Full Opinion

Rel: October 16, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ CL-2026-0075 _________________________ Dale Golson Warriner v. Timothy James Warriner Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court (DR-23-900342) BOWDEN, Judge. Dale Golson Warriner ("the wife") appeals from a judgment entered by the Baldwin Circuit Court ("the circuit court") divorcing her from Timothy James Warriner ("the husband") and dividing the parties' marital assets. We dismiss the appeal because it is taken from a nonfinal judgment. CL-2026-0075 Background and Procedural History The parties were married on September 1, 2002, and separated on July 5, 2021. During the parties' marriage, they lived on a 112-acre farm in Foley ("the farm"). The husband worked consistently outside the farm in the construction industry, and the parties also earned income from the farm itself by selling livestock and selling dirt from a dirt pit, among other things. On March 23, 2023, the wife filed a complaint for a divorce from the husband in the circuit court. The following day, the circuit court entered a status quo order. During the pendency of this matter, both parties filed motions to hold the other party in contempt, alleging that the other party had violated the status quo order or other orders of the circuit court. On June 27, 2024, the circuit court entered an order following a hearing, ordering the husband to comply with certain provisions of the status quo order. The order also stated that "the subject of contempt and sanctions of either party, which have occurred to this point, will be heard and taken into consideration by this Court when fashioning a division of the marital properties, alimony, and attorney fees." On December 18, 2024, the 2 CL-2026-0075 circuit court ordered the husband to pay $6,890 per month in "family support" to the wife. After a trial on September 16, 2025, and September 30, 2025, the circuit court entered a nonfinal judgment that stated, in pertinent part: "3. The Court orders the [the farm] (112 acres) … to be listed for sale. The parties shall have 30 days to choose a reputable realtor to list the property. The Court retains jurisdiction to enter orders regarding the terms of sale, including the appointment of a commissioner. "4. The [farm] sale net proceeds shall be distributed as follows: "(a) The PNC mortgage shall be paid in full; "(b) The Farm Service Agency loan balance shall be paid in full; "(c) The [wife's] credit card balances with American Express; Chase; Home Depot; USAA and Tractor Supply shall be paid in full; "(d) The remaining net proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties, fifty (50%) to [the wife] and fifty (50%) to [the husband]. "5. If there are not enough funds from the sale of the real property to satisfy the above debts, the cows of the parties shall be sold and proceeds used to pay the remaining debts. Any remaining proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties, fifty (50%) to [the wife] and fifty (50%) to [the husband]. 3 CL-2026-0075 "6. The stock trailer, tractor, bush hog and other implements/equipment shall be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties, fifty (50%) to [the wife] and fifty (50%) to [the husband]. "7. Neither party is awarded any alimony. "8. Each party shall keep the automobiles in their possession and be responsible for any debt associated with the respective vehicle. "9. [The husband is] to pay [the wife] the sum of $2,500.00 for attorney[']s fees. "10. Each party shall be responsible for all debts in their individual name. Each party shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless of the same. "11. The costs have been prepaid, so there is no further order as to the same. "12. Any relief requested not set out herein is hereby denied." The wife filed a postjudgment motion on November 6, 2025. On December 11, 2025, the circuit court entered an amended nonfinal judgment that altered the division of the sale proceeds of the farm from an equal split to 60% of the proceeds going to the wife and 40% of the proceeds going to the husband. The provision requiring the sale of the parties' cattle, if the proceeds from the sale of the farm were insufficient to satisfy the specified debts, remained unchanged. The 4 CL-2026-0075 amended nonfinal judgment also altered the division of the sale proceeds of the farm equipment from an even split to 60% of the proceeds going to the wife and 40% of the proceeds going to the husband. Finally, the circuit court also amended the award of attorney's fees to the wife, ordering the husband to instead pay the wife $3,500 toward her attorney's fees. The wife timely appealed. Analysis "Although neither party has raised the issue of this court's jurisdiction over this appeal, 'jurisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu.' " Hubbard v. Hubbard, 935 So. 2d 1191, 1192 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (emphasis and citation omitted). Additionally, "[t]he question whether a judgment is final is a jurisdictional question, and the reviewing court, on a determination that the judgment is not final, has a duty to dismiss the case." Id. "Our Supreme Court has defined a final judgment as " 'a terminative decision by a court of competent jurisdiction which demonstrates there has been complete adjudication of all matters in controversy between the litigants within the cognizance of that court. That is, it must be conclusive and certain in itself .... All matters should be decided; damages 5 CL-2026-0075 should be assessed with specificity leaving the parties with nothing to determine on their own.' "Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co., 331 So. 2d 623, 625 (Ala. 1976)." Id. In Hubbard, this court dismissed the appeal on the basis that the judgment was nonfinal when the trial court divided the parties' marital property but purported to retain jurisdiction to modify the division of property upon the occurrence of a contingency. Id. at 1193. In doing so, we noted that "[t]his court has, however, frequently dismissed appeals from judgments that failed to dispose of all of the marital property or otherwise failed to adjudicate all issues between the parties." Id. See Blythe v. Blythe, 976 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) ("Although the … judgment states that the marital property should be divided equally, it does not actually divide the marital property. Moreover, it does not adjudicate the wife's claim for alimony. Consequently, the … judgment is not a final judgment." (footnote omitted)); Grubbs v. Grubbs, 729 So. 2d 346, 347 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (concluding that a divorce judgment was nonfinal because, instead of dividing the parties' personal property, it ordered the wife in that case to make two lists of their 6 CL-2026-0075 personal property and provided that the husband in that case would have his choice of personal property on the lists). We have also previously stated that "[a] final judgment of divorce does not necessarily have to dispose of all the parties' jointly owned property. See Fitts v. Stokes, 841 So. 2d 229 (Ala. 2002); Garrett v. Garrett, 521 So. 2d 1337 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988); and Hammock v. Hammock, 867 So. 2d 355 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). Rather, when a final judgment of divorce does not reference a specific asset, liability, or piece of personal or real property, jointly owned by the parties, the property remains unaffected by the judgment, and the ownership, along with the benefits and burdens thereof, remains as it was before the entry of the divorce judgment. Radiola v. Radiola, 380 So. 2d 817 (Ala. 1980); Miller v. Miller, 391 So. 2d 119 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); and McGuire v. Horton, 586 So. 2d 9 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)." Clements v. Clements, 990 So. 2d 383, 395-96 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). Put simply, when a divorce judgment is silent as to a particular asset, the parties are left in the same position relative to that asset as they were in before the divorce. But when a trial court undertakes to divide an asset, it must complete that adjudication. In the amended nonfinal judgment, the circuit court ordered that the parties' main asset -- the farm -- be sold, with the proceeds being used first to pay off the parties' mortgage, a Farm Service Agency loan, and several credit-card bills. The remaining proceeds would be divided with 7 CL-2026-0075 60% going to the wife and 40% going to the husband. The circuit court then stated that if the sale proceeds from the farm were insufficient to satisfy the parties' debts, the cattle belonging to the parties would be sold and the proceeds would be used to pay the remaining debts. The amended nonfinal judgment does not, however, provide for the division of the parties' cattle if the sale proceeds from the farm are sufficient to satisfy the parties' debts. And it does not award either party any of the cattle, even though the parties made many references to livestock as an asset in filings during the pendency of this matter and in trial testimony. That the farm -- where many, if not all, of the parties' livestock remains -- has been ordered to be sold underscores the issue with failing to divide the livestock in the event the cattle are not needed to be sold to pay the parties' debts. Conclusion Because the amended nonfinal judgment references an asset but disposes of that asset only if a contingency occurs -- and does not dispose of that asset if the contingency does not occur -- it does not fully resolve the division of the parties' personal property and has not effectuated a " 'complete adjudication of all matters in controversy.' " Hubbard, 935 So. 8 CL-2026-0075 2d at 1192 (quoting Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co., 331 So. 2d 623, 625 (Ala. 1976)). It does not fully resolve what happens to the parties' livestock in all scenarios, and a divorce judgment is not final if it purports to divide an asset only upon the occurrence of a particular contingency. Because there was no final judgment in this matter, we dismiss the appeal. APPEAL DISMISSED. Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur. 9