Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-9577 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 28, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court MARIA ALEJANDRA CONTRERAS RAMIREZ, on behalf of herself and M.G.C., a minor; RODRIGO ANDRES GONZALEZ MOSQUERA, Petitioners, v. No. 25-9577 (Petition for Review) TODD BLANCHE, United States Attorney General, ∗ Respondent. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT ** _________________________________ Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, MORITZ and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ Rodrigo Andres Gonzalez Mosquera, Maria Alejandra Contreras Ramirez, and their minor child petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) Todd Blanche is now Attorney General of the United States and has been ∗ substituted as Respondent. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined ** unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-9577 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2026 Page: 2 decision affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for withholding of removal. 1 Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we deny the pro se petition for review. 2 I. BACKGROUND A. Underlying Facts Petitioners are natives and citizens of Colombia who entered the United States without inspection in May 2023. They were then placed in removal proceedings, and the IJ found them removable. Seeking relief from removal, Petitioners applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). At the merits hearing before the IJ, Petitioner testified that a stranger raped him when he was six years old. After that incident, he was sent to live with his aunt and uncle in Bogota. He studied gastronomy and worked as a chef for restaurants and various organizations in Bogota. He was active in his local Catholic church and helped provide cooking workshops and social activities for vulnerable youth. Beginning in April 2022, Tren de Aragua gang members began harassing and threatening Petitioner because of his work in the community. They called him racial slurs related to his dark complexion and said he was not his child’s father because his 1 We refer to Gonzalez Mosquera as “Petitioner,” to Contreras Ramirez as “Petitioner’s wife,” and to all three collectively as “Petitioners.” 2 Because Petitioners represent themselves, we liberally construe their arguments, but do not act as their advocate. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). 2 Appellate Case: 25-9577 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2026 Page: 3 wife is white. These gang members also threatened to harm Petitioner if he continued the cooking workshops. At some point, he reported the threats and harassment to local police, but the police told Petitioner they could not act on the report because he could not provide the perpetrators’ names. Petitioner’s wife testified that in October 2022, she encountered four Tren de Aragua gang members when she was on her way to work. They called her insulting names, took her to a secluded area, and grabbed her chest and vagina. Neighbors heard her screams and activated an alarm system, which caused the men to flee. She did not report the incident to police because she could not identify the men. She did not leave the house alone after that incident. Petitioner testified that members of Tren de Aragua continued harassing and threatening him when he encountered them in the neighborhood. In late April 2023, an unknown man on a motorcycle pointed a gun at Petitioner’s chest and pulled the trigger, but the gun did not fire. Petitioner tried to report the incident to police, but police were unable to help because Petitioner could not identify his attacker. Petitioners fled Colombia just over a week after that incident. B. Agency Proceedings The IJ found Petitioners generally credible but denied all forms of relief. First, the IJ found Petitioners ineligible for asylum under the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule based on the timing, place, and manner of their entry into the United States. Regarding withholding of removal, the IJ found Petitioner endured “severe harm” that “cumulatively r[o]se to the level of persecution,” R. vol. I at 63. But the 3 Appellate Case: 25-9577 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2026 Page: 4 IJ determined Petitioner failed to establish a nexus between the past harm and a protected ground. In assessing the likelihood of future harm, the IJ found Petitioner did not show the Colombian government’s inability or unwillingness to protect him from future persecution. The IJ applied the same findings to Petitioner’s wife and child’s withholding applications because they relied “on the same facts and circumstances.” Id. at 62. 3 Based on these findings, the IJ denied withholding of removal. In denying CAT protection, the IJ found Petitioners failed to prove it was more likely than not that Colombian officials would acquiesce to their torture. Petitioners did not challenge the IJ’s denial of asylum or CAT relief, 4 but they appealed the denial of withholding of removal to the BIA, which dismissed their appeal. The BIA upheld the IJ’s conclusion that Petitioners did not establish their eligibility for withholding of removal because they did not show a nexus between their past or feared future harm and a protected ground. The BIA rejected Petitioners’ due process arguments, concluding they failed to establish prejudice. 3 See R. vol. III at 709 (Petitioner’s application stating “in April 2022, my family and I began to receive threats, persecutions, and aggressions . . . I fear that the Tren de Aragua group may kill, torture, or make me disappear due to the social activities I was engaged in in Colombia.”); R. vol. I at 380 (Petitioner’s wife’s application stating “[m]y story is based on the episodes that my spouse . . . lived . . . I fear that the Tren de Aragua group may kill, torture, or make me disappear due to the social activities that my spouse . . . was engaged in in Colombia.”); R. vol. IV at 990 (Petitioner’s child’s application stating “[m]y story is based on the episodes that my father . . . lived . . . I fear that the Tren de Aragua group may kill, torture, or make me disappear due to the social activities that my father . . . was engaged in in Colombia.”). 4 The BIA deemed those claims waived, and Petitioners do not seek review of that determination. 4 Appellate Case: 25-9577 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2026 Page: 5 II. DISCUSSION Where, as here, a single BIA member issues a brief order affirming an IJ’s decision, we review both the BIA order and any parts of the IJ’s decision it relied on. Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010). We review legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for substantial evidence. Id. Under the substantial-evidence standard, “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). A. Withholding of Removal To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must show “a clear probability of persecution on account of” any of five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group (“PSG”), or political opinion. Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 987 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). To demonstrate persecution on account of a protected ground, an “applicant must establish a ‘nexus’ between the alleged persecution and a protected ground.” Miguel-Pena v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Dallakoti, 619 F.3d at 1267). Petitioners challenge the agency’s conclusion that they failed to establish a nexus between their past or feared future harm and a protected ground. Whether an applicant has satisfied the nexus requirement is a factual determination that we review for substantial evidence. See id. 5 Appellate Case: 25-9577 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2026 Page: 6 Petitioners checked the box for membership in a PSG on their applications, but the IJ found they did not identify a specific PSG or otherwise “clearly articulate a protected ground.” R vol. I at 64. The IJ further found “the threats and harassment [Petitioner] and his family suffered were unspecific and never mentioned any protected ground.” Id. The IJ determined there was “insufficient evidence that anyone had imputed a political opinion upon [Petitioner] or sought to punish him for any beliefs he held.” Id. at 64–65. Instead, the IJ found the members of Tren de Aragua who harmed Petitioners seemed to be “motivated by general criminal incentives, such as protecting their own influence and control over the region.” Id. at 65. The BIA upheld the IJ’s nexus determination. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that members of Tren de Aragua harmed Petitioners on account of a protected ground. See Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing “acts of common criminality or personal hostility” from persecution on account of a protected ground). B. Due Process 5 Petitioners argue the agency denied them due process. Noncitizens facing removal “are entitled only to procedural due process, which provides the opportunity 5 The BIA rejected Petitioners’ arguments that the IJ deprived them of their statutory right to counsel and failed to confirm that their notices to appear were properly served. We do not consider these issues because Petitioners’ opening brief does not address them. See Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 6 Appellate Case: 25-9577 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2026 Page: 7 to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Schroeck v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 947, 952 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioners “must show prejudicial error” to prevail on a due-process challenge. Matumona v. Barr, 945 F.3d 1294, 1308 (10th Cir. 2019). This means Petitioners must demonstrate their “rights were violated in a manner so as potentially to affect the outcome of the proceedings.” Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573, 577 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioners argue the IJ failed to develop the record regarding an independent claim for relief for Petitioner’s wife. This court has not “explicitly recognized” that “an IJ has an affirmative duty to develop the record when the applicant is not represented.” Matumona, 945 F.3d at 1303–04; see also Arostegui-Maldonado v. Garland, 75 F.4th 1132, 1147 (10th Cir. 2023), abrogated on other grounds by Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025). But even assuming such a duty, Petitioners must show “that the IJ’s development of the record was prejudicially inadequate.” Matumona, 945 F.3d at 1304. The BIA concluded Petitioners had not shown prejudice because the IJ considered the harm Petitioner and his wife endured “and still concluded, without error, that they did not establish the requisite nexus.” R. vol. I at 7. On appeal, Petitioners summarily assert that the IJ “failed to separately evaluate the female Petitioner’s independent basis for relief” and that the IJ’s “errors resulted in extreme prejudice by preventing Petitioners from meeting their burden of proof.” Opening 7 Appellate Case: 25-9577 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2026 Page: 8 Br. at 4. Petitioners have neither shown that the IJ failed to develop the record nor that the alleged failure was prejudicial. C. Unexhausted Arguments Petitioners assert they “submitted police reports and other critical evidence to prior counsel” but they were unable to present this evidence to the IJ “due to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Opening Br. at 4, 5. They also argue “the IJ ignored evidence of psychological trauma and heightened risk due to [Petitioner’s] wife’s current pregnancy.” Id. at 5. But the government objects, and we agree, that Petitioners did not raise these arguments before the BIA. We may only review a final removal order if the noncitizen “has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the [noncitizen] as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). And we consider an argument exhausted only if the noncitizen presented “the same specific legal theory to the BIA.” Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023). We decline to consider these unexhausted arguments in the first instance. See Miguel-Pena, 94 F.4th at 1158. D. Petitioners’ Noncompliant Opening Brief When “an attorney or unrepresented party” presents a brief to this court, they certify that they have undertaken a reasonable inquiry to ensure that “the issues presented are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or establishing new law.” 10th Cir. R. 46.5(B)(2). Petitioners’ Opening Brief does not comply with Rule 46.5 because it 8 Appellate Case: 25-9577 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2026 Page: 9 contains citations to four nonexistent cases and attribution of propositions to two real cases that do not stand for those propositions. See Opening Br. at 4–5. We suspect that these hallucinated and fabricated citations stem from Petitioners’ use of generative artificial intelligence (“GenAI”) in drafting their brief. We recently issued sanctions in a case where an attorney litigating her own case pro se filed a GenAI-drafted brief that cited seven nonexistent cases and two cases that exist but do not contain the quotations that the brief alleged. See Amarsingh v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., No. 24-1391, 2026 WL 352016, at *5 (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 2026) (unpublished) (noting court’s inherent power to impose sanctions but relying instead, on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which permits court to award damages and costs, including attorney fees, for a frivolous appeal). 6 See also 10th Cir. R. 46.5(C) (empowering this court to issue sanctions for noncompliant briefs); Lichfield v. Kubler, 183 F.4th 1248, 1270 (10th Cir. 2026) (determining sanctions were not warranted where the brief contained “misrepresentations of legal authority” likely caused by GenAI but “had significantly fewer errors than in Amarsingh.”). We do not sanction Petitioners for filing their noncompliant brief. But we caution Petitioners that even though they are pro se, they remain “responsible for ensuring briefs and representations made to the court are warranted by the law and supported by the record, no matter the technology used to create them.” Lichfield, 183 F.4th at 1271. 6 We cite unpublished decisions for their persuasive value only and do not treat them as binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 9 Appellate Case: 25-9577 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2026 Page: 10 III. CONCLUSION We deny the petition for review. Entered for the Court Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge 10