Full Opinion

Rel: October 9, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ CR-2026-0250 _________________________ Ex parte Shaun Michael Davis PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: State of Alabama v. Shaun Michael Davis) (Henry Circuit Court: CC-26-1) PER CURIAM. Shaun Michael Davis petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus requesting that we direct Judge Jimmy Kevin Moulton to vacate his February 28, 2026, order denying Davis's petition for a writ of mandamus CR-2026-0250 that he filed with the Henry Circuit Court and to enter an order granting his mandamus petition. In that petition, Davis requested that Judge Moulton direct District Judge Spencer Danzey to grant Davis's request for a hearing pursuant to § 13A-3-23, Ala Code 1975, ("the stand-your- ground statute") to determine whether Davis has satisfied the requirements for immunity from criminal prosecution under the stand- your-ground statute. Davis was arrested on October 3, 2025, and charged with one count of murder made capital because of the use of a deadly weapon fired within or from a vehicle, a violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(18), Ala. Code 1975; one count of discharging a gun into an occupied building or vehicle, a violation of § 13A-11-61(b), Ala. Code 1975; and one count of second-degree assault, a violation of § 13A-6-21, Ala. Code 1975. A hearing regarding bail was held on October 15, 2025, during which it was determined that Davis would be given a "no bond" designation. On January 8, 2026, counsel for Davis filed a "Motion for Hearing and to Dismiss," requesting that the district court hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is entitled to immunity under the stand-your-ground statute. On January 29, 2026, Judge Danzey denied the motion. On February 3, 2026, Davis 2 CR-2026-0250 filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Henry Circuit Court, and on February 25, 2026, Judge Moulton denied that petition. Davis then filed a mandamus petition in this Court. Davis argues that the prosecution began the moment he was arrested pursuant to a warrant. Further, Davis argues that, under § 13A-3-23(d), he is entitled to a hearing in the district court to establish whether his use of force was justified and that, if the court determines his use of force was justified, he is entitled to the entry of a judgment determining that he is immune from prosecution. Section 13A-3-23(d)(1) states that "[a] person who uses force, including deadly physical force, as justified and permitted in [the stand- your-ground statute] is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force, unless the force was determined to be unlawful." However, that provision of the stand-your-ground statute must be read in pari materia with § 13A-3-23(d)(2), which states, in pertinent part, that, "[p]rior to the commencement of a trial in a case in which a defense is claimed under this section, the court having jurisdiction over the case, upon motion of the defendant, shall conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether force, including deadly force, used by the defendant was justified or 3 CR-2026-0250 whether it was unlawful under [the stand-your-ground statute]." Davis asserts that a district court should be able to hold a hearing regarding a defendant's assertion that he or she is entitled to immunity under the stand-your-ground statute because, he claims, for purposes of § 13A-3-23(d)(1), a prosecution begins with the issuing of an arrest warrant. He bases his argument on § 15-3-7, Ala. Code 1975, which states: "A prosecution may be commenced within the meaning of this chapter by finding an indictment, the issuing of a warrant or by binding over the offender." However, in doing so, he ignores the portion of that statute that limits its application to "this chapter," i.e., to the "limitations on prosecution" established by Title 15, Chapter 3, of the Alabama Code. Thus, by its terms, § 15-3-7's provision stating that prosecution is commenced by "the issuing of a warrant" is limited to determining whether a prosecution falls within the various limitations periods set forth in Chapter 3. See, e.g., Money v. State, 138 So. 2d 332, 338 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) ("Furthermore, § 15-3-7, Ala. Code 1975, provides that '[a] prosecution may be commenced within the meaning of [§ 15-3-2] by finding an indictment, the issuing of a warrant or by binding over the offender.' " (emphasis added)). 4 CR-2026-0250 For any other purposes, Rule 2.1., Ala. R. Crim. P., governs. Rule 2.1 states: "All criminal proceedings shall be commenced either by indictment or by complaint." As noted in Schoenvogel ex rel. Schoenvogel v. Venator Group Retail, Inc., 895 So. 2d 225 (Ala. 2004), the rules of court adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court, including the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, supplant and supersede any provisions of the Alabama Code that are contrary to those rules, subject to the Legislature's subsequently overriding one of those rules by enacting a general act of statewide application. If § 15-3-7 had applicability beyond its own chapter, i.e., if it governed the commencement of prosecutions generally, it would no longer be in force or effect. The Legislature has not amended that statute since the adoption of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure; therefore, Rule 2.1 supersedes § 15-3-7 for any purpose beyond calculating the limitations period set out in Title 15, Chapter 3. Moreover, in State v. Brown, 259 So. 3d 655, 658 (Ala. 2018), the Alabama Supreme Court held that, "in noncapital felony cases, a district court has authority only to hold preliminary hearings and to receive guilty pleas and impose sentences resulting from those guilty pleas." In 5 CR-2026-0250 capital cases, a district court's authority is even more restricted because, in such cases, a district court is prohibited from receiving guilty pleas. See §§ 12-11-30(2) and 12-12-32(b), Ala. Code 1975. Given that criminal proceedings commence by indictment or complaint and given the limited authority of a district court in felony proceedings, as recognized in State v. Brown, supra, a district court cannot conduct a hearing pursuant to § 13A-3-23(d) relating to felony charges. "In order to satisfy the prerequisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, the petitioner must establish: (1) a clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) no adequate remedy at law; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the reviewing court." Ex parte Wyre, 74 So. 3d 479, 480-81 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). Davis does not have a legal right to a pretrial hearing before the district court on his claim of immunity; therefore, he has failed to establish the requirements necessary for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Davis's petition for a writ of mandamus is therefore denied. PETITION DENIED. Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Cole, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur. 6