Abedi v. Carter

Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 21, 2026 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________ KAVEH ABEDI 1, Petitioner - Appellant, v. No. 25-3179 CRYSTAL CARTER, Warden, FCI- Leavenworth; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security 2; CHRISTOPHER CHAMBERLIN, Acting Assistant Field Office Director, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 3 Respondents - Appellees. ------------------------------ ROCKY MOUNTAIN IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY NETWORK, Amicus Curiae. Petitioner-Appellant Kaveh Abedi’s first name is misspelled as “Kavah” on 1 the docket. We direct the Clerk to update the docket to reflect the correct spelling of Mr. Abedi’s first name. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), the current 2 Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Markwayne Mullin, is automatically substituted for former Secretary Kristi Noem. 3 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was named as a respondent in the district court proceedings and has participated as an appellee, but it is not listed on the docket for this appeal. We direct the Clerk to update the docket to include the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as a Respondent–Appellee.  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 2 _________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas (D.C. No. 5:25-CV-03141-JWL) _________________________________ Rekha Sharma-Crawford, Sharma-Crawford, Attorneys at Law, LLC, Kansas City, Missouri, for Petitioner-Appellant. Russell J. Keller, Assistant United States Attorney (Ryan A. Kriegshauser, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), District of Kansas, Kansas City, Kansas, for Respondents-Appellees. Virginia M. Creighton, Blaire Bayliss and Iva Velickovic, Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP, Denver Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for the Rocky Mountain Immigrant Advocacy Network in support of the Petitioner-Appellant. _________________________________ Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ McHUGH, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ Petitioner-Appellant Kaveh Abedi, a native and citizen of Iran, filed a habeas petition to challenge the legality of his immigration detention. The district court denied his habeas petition, and he filed this appeal. While the appeal was pending, Mr. Abedi filed a second habeas petition in which he sought release based on the length of his detention and the unlikelihood that he will be removed from the United States in the reasonably foreseeable future. The district court granted the second habeas petition, and Mr. Abedi was therefore released from detention. Respondents-Appellees Crystal Carter, Markwayne Mullin, Christopher Chamberlain, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (collectively, “the 2  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 3 Government”) argue that Mr. Abedi’s release from detention mooted this appeal. However, we conclude that this case falls within the mootness exception for wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review. And on the merits, we conclude that the district court committed various legal errors in assessing Mr. Abedi’s claims for relief. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND Mr. Abedi was born in Iran. In 1991, when he was ten years old, his family fled Iran and entered the United States, where they were granted asylum. Shortly after Mr. Abedi turned twenty-one, however, he was convicted in a California state court on a single drug possession count. He was accordingly placed in removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any [noncitizen] who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance . . . , other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”). On September 30, 2002, an immigration judge granted Mr. Abedi’s request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Mr. Abedi was thereafter released under an order of supervision. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 (setting forth the procedures governing the release of noncitizens subject to a final order of removal who are unlikely to be removed from the United States in the reasonably foreseeable future). Over the next twenty-plus years, Mr. Abedi complied with all 3  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 4 requirements imposed by immigration officials as part of the conditions of his release, including attending check-in meetings as required and seeking advance permission before traveling outside of the state where he resided. In 2016, Mr. Abedi married a U.S. citizen who had been his high school classmate. Since 2020, Mr. Abedi has been the primary provider and caretaker for his wife, whose chronic health conditions prevent her from continuing to work in her prior profession as a chef. Around May 2025, Mr. Abedi and his wife decided to relocate from California to Kansas for financial reasons. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) office in San Diego approved their move, and they relocated to Kansas at the beginning of June 2025. On the morning of June 23, 2025, Mr. Abedi and his wife encountered ICE officers in their front yard. The officers handcuffed and detained Mr. Abedi. One officer told Mr. Abedi’s wife that Mr. Abedi was being deported to Iran. Mr. Abedi’s wife responded that he had his papers and that he would be killed if he was sent to Iran. But the officers loaded Mr. Abedi in an unmarked van and drove away. The officers initially took Mr. Abedi to a county jail. They informed Mr. Abedi that they intended to deport him to Iran despite the immigration judge’s order deferring removal under the CAT, but they did not give him any other explanation or information about his detention. And they did not accuse him of violating any of the terms of his order of supervision. 4  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 5 While Mr. Abedi was in detention, immigration officials allegedly provided him with a Notice of Revocation of Release. The Notice of Revocation stated that Mr. Abedi’s order of supervision had been revoked because “[r]emoval to a country other than Iran is now a possibility.” App. Vol. I at 93. The Notice of Revocation promised that Mr. Abedi would “promptly be afforded an informal interview at which [he] w[ould] be given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for the revocation.” Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) (setting forth various procedures, including the requirement for a prompt informal interview, that govern the revocation of release for a noncitizen who was released pursuant to § 241.13 based on the unlikelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future). Mr. Abedi asserts, and the Government does not dispute, that—as of the time of briefing in this appeal—he had never received the promised informal interview. 4 On July 21, 2025, four weeks after he was re-detained, Mr. Abedi filed the instant habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the legality of his detention on several grounds. Among other arguments, Mr. Abedi contended that ICE had violated its own regulations, as well as his due process rights, by revoking his 4 As discussed in more detail below, Mr. Abedi filed a second habeas petition on January 16, 2026. We take judicial notice of relevant documents filed in the second habeas proceeding, see Bunn v. Perdue, 966 F.3d 1094, 1096 n.4 (10th Cir. 2020), and we note that certain documents filed in that case suggest that the Government may have finally provided Mr. Abedi with an informal interview sometime in January 2026, more than six months after he was re-detained. However, whether an interview occurred more than six months after the revocation of Mr. Abedi’s release or never occurred at all, we would reach the same conclusion in this appeal, and we therefore need not resolve any possible disputes on this point. 5  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 6 release without notice or an opportunity to be heard. He also argued that his detention was impermissible under the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), because it lacked a reasonable relationship to any legitimate purpose. Mr. Abedi requested habeas relief and a declaratory judgment on the legality of his detention. He also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Government from transferring him outside the jurisdiction of the District of Kansas pending the resolution of this case, as well as an award of costs and attorneys’ fees. The district court denied the request for a preliminary injunction in August 2025, then denied the habeas petition in October 2025. In its order denying habeas relief, the court invited Mr. Abedi to file a new habeas petition seeking relief under Zadvydas if his detention extended for more than six months. The district court entered final judgment on October 6, 2025, and Mr. Abedi filed his notice of appeal on that same day. On January 16, 2026, shortly before the appellate briefing in this case was complete, Mr. Abedi filed a second habeas petition in the district court, asserting that he had now been detained for more than six months with no real likelihood of imminent removal and that he was therefore entitled to relief under Zadvydas. See Abedi v. Carter (Abedi II), No. 26-3012-JWL, 2026 WL 482329, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 20, 2026). The district court granted the second habeas petition in February 2026. See id. Mr. Abedi was accordingly released under an order of supervision on February 25, 2026. The Government then filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as moot based on Mr. Abedi’s release from detention. 6  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 7 II. DISCUSSION We first address the Government’s motion to dismiss for mootness, concluding that this appeal is not moot. Turning then to the merits of the appeal, we consider Mr. Abedi’s challenge to the district court’s denial of his request for a preliminary injunction, which we affirm in part and reverse in part. We next consider Mr. Abedi’s argument that immigration officials violated the regulations applicable to his re- detention, and we conclude that he is entitled to declaratory and habeas relief on this basis. Finally, we address Mr. Abedi’s argument that he was separately entitled to declaratory and habeas relief pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas. We conclude that the district court evaluated this claim under the wrong standard, incorrectly holding that the first six months of Mr. Abedi’s re-detention were presumptively reasonable, and we remand for the district court to reconsider the issue without the benefit of any presumption. A. Mootness 1. Legal Background “Courts recognize two kinds of mootness: constitutional mootness and prudential mootness.” Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1121 (10th Cir. 2011). A case becomes constitutionally moot “when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome,” causing there to no longer be the constitutionally required “case or controversy.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)). This occurs, 7  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 8 however, only “when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever” to a litigant if that litigant prevails in the action. Id. (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps., 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)). “As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” Id. (quoting Knox, 567 U.S. at 307). The prudential mootness doctrine applies when, although the case is not constitutionally moot, “the benefit of injunctive (or declaratory) relief is too slight or speculative to justify granting such relief.” Eaves v. Polis, 167 F.4th 1304, 1311 (10th Cir. 2026). In such circumstances, the court “may rely on its remedial discretion” to deny prospective relief. Id. “Under both Article III and prudential mootness doctrines, the central inquiry is essentially the same: have circumstances changed since the beginning of litigation that forestall any occasion for meaningful relief.” Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 601 F.3d at 1122 (quotation marks omitted). The burden of proof does not apply in the same way under these two doctrines, however. See Eaves, 167 F.4th at 1312. When a defendant seeks dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief under the constitutional mootness doctrine, “[the] defendant bears the burden of establishing that a grant of at least some meaningful relief to [the] plaintiff is not possible, because the prospect that the wrong(s) about which [the] plaintiff complained will recur is highly unlikely.” Id. (citation omitted). “But to avoid dismissal [of these claims] on the basis of prudential mootness, [the] plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a recurrent violation of the wrongs about which he complained is more 8  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 9 than an abstract possibility, such that the court may grant him some meaningful relief.” Id. (citation omitted). When the district court addresses mootness in the first instance, we review its evaluation of constitutional mootness de novo but review its prudential mootness determination for an abuse of discretion. See Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1023 n.14 (10th Cir. 2011). But when, as in this case, the question of mootness arises after the district court proceedings have terminated, “we necessarily undertake the mootness inquiry in the first instance” and therefore “operate on a clean slate as to both our constitutional and prudential mootness analyses.” Id. Although “mootness has often been characterized as standing set in a time frame . . . [,] that characterization is not totally accurate.” Ajaj v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 25 F.4th 805, 811 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, mootness differs from standing in that “(1) there is at least one exception to mootness (when the terminated action is capable of repetition yet evading review) that has no counterpart in standing doctrine,” “(2) the defendant has the burden of proving mootness while the plaintiff must establish standing,” and (3) “the likelihood of future action by the defendant may be too speculative for standing but not to overcome mootness.” Id.; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000) (“[T]here are circumstances in which the prospect that a defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative to overcome mootness.”); WildEarth Guardians v. Pub. Serv. Co., 690 F.3d 1174, 9  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 10 1183 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[S]ometimes mootness relies on contested facts, particularly where the likelihood of future harm is at issue. In such cases, the defendant may be unable to show mootness, even if the facts . . . would not have been sufficient for the plaintiff to demonstrate standing at the start of the case.” (citation omitted)). We have recognized four types of circumstances that we have referred to as “exceptions to the mootness doctrine,” Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 2022), although they might more accurately be viewed as situations in which the court retains the ability to grant meaningful relief despite the apparent resolution of the primary injury alleged by the plaintiff. See Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172 (“[A] case ‘becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’” (quoting Knox, 567 U.S. at 307)); Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1166 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Courts recognize [certain] ‘exceptions’ to the mootness doctrine—situations in which a case remains subject to federal court jurisdiction notwithstanding the seeming extinguishment of any live case or controversy.”). Under these so-called mootness exceptions, we may resolve a seemingly moot case on the merits if (1) “secondary or ‘collateral’ injuries survive after resolution of the primary injury”; (2) the matter before the court “is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review”; (3) “the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time”; or (4) “it is a properly certified class action suit.” Riley, 310 F.3d at 1257 (quoting Chong v. Dist. Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2001)). The plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion with respect to the first, second, and fourth mootness exceptions. See Ind 10  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 11 v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 801 F.3d 1209, 1215 (10th Cir. 2015); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14, 18 (1998); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 78 (2013). On the other hand, a defendant who has voluntarily ceased an allegedly wrongful practice “bears the heavy burden of persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again.” Ind, 801 F.3d 1209 at 1214 (quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1215. We may consider these mootness exceptions as “an important component of the overall analysis with respect to both constitutional and prudential mootness.” Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 601 F.3d at 1122. a. Wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review We conclude that this appeal is not moot based on the mootness exception for wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review. We therefore address only this mootness exception and do not reach the parties’ arguments regarding the other mootness exceptions. The mootness exception for wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review applies when “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” Brown, 822 F.3d at 1166 (quotation marks omitted). Our analysis of this exception is guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011). The petitioner in that case, Michael Turner, was held in contempt several times based on his repeated failure to pay his court- 11  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 12 ordered child support. Id. at 436. “The first four times he was sentenced to [ninety] days’ imprisonment, but he ultimately paid the amount due (twice without being jailed, twice after spending two or three days in custody).” Id. “The fifth time he did not pay but completed a 6–month sentence.” Id. When Mr. Turner still failed to pay his child support after his latest release from jail, the family court judge found him in willful contempt and sentenced him to twelve months of incarceration. Id. at 437. Mr. Turner appealed this decision, contending that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel at his contempt hearing. Id. at 438. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that Mr. Turner was not entitled to counsel in a civil contempt hearing. Id. Mr. Turner then sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. By this point, he had already been released from custody. Id. Despite Mr. Turner’s release from custody, the Supreme Court held that his case was “not moot because it falls within a special category of disputes that are ‘capable of repetition’ while ‘evading review.’” Id. at 439 (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). The Court explained that “[a] dispute falls into that category, and a case based on that dispute remains live, if ‘(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.’” Id. at 439–40 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). The Court then concluded that both of these prongs were met in Mr. Turner’s case. See id. at 440. On the first prong, the Court held that its “precedent makes clear 12  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 13 that the ‘challenged action,’ [Mr.] Turner’s imprisonment for up to [twelve] months, is ‘in its duration too short to be fully litigated’ through the state courts (and arrive here) prior to its ‘expiration.’” Id. (quoting Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 149). On the second prong, the Court reasoned that there was “a more than ‘reasonable’ likelihood that [Mr.] Turner w[ould] again be ‘subjected to the same action.’” Id. (quoting Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 149). He had “frequently failed to make his child support payments” and had “been the subject of several civil contempt proceedings,” for which he was imprisoned several times. Id. And the Court concluded that “[t]hese facts bring this case squarely within the special category of cases that are not moot because the underlying dispute is ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’” Id. (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546–47 (1976)). 2. Analysis Applying this test to Mr. Abedi’s circumstances, we conclude that he has shown both that the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated and that there is a reasonable expectation he will be subjected to the same action again. We therefore conclude this appeal falls within the mootness exception for wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review, thus defeating the Government’s constitutional and prudential mootness arguments. See id.; see also Eaves, 167 F.4th at 1312. a. Evading review Mr. Abedi was detained from June 23, 2025, to February 25, 2026. His immigration detention thus lasted for eight months, four months less than the twelve- 13  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 14 month imprisonment that the Turner Court held was “clear[ly] . . . ‘in its duration too short to be fully litigated’ . . . prior to its ‘expiration.’” 564 U.S. at 440 (quoting Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 149) Nevertheless, the Government contends that Mr. Abedi has not satisfied this prong of the mootness exception for disputes capable of repetition yet evading review because the detention that Mr. Abedi challenges in this appeal “would have been long enough to fully litigate the matter if [he] had not filed a Second Habeas Petition and obtained a release order from the district court in Abedi II.” Mot. to Dismiss at 15. But the Government cites no authority for the proposition that the first prong of this mootness exception requires courts to consider how long an alleged injury could have continued if the injured party had not taken steps to stop the injury, and we see no basis for adopting such a requirement. Cf. FCC v. Consumers’ Rsch., 606 U.S. 656, 671 n.1 (2025) (holding that litigation decisions such as declining to request preliminary relief do not prevent a party from availing itself of this mootness exception). Accordingly, because Mr. Abedi was detained for a significantly shorter period of time than the twelve-month period of imprisonment that the Supreme Court held was too short to be fully litigated prior to its expiration in Turner, we hold that Mr. Abedi has satisfied this prong of the mootness exception for wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 440. 14  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 15 b. Capable of repetition We turn then to “[t]he second prong of the ‘capable of repetition’ exception[, which] requires a ‘reasonable expectation’ or a ‘demonstrated probability’ that ‘the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.’” FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 463 (2007) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam)). “[T]he same controversy [is] sufficiently likely to recur when a party has a reasonable expectation that it ‘will again be subjected to the alleged illegality,’ or ‘will be subject to the threat of prosecution’ under the challenged law.” Id. (first quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983), then quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774–75 (1978)). This standard does not require the plaintiff to “demonstrate[] that a recurrence of the dispute [i]s more probable than not.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 n.6 (1988). To the contrary, courts may find a matter to be “capable of repetition based on expectations that, while reasonable, [a]re hardly demonstrably probable.” Id. Thus, this standard may be satisfied by evidence that would have been too speculative to demonstrate standing at the onset of the litigation. See Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 190 (“[T]here are circumstances in which the prospect that a defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative to overcome mootness.”); WildEarth Guardians, 690 F.3d at 1183 (“[S]ometimes mootness relies on contested facts, particularly where the likelihood of future harm is at issue. In such cases, the 15  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 16 defendant may be unable to show mootness, even if the facts . . . would not have been sufficient for the plaintiff to demonstrate standing at the start of the case.” (citation omitted)). Applying this test here, we find guidance in other cases in which the plaintiffs’ injuries were allegedly inflicted by government officials. In this context, courts have held that a plaintiff cannot establish a reasonable expectation that the same controversy is likely to recur if (1) the claimed reinjury will not occur unless the plaintiff engages in future misconduct, and (2) the plaintiff has the ability not to engage in this misconduct. In Ind v. Colorado Department of Corrections, for instance, a state prisoner in administrative segregation filed suit to challenge a policy preventing inmates in administrative segregation from possessing more than two books. 801 F.3d at 1211. While the case was pending, however, he was transferred out of administrative segregation and into the general population. Id. We concluded that this transfer mooted the case, reasoning in part that the prisoner did not have a reasonable expectation that the injury would recur because the book policy would only apply to him if he repeated his misconduct and thus ended up in administrative segregation again, which we “decline[d] to assume” he would do. Id. at 1216. In reaching this conclusion, we cited to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2007), which involved very similar facts. See Ind, 801 F.3d at 1216. As we explained, the Fourth Circuit reasoned in Incumaa that the inmate in that case “had not carried his burden of establishing there was a reasonable expectation he would be subject to the publications ban again in the future because 16  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 17 ‘assignment to the [Maximum Security Unit] is directly tied to an inmate’s bad behavior, so [the inmate] thus “holds the keys” to his remaining free from the unit.’” Ind, 801 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Incumaa, 507 F.3d at 289). However, the same reasoning does not apply if the conditions that led to the prior alleged injury have remained intact and the plaintiff cannot readily prevent recurrence of the injury by choosing not to engage in misconduct. For instance, the Supreme Court has explained that the plaintiff’s imprisonment in Turner was capable of repetition due to his “inability, for reasons beyond [his] control, to prevent [himself] from transgressing and avoid recurrence of the challenged conduct.” United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381, 393 (2018). Specifically, the Court explained, Mr. Turner’s “large outstanding debt made him effectively incapable of satisfying his imminent support obligations,” creating a reasonable expectation that he would again be held in contempt for failing to make his child support payments. Id.; see also Turner, 564 U.S. at 437, 440–41. The claimed injury in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988), was likewise capable of repetition due to the plaintiff’s inability to avoid running afoul of government authorities by simply choosing not to engage in misconduct. See Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. at 393; see also Honig, 484 U.S. at 317–22. In Honig, a disabled student named Jack Smith brought a claim under the Education of the Handicapped Act (“EHA”) against local and state school officials after he was expelled from a public school “for violent and disruptive conduct related to [his] disabilities.” 484 U.S. at 312; see also id. at 314–15. At the time of the Supreme 17  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 18 Court’s decision, Mr. Smith was “not faced with any proposed expulsion or suspension proceedings,” and he no longer resided within the same school district. Id. at 318. Indeed, Mr. Smith was no longer attending a public school, whether in his former school district or his current one, and “his counsel was unable to state affirmatively during oral argument that [Mr. Smith] would seek to reenter the state school system.” Id. at 318 n.6. Nonetheless, the Court held that the case was not moot based on the mootness exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review. Id. at 317–20. “Given [Mr.] Smith’s continued eligibility for educational services under the EHA, the nature of his disability, and [the State Superintendent of Public Instruction’s] insistence that all local school districts retain residual authority to exclude disabled children for dangerous conduct,” the Court had “little difficulty concluding that there [wa]s a ‘reasonable expectation’ that [Mr.] Smith would once again be subjected to a unilateral ‘change in placement’ for conduct growing out of his disabilities.” Id. at 318–20 (footnote and citation omitted). The Court reasoned that Mr. Smith had a “prior history of behavioral problems” caused by his disability, and the record was void of “any suggestion that [he] ha[d] overcome his earlier difficulties.” Id. at 320. Thus, the Court could not “assume that [his] future placement w[ould] satisfactorily prevent any further dangerous conduct on his part.” Id. at 321. And because the State Superintendent of Public Instruction “urge[d the Court] to hold that local school districts retain unilateral authority under the EHA to suspend or otherwise remove disabled children for dangerous conduct,” the Court had “every reason to believe that . . . [Mr. Smith] 18  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 19 would be faced with a real and substantial threat of such action in any California school district in which he enrolled.” Id. at 321–22. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that Mr. Smith had established a reasonable expectation that his claimed injury would recur in the future, even if he had not shown that recurrence of his injury was “more probable than not.” Id. at 318 n.6; see also id. at 318–23. Applying the reasoning of these cases to the facts of this case, we conclude that Mr. Abedi has established a reasonable expectation that his injury will recur. As Mr. Abedi notes, his “removal order remains in effect,” and “ICE continues to pursue removal to a third country.” Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 18. Given the nature of a removal order, Mr. Abedi cannot avoid recurrence of his claimed injury through good conduct. Indeed, the Government does not dispute Mr. Abedi’s assertion that he has consistently complied with all terms of his order of supervision since he was first released in 2002, nor does the Government dispute that his release was revoked based on the unilateral decision of ICE officials rather than anything he did. Moreover, as Mr. Abedi points out, “[t]he Government has not disclaimed its authority to revoke his current [order of supervision]” in the same manner in the future. Id. at 18. Thus, unlike the plaintiffs in Ind and Incumaa, Mr. Abedi does not “‘hold[] the keys’ to his remaining free,” Ind, 801 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Incumaa, 507 F.3d at 289), from a recurrence of the injury he alleges here. Rather, as in Turner and Honig, the conditions that led to his prior injury remain intact, and he is unable, “for reasons beyond [his] control,” to “avoid recurrence of the challenged conduct.” Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. at 393; see also Turner, 564 U.S. at 437, 440–41; Honig, 19  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 20 484 U.S. at 317–22. And, as in Honig, the Government’s litigation position gives us “every reason to believe” that Mr. Abedi is “faced with a real and substantial threat” of government officials inflicting the same injury upon Mr. Abedi again in the future. 484 U.S. at 321–22. The Government resists this conclusion, arguing that Mr. Abedi cannot establish a reasonable expectation of re-detention because he argued in Abedi II “that certain United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement employees had determined the chances of removal were slim and he should not be detained.” Mot. to Dismiss at 11. However, the Government does not suggest that these ICE employees’ determinations will be binding on other government officials or will otherwise prevent Mr. Abedi’s re-detention. 5 Indeed, the Government has repeatedly emphasized in both this appeal and in the Abedi II litigation that this determination 5 The dissent argues that “a binding recommendation (or court order) is not required,” contending that “[t]o hold otherwise would improperly flip the burden onto the government.” Dissent at 2. This argument misses the point. Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that Mr. Abedi has met his burden of showing a reasonable expectation that he will be re-detained in similar circumstances again. And we hold that the Government cannot defeat this showing by relying on the non-binding recommendation of “certain” local ICE officials whom the Government repeatedly argues lack the authority to make a final decision on Mr. Abedi’s detention status or removability. Mot. to Dismiss at 11. Ultimately, the Government’s own litigation position demonstrates that the two local ICE officials’ recommendation bears little importance in assessing whether Mr. Abedi has a reasonable expectation of being re-detained in similar circumstances in the future. We therefore give this non-binding recommendation little weight in evaluating whether, under all of the circumstances of this case, Mr. Abedi has met his burden of showing a reasonable expectation that he will suffer a similar injury in the future. 20  Appellate Case: 25-3179 Document: 50 Date Filed: 10/21/2026 Page: 21 was made solely by “certain” local ICE employees. 6 Id.; see also Oral Arg. Recording at 16:25–16:48; Resp. to Second § 2241 Habeas Petition at 2, 6, 14–15, Abedi II (D. Kan. Feb. 17, 2026). And the Government has asserted that these local employees lack final authority to decide Mr. Abedi’s detention status. Moreover, although the district court relied on these local officials’ determination in Abedi II to find that Mr. Abedi was not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, thus warranting his release under Zadvydas, the order granting habeas relief did not foreclose either these local officials or any other ICE officials from making a contrary determination later. Thus, as in Honig, Mr. Abedi continues to face “a real and substantial threat,” 484 U.S. at 322, that government officials will inflict the same injury upon him in the future, regardless of the determination on removability made by “certain” local ICE employees, Mot. to Dismiss at 11. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 321–22 (holding that “it matters not that [Mr.] Smith no longer resides within the [school district that expelled him],” as the State Superintendent of Public Instruction’s litigation position created a reasonable expectation that the same injury might be inflicted “in any California school district in which he enrolled”). The Government further asserts that re-detention is unlikely because the district court granted Mr. Abedi’s release in Abedi II. However, the district court’s order granting Mr. Abedi’s release did not prohibit his re-detention, and the Government has presented no evidence that the district court’s decision has caused 6 We take judicial notice of relevant documents filed in Abedi II. See Bunn, 966 F.3d at 1096 n.4.