Calm Shipping Co., S.A. v. Cooks, 565 So. 2d 212, 216 (Ala. 1990)).' "Allsopp v. Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 960 (Ala. 2011)." Harris v. Owens, 105 So. 3d 430, 436 (Ala. 2012). Although he makes general conclusory allegations that venue was proper in Barbour County, McConico has not presented any actual 6 SC-2026-0410 authority to support that conclusion. Therefore, his argument in this regard does not comply with Rule 28(a)(10), and we will not consider this issue.2 II. McConico also argues that the Montgomery Circuit Court erred in granting Haynes and Jackson's motion for a summary judgment without giving him an opportunity to respond to the motion. Regarding time and motions for summary judgment, Rule 56(c)(2) provides: "The motion for summary judgment, with all supporting materials, including any briefs, shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time fixed for the hearing, except that a court may conduct a hearing on less than ten (10) days' notice with the consent of the parties concerned. Subject to subparagraph (f) of this rule, any statement or affidavit in opposition shall be served at least two (2) days prior to the hearing." In Cartron v. Board of Governors of Valley Hill Country Club, Inc., 372 So. 3d 1175, 1177 (Ala. 2022), this Court stated: 2McConico also argues that Haynes and Jackson improperly characterized his complaint as a petition for a writ of certiorari. However, we need not address that argument because he has not established that venue was proper in Barbour County. 7 SC-2026-0410 " 'To expedite its business, the court may make provision by rule or order for the submission and determination of motions not seeking final judgment without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition.' "Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). "This Court has previously noted that the language of Rule 56 'contemplate[s] a hearing upon a motion for summary judgment,' Lightsey v. Bessemer Clinic, P.A., 495 So. 2d 35, 38 (Ala. 1986), and has held that 'Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., itself entitles the parties to a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.' Van Knight v. Smoker, 778 So. 2d 801, 805 (Ala. 2000). Moreover, although Rule 78 provides that a trial court may rule on some motions without conducting an oral hearing, that provision applies only to motions 'not seeking final judgment,' and the Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 78 further provide that 'the rule prohibits the granting of a Motion Seeking Final Judgment such as a Motion for Summary Judgment without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard orally.' (Emphasis added.)"3 In Van Knight v. Smoker, 778 So. 2d 801, 805-06 (Ala. 2000), this Court explained: "One purpose of the procedural rights to notice and hearing under Rule 56(c) is to allow the nonmoving party the opportunity to discover and to present evidence opposing the 3This Court has recognized "that, under 'certain limited circumstances, a trial court may rule on a motion for a summary judgment without conducting a hearing.' Van Knight[ v. Smoker,] 778 So. 3d [801,] 805 [(Ala. 2000)] (citing Pate v. Rollison Logging Equip., Inc., 628 So. 2d 337, 341 (Ala. 1993))." Cartron, 372 So. 3d at 1178. This case does not involve any such exceptions. 8 SC-2026-0410 motion for summary judgment. Tharp[ v. Union State Bank], 364 So. 2d [335,] 338 [(Ala. Civ. App. 1978)]. Although the nonmoving party may waive the requirements of notice and hearing, the 'waiver requires knowledge, actual or implied, of the right being waived.' Tharp, 364 So. 2d at 338 (citing Givens v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 56 Ala. App. 561, 324 So. 2d 277 (1975)). In Tharp, the defendant attended a hearing conducted for the purpose of considering a motion to dismiss a counterclaim. However, at that hearing, the trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant objected to the entry of summary judgment on the ground that it was not aware that the summary-judgment motion would be discussed and decided at the hearing. The Tharp court held that '[t]his objection to the entry of summary judgment and the state of the record showing that ten days had not expired since even the certified date of service [of the motion for summary judgment] negates any claim of waiver.' 364 So. 2d at 338. The Tharp court noted that the plaintiff's argument that the defendant was not prejudiced by the entry of summary judgment against it was invalid because Rule 56 'is not prefaced upon whether or not the opposing party may successfully defend against summary judgment, [but] it does require that the opportunity to defend be given.' Tharp, 364 So. 2d at 338." In Woodruff v. City of Tuscaloosa, 101 So. 3d 749, 753 n.1 (Ala. 2012), this Court stated that "10 days is considered sufficient time for a party to have a meaningful opportunity to respond to a summary-judgment motion. See, e.g, Hill v. Chambless, 757 So. 2d 409, 411 (Ala. 2000) ('Rule 56(c)(2)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] establishes the notice requirement for summary-judgment motions. In order to ensure that an opposing party has a meaningful opportunity to respond, this rule requires that the trial court must allow a minimum of 10 days to pass between the date the hearing is 9 SC-2026-0410 set and the date of the actual hearing, unless the parties agree otherwise.')." Finally, in Billingsley v. Gordon, 340 So. 2d 743 (Ala. 1976), the trial court granted an oral motion for a summary judgment that was made in court on the date the case was set for trial. This Court found that the trial court had erred, reasoning as follows: "Rule 56(c) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure calls for notice to be given a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is sought, when it states: 'The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.' The rationale for this requirement is obviously to give the non-moving party sufficient time to prepare a rebuttal to the moving party's burden of proving that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The results to the party against whom a motion for summary judgment is granted are extremely harsh and the rule attempts to ensure that the court rules on a summary judgment motion only after it is fully apprised of all the relevant facts and circumstances of the cause before it. See Wright & Miller, § 2719 (1973). "It does not appear that the plaintiff had any notice of the motion prior to the time [the defendant] 'orally' moved for summary judgment at the hearing held on March 31, 1975, which was the day for the trial of the case. A motion for summary judgment should only be granted when substantial justice is served and when it is apparent that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact. The trial court's granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment was not only in derogation of the specific requirements of Rule 56, but also violated the spirit of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure." Billingsley, 340 So. 2d at 744. 10 SC-2026-0410 In this case, Haynes and Jackson filed their motion for a summary judgment on September 10, 2025, and the Montgomery Circuit Court granted the motion five days later on September 15, 2025. In his motion to alter, amend, or vacate, McConico stated that he did not even receive the motion for a summary judgment until September 17, 2025, which was two days after the Montgomery Circuit Court had granted that motion. Haynes and Jackson did not dispute or refute that statement. McConico did not receive either notice of the motion for a summary judgment or an opportunity to defend against the motion because the Montgomery Circuit Court had granted the motion two days before he received the motion. Therefore, under these specific facts, the "[Montgomery Circuit Court's] granting of the … motion for summary judgment was not only in derogation of the specific requirements of Rule 56, but also violated the spirit of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure." Billingsley, 340 So. 2d at 744; see also Cartron, 372 So. 3d at 1179 (holding that the plaintiff in that case "was prejudiced and denied the procedural safeguards of Rule 56(c) when the trial court granted the defendants' summary-judgment motion without first holding a hearing on the motion or otherwise notifying [the plaintiff] that it had taken the motion under submission"). 11 SC-2026-0410 Conclusion For these reasons, we reverse the Montgomery Circuit Court's summary judgment and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Stewart, C.J., and Cook and Parker, JJ., concur. Sellers, J., concurs in the result. 12