Matthew Sherman Phillips v. Governor Kay Ivey

Rel: October 16, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ SC-2026-0100 _________________________ Matthew Sherman Phillips v. Governor Kay Ivey et al. Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court (CV-25-397) MENDHEIM, Justice. Matthew Sherman Phillips, an inmate of the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC"), appeals pro se from the Montgomery Circuit SC-2026-0100 Court's orders dismissing his claims against multiple state officials and entities. We dismiss the appeal. I. Facts In 2008, Phillips pleaded guilty to two counts of reckless murder and one count of assault stemming from a car accident that he caused while under the influence of methamphetamine that resulted in the deaths of Jason Campbell and Deborah Campbell and injuries to Gary Campbell. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 25 years in prison for the reckless-murder counts and a term of 10 years for the assault count. On November 17, 2020, Phillips wrote a letter to ADOC and the Commissioner of ADOC with "several questions and thoughts" concerning § 15-22-28, Ala. Code 1975, which concerns the duty of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board") to investigate "the feasibility of releasing the prisoners on parole and effecting their reclamation." Specifically, Phillips requested temporary leave from prison for a Christmas furlough under § 15-22-28(c). 1 Phillips alleged 1Section 15-22-28(c), Ala. Code 1975, provides: 2 SC-2026-0100 that his request was ignored. On May 30, 2021, Phillips wrote a second letter to ADOC and the ADOC Commissioner in which he again requested a Christmas furlough. Phillips alleged that this second inquiry also was ignored. Phillips wrote a third letter to the ADOC Commissioner on October 13, 2024, once again requesting a Christmas furlough. Phillips alleged that his request was ignored again. On January 18, 2017, the parole Board conducted its initial consideration hearing with respect to Phillips. The Board denied parole to Phillips. On July 12, 2022, the Board held a second parole- consideration hearing concerning Phillips. Once again, the Board denied parole to Phillips. The Board set Phillips's next hearing for April 2026. "(c) Temporary leave from prison, including Christmas furloughs, may be granted only by the Commissioner of Corrections to a prisoner for good and sufficient reason and may be granted within or without the state; provided, that Christmas furloughs shall not be granted to any prisoner convicted of drug peddling, child molesting, or rape, or to any maximum security prisoner. A permanent, written record of all temporary leaves, together with the reasons therefor, shall be kept by the commissioner. He or she shall furnish the Board of Pardons and Paroles with a record of each leave granted and the reasons therefor, and the same shall be placed by the board in the prisoner's file." 3 SC-2026-0100 On June 15, 2024, Phillips filed an "Application for Early Parole Consideration Hearing" pursuant to § 15-22-28(f). 2 On July 10, 2024, the Board denied Phillips's application based on a finding that he had "violent disciplinaries during present incarceration." On July 25, 2024, 2Section 15-22-28(f), Ala. Code 1975, provides: "(f)(1) The board may deviate from the initial parole consideration date established in subsection (e) or any reconsideration date prescribed by the board's rules only in either of the following circumstances: "a. To comply with the policy and procedural guidelines in effect on or before January 1, 2019, issued by the board under Section 15-22-24(e)[ Ala. Code 1975]. "b. If the prisoner shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she is more likely than not to be granted parole and that he or she would have been considered for parole on an earlier date under generally applicable rules or policies previously in effect. "(2) Any decision by the board to invoke the procedures of this subsection shall be subject to legal review by the deputy Attorney General or assistant Attorney General assigned to the board, prior to the issuance of a parole certificate and the prisoner's release. If it is determined that the grant of parole consideration failed to satisfy the requirements of this subsection or any rule adopted pursuant to this subsection, the decision shall be reversed and the prisoner shall be notified by the board." 4 SC-2026-0100 Phillips wrote a letter to Board Director Cam Ward and Board Operations informing them of his belief that the Board and Board Operations Division ("Board Operations") had applied the law "discriminately to Phillips," had misinterpreted § 15-22-28(f), and that this had resulted in an "ex post facto" application of the law. Phillips alleged that the letter was ignored. Also on July 25, 2024, Phillips filed two bar complaints against Attorney General Steve Marshall and Assistant Attorney General Claudia Kennedy Smith 3 on the ground that they were allowing the Board and Board Operations to violate the law. On August 23, 2024, the Alabama State Bar ("ASB") informed Phillips that no action would be taken with respect to his bar complaints because they did not show any violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct. On September 2, 2024, Phillips sent the ASB's Office of the General Counsel a follow-up letter in which he asserted that Marshall and Smith had committed fraud, deceit, and violations of criminal law by allowing the Board to flaunt the parole statute. On September 19, 2024, the ASB informed Phillips that it did not believe Phillips's letter had raised "any new 3Smith served as the Board's general counsel. 5 SC-2026-0100 information that warrants a formal investigation into possible ethical violations" by either Marshall or Smith. On September 2, 2024, Phillips filed an open-records request with the Board asking for access to his parole file. On September 18, 2024, the Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles ("the Bureau") responded to Phillips's request, explaining: "[T]he Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles' Board Action Sheets constitute public records subject to disclosure. The Board Action Sheets document the Board's reasons for granting or denying parole. ... Based on the above, the records that you requested have been attached to this letter. "However, the Bureau has determined that an absolute statutory privilege covers parole files, making them exempt from disclosure. ... Consequently, the Bureau is statutorily required to deny requests for inmate parole files." (Footnote omitted.) That response was submitted on the Bureau's behalf by Assistant Attorney General Eric Anderson. In March 2025, Phillips filed another application for early parole with the Board. (See Rec. vol. II, C. 208.) On March 24, 2025, the Board denied Phillips's application for early parole. Phillips alleged that on May 14, 2025, he sent a notification to ADOC asserting that it had: (1) denied his request for participation in 6 SC-2026-0100 the Supervised Reentry Program ("SRP"); 4 (2) denied his request for a nondriver identification card; and (3) violated the federal Americans with Disabilities Act and the federal Rehabilitation Act by denying him needed mental-health treatment. Based on those allegations, Phillips contended that he was entitled to a release order through a three-judge panel pursuant to § 14-15-10, Ala. Code 1975. 5 On September 30, 2025, Phillips filed a pro se complaint in the Montgomery Circuit Court that he styled as a "Complaint [for] Declaratory and Injunctive Relief." Phillips asserted claims against the State of Alabama, ADOC, Governor Kay Ivey, Attorney General Marshall, ADOC Commissioner John Hamm, ADOC Chief Deputy Commissioner Greg Lovelace, ADOC Deputy Commissioners Chuck Williams, Dion Robinson, and Stan Goolsby, ADOC Facilities Management Director Jenny Abbott, and ADOC Classification Director Angie Baggett (collectively referred to as "the State officials"). 4The SRP program exists pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 14-8-60 et seq., and allows inmates, within certain parameters described by ADOC regulations, to live in communities, seek employment, or study vocational or educational curricula. 5Section 14-15-10 is part of Alabama Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, § 14-15-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. 7 SC-2026-0100 Additionally, Phillips asserted claims against the Board, the Bureau, Board Operations, Board Director Ward, Board General Counsel Smith, Board Assistant Attorney General Anderson, and Director of Board Operations Scott Perkins (collectively referred to as "the Board officials"). In his complaint, Phillips alleged that the Board officials and the State officials had wrongly deprived him of: (1) early parole; (2) access to his parole file; (3) Christmas furloughs; (4) entry in the SRP program; (5) a nondriver identification card; and (6) mental-health treatment for his conditions of bipolar disorder and manic depression. On November 7, 2025, the State officials filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against them. On November 24, 2025, the State officials filed an amended motion to dismiss to include ADOC in its motion. The State officials contended that Phillips lacked standing and that he failed to state a claim against them. On November 26, 2025, the Board officials filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against them. The Board officials argued that Phillips lacked standing to assert some of the claims against them and that the Board had properly denied Phillips's applications for early parole consideration. 8 SC-2026-0100 On November 24, 2025, Phillips filed a response in opposition to the State officials' motion to dismiss. In that filing, Phillips presented his own interpretation of § 15-22-28(c) with respect to parole and referenced the correspondence that he had sent to Commissioner Hamm as evidence indicating that he had been entitled to a Christmas furlough. On December 15, 2025, Phillips filed what he styled as an "Objection" to the Board officials' motion to dismiss in which he sought to counter each of the arguments presented by the Board officials for dismissing the claims against them. In particular, Phillips argued that the statutory privilege prohibiting the disclosure of parole files had been repealed by the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Commission ("ACJIC") article ("the ACJIC article"). See Ala. Code 1975, § 41-9-590 et seq. On January 7, 2026, the circuit court entered an order granting the Board officials' motion to dismiss, with prejudice, concluding that Phillips "has failed to show that the Board [officials] acted outside their jurisdiction, contrary to state law, or in any other improper way. ... [T]his Court further finds that [Phillips] has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted." On January 9, 2026, the circuit court entered an order granting the State officials' motion to dismiss, with prejudice. That 9 SC-2026-0100 order did not state the court's reasons for granting the State officials' motion. Phillips filed his appeal on February 12, 20226. II. Analysis There are two fundamental issues with Phillips's appeal that necessitate its dismissal: immunity and a lack of appellate jurisdiction. First, Phillips has purported to assert claims against "the State of Alabama," ADOC, and the Board. Article I, § 14, Ala. Const. 2022, expressly states "[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." "This constitutional provision 'has been described as a "nearly impregnable" and "almost invincible" "wall" that provides the State an unwaivable, absolute immunity from suit in any court.' Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Ala. 2006). Section 14 'specifically prohibits the State from being made a party defendant in any suit at law or in equity.' Hutchinson v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 288 Ala. 20, 23, 256 So. 2d 281, 283 (1971). Additionally, under § 14, State agencies are 'absolutely immune from suit.' Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d 257, 261 (Ala. 2003). ".... "... Generally, 'any exceptions to that immunity extend only to suits naming the proper State official in his or her representative capacity.' Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978 So. 2d 17, 22 (Ala. 2007) (emphasis added). ... 10 SC-2026-0100 ".... "The purpose of the so-called 'exception' to § 14 allowing declaratory-judgment actions is to give direction to State officers. Consistent with the other 'exceptions' to § 14 immunity, we hold that only State officers named in their official capacity -- and not State agencies -- may be defendants in such proceedings." Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831, 839-41 (Ala. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119 (Ala. 2013). Thus, § 14 requires the dismissal of Phillips's claims against the State of Alabama, ADOC, and the Board. Moreover, Phillips has asserted claims against the Bureau and Board Operations as defendants, but both of those entities exist under the auspices of the Board. Therefore, the Bureau and Board Operations likewise cannot be sued. Second, the gist of Phillips's claims concerning being denied early parole and being denied access to his parole file revolve around disagreements with Board rulings. "Actions of an administrative board or commission are generally subject to judicial review if that agency comes within the scope of the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act ('AAPA'), §§ 41-22-1 through -27, Ala. Code 1975. See Sellers v. State, 586 So. 2d 994 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). The Board [of Pardons and Paroles], however, is exempt from the AAPA, and no other right of review from the actions of the 11 SC-2026-0100 Board has been provided by statute. Sellers, 586 So. 2d at 995 (citing § 41-22-3(3), Ala. Code 1975). In the absence of a statutory right to appeal, or any other adequate remedy, a common-law writ of certiorari lies to review the rulings of an administrative board or commission. Ellard v. State, 474 So. 2d 743, 748 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), aff'd, 474 So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1985)." Ex parte Board of Pardons & Paroles, 793 So. 2d 774, 776 (Ala. 2000). See also Ex parte Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 849 So. 2d 255, 257 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) ("Review of proceedings from the Board [of Pardons and Paroles] is by a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari filed in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County."). Thus, the correct avenue for Phillips to challenge the denials of his applications for early parole and the denial of access to his parole file was a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari. 6 Instead, Phillips purported to commence a declaratory-judgment action against the Board officials. 6A common-law writ of certiorari is not a direct action against the State, which is why it is a permissible filing against the Board. See, e.g., G.W. v. Dale Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 939 So. 2d 931, 934-35 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) ("The common-law writ of certiorari is a remedial writ invoking the ' "supervisory power of a superior over an inferior legal tribunal." ' City of Birmingham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 203 Ala. 251, 252, 82 So. 519, 520 (1919). The writ can, under appropriate circumstances, be used to review decisions of an administrative agency or board that are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature."). 12 SC-2026-0100 Even if we construe Phillips's complaint filed in the circuit court as a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, "[t]he Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of a writ of a certiorari attacking the Board's denial or revocation of parole." Ex parte Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 849 So. 2d at 257. But Phillips appealed to this Court, not to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Consequently, Phillips's claims against the Board and the Board officials must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The same disposition applies to Phillips's claims against ADOC and the State officials for denying Phillips's requests for Christmas furloughs, However, the standard of review in circuit court for such writs is limited: "Review of the Board's actions by writ of certiorari is more narrow than review by appeal. The appellate courts of this state have often characterized certiorari review as 'limited in scope, and ordinarily the courts will only pass on the question of whether the administrative agency has acted within its constitutional or statutory powers, whether its order or determination is supported by substantial evidence, and whether its action is reasonable and not arbitrary.' Ellard v. State, 474 So. 2d 743, 750 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), aff'd, 474 So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1985)." Ex parte Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 849 So. 2d 255, 259 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002). 13 SC-2026-0100 not allowing him to participate in the SRP program, failing to issue him a nondriver identification card, and not providing mental-health treatment. "We have held that the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction to hear an inmate's appeal of the trial court's denial of his petition for the writ of certiorari challenging a decision of [ADOC]." Robinson v. State, 12 So. 3d 58, 60 (Ala. 2008). See also Pearson v. Alabama Dep't of Corr., 89 So. 3d 830, 831 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) ("This Court has jurisdiction to hear an inmate's appeal of the trial court's denial of petition for a writ of certiorari challenging a decision of [ADOC]."). Thus, again, even if we construe Phillips's action as a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, Phillips's claims against ADOC and the State officials also must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. It is true that, in an effort to avoid the foregoing jurisdictional defects, Phillips has attempted to couch his challenges to the parole denials and Christmas furloughs as misinterpretations of § 15-22-28(c) and (f), his challenge to the denial of access to his parole file as a failure to recognize that § 15-22-36(b) has been repealed by § 41-9-603 of the ACJIC article, and the refusal to allow him to participate in the SRP 14 SC-2026-0100 program as contrary to Ala. Code 1975, § 14-8-60 et seq. But any purported applications of those statutes occurred within the context of rulings, or lack thereof, personally against Phillips. " '[W]e treat a pleading and any other filing according to its substance, rather than its form or style.' " Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v. Wright, 897 So. 2d 1059, 1075 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Ex parte Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 879 So. 2d 577, 584 (Ala. 2003)). Therefore, any disagreement Phillips has with the application of law by the Board, the Board officials, ADOC, or the State officials must be challenged by petitions for a common-law writ of certiorari, and appeals of such petitions belong in the Court of Criminal Appeals. Cf. Mitchell v. Hammond, 252 Ala. 81, 83, 39 So. 2d 582, 583 (1949) ("[A] proceeding in declaratory judgment [may not] be substituted for the remedy of appeal, certiorari or mandamus as the method of direct review of the judgments, decrees or orders of a judicial nature, respectively, of lower courts, bureaus, departments, or the directors or administrators thereof."). In sum, Phillips's claims asserted directly against the State of Alabama, ADOC, and the Board are barred by State immunity. The proper avenue for Phillips to challenge the asserted actions, or lack 15 SC-2026-0100 thereof, by the Board and the Board officials and by ADOC and the State officials was by a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Montgomery Circuit Court. An appeal from the denial of such a writ belongs in the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. APPEAL DISMISSED. Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and McCool, JJ., concur. 16